Volume XI – Number 1
Bernard K. Gordon
Abstract:
At the conclusion of the war in Vietnam, the US was concerned with finding a regional Southeast Asian partner capable of representing regional anti-Communist interests. By allying itself with a developing regional power, the US would guarantee that US diplomats would have political access to the region and could monitor and combat the spread of communism. Indonesia emerged as the most likely candidate for this role. Not only had Indonesia enjoyed relative political stability in comparison to its war-torn neighbors, Indonesia’s population was expected to grow by 14 percent from 1975 to 2000, and Indonesia had already achieved regional prominence through its role in facilitating negotiations during the US incursion in Cambodia. In addition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had its headquarters in Indonesia’s capital of Jakarta. Overall, it appeared that Indonesia was the most logical regional partner for the US. This assessment, however, ignores the less publicized contributions of Thailand. While Indonesia was certainly the most visible regional actor, Thailand was present in more negotiations and engaged more often economically with neighboring states than Indonesia. Apart from this, the Thai bureaucracy was more robust and experienced than that of Indonesia, as Thailand had not had its existing bureaucratic institutions disrupted by colonial rule. Thailand, then, would have been a superior conduit of US influence.
