Bruce Weinrod
Abstract: The arms control process has been commonly assumed to be the “Great Hope of Mankind” to lessen the tensions and burdens of national rivalries, but it has not delivered in fulfilling these hopes. In some ways, it has even been harmful to US interests in terms of nuclear stability and security and has been unsuccessful, even on its own terms. Traditional arms control objectives include: strategic stability, balanced reduction of nuclear forces, minimization of destruction should conflict occur, and the establishment of predictability in the arms control relationship. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and SALT II) both led to diminished strategic balance between the US and Soviets, with the Soviets continuing to assemble arms. US arms control policy is currently at an impasse due to its general approach and assumptions as well as substantive treaty terms. The US assumed that Moscow shared its goals of preserving parity of arms, mutual deterrence, and strategic stability despite Kremlin public statements indicating otherwise. It also assumed that the Soviets would accept its interpretation of important, yet ambiguous SALT terms such as “heavy missile” or “deployment.” Whatever the specific approach taken in future arms talks, the status of arms control, maintenance of US military strength, and Soviet objectives must be kept in mind during negotiations.
