Volume IV — Number 1
Robert W. Tucker
Abstract: In August 1968, the Warsaw Pact states invaded Czechoslovakia in reaction to liberalization efforts by Slovak politician Alexander Dubcek. The invasion came as a shock to many international relations experts. It seemed that the Soviet Union had much to lose from military intervention—other Eastern bloc states would certainly not be enthusiastic about the precedent of invasion, and Western states would see aggression as a sign that the USSR was not committed to détente. The invasion, then, was roundly criticized as a blunder made in a state of panic. This article contests the perception of Soviet intervention as irrational and ill-advised. The USSR’s policy makers were bound to a “sterile and unimaginative conservatism” that could only see liberalization in one of its satellites as the first step toward inevitable revolt. This belief was not completely unfounded; that Dubcek found a receptive audience for his message serves as evidence that the existing Soviet-dominated system did not enjoy a broad base of support among average Czechoslovak citizens. In this case, military intervention would not be doing any more damage to the Soviet-Czechoslovak relationship than had already been done. Moreover, while the prospect of widespread revolt throughout the Warsaw Pact states seemed unlikely, the USSR was making decisions from a position of uncertainty and could not be sure that leaving Czechoslovak dissent unchecked would not result in emboldening other dissenters throughout the communist world. Understanding the insecurity of the Soviet position, Soviet intervention was then not only reasonable, but was the most natural reaction to Dubcek’s reformation campaign. For the USSR, further alienating the Western powers through military action was preferable to being perceived as weak by satellite states.
Keywords: Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, Alexander Dubcek, Czech Intervention
Click here for full article
