Soviet March

Abstract:

Bruce D. Hamlett

This piece explores an alternative to unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops in Europe during the Cold War. The Nixon Administration opposes any reduction in U.S. forces unless it is supported by NATO allies and reciprocated by Warsaw Pact states. While this policy is resolute under Nixon, domestic and international economic problems among the U.S. and its NATO allies require long-term changes. Unilateral only withdrawal, however, is not a favorable direction as it would result in economic savings if troops were demobilized and not redeployed in the U.S. The political benefit of stationing a presence in Europe outweighs the balance-of-payment costs since the U.S. military is needed to maintain an influence over future outcomes despite a developing détente. Instead of unilateral withdrawal, both NATO states and the Soviet Union have expressed interest in a Mutual Balanced Force Reduction agreement to expand their security interests. This agreement would consider the military interests of both sides and ensure that reductions are reciprocated, however is complicated by the differences in perspective by members of each alliance. An agreement like this is unlikely to be negotiated due to problems with verification, delaying immediate and significant changes.

Keywords: Cold War, unilateral withdrawal, Nixon

Click here for full article

Return to issue

Previous Article/Next Article