Volume XXI – Number 2
Alemayehu Gebre Mariam, Ph.D.
Abstract: This article analyzes the impact of U.S. military aid policy to low income states, arguing that it serves as a destabilizing factor in already volatile states. The author uses the U.S. military aid provided to Ethiopia to exemplify how military aid leads recipient countries to move away from a democratic form of government, and become increasingly authoritarian. A low-income society is characterized by both a weak economy and weak government institutions. By providing more sophisticated military hardware, the strength of the armed forces will increase as well, and so will their tendency to infringe upon the civilian political process. As such, military assistance is used by the United States to help keep in power friendly regimes in volatile areas. The case of U.S. aid in Ethiopia is divided into four phases. Phases one and two, 1942-1951 and 1952-1960 respectively, cover the initial output of U.S. aid to Ethiopia, consisting of military hardware and troop training that allowed for Ethiopia to develop its own independent armed forces, while simultaneously allowing the U.S. to keep the friendly Sellassie regime in power. Phase three, 1961-1969 began with a failed coup, with U.S. military aid failing to keep the Sellassie regime in power. This ultimately led to phase four, 1970-1977, where the rebel government became disillusioned with U.S. involvement in Ethiopian affairs, aligning itself instead with the Soviet Union. Ethiopia is an example of how U.S, military aid has failed in its goal of stabilizing low income states. Keywords: Ethiopia, United States, Military Aid, Destabilization
