by Dagmawi Teferi, Towson University

On November 15^th, 1864 Union General William Tecumseh Sherman marched his army of 60,000 troops out of the burning city of Atlanta, Georgia to embark upon a military campaign that stretched 300 miles to Savannah, leaving utter destruction in their wake.[1]

The political objective of this campaign was to hasten the end of the Confederate insurrection. There were two strategic objectives for this campaign. The first was to cut off supply lines for the Confederate army battling the forces of Union General Ulysses S. Grant in Virginia. The second purpose was to inflict psychological damage on the civilian population of Georgia and break the will of the Confederacy. Through the employment of a scorched-earth policy, Sherman successfully disrupted the flow of supply of Confederate forces, broke the will of the civilian South to support the Confederate cause, and thus, hastened the end of the civil war.

Prior to his march to Savannah, Sherman successfully captured the city of Atlanta after a grueling months long campaign. Sherman sought the capture of Atlanta because it was the industrial hub of the Confederacy. Georgia was even called the “antebellum Empire State of the South.”[2] Its manufacturing capability and railroad system made it a vital asset to the Confederacy since much of the food, weapons, and ammunitions that supplied its armies came out of Atlanta.

By 1860, Georgia had 1,420 miles of rail tracks, second most in the South after Virginia.[3]  The rise of railroads led to the rise of other industries like iron and other metals that were used for railroad construction. Georgia, Atlanta most of all, was connected to many other states in the Confederacy and kept supplies flowing throughout the South. This made it’s capture a top priority for Sherman.

However, capturing Atlanta alone would not be enough. The rest of Georgia still had the potential to keep the Confederacy supplied well enough to prolong the war. Thus, he devised his plan to march to the sea. After stripping Atlanta of its infrastructure and burning a significant portion of the city, Sherman’s army went on to do much of the same along the march to Savannah, believing that it would bring the war to a close much faster.

The Confederacy had sought to fight a war of attrition. Their objective was to defend their capital, Richmond, Virginia, by holding off the advance of General Grant’s forces long enough to wear down the North’s will to fight. They believed that they could win the war by simply not losing, similarly to how the American Revolutionaries won their independence from Great Britain. Sherman had the opposite in mind.

With the newly found will to win the war in the North following the capture of Atlanta and President Abraham Lincoln’s reelection in 1864, Sherman followed a “hard-war” policy. He believed that destroying Georgia’s capabilities to keep the Confederate forces supplied would be far more efficient for the Union than occupying it until the end of the war. In a letter to his friend General Grant, Sherman stated, “until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it, but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources.”[4]

From a Clausewitzian perspective, by targeting the confederacy’s source of military supplies, Sherman was aiming to effectively disarm the enemy. Doing so would weaken the ability of General Robert E. Lee’s forces to fight at full strength in Virginia, allowing the Union army under Grant to be stronger at the right place and the right time.

Though he didn’t level another town like Atlanta, he allowed his troops to destroy property throughout the campaign, as long as it was in an area of continued resistance. They tore apart buildings, mills, factories, and houses then burned them when they were done. To destroy Georgia’s railroad system, his soldiers would tear out the tracks and melt them so they could be twisted into a loop that would go on to be called “Sherman’s neckties.” They also destroyed the stations and warehouses. By doing this, Sherman’s army cut off Georgia’s resources and supplies from the confederate forces fighting further North. This shortened the war as General Lee could not afford to maintain the fight against General Grant.

Yet, cutting off supply lines was only one part of Sherman’s motivation for this march. The other motivation relates to Clausewitz’s moral factors of will and hope.

Prior to his campaign, the civilian population of the Confederacy this far South had been virtually untouched by the war. They continued to be very supportive of the war and had hopes of victory. Through this march, Sherman wanted to show the people of the South that the Confederacy could not protect them from the Union. He thought that if he could inflict the psychological hardships of war on to the people of the South, he could break Southern morale and support for the war.

In the name of keeping his army fed, Sherman declared his troops would “live off the land.” Being cut-off from both communication and supplies from the North, Sherman’s forces had to forage for food as they marched towards the sea. Foraging parties were often miles ahead of the main force and could not be supervised, leading to looting and harm of civilians despite being against Sherman’s wishes. These foraging groups would burn everything they couldn’t carry, leaving the people they terrorized with nothing and further contributing to the demoralization of the South. Whether Sherman approved of their behavior or not, the result was the same. The South’s will to fight was fading.

With most able-bodied men off fighting against the Union, those who were left in Georgia were mainly women, children, and slaves. Spread of the news of Sherman’s destructive campaign and the hardships the women of the South faced eventually led to an increase in desertions of Lee’s army in Virginia,[5] further contributing to the hastened end of the war. Sherman’s strategy to “make Georgia howl” did exactly what it was intended to do.

By having his forces engage in what can be considered a total war against Georgia, engaging in the utter destruction of the land and the terrorizing of its people, Sherman successfully broke the South’s will to fight and the Confederacy’s ability to fight at full capacity. This allowed the Union be stronger at the right place and the right time in Virginia and bring the Civil War to an end. Though he cannot be given credit for creating the concept of total war, Sherman’s legendary campaign influenced how the U.S. would conduct warfare in the generations that followed.

[1] Anne J. Bailey. “Sherman’s March to the Sea.” New Georgia Encyclopedia. 08 June 2017.

[2]  Sean H. Vanatta, and Dan H. Du. “Civil War Industry and Manufacturing.” New Georgia Encyclopedia. 06 June 2017.

[3] Ibid.

[4] William T. Sherman. “Letter to Ulysses S. Grant.” 09 October 1864.

[5]  Bailey. “Sherman’s March to the Sea.” 2017.

by Ieuan Gale, University of Kent

Most nations have battles that are heralded as defining moments in their history. Taught in schools as important moments in the history of the nation, they often take on a mythical position in their nation’s identity. Whether it be Saratoga or Bunker Hill for Americans, Waterloo for the English or Gallipoli for Australians, the names of these battles have become legendary in their respective nations.

For us Welsh, the battle of Agincourt in 1415 is often considered our legendary battle. Although often considered an English victory, with the victorious Henry V being the King of England, the battle is remembered in Wales with pride. This is in large part due to the role played by the now famous (at least within Wales) Welsh longbowman throughout the course of the battle. The battle still conjures up images today of plucky poor Welshmen battling the imposing and wealthy French. In fact, when advertising for the 2012 Wales-France rugby game during the Six Nations tournament, Agincourt was used extensively in the match’s marketing campaign.

Apart from being a popular and often somewhat fondly remembered moment in Welsh history, the true significance of the battle of Agincourt was the use of the longbow by Henry’s army. It was the key weapon during the battle that allowed Henry’s inferior force to overcome a superior French Army.

By almost all accounts of the battle (as with studying many battles from medieval battles, reports vary wildly over the specifics) it was the archers within Henry’s army that gave him the tactical edge. The tactical value that they provided Henry with was their far superior rate of fire. Although their range was probably shorter than that of a crossbow’s and their power and armour piercing capabilities were certainly far more limited than those of a crossbow, the English longbowmen could fire far more arrows in a far shorter space of time than the French missile troops (Howard, M., War in European History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p11). Even an average longbowman could aim and fire up to six times as many arrows in the time it took a crossbowman to load and fire just one bolt. It was this incredible volume of firepower that his longbowmen provided that gave Henry’s forces such an advantage over is French counterparts.

Mostly ignored by the French military at the time due to the incredible amount of time it took for an archer to develop the raw strength needed to simply draw a full longbow, or “warbow”, (many archers began practicing as early as 8 years of age) let alone shoot it accurately. Instead the French found the crossbow far more suitable to their needs. The crossbow required considerably less training and was far more cost effective in the eyes of many in Europe, as they favoured large mostly untrained armies. By contrast Henry fielded a small but highly trained and experienced force.

It was therefore this volume of firepower that tipped the balance in Henry’s favour during the battle. Positioning his army carefully, with his archers, which made up the bulk of his army (of his force of around 7-8000 men, perhaps as many as 6000 of Henry’s men were archers, and 500 of those, who according to some were his most elite, were Welsh) positioned on the flanks but also dispersed amongst his men at arms in the centre of his line, Henry’s army held a strong defensive position. This position meant he could not be outflanked and could focus his limited resources in just one direction. If he were to fight in open land his army would surely have been overwhelmed by the numerically far superior French forces.

However, with the forests on either side of the field hemming in all the forces and removing any possible French outflanking manoeuvres, the French numbers were negated. Provided Henry could get the French forces to attack him, his defensive position would give him a significant advantage. Once goaded, the French nobles did indeed attack. Due to the terrain and conditions of the battlefield (woods on either side of a recently ploughed field that the French had to cross on a cold wet day) the attacking French forces were funnelled towards the English army.

The recent weather had made the field very difficult to cross, particularly for soldiers as heavily armoured as the French Knights. Heavy rainfall the previous night had reduced the field where the battle would take place to a thick, muddy quagmire. The heavily armoured French Knights sank knee deep in the mud when they tried to cross. This made it extremely difficult to cross the field, with one French monk describing the advancing French troops as, “already being overcome with fatigue even before they advanced against the enemy.” This meant that progress was slow, even for the mounted cavalry.

The excruciatingly long time it took to cross the open field suited the English archers perfectly who could launch volley after volley of arrows at the French forces slowly trudging towards the English line. With there being no cover in the field for the advancing French troops to take cover behind to avoid the incoming fire, and with modern plate armour largely negating the need for Knights to carry shields (Keegan, J., The Face of Battle, Penguin Books, London, 1978, p95), the advancing French troops could do nothing but absorb Henry’s archers’ volleys of arrows.

This storm of arrows caused mayhem amongst the assaulting French forces. Maddened French horses and knights fleeing the hail of incoming missiles, bolted away back through the French forces destroying any cohesion and killing many of their own dismounted comrades. Meanwhile, in a desperate effort to take cover from this constant fire, the dismounted knights did all they could do and bunched together as they approached the English. This lack of organisation meant that the strength of the French attack was lost.

When they finally crashed into the centre of the English line, their immense force thanks to their weight of numbers, threatened to break through. However, the dismounted French knights were so densely bunched together and no longer in any sort of battle lines or fighting formation due to the chaos of the advance. They therefore could not use their weapons effectively and fight as a cohesive force.

The English men at arms subsequently fell upon them with the resulting melee being a bloody and disastrous massacre for the French (Keegan, p83). This led to the eventual rout of the French army which suffered severe casualties, some arguing as many as 5000 dead, while Henry’s forces suffered just 400 losses. Henry’s strong defensive strategy had worked perfectly. He had successfully drawn in the French forces to his well-defended position where he had used all of his forces in a combined effort that made the most of his limited resources to overcome a far superior force.

Without the fire of Henry’s archers his force would mostly likely have been overwhelmed by the attacking French forces, firstly by the usually devastating charge of mounted French knights in full plate armour wielding lances, and then by the subsequent ranks of dismounted knights. Having the space to fight properly without the need to evade incoming fire, these dismounted knights would have most likely made short work of Henry’s more lightly armed and armoured men at arms. The archers’ role was therefore invaluable in enabling Henry’s army, that was exhausted from a long campaign up to that point as well as being vastly outnumbered, to overcome the French forces. Henry’s archers rained down clouds of arrows on the attacking French forces relentlessly, firstly breaking up and blunting the French heavy cavalry charge and then subsequently negating their huge numerical advantage of dismounted troops who’s attack followed.

Agincourt was the latest in a series of instances where English longbowmen proved their worth and for a time, came to dominate European warfare. The battles of Crecy, Poitiers and later Agincourt cemented the English archer as a battle winning weapon that, until the introduction firearms in the late 15^th century, led to English military preeminence in Europe. And the Welsh are proud to have played, as we see it, a key role in this!

by Matt Conner, Towson University

Germany should provide military advisors, special forces and air-support, as well as, offer economic and humanitarian aid to the UN-backed, Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya.  Supporting the GNA could enable Germany to minimize the risk of Islamic State (IS) terrorism in Europe by controlling the flow of refugees and migrants, as well as limit Russian influence in Northern Africa and the Middle East.   The Germans can accomplish this by deploying military advisors, special forces, and fighter aircraft to assist GNA military operations in Tripoli and Western Libya.  German economic and humanitarian aid could help the GNA provide basic government functions for the local population, and lead to an increase in the perceived legitimacy of the GNA.  The increased popular support could lead to greater cooperation with rival militant groups and create a GNA army that could be used to defeat the Islamic State (IS) and Ansar Al-Sharia (ASL), as well as the Russian-backed Libya National Army (LNA) in Eastern Libya.

Why Germany?

In 2015, Germany’s position as the fourth largest global economy, and its generous policies regarding refugees and asylum-seekers made the country an attractive destination for 890,000 Middle-Eastern and African migrants.  In 2016, security concerns regarding IS operatives entering Germany disguised as refugees, arose after IS claimed responsibility for nine terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany.  Today, enhanced security and border controls along the Turkish and Greek borders has made it more difficult for migrants to access Western and Central Europe through the Balkans.   Because of the partial route closure, Libya has become the preferred point of departure for Middle Eastern and African migrants seeking to enter Europe.

Before 2011, Germany and the EU relied heavily on former Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, to control migration between Libya and Europe.  However, the migration control provided by the Gaddafi regime ended, when the leader was killed by NATO-backed rebels in the “Arab Spring” uprising.  The Arab Spring was a failed democracy movement supported by the U.S. and NATO that aimed to establish democratic rule in Syria, Egypt, and Libya.  The lack of a legitimate government and maritime law enforcement made it easier for migrants to attempt the deadly migration across the Mediterranean.  Though migration numbers have decreased since Germany imposed greater restrictions on immigration, the possibility of terrorist infiltration remains a significant security concern.  German support of the GNA would help to establish a democratic government and increase Libyan maritime enforcement.

In addition to reducing the risk posed by transnational terrorism in Libya, the establishment of the GNA in Libya could help to limit Russian influence in the Mediterranean.  Russia’s growing perception as a power-broker in the Middle-East and North Africa affords Russia greater influence and recognition in world affairs.  One of Germany’s political objectives is to stop Russian aggression towards former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) in Eastern Europe.  The Russian President Vladimir Putin is widely regarded as seeking to re-establish the territorial boundaries of the former 18^th century Russian Empire and the USSR, calling the collapse of the USSR in 1991, “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20^th century”.  Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa could provide Putin with the necessary political capital – or advantage over political opponents – that could affect outcomes and challenge German interests around the world.

In November 2016, Russian president Vladimir Putin, hosted General Khalifa Haftar in Moscow to discuss the Libyan civil war.  Gen. Haftar is the leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA) a loose coalition of militias that control most of Eastern Libya.  Once seen by the U.S. and its allies as a pro-democracy alternative to Gaddafi, Gen. Haftar refuses to recognize the U.N. brokered GNA, and instead, seeks to align Libya under his own self-styled military rule.  The LNA controls the valuable oil refineries in Eastern Libya, after re-capturing them from the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a faction loyal to the GNA.  There is evidence that Putin deployed Russian special forces and drones to Egypt in support of Haftar and the LNA advance.

The Causal Argument:

Germany should deploy military advisors, special forces and fighter aircraft to provide support to GNA military operations in Libya, as well as supply economic and humanitarian aid to help establish the GNA as a legitimate government.  The GNA was the result of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) which the U.N. helped to broker on December 17, 2015.  The LPA calls for the establishment of a democratic Libyan national government, called the Government of National Accord (GNA), which would share powers among the multiple factions and tribes in Libya.  The perception of the GNA as legitimate by the local population is vital to the success of the democratic government.  Germany should use its military advisors to help the GNA in establishing a police force capable of enforcing laws and remove the presence of militia rule.  Next, the German government should supply economic and humanitarian aid to the GNA so it can fulfill the basic the needs of the local population of Tripoli.  In gaining the popular support of the local population through increased legitimacy of the GNA, the government could expect an overall decrease in militia conflict and violence in Western Libya.

After helping the GNA consolidate power in Tripoli, German military advisors could help the GNA create an army by incorporating various pro-GNA militias, like Libya Dawn and Libya Shield, into a single command structure.  Together, with the help of German Special Forces, the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK), the GNA military can use fast, tactical strikes against IS and ALS camps in Western Libya.   The KSK has more than a decade of experience fighting terror groups in Afghanistan and Africa and could use their experience to help train GNA police and military units. Limited German military involvement, economic support, and humanitarian aid could help Middle-Eastern and African countries, like Libya, develop power-sharing democracies without the risk of overwhelming anti-U.S. sentiment preventing cooperation.

The GNA army, aided by German fighter aircraft and military advisors, could begin to recapture the oil fields, refineries, ports, and the city of Benghazi in Eastern Libya.  Oil production and trade is vital to the Libyan economy.  The oil fields, refineries, and ports are predominately controlled by the pro-GNA PFG and Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB).  However, on March 14, 2017, the LNA re-captured the oil ports of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf from the PFG, after losing control in September 2016.  US officials claim that Russian special forces and drones were launched from Western Egypt to aid the LNA assault.  German presence in the region and support of the GNA could off-set Russian support of the LNA.  The GNA army, together with the BDB and the PFG, could retake the oil ports with close-air-support from the German Luftwaffe (Air Force).  After the GNA secures Eastern Libya and hostilities cease, the U.N. should initiate a peace-keeping mission and remain in Libya until national elections are followed by a peaceful transfer of power from one government to the next.

Conclusion:

Germany should provide military advisors, special forces, and air-support, as well as offer economic and humanitarian aid to assist the GNA in Libya.  German intervention could help broker a resolution to the conflict in Libya by helping to establish the democratic GNA government.  GNA control of Libya could minimize the risk of IS and ALS attacking Germany and Europe, by controlling illegal mass migration across the Mediterranean. The success of the GNA in Libya could establish Germany as an alternative to direct U.S. involvement in the region and establish a democratic regime and US/EU/NATO partner in North Africa, limiting Russian influence in the region.

 

 

 

by Joshua Brumage, Towson University

Since 2004, more than 400 drone strikes have been carried out by the United States in Pakistan alone. These weapons have become a staple in the fight against terrorism. However, if the objective of the War on Terror is to “stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around the world,” then has the use of unmanned drone strikes helped achieve this objective? Considering the fact that number of global deaths cause by terrorism has been rising, the answer may be just the opposite. It is important that current tactics and strategies, such as the prolific use of drones, be analyzed to determine if they are indeed exacerbating the problem, instead of fixing it.

The use of drones has had a recognizable tactical effect. Before his death, Osama bin Laden wrote to his chief of staff, advising him that members of al Qaeda operating in the tribal regions of Pakistan (which have seen some of the heaviest amount of drone activity) should only move on overcast days to avoid being seen by satellites and drones, and that they should consider moving to the Kunar province in Afghanistan. Key Taliban and al Qaeda leaders have been eliminated by the strikes, such as Baitullah Mehsud, leader of a Pakistani militant group affiliated with the Taliban. Drone strikes are also unique in that they accomplish these tasks without endangering the lives of any United States personnel. As a result, the response among United States policymakers has been largely positive, leading to the program’s escalation.

Why then, are the numbers of terrorist attacks in the world rising? The answer lies in the relationship between tactics and strategy. In The Future of Strategy, Colin S. Gray writes that strategy serves as the “bridge” between tactics and politics. If tactics refers to actions taken on the battlefield, then strategy is using these actions to produce an effect, or consequence, that helps one achieve the political objective. In other words, successful tactics that do not produce a strategic effect are largely of little consequence. Worse still, tactical victories won without consideration for their possible effects on the political objective can actually have a negative strategic effect. A prime example is the Tet Offensive of the Vietnam War, when North Vietnamese forces launched surprise attacks across South Vietnam. By all accounts, the Tet Offensive was a major tactical victory for the United States; the Viet Cong was decimated, with over 33,000 dead compared to approximately 3,470 dead for the United States and their allies. However, the offensive is considered a turning point in the Vietnam War, and not in favor of the United States. Although Hanoi did not achieve their objective of overthrowing the South Vietnamese government, the offensive had the strategic effect of showing the American public that the war was not going as well as the United States government had led them to believe. Public support waned, and eventually a weary and frustrated United States military withdrew from the country, which was then unified by North Vietnam.

So, what has been the strategic effect of the United States’ drone strikes? The aforementioned attack that killed Baitullah Mehsud also resulted in the deaths of four members of his family. Additionally, the strike was preceded by sixteen others that failed to kill Mehsud, and resulted in anywhere between 207 and 321 deaths. In all, the United States government released a statement in 2016 estimated that between 2009 and 2016, between 64 and 116 non-combatants had been killed in drone strikes. Estimates by third parties are less optimistic, ranging between 200 and over 800. In Pakistan, the reaction to these tactics has been understandably hostile. A 2011 poll among the Pakistani public showed that 89 percent think the strikes kill too many innocent bystanders, and anti-US demonstrations are common in the country.

The center of gravity of insurgent groups such as al Qaeda has been identified as their ideology; in order to effectively combat them, one must present an alternative ideology that the public finds preferable to that of the extremist’s. The increased use of drones in an attempt to deter terrorist activities has been unsuccessful because it fails to produce a preferable alternative. Every civilian killed by a drone strike stirs outrage among the civilian population. Insurgent leaders like Baitullah Mehsud are able to tap into these feelings and offer an opportunity to seek revenge against the instigators: the United States. For example, a Pakistani immigrant tried (unsuccessfully) to commit an act of terrorism in Times Square in 2010. During his trial, he cited American drone strikes as being the inspiration behind his plot. If the United States truly wishes to reduce or eliminate worldwide terrorism, it would behoove policymakers and strategists to examine their tactics, and adopt ones that more effectively help them achieve this objective.