U.S. MILITARY AID POLICY IN ETHIOPIA, 1942-1977

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Introduction

U.S. military aid policy in low income societies has long been a controversial issue among both scholars and policymakers. Much of the current debate has focused upon the socio-political impact of U.S. military aid programs on low-income recipient nations. On the one hand, U.S. officials have consistently maintained that military aid programs promote stability and order in recipient nations while concomitantly enhancing their defensive capabilities. Thus according to official U.S. pronouncements, military aid programs serve to strengthen the defensive capabilities of friendly recipient nations,[1] provide resources to recipient governments in their efforts to resist internal communist subversion,[2] minimize the need for direct U.S. intervention and ultimately promote diplomatic support for the U.S. at the United Nations and other international forums.[3]

On the other hand, some of the currently available scholarly literature shows conflicting interpretations of both the intentions and consequences of U.S. military aid programs in recipient societies. A principal argument in this literature suggests that, contrary to official declarations, U.S. military programs aid tends to increase the threat of military control of the civilian political process and institution of authoritarian regimes. Military intervention and coups in recipient societies are presumed to be a direct or indirect consequence of military assistance programs, and consequently, the emerging military regimes are said to be repressive and undemocratic. Thus, U.S. military aid programs are said to trigger fundamental political shifts toward authoritarianism and undemocratic institutions in recipient societies.

The present study seeks to examine U.S. military aid policy and programs in Ethiopia between 1942 and 1977 within the framework of these two conflicting orientations.

Overview of Two Dominant Orientations on the Impact of U.S. Military Aid Policy and Programs in Low Income Societies

U.S. Military Aid as a "Destabilizing" Factor in Recipient In Low Income Societies

The view that U.S. military aid operates as a "destabilizing factor" in recipient low income societies represents one major orientation in the debate over U.S. military aid programs. Proponents of this view assert that U.S. military aid increases the threat of overt military control and intervention in the civilian political processes of low income societies and further leads to the suppression of democratic institutions. To be sure, military aid is said to increase the power differential which presumably exists between the military and other sectors of society. The infusion of military aid is therefore said to transform the military in recipient societies into a new and

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[1]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Hearings, 89th Congress, First Session, 1969, p. 1.

[2]U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts, Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 1, 7.

[3]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1966, 85th Congress, First Session, 1966, pp. 425-26.

troublesome political force. Continuing military aid purportedly strengthens the position of the military and its institutionalization in society. In this manner, military aid is viewed as a generally disruptive factor in low income recipient societies closely associated with occurrences of political instability and authoritarianism.

The view of military aid as "destabilizing" has gained some currency among both scholars and policy-makers. For instance, Senators Fulbright and Aiken have suggested that the experience in those countries outside Western Europe which have received large amounts of U.S. military aid shows that all had undergone coups in which civilian governments were replaced by military dictatorships.[4] These legislators have suggested that the experience in Pakistan, Turkey and Korea indicates a strong relationship between U.S. military aid and military coups in these countries. Other scholarly analyses have also suggested similar outcomes in other parts of the world.[5] In the Latin American context, Tannenbaum asserted a linkage between U.S. military aid, loss of civilian political control, and the emergence of the military as a political force:

> The arming of the central governments' forces upset the traditional bridling of tyranny at the center and makes it impossible for anyone to overthrow the government except the army, which means no one can be elected or keep office unless he is acceptable to the army. All of civilian government (or nearly all) is at the mercy of the army.[6]

Several recent empirical studies on the impact of U.S. military aid in the developing countries tend to support the general hypothesis that military aid contributes to regime instability in low income recipient societies. Rowe, in a comparative study of military aid recipients, presents findings which suggest U.S. military assistance to be a contributive factor in the incidence of coups, suppression of civilian institutions and the increasing incidence of praetorianism in recipient societies.[7] Rowe argued that the majority of the military aid recipient countries do not have the military under full civilian control and the provision of military assistance to these countries increases the likelihood of regime instability and the incidence of coups. On the other hand, in those countries already under military rule, U.S. military aid programs strengthen and insure the dominance of the military in these societies.

Wolpin in a seminal study of U.S. military aid suggests that military aid serves to develop ties and attitudes among leaders in low income societies and ultimately establish and preserve regimes favorable to American interests.[8] Wolpin concludes that U.S. military assistance programs in low income societies serve to conceal an Americanization doctrine guided by political and strategic interests.[9] Other scholarly analyses suggest a link between military aid and cultural and political conditions in recipient societies. Powell, for instance, contends that U.S. military aid directly contributes to certain militaristic tendencies in Latin America by aggravating the cultural milieu which is presumably characterized by such factors as "machismo" and a marked tendency toward

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[4]U.S. Senate International Development and Security, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Congress, First Session, Part 2, May 1961, pp. 610-12, p. 681.

[5]*Ibid.*

[6]Frank Tannenbaum, "Considerations for the Latin American Policy" in James Roosevelt (ed.), *The Liberal Papers,* N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962, p. 281.

[7]Thomas Rowe, "Aid and Coups d'Etat", *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 18, No. 2, 1974, p. 252.

[8]Miles Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolutions in the Third World,* Toronto: Health & Co., 1972, p. 16.

[9]*Ibid.*

fatalism. According to Powell, U.S. military aid tends to aggravate the tradition of militarism in Latin America resulting in the eventual intervention of the military in civilian politics.[10]

The specific consequences of U.S. military aid as a "destabilizing" factor are said to occur at two levels. First, military aid is said to undermine civilian and competitive political institutions in the recipient societies leading to a dangerous "competency gap" and military control of the political process. Secondly, increasing military aid is said to create large defense budgets in recipient countries overburdening the domestic economy and resulting in the misallocation of scarce resources needed for vital development projects. In both instances the relative power of the military is enhanced, and as civilian governments are unable to cope with social and economic problems, the military inevitably intervenes.

U.S. Military Aid As A "Catalyst" In Low Income Societies

A second major orientation to U.S. military aid focuses upon regime types requiring extensive military assistance and underscores the consequences of military aid programs on the social and political structures of recipient societies. Accordingly, while military aid and other programs may not necessarily lead toward authoritarian regimes, it is said that such regimes, however they come to power, tend to generate relatively large demands for military assistance and defense budgets.

Four key propositions in support of this view have been advanced. First, military aid presumably helps to maintain and preserve recipient governments in power. Second, dictatorships, oligarchies and otherwise undemocratic regimes are said to be more difficult to keep in power and therefore need increased military means to remain in power. Third, these authoritarian governments seek to develop a sizeable military force using military aid programs. Fourth, the expanded military establishment is said to require increased infusion of military aid for its continued maintenance. Thus, by emphasizing regime types which require large military aid proponents of this view suggest tenuous political or social consequences resulting from U.S. military aid.

Examination of these propositions in the Latin American context reveals contradictory findings. Wolf, for instance, reports not finding a significant relationship between U.S. military aid programs and authoritarian political institutions. He suggests that while dictatorships, military or otherwise, are a frequent and disturbing occurrence in Latin America, their frequency and recurrence is not attributable to military aid and defense budgets. And in fact, "these factors do not appear to play a significant role in the process at all."[11]

Putnam, similarly finds little relationship between military aid and military intervention in recipient societies. He attributes the military's tendency to intervene in Latin America to the long tradition of militarism and other cultural factors. He concludes that "the tradition of the military playing an important role accounts for the contemporary military intervention. Neither foreign training missions nor examples of successful intervention seem to have any impact."[12] Nelkin, in a study of six Central and West African countries, similarly suggests that the military intervened in these countries not because of foreign military aid, but internal economic and social conditions. To be sure, the military intervened because of "urban unemployment, austerity budgets, wage cuts, increased taxation. . . and the governments' gross fiscal management."[13]

[10]John Powell, "Military Assistance and the Military in Latin America", *Western Political Quarterly,* Vol. 18, 1965, p. 383.

[11]Charles Wolf, *U.S. Policy and the Third World.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967, pp. 109-110.

[12]Robert Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Interventions in Latin American Politics", *World Politics,* Vol. 20, p. 106.

[13]Dorothy Nelkin, "The Economic and Social Setting of Military Takeovers in Africa", *Journal of Asian and African Studies,* (1967-68) pp. 230-31.

A Model of Expanding Repercussions of U.S. Military Aid in Low Income Societies

U.S. military aid may be viewed as having expanded repercussions on the internal social, political and economic structures and processes of recipient societies. These repercussions may involve intended and unintended transformations which may be directly or indirectly attributable to military aid. Specifically, such transformation resulting from military aid may include among other things, establishment or disestablishment of a regime, institutionalization, and enhancement of the military and various distortions in the socioeconomic system of recipient societies. The expanding repercussions of military aid may be observed at three levels: the state, armed forces and society.

The State

The state in low income societies seeks to function in much the same way as those found in the industrialized societies. Most importantly, the state aims to regulate and harmonize social relations and make authoritative decisions and policies for the welfare of the society. A major precondition for the state to discharge its functions is the establishment of order and stability in the society.

U.S. military aid may be said to facilitate and improve conditions for orderly development and progress in recipient societies. To the extent that the U.S. has an interest in the orderly and stable development of friendly recipient societies, it may be expected that military aid represents an important component in the preservation of domestic tranquility and defense against external aggression.

A major repercussion in U.S. military aid in low income societies occurs when the U.S. seeks to shape or influence events in recipient societies in consideration of certain strategic or other economic interests. This may become manifest when U.S. military aid policy overtly serves to preserve and promote the particular regime in ways which will not menace U.S. interest or security and, on the other hand, enable the regime to suppress internal subversion and repel external attack. In exercising "influence" over the internal political process, U.S. military aid may be used to stimulate the growth and maintenance of viable friendly governments that are not only supportive of U.S. interests in their societies but also share American global security concerns. In this context, U.S. military aid may be viewed as a means of maintaining friendly regimes sympathetic to and supportive of U.S. interests.

Within this formulation, we may begin to examine particular repercussions engendered by military aid which are likely to occur within the regime and state structure of recipient low income societies. First, there is a tendency for the state in the low income societies to employ its available military aid indiscriminately against all opposition elements, including legitimate ones. The state is likely to justify its use of military force as a response to threats posed by elements seeking to create anarchy and disorder in the society. Moreover, since the state has superior military means at its disposal, there is a tendency and an irresistible temptation to utilize military means to eliminate potential sources of opposition in the name of instability. Thus, military aid designed to assist in the maintenance of social order and stability in the recipient society is transformed into a powerful instrument of regime maintenance in the hands of the state.

The repercussions of military aid on the behavior of the state in recipient societies are diverse and may be partially specified in the following two propositions. First, military aid enables the state to centralize and consolidate its authority; however, this process conversely engenders a tendency in the state to suppress competing political institutions on the claim that these institutions are divisive

and a threat to order and stability. As the state consolidates its authority over its citizens, there is also a tendency for the state to limit popular participation, curtail the growth of competitive political institutions and vigorous use of available military aid to accomplish restrictions on political democratization. In this context, military aid may operate as a disincentive to the state from engaging in a democratic process accentuated by negotiations and political discussions with other power contenders in society.

Increasing instability in the recipient society further tends to create a condition of dependency by the State in the recipient society on the U.S. for increased military aid and further expansion of its military capabilities to contain the spread of instability. Continuation for increase in the level of military aid therefore serves to perpetuate and preserve the power of the State in the recipient society. Moreover, dependence on U.S. military aid is likely to increase with the increased incidence and severity of instability in the recipient society. On the other hand, in such circumstances the U.S. is likely to respond by continuing or increasing military aid and by further getting involved in the domestic political process of the recipient society since the outcome of the instabilitiy may be perceived to affect U.S. interests and security. In this manner, U.S. military advisors may involve themselves in the defense and military related decision-making processes of the recipient society.

Secondly, the package of military aid provided by the U.S. is likely to involve credit arrangement and loans. This method of arms procurement may further encourage the state in the low income society to acquire increasing amounts of military hardware to expand its military capabilities. In turn, this tends to generate a large defense budget in the recipient society for the maintenance of the expanding military establishment.

Armed Forces

In low income societies the military is one of the few modernized and organized institutions. In many instances, the emergence of a modern armed force in these societies has contributed to the process of statehood and nationhood and the maintenance of social order and stability.

The impact of U.S. military aid on the armed forces of low income societies is evident, *prima facie,* in terms of the emergence of the military as a highly organized and well equipped institutional force which is capable of intervening in the civilian political process. Equally important, military aid has served to reinforce military institutions in these societies by promoting specialization of function and professionalization of activities. Thus, military aid has enabled the armed forces in these societies to develop as a relatively self-sufficient institution with its own mode of organization, command and sense of national consciousness.

The contradictory effects of U.S. military aid on the armed forces in low income societies tends to occur in the process of institutionalization. Two important factors seem to be responsible for this contradiction. First, because of U.S. military training programs and other opportunities within the armed forces, there is a tendency for military elites to evolve in contradistinction to other elites in society. The military training programs available through the general military aid programs impart not only military skills but also managerial and technical skills comparable to or better than that available in the emerging educational institutions of these low income societies. Military elites are also called upon to act in situations of acute social instability, e.g. rebellion, riots, to use their institutional resources to restore order. Second, military aid increases the supply of modern weaponry available to the armed forces, increasing the capabilities of the military relative to other sectors of society. Organization and access to weapons further tends to encourage independent

political action by the military elite including the use of military action to wrest political power from civilian authorities.

Persistent instability in recipient societies provides the crucial opportunity for the armed forces to intervene in the political process. When the military elites perceive the unpopularity of the regime in power and the ineffectiveness of the political institutions under civilian control, they are likely to present themselves as a force of relative stability and order, taking prompt control of the political process. This phenomenon appears directly linked to military aid. Since institutionalization of the military adversely affects the development of compatible civilian political institutions which can counterbalance the interventionary impulses of the armed forces in times of acute social instability.

Society

The societal repercussions of U.S. military aid in low income recipient societies may be observed in terms of the effects of military aid upon social change and allocation of scarce resources in recipient low income societies. These consequences are manifold. The first impact may be evident in the relationship between the state and its citizenry. The influx of military technology and training widens the "capability" gap between the unarmed citizenry and those exercising political power in low income societies. Popular attempts to share in the exercise of political power are likely to be constantly rebuffed and frustrated by the regime in power. While military aid enables the state to monopolize political power, the indiscriminate use of the acquired military capability further promotes widespread popular alienation and reaction.

Among the various expressions of popular discontent may include communalist and secessionist movements, rebellions, riots and other acts of political violence and civil disobedience. In such instances, the state in recipient societies resorts to increased military action against opposition elements, further aggravating the level of social and political instability in the recipient society. Disaffected groups in society are likely to seek alternate means of expressing their demands to which the state responds with increasing use of military force. The inability of the state to effectively control the activities of opposition elements leads to a condition of chronic social disorder and instability which serves to prepare the way for military intervention.

Secondly, the economic impact of military aid may be observed in terms of rising state budgets. U.S. military aid effort to increase the defensive capability of the low income society generally tends to lead to the building of a military establishment that cannot be readily and adequately supported by the local economy; therefore, higher levels of scarce resources must be committed to the maintenance of the military establishment. Due to the high priority given to the military sector in recipient societies, social and economic programs tend to be undermined. Consequently, educational, agricultural and general development programs and projects tend to be neglected for lack of available resources.

The significance of the military sector is also reflected in excessive defense expenditures which exhaust available foreign exchange reserves. On the other hand, to meet shortfalls in the civilian economy and avoid further instability, U.S. military aid programs promote stopgap schemes for economic relief. Thus, military aid over time is likely to be complemented by increasing levels of economic aid in an attempt to stabilize the economy of the recipient society and compensate for distortions in its balance of payments.

Moreover, the state in the low income society may seek to stabilize its economy by increasing local taxes which may lead to further instability, and the inability of the state to curb defense expenditures and manage the economy may lead to severe economic crises. Consequently,

increasing military aid may trigger increasing economic aid in an effort to stabilize the socioeconomic and political structures and processes of the recipient society.

The Context of U.S. Military Aid Policy in Ethiopia

Outside observers of Ethiopian society have long noted the prominence of warfare and militarism in Ethiopian traditions and cultures. In 1684, for instance, Ludolphus described Abyssinians as a "Warlike people continually excercised in war."[14] More recently, Levine similarly observed that "military virtues have ranked among the highest in the Abyssinian value system...(and) military symbolism has provided a good deal of national sentiment."[15] In traditional Ethiopian society, the distinction between the military and civilian sectors were indeed difficult to make and it was customary for all able-bodied males to serve in the militia in times of war.

The underlying reasons for the prominence of the military in the society appear to be twofold. The first is external. Ethiopia has long been threatened by external aggression and historically it was imperative that military means be used to repeal colonial attempts and other hostility directed from neighboring states. There were also internal reasons. Military confrontations between feudal lords and principalities were common throughout Ethiopian history and subsequent efforts at centralization of authority and national unification in the late nineteenth century have entailed considerable military action.

The historical development of military institutions in Ethiopia have not been without their external sources. In 1540, for instance, the armies of the Agau Dynasty were able to capture about 1,500 muskets after routing Turkish supported Moslem Jihadists.[16] The Portuguese have also been credited with introducing matchlock muskets around the same time. In the late nineteenth Century, King Yohannes reportedly expropriated an estimated 20,000 Remington rifles from fleeing Egyptian forces.[17] Subsequently, King Menelik imported an estimated 100,000 rifles and 40 cannons from France and Italy.[18] It was not, however, until the early 1940s that Ethiopia embarked upon a major and systematic arms procurement, and military training and aid programs with other foreign powers. In 1942, Emperor Haile Selassie concluded a defense agreement with the British government for the training and supply of equipment for a modern Ethiopian Armed Force.

U.S. Military Aid in Ethiopia

The first official U.S. military aid to Ethiopia was given in 1942 pursuant to the Defense of the U.S. Act.[19] President Roosevelt declared that the defense of Ethiopia was in the interest of the U.S., and Ethiopia was made eligible to receive aid under the lend-lease program. In return for military aid, the Ethiopian government agreed not to burden commerce between the two countries and to

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[14]Quoted in Donald Levine, "The Military in Ethiopian Politics: Capabilities and Constraints", in Henry Bienen, *The Military Intervenes,* N.Y.: Sage, 1968. p. 6.

[15]*Ibid.*

[16]Quoted in Richard Pankhurst, *Economic History of Ethiopia,* London: Lalibela House, 1961, p. 165.

[17]Levine, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

[18]*Ibid.*

[19]U.S. Congress, Senate, *Statutes at Large,* 77th Congress, First Session, Vol. 55, 1941, pp. 31-33.

further facilitate conditions for commercial expansion and the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.[20] In this regard, the military aid agreement reaffirmed the principles of two previous agreements concluded between the two countries in the early 1900s.[21]

U.S. military aid to Ethiopia since 1942 has subsequently undergone four major phases. Table 1 represents periodic distribution of U.S. military aid to Ethiopia between 1942 and 1977. The early period (1942-1952) was characterized by the provision of minimal military aid and training programs. In view of British commitments to modernize the Ethiopian military, the U.S. played a diminished role by generally providing small amounts of military supplies. In the second phase (1952-1960), the U.S. substantially increased and expanded its military aid and training programs in Ethiopia. The two countries concluded a mutual defense treaty which allowed for increased military cooperation between the two countries. In the third phase (1961-1973), U.S. military aid policy assumes a central role in the maintenance of Haile Sellassie's regime, and the Ethiopian armed forces are greatly expanded and equipped with modern military supplies and training. In the fourth phase (1974-1977), the U.S. undertakes a major policy shift, first by emphasizing training over hardware and supplies, and subsequently by cutting off all military aid following the proclamation of socialism alignment of ruling military junta with the Soviet Union.

Phase I - 1942-1951

Phase I of U.S. military aid was officially underway following the conclusion of a lend-lease agreement between the two countries in 1942. Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement, Averill Harriman contacted Ethiopian officials regarding the possibility of setting up a U.S.

Table I

U.S. Military Aid to Ethiopia (1942-1976) [a]

U.S. Fiscal Years	Millions of Dollars [b]
1942 - 1952	0.8
1953 - 1960	38.2
1961 - 1973	158.7
1974 - 1976	81.7
Total	278.8

[a]Source: Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants,* 1973, p. 93. See also: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1976,* Hearings, Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1454.

[b]Aggregate official figures are reported for the period 1952-1961, therefore an average is taken for the period, and the amount for 1961 is included in the second period of U.S. military aid policy in Ethiopia.

[20]U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1967, p. 93.

[21]U.S. Congress, House, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relation's of the U.S.,* House Document, No. 1, 58th Congress, Third Session, 1905, pp. 298-300.

communications facility near Asmara to enhance U.S. capability to gather, intercept and relay messages from as far away as the Soviet Union. Mutual understanding on the possible use of such a facility was apparently reached during Harriman's visit with the details to be worked out later.

The prospects for such a communications facility spurred a number of strategic studies in the Departments of Defense and State which recommended a vigorous program of economic and military aid to Ethiopia. As a result, by 1952 Ethiopia had received a total of 4.8 million dollars in economic and military aid.[22]

The major thrust in U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia in the 1940s was aimed at the organization of a police force and provision of training to the reconstituted Imperial Honor Guards. The police force was organized as an expeditionary force for use in suppressing rebellion and opposition against the imperial government. On the other hand, the Imperial Honor Guards, which had been established in 1929 for the protection of the royal family, received advanced training and modern equipment and further expanded their activities to cover all high government officials.

Phase II - 1952-1960

The expiration of the ten year Anglo-Ethiopian Defense Treaty in 1952 heralded large scale American military assistance to Ethiopia. Discussions between Ethiopian and American officials in the same year culminated in the conclusion of a Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement between the U.S. and the Ethiopian government in 1953.[23] In conjunction with the MDA, a twenty-five year treaty allowing for American construction and use of a communications facility at Asmara was concluded.[24] This agreement comprehensively provided for the U.S. government to construct and improve upon military facilities and systems within the scope of the agreement.[25] It also provided for unrestricted American use of Ethiopian land, air space, waterways and port facilities when it deems it necessary for emergency and rescue operations.[26] In return, the U.S. agreed to supply the Ethiopian government with unspecified amounts of military equipment and material, and to train elements of the Ethiopian armed forces.[27]

The facility resulting from the agreement led to the establishment of a U.S. military communications base known as Kagnew, and until the early 1970s it represented one of the largest U.S. land communications bases in the world providing a worldwide network for U.S. and NATO communications.[28] With the arrival of technicians at the Kagnew Base, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) followed. MAAG personnel immediately undertook the task of reorganization and expansion of the Ethiopian armed forces. The Army was organized in three divisions with six thousand soldiers each.[29] Modern weapons and training were provided for the newly established army, and in 1955 the U.S. expanded the Ethiopian Navy and equipped it with

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[22]U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, op. cit.*, p. 93.

[23]*U.S. Treaties and Other Agreements,* Vol. 4, pt. 1, 1953, pp. 422-26.

[24]*Ibid.*

[25]*Ibid.*

[26]*Ibid.*

[27]*Ibid.*

[28]U.S. Senate Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Relations with Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa,* 94th Congress, Second Session, August, 1976, pp. 26-27.

[29]U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Ethiopia,* 91st Congress, Second Session, pt. 8, June, 1970, p. 1885.

coastal patrol boats, seaplane tenders and sophisticated navigational and detection devices. Two years later, military agreements for further expansion were reached, and in return the Ethiopian Government agreed to make available the added assistance to other "free nations" if necessary.[30] The following year the Ethiopian Air Force, which had operated under Swedish direction, was reorganized and equipped with modern fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft. In the same year, the U.S. established a military academy in southeastern Ethiopia to train Ethiopian officers.

The massive American military aid activity in Ethiopia in the 1950s was complemented by visits from top American military commanders and civil officials. The vice-commander of the U.S. Forces in Europe, as well as the deputy chief of staff for military operations, periodically met with Ethiopian officials to assess the progress of MAAG activity. Then Vice President Richard Nixon and President Eisenhower's special envoy to the Middle-East also visited Ethiopia for further bilateral negotiations. Vice President Nixon reassured Ethiopian officials that the U.S. would use its armed forces should Ethiopia be attacked by any country under the control of international communism.[31]

The expanded military assistance program further led to the placement of MAAG personnel and other civilian advisors in key positions within the armed forces and civilian agencies. The MAAG program also served to create certain institutional links with the top echelon of the Ethiopian military leadership. The resulting U.S. involvement in Ethiopian politics was capsulized in the Congressional testimony of one specialist:

> . . . American involvement in politics in Ethiopia is something which is not often talked about, but is obviously very real. . . . Whether or not Americans would become actively involved or not is less important than the fact that our program does manifest a great American interest in the existing regime.[32]

Thus, during the second decade of the U.S. military assistance program in Ethiopia, MAAG officers participated in the planning and implementation of Ethiopian defense programs and policies. As one senior MAAG officer observed, "high ranking American officers sat in Ethiopia's Defense Ministry within yards of the desk of the Chief-of-Staff."[33] Presumably, due to the lack of competent Ethiopian officers, MAAG officers also served as interim commanders in the various divisions and brigades.

Military training programs provided another major avenue for direct American influence in Ethiopian politics. The selection and recruitment of military trainees provided the most favorable conditions, and recommendations by MAAG field officers on "promising officers" for training in the U.S. were regularly submitted to the Ethiopian Defense Ministry which gave its formal stamp of approval. Thus, between 1953-1963, some 1,695 Ethiopian officers received training in the U.S.[34] Officers brought to the U.S. for training received not only the specialized military preparations, but also underwent a five to six week intensive political training on democracy, communism and a host of other issues. These "civics courses" generally sought to orient officers from recipient nations to

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[30] *U.S. Treaties and Other Agreements,* Vol. 8, pt. 2, pp. 2483-85.

[31] Richard Greenfield, *Ethiopia: A Political History,* London: Pall Mall, 1967, p. 362.

[32] U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Committee on Foreigh Affairs, *Military Assistance Training,* 91st Congress, Second Session, 1970, pp. 124-25.

[33] *U.S. News and World Report,* February 23, 1970.

[34] U.S. Department of Defense, *MAP Student Count* 1973, (available upon request).

American global interests and further sought to foster the growth of officers corps which would be sympathetic to U.S. interests.[35]

American military penetration in Ethiopia by the late 1950s was ubiquitous. MAAG personnel and officers were intimately involved in the command structures of the various branches of the armed forces and top MAAG officers routinely interacted with the Ethiopian chief-of-staff. Moreover, officers returning from training in the U.S. were periodically assigned to work with MAAG personnel in liaison capacity.

The military assistance program also facilitated the infusion of further technical economic aid. American technical advisors and experts were assigned to each ministry and agency of the Ethiopian government as legal, technical and military advisors. One American advisor, for instance, attached to the prime minister's office, had as one of his duties the drafting of foreign policy speeches for the emperor.[36] A number of American architects and city planners under the AID program also worked in the city government of Addis Ababa on urban housing projects. The Ethiopian Ministry of Education also received technical advisors under the AID program in its preparation of curricula for the public schools. Haile Sellassie University and its subsidiary colleges which were originally established with U.S. aid, acquired additional American instructional staff.[37]

During the second phase of U.S. military aid in Ethiopia Haile Sellassie consolidated his authority and power in large measure due to the provision of U.S. military assistance. Clearly, without U.S. aid, he would almost certainly have been unable to impose his dominion over a number of potential and legitimate contenders to the throne. U.S. military aid represented the decisive means by which Haile Sellassie insured his regime against any serious challenges to his rule.

This was particularly important in the context of two major problems which arose during the second phase U.S. military aid in Ethiopia. First, Haile Sellassie was besieged by challengers, particularly the Northern aristocracy and nobility, who claimed closer lineage to the Solomonic line and thus the throne. There were also other popular resistance leaders who emerged after the Italian war who were contemptuous of Haile Sellassie and believed that he cowardly fled the country during the war. These power contenders were unwillling to accept Haile Sellassie's authority and administration and many sought to challenge him by establishing their own local and provincial jurisdictions. Secondly, in view of U.S. concerns over international communist movements, there was some fear that the forces of international communism may try to take advantage of the unstable situation in Ethiopia by fomenting popular uprisings and instability.

Thus, for these and other reasons, any attempts at reform, change or public expression of dissenting political views were considered subversive and a challenge to the imperial government. As part of the overall state security efforts, a secret police force estimated at over 25,000 was established. This secret police infiltrated reform and protest movements arresting suspected leaders and other considered subversives.[38] Notable among the reform movements in the mid-1950s was one led by a certain Dejazmatch Takele Haile Hawariat. Takele and a group of former resistance leaders had planned on persuading Haile Sellassie to abdicate in favor of a constitutional monarchy and had drafted a secret resolution to that effect. However, this effort was prematurely discovered

[35]Miles Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolutions in the Third World,* London: Lexington Books, 1972, pp. 59-63.

[36]U.S. Senate, Hearings, *U.S. Relations with Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, op. cit.* p. 13.

[37]Greenfield, *op. cit.* pp. 365-66.

[38]*Ibid.* p. 359.

by the secret police and the participants were subsequently apprehended and received long prison terms as conspirators against the throne.[39]

U.S. military aid and presence in Ethiopia became increasingly important to Haile Sellassie in the late 1950s. He surrounded himself with the American military and civilian experts who advised him on major economic and defense policies. Expanded American involvement and participation in the domestic policy making process further led to increased military and economic aid. Although Haile Sellassie's increasing dependence on U.S. aid strengthened his position and leadership, the aid program did not appear to adequately address critical social and economic problems.

In the late 1950s social and political unrest began to gain overt expression. The unrest appears to have come from three quarters: reform from Korean War veterans, foreign trained Ethiopian intellectuals, and university students. Among these elements, there was increased awareness that the country was languishing in underdevelopment and that there needed to be some changes to improve the lives of the people. The university students were particularly disturbed by Ethiopia's backwardness in comparison to other African countries and the lack of academic freedom. The state of academic freedom at the university was such that "a copy of the Bible was sent to the Security Department who insisted on censoring a dramatic version of the trials of Job to be performed by students."[40] On the other hand, the foreign trained intellectuals, while aware of Ethiopia's problems, were divided on the methods and types of change necessary for the country but were aware of the need to make some changes.

In the late 1950s, Girmame Neway, a political science graduate from Columbia University, began an effort to create a coalition of progressive military forces with intellectuals to bring about change in Ethiopia. Girmame was not an outside agitator; in fact, he came from within the ruling families and was highly thought of by Haile Sellassie. Girmame began to openly criticize corruption and mismanagement in government and publicly denounced the conduct of certain high officials. He was particularly critical of the small group of aristocratic landowners whom he believed dominated the Ethiopian government and obstructed vitally needed agricultural and economic reform.

Within the American military and diplomatic establishment, Girmame gained a reputation of being anti-American and a communist.[41] Despite Girmame's open criticism of government officials and advocacy of social change, the government was restrained from taking drastic actions against him. His older brother, Brigadier General Mengistu Neway was commander of the Imperial Honor Guard and a most trusted confidant of Haile Sellassie. Rather, Girmame was appointed to be district governor of a remote southern province.

In the district of Wellamo, Girmame began his experiment in social reform and change for Ethiopia. After six months in office, he produced 30,000 dollars which he publicly acknowledged as having received in bribes for the construction of a school.[42] He organized the local residents to work on cooperative agricultural projects and distributed undeveloped land to those wishing to maintain their own farms. Doubtless, his land reform program brought about severe protests from the local landowners who had lost some of their lands to their tenants and laborers.

Haile Sellassie again responded by transferring Girmame to a desert outpost at Ji-Jiga near the

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[39]*Ibid.* p. 277-282.

[40]*Ibid.* p. 366.

[41]*Ibid.* p. 346.

[42]*Ibid.* p. 371.

Somali border. There he continued to implement similar measures and conducted regular political discussions with the cadets at the Harrar Military Academy. Within months he was recalled again, and it was upon his return to Addis Ababa that he persuaded his brother General Mengistu to attempt to overthrow Haile Sellassie. Thus, on December 13, 1960, while Haile Sellassie was away on a visit to Brazil, the commanders of the Imperial Honor Guard and Police, Brigadier General Mengistu Neway and Brigadier General Tsige Dibou, the first major organized attempt to overthrow the regime of Haile Sellassie.

American response to the attempted coup was swift, direct and decisive. On the second day of the coup, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Richards apparently sought to play a mediating role between rebel leaders and reactionary elements while Brigadier General Chester de Gavre and other MAAG officers made strategic plans for an armored assault and air support some thirty miles south of Addis Ababa at the Air Force Base in Debre Zeit.[43] Communications and signal equipment were brought in by MAAG mobile teams and American pilots reportedly flew reconnaissance missions over rebel positions. On the afternoon of December 15, the Ethiopian Air Force, under the command of Col. Robert Ramsay, strafed rebel positions.[44] A tank battalion with MAAG advisors and close air support reached the capital the following day, and the rebels lacking in supplies and ammunition, were driven out of the city with little difficulty.

The American counter-offensive against the attempted coup was critical. According to Greenfield, "General Lindbal called the expatriate officers (MAAG personnel)... and stated that they were employees of Haile Sellassie and must not support any change in government... (He also told the officers) that there were arrangements with the British government, but if they fell through, the U.S. government would act independently... The officers assumed when an "attack" order came, that it had at the very least the approval of their government."[45] The critical air support and strategic planning provided by the American MAAG personnel in the end proved to be the decisive factor in the outcome of the coup.

Five days after the abortive coup, Haile Sellassie returned to the capital with Colonel Robert Ramsay leading the military escort.[46] The U.S. role in staging the counter offensive was later denied or de-emphasized by those who participated in it. Colonel Ramsay and Ambassador Richards claimed that they had only sought to "consult and meditate" in the situation and played no active role. However, State Department officials would not support their denials.[47]

The coup was not perceived to be a total failure. As Ambassador Richards remarked, it "cleared the rats out of the hen house."[48] The coup leaders had rounded up most of Haile Sellassie's top officials and advisors whom they considered to be corrupt at the Grand Palace under the guise of an emergency meeting for the ailing empress where they were subsequently executed. Immediately upon Haile Sellassie's return the armed forces received an across-the-board 10 dollars - 20 dollars per month increase; but Haile Sellassie announced that there would be no changes in government policy as a result of the attempted coup.

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[43] *Ibid.* p. 412-13; 425.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *New Republic,* August 21, 1961.

[48] Greenfield, *op. cit.* p. 425.

Phase III - 1961-1973

In the aftermath of the coup, U.S. military aid increased at an accelerated rate. Table II shows the massive increases in military aid training in the pre and post coup period.

Table II

U.S. Military Assistance to Ethiopia - In Millions[a49]

	1953-1960 (8 years)	1961-1965 (5 years)
Grants:		
a. MAP Grants	38.2	59.0
b. Transfers from Excess	36.0	50.1
Stocks	2.2	3.4
c. Other Grants	—	5.5

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Officers Trained Under MAP[b50]

	1953-1960 (8 years)	1961-1965 (5 years)
Ethiopia	1233	852

[a]Official reports as adjusted in Table I.

[b]For the period 1953-1965 U.S. officers training for other African countries was: Ghana, 20; Morocco, 138; Tunisia, 143; Zaire, 25; Sudan, 83. MAP Student Count, DOD.

The increases in military aid in the post-coup period were made possible by the conclusion of two secret agreements between the two governments. The details of these two agreements were highly classified and for a decade not even legislative committees were privy to the terms. According to a 1970 congressional investigation, the terms of these agreements were substantial. The general report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated:

> . . . Involved in this agreement was not only a commitment to support a 40,000 man Ethiopian army but also a pledge to continue military assistance now running 12 million a year (147 million through 1970);

[49]U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, op. cit.*, p. 93.

[50]U.S. Department of Defense, *MAP Student Count, op. cit.*

> economic assistance (97.2 million in loans and 131.5 million in grants through fiscal year 1969); and what is even more significant, a statement "reaffirming" the United States' continuing interest in the security of Ethiopia and its opposition to any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. . . The U.S. has now become involved in the military structure and activities of the Ethiopian Army.[51]

Thus, the agreements concluded shortly after the coup expressed American "reaffirmation" of its continued interest in Ethiopia and further the U.S. pledged to protect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. According to some knowledgeable sources, the U.S. had also committed itself to support the regime of Haile Sellassie against any domestic challenge as well.[52] The U.S. also made specific commitments to continue military assistance and establish the Ethiopian Army's Fourth Division complete with training and equipment.[53] In 1963, another agreement on aerial photography and mapping of Ethiopia was concluded.[54]

With the conclusion of these agreements, the U.S. military presence in Ethiopia rapidly increased. By 1964, the official U.S. family in Ethiopia numbered over seven thousand consisting of a large U.S. mapping mission at Kagnew Station, the largest Peace Corps contingent in the world at the time.[55] In the late 1960s the U.S. MAAG mission increased its activities in Ethiopia and active U.S. involvement included direction of counterinsurgency activities and provision of military intelligence to the Ethiopian Army.

Despite the official secrecy on U.S. military activity in Ethiopia in the late 1960s, a number of episodes appear to have been established. In the late 1960s the U.S. military personnel were repeatedly involved in counterinsurgency efforts with Ethiopian troops in the northern province of Eritrea. The counterinsurgency program known as the Delta Plan was officially designed to "provide professionalism to the Ethiopian forces and improve their use of U.S. provided equipment. . . and command and control techniques."[56]

The plan was apparently part of an "arrangement" made when Vice President Humphrey visited Ethiopia in 1968. Apparently, Humphrey had given Ethiopian officials verbal assurances that the U.S. would be prepared to provide a three-month counterinsurgency mobile team to assist Ethiopian forces fighting secessionist elements. Thus in 1968, one hundered sixty-four Green Berets (Special Forces) were brought into Ethiopia to assist in counterinsurgency efforts.[57] Although there was no public disclosure of Green Beret participation, it was clear that the advisors were qualified in special counterinsurgency techniques and did in fact participate actively in various operations.[58] In actual combat, field officers from the Special Forces are reported to have planned offensive strategies and directed Ethiopian forces by radio within range of combat zones.

U.S. counterinsurgency support in Ethiopia does not appear to have been limited to the Erithean front. A similar program also appears to have taken place in the Gojam province in 1968. The Gojam rebellion erupted as a result of changes in the system of land taxation and corrupt practices by the governor. It appears that at first it was suggested by the chief-of-staff in consultation with MAAG officers that specially trained civic acting groups be dispatched to Gojam to minimize the

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[51] U.S. Senate, Hearings, *Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, op. cit.,* pp. 9-10.

[52] John Markakis, *Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Policy,* London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 373.

[53] U.S. Senate, Hearings, *Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Ethiopia, op. cit.,* p. 1885.

[54] *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements,* Vol. 14, pp. 151-55.

[55] U.S. Senate, Hearings, *U.S. Security and Commitments Abroad, Ethiopia, op. cit.,* pp. 1935-38.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Ibid.*

possibilities of mass uprisings; and indeed a small contingent of civic action personnel was immediately sent into the area. However, by the time the civic action group arrived, area residents had attacked local garrisons and the police. Shortly after the attacks, a decision to use air strikes was reached in the presence of three top MAAG officers.[59]

Although documentation of other direct U.S. involvement in combat and military operations in Ethiopia tends to be scarce, the size of the official U.S. presence and the placement of senior military advisors in the various departments of the Ethiopian armed forces during this period is particularly notable. Total U.S. military expenditure in Ethiopia also shows significant increases over the early period. Thus, since 1960, U.S. annual appropriations for military aid, as well as the maintenance of the Kagnew Base have been running at an average of 25.2 million dollars.[60]

U.S. MAAG assistance and cost of officer training program also showed increases in the last years of the second period. Ethiopia's share of world-wide MAAG assistance was considerable at a reported 1,165,900 dollars for Ethiopia out of a total package of 13,507,700 dollars.[61] This represented 8.6 percent of the total MAAG appropriations making Ethiopia the third largest recipient of MAAG assistance after Korea and Turkey. Increases in military aid and training are also perceptible as shown below in the graphs for the period 1953-1977.[62] In the aftermath of both the 1960 and 1974 coups, increases are reflected in sharp changes in slope. The trend seems to suggest a doubling of aid after a crisis period.

Phase IV - 1971-1977

U.S. military aid to Ethiopia in the post-coup period seems to be reflective of shifts in policy that occurred in the three years preceding the coup. Two distinct patterns seem to emerge in U.S. military aid policy in Ethiopia in the early 1970s. First, U.S. military aid shows an emphasis and concentration on officer training program. Secondly, in the post-1974 coup period, reversal from officer training to supplies of military equipment is perceptible. This trend is especially meaningful in the context of the overall U.S. military aid program in Ethiopia since 1953.

U.S. military training aid between 1953-1970, for 2,813 officers amounted to 6.8 million dollars at an average of 165 officers per annum at a cost of 2,417 dollars per officer.[63] On the other hand, the total amount given for military equipment and supplies for the same period was 156.6 milion dollars at an average of 8.7 million dollars per year.[64] This appears to have been a general trend; and as Wolpin observes:

> Unlike equipment, the cost of training foreign officers has remained almost static since the mid-fifties at an approximately $2,500 per man. During the same 1955-1970 period, the share of total MAP cost has risen from 2 to about 4 per cent.[65]

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[59]_____, Interview with Former Ethiopian Liaison Officer with U.S. MAAG mission in March 1977.

[60]U.S. Senate, Hearings, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Ethiopia, op. cit.*, p. 1927.

[61]U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, *Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1972,* 92nd Congress, Second Session, 1971, p. 157.

[62]The simple linearity in the graph for the first light years of U.S. military aid is due to a lack of breakdown in figures reported in official documents for those years. After 1960 yearly figures are reported and show quite clearly increases immediately after periods of crises in Ethiopia.

[63]U.S. Senate, Hearings, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Ethiopia, op. cit.*, pp. 1914-15.

[64]Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, op. cit.*, p. 93.

[65]Wolpin, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

However, U.S. military aid allocations between 1971-73 for officer training were extraordinary. Military training authorizations reported for the years 1971 and 1972 list 1.5 million dollars for training 141 Ethiopian officers at an average of 10,638 dollars per man.[66] The average for military aid in supplies for the same period was 10.4 million dollars. Military aid in the post-coup period shows a dramatic shift from training to supplies. Thus military aid in equipment and supplies for the years 1974-76 averaged 27.1 million dollars with no reported allocations for officer training program.[67]

U.S. MAAG assistance also shows increases during this period. Between 1970-73, the total number of U.S. MAAG officers attached to the Ethiopian armed forces was reported at a constant number of 48.[68] In 1974, immediately after the coup the number of MAAG personnel increased to 80 with the third largest U.S. MAAG mission in Africa and the Middle-East after Israel and Saudi Arabia.[69] The trend in U.S. military aid after periods of domestic instability in Ethiopia has consistently shown sharp increases. On the other hand, in post crises periods there have been indications of decline in number of officers trained.

In the later part of 1976 and early 1977, the relationship between the U.S. government and the ruling junta in Ethiopia showed some severe strains. While the U.S. had enjoyed clear influence with the military junta shortly after the coup and had increased its MAAG personnel, this trend had been undermined by a number of developments in Ethiopia. First, the junta's military campaigns in Eritrea had generated large military aid requests to which the U.S. showed only lukewarm support. Second, the junta's disaffection with U.S. policy not to provide large-scale military aid spurred a search for alternate sources of military aid primarily from the Soviet Union. Third, the Carter Administration's policy on human rights in military aid recipient countries effectively foreclosed further large-scale military aid to Ethiopia. The combined effect of these three factors led to serious deterioration in the relations between the two countries.

In the meantime, Ethiopian junta had grown increasingly suspicious of U.S. military aid and the prospects of "counter-revolution" by U.S. supported elements in Ethiopia. The junta suspected the U.S. of aiding and supporting anti-junta elements within and without Ethiopia. It publicly accused the CIA of "supporting anarchists and reactionaries to dismantle the Ethiopian revolution."[70]

The first major signs in the deteriorating relations between the two countries surfaced in early 1975 during the height of the junta's war efforts in Eritrea. During the course of the war, the junta requested additional large-scale military aid to fight "rebels" in Eritrea.[71] The Ford Administration, after some delay, partially approved the requested military aid; however the Dergue continued to press for more aid and sales of sophisticated aircraft and other supplies to compensate for losses during the Eritrean campaign. Although the U.S. agreed for sale of certain military hardware and aircraft, it was unwilling to provide large-scale military aid to the junta.

In the later part of 1975, the junta announced that it would execute 12 members of the royal

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[66]U.S. Senate, Hearings, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Ethiopia, op. cit.,* pp. 1915-16.

[67]U.S. Senate, Hearings, *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations,* 93rd Congress, Second Session, 1976, p. 1454; See also: *U.S. Senate, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs,* 94th Congress, Second Session, 1977, p. 1125.

[68]U.S. Senate, Hearings, *U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Ethiopia, op. cit.,* p. 1913.

[69]U.S. Senate, Hearings, *Foreign, Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, op. cit.,* p. 1536.

[70]*The Washington Post,* September 10, 1976.

[71]*The New York Times,* February, 1975.

family and attacked the U.S. and Great Britain for involvement in Ethiopian politics.[72] With the announcement of the scheduled executions, the U.S. warned the junta that carrying out the executions would entail serious repercussions on U.S. military aid to Ethiopia.[73] This warning was soon to be followed by the arrest and interrogation of Colonel Joseph Ramsey, the U.S. Military Attache in Addis Ababa.[74]

By the middle of 1976, relations between the two countries had reached a new low. The junta had grown increasingly repressive in its policies with an all out assault on Eritrea, further exacerbating the worsening relations between the two countries.[75] By late 1976, the junta openly took a strong anti-American position and declared its affiliation with the socialist bloc. Consequently, in late 1976, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, William Schaufle issued a warning to the Ethiopian junta against further accusations of U.S. subversive activities in Ethiopia.[76] The junta continued its rhetoric against U.S. "imperialism" while firmly aligning itself with the Soviet Union.

In early 1977, the Carter Administration announced that due to human rights violations, military aid scheduled for Ethiopia will be drastically reduced.[77] Even though U.S. military aid to Ethiopia in 1977 has been substantially reduced, the U.S. expressed its willingness to continue arms sales on a cash basis.

Conclusion

U.S. military aid experience in Ethiopia provides a negative example on how to promote stability and orderly development in low income societies through the use of military aid. The evidence assembled in the foregoing discussion shows the negative impact of military aid on the socioeconomic and political development of low income societies. Although U.S. military aid to Ethiopia was purportedly designed to foster stability and order, the effects have been shown to be contradictory.

The Ethiopian case seems to suggest that U.S. military aid operates as an obstacle in the transition from a traditional society to a more modernized and democratic society. The evidence suggests that U.S. military aid has been instrumental in undermining and thwarting social and economic changes in Ethiopian society. The underlying theme of stability in U.S. military aid policy in Ethiopia seems to have been translated into social stagnation, and indeed while the stability of Haile Sellassie's regime was promoted, it was clearly to the detriment of establishing stable democratic political institutions which in the long-term appear to be vastly more important to U.S. interests. In short, U.S. aid aimed at supporting nation-building was converted into an instrument of state-building.

The emergence and proliferation of democratic institutions in Ethiopia was of the utmost importance since the underlying cause for instability and unrest was largely premised on the absence of these institutions. Institutions would have forced Haile Sellassie's regime to deal with basic social and economic problems and enhance the regime's responsiveness to popular demands. The contradictions of U.S. military aid in Ethiopia have also been shown to affect and aggravate

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[72]*The New York Times,* September 14, 1975.

[73]*Ibid.*

[74]*The New York Times,* October 12, 1975.

[75]*The Washington Post,* August 19, 1976.

[76]*The New York Times,* August 6, 1976.

[77]*The Chicago Tribune,* February 15, 1977.

structural components in Ethiopian society. The preoccupation with stability and order have been shown to have led the imperial government to actively limit political participation.

U.S. military aid since 1942 has consistently shown concern with the stability of Haile Sellassie's regime and centralization of his administration. A small U.S. military aid program which sought to assist Haile Sellassie control "brigandage" evolved to become a massive program instrumental in the suppression of reform movements, dissent, opposition or popular uprisings against the imperial government. On the other hand, U.S. aid reinforced the regime by providing it with the means to impose its authority unopposed. Haile Sellassie fully employed military aid to centralize and stabilize his regime although in the long-term, the effect was highly destabilizing resulting in the overthrow of the monarchy and declaration of socialism.

Centralization of authority in the Ethiopian context meant the virtual exclusion of all opposition and the various nationalities from the political process. For instance, the Oromo nationality enjoyed only limited representation in the political process although their loyalty to the crown was insured by force of arms. In this manner, existing antagonisms between and among ethnic groups were exacerbated.

The societal impact of U.S. military aid was evident in terms of the "competency gap" created by the infusion of aid and training. By the late 1960s the competency gap between the military and civilian sectors had widened and the rift became severe in the early 1970s. Consequently, in the face of wide-spread famine, inflation and popular political activism, the military decisively intervened proclaiming radical social changes. Thus, the proposition that U.S. military aid policy is less concerned with social stability and more concerned with the character of the regime seems to be largely supported by the Ethiopian case.

The massive U.S. military aid in the 1950s is shown to have been the decisive factor in the greatly increasing personal power of Haile Sellassie. The modernized armed forces with their U.S. advisors exhibited great loyalty to the emperor and the royal family. The armed forces were provided vast resources and organizational capacity to insure against any opposition against the imperial government. Similarly, the military aid given to the junta in the aftermath of the 1974 coup was instrumental in its effort to centralize its administration although subsequent U.S. refusal to provide large-scale military aid seems to have strained relations.

The proposition that U.S. military aid tends to increase the likelihood of military intervention and decreased political stability in low income recipient societies seems to also find confirmation in the Ethiopian experience. The abortive military coup of 1960 was primarily carried out by those branches of the armed forces that had received the largest amount of U.S. military training and supplies. The Imperial Honor guards and the police which had been the focus of much U.S. military training and equipment since the 1940s were the main participants in the attempted coup. In contrast, the army and other branches of the armed forces that were not fully organized until the late 1950s did not participate in the coup.

In the 1974 coup, the trend in U.S. military aid policy suggests interesting relationships, especially in the context of shifts in U.S. military aid policy in the 1970s and the general membership of the current military junta. While it may be difficult to make any direct inferences on the relationship between U.S. military aid emphasis on officers training in the years immediately before the coup and the training of most of the leaders following the coup in the U.S., it seems, however of possible U.S. awareness of impending changes in Ethiopia.

The military training program also had a major societal impact. Although the data on the recruitment and selection process in the Ethiopian armed forces appears to be limited, indications are that the U.S. went along with the imperial government's policy on the ethnic composition and

selection of recruits in the armed forces. Although the policy may have appeared prudent to the U.S. due to the appeal of organizing a military force with maximum ethnic and political loyalty to the regime, the consequences of such policies were far reaching.

Similarly, appointment in the Ethiopian armed forces, particularly at the higher levels, was determined by factors of loyalty, and the emperor drew his corp of commanders from among his ethnic confederates and others with unimpeachable loyalties to the Crown. This seems to have negatively contributed to the general stability in Ethiopian society particularly when the armed forces were used to suppress regional uprisings and rebellions.

The economic effects of U.S. military aid are not directly borne out by our data. However, it is clear that the large U.S. military establishment created by U.S. military aid had burdened the country's economy. This is particularly manifest in terms of the share of the national budget spent on defense and internal security. Expenditure for defense and internal security in the 1960s steadily increased to command close to fifty per cent of the government's budget.

On the other hand, the economic aid given by the U.S. did not focus on infrastructural needs. Three five-year plans were made with large U.S. economic assistance. Except for poorly constructed highways and bridges that connected the capital with its immediate surroundings, it would be difficult to cite evidence of 225 million dollars worth of economic aid. The U.S. government channeled its economic aid through the Ethiopian government which diverted part of the economic aid to compensate for budgetary deficits; and no doubt a significant amount was also misappropriated or converted to private use.