Before the West gets too excited about downsizing in Iraq and Afghanistan, it shouldn’t forget about the Sahel, notably the West African portion. The Sahel region of Africa, along the southern Sahara, extends from northern Senegal through Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea.[1] The region, particularly the Sahel region in Western Africa, has seen a considerable rise in terrorism over the past seven years.[2] Despite this, funding and military support to the region has increased with very mixed results.[3] Why are these efforts failing? It seems Western counterterrorist military intervention has perpetual difficulty succeeding, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now the Sahel. The reasons for the failure of counterterrorist operations, and thus the paths going forward to effectively combat terrorism, originate with the low capacity of regional governments[4] and the poor socioeconomic conditions of the local populace.[5]
The French Operation Barkhane is a 4,500-man effort in the Sahel aimed at rooting out terrorist groups from the region. The operation originated in 2013 when Islamic militants conquered Northern Mali and threatened the city of Timbuktu.[6] This effort is going to be expanded as French president Emmanuel Macron pledged an additional 600 men to the effort.[7] In addition to this, the United Nations has a 12,000-man peacekeeping force in Mali, and twelve other European countries have pledged special forces units for deployment to the Sahel. These special forces units would work together with local forces of the Liptako region, an area within Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, which is a stronghold for ISIS-affiliated militants. The UN, France and the US have collectively poured billions into the region.[8] The United States has 6,000 military personnel within the African continent,[9] though it predominantly relies on special forces to advise local forces for counterterrorist initiatives in the region.
Outside of Western counterterrorist efforts in the region, efforts by local governments also constitute a key element of attempts to address terrorism in the Sahel. The main faction in these efforts is the G5 Sahel Joint Force, compromising of a five-thousand man[10] force with troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania.[11] Each member state of the G5 contributes about ten million USD of funding to the force, and though the US was reluctant to provide funding without a coherent and articulate strategy by the G5, it did provide 60 million USD of financial support.[12]
The African Union (AU), a pan-continental intergovernmental organization based out of Addis Ababa, pledged 3,000 men to counterterrorist operations in the Sahel. This force will work in tandem with the G5 Sahel Joint Force as a means of boosting the capacity of counterterrorist efforts in the region.[13] With the aforementioned efforts by international and domestic military forces, counterterrorism in the Sahel is a subject of top priority. Questions therefore arise over the effectiveness of existing counterterrorist efforts and the changes that can be made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these operations.
Initiatives to reduce terrorism in the Sahel region have largely been failing, according to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.[14] There were five times more terrorist attacks in 2019 than there were in 2016. Millions have been displaced and there were 4,000 deaths in 2019 alone.[15] Within the last twelve months, 700,000 have been displaced in Burkina Faso, and though civilians were once simply collateral damage, attacks on civilian populations are increasing in size and frequency. The two main terrorist actors in the region are Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), with affiliation to Al-Qaeda, and the ISIS-affiliated Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).[16]
A massive insurgency, corrupt and feeble local government, Islamic extremism, a variety of armed factions fighting for power, ethnic tensions, and poor governance in many areas of the Sahel makes the region seem like the Afghanistan of Africa.[17] Western powers know all too well that another drawn out, ineffective war across the globe is not within their interests, so why are current efforts failing? Let’s start off with the counterterrorist forces themselves. The G5 Sahel Joint Force requires 500 million USD in funding to be able to reasonably enforce counterterrorist measures in accordance with what is required. Currently, it only receives a small fraction of the 500 million USD it requires, despite funding from the member states, France and the US.[18]
The ineffectiveness of the G5 can in part be attributed to shortfalls in coordination. Unlawful killings of locals in the Sahel during counterterrorist operations have also alienated locals from government forces.[19] The militaries of the G5 states are often corrupt and therefore are not seen as impartial and trustworthy figures by communities within the regions affected by terrorism. Furthermore, G5 member states’ militaries often lack the supplies needed to fight terrorist groups, with Malian military units often not having enough weapons, stationed in poorly guarded outposts, and maintaining dismal accountability of military personnel.[20]
Yet what has allowed for the proliferation of terrorist groups in the Sahel is the socioeconomic difficulties faced by the region’s populace. The West-African Sahel region is an extremely underdeveloped, subsistence area that is very non-resilient. Recent climate shifts have stimulated droughts that have devastated and displaced local communities, driving many to seek alternative means of earning money.[21]
According to 2nd Lieutenant David Ouedraogo, a member of the Burkina Faso Special Operations force who has interrogated captured militants, joining local militias provide a reliable source of income for males afflicted by poverty and displacement. However, a significant portion of recruited militants are recruited involuntarily, with terrorist organizations threatening to kill the recruits’ families. Many militants do not know for whom nor for what cause they are fighting.[22]
These issues are exacerbated by the absence of a functioning government and police force in many regions of the Sahel, leaving local militias to fill the power vacuum and serve as a form of safety for locals. The rapid population growth seen in the region, exemplified by Burkina Faso’s population quadrupling within the last few decades and Niger possessing the highest global fertility rate, puts further stress on men vulnerable to militia recruitment.[23] Local conflicts among pastoralist communities, and ethnic and religious rifts, are also being exploited by extremist groups in recruitment efforts.[24]
Is there any chance of salvaging the West African Sahel, with such a dramatic rise in the severity and scope of terrorism in the region? If so, it would require significant adjustments to the approach taken toward counterterrorism. One notable difference between the Sahel and Afghanistan is the fact that the terrorist groups in the Sahel are not as much spawned out of opposition to Western intervention, but rather out of the socioeconomic difficulties of the local populations.
Counterterrorist efforts are therefore not having to radically change the ideology of an entire population through winning hearts and minds and can rather focus on more tangible, achievable goals of improving the quality of life, resilience and economic conditions of the Sahel region.[25] This would remove the need for a large portion of potential militant recruits to join extremist groups, while simultaneously mitigating the ability for these groups to exploit inter-communal conflicts.
That said, military force and multilateral cooperation are still undoubtedly essential. The arms supply for extremist groups in the Sahel originates in Libya, a nation plunged into civil war with rival factions being supported by various world powers, contributing to significant arms exports to the Sahel region. In January, a meeting between countries surrounding Libya, including Mali, Chad and Niger, was held in Algeria. This meeting was held to coordinate with international actors a plan to expedite peace and conflict resolution in Libya.[26] Taking down the entire Libyan arms market that supplies the Sahel is a very ambitious goal and would only hinder, rather than eliminate, the means to conduct terrorist operations.
Military commitment to the region is needed, with a particular focus on enhancing the capacity of the G5 member states to establish a government presence within the terrorism-afflicted areas. France called on G5 members to address rising anti-French sentiments within G5 militaries originating from ideas that the French seek the minerals of northern Mali or use counterterrorist efforts as a means of carrying out a neocolonialist agenda.[27] Having the French military and the G5 operate under a common command structure also enhances the cohesion and cooperation abilities of both forces, ensuring more effective military responses to counterterrorism.[28]
Therefore, the betterment of counterterrorist military operations is a welcome change, though the trends seen in the activity of terrorism in the Sahel indicates that this alone is nowhere near what is needed to reduce the prevalence of terrorist groups in the Sahel. Tackling the root causes of the growth of extremist groups, including poverty, corruption, a lack of infrastructure, and a power vacuum would drastically reduce the ability for terrorist groups to exist, let alone recruit, within the Sahel region. Counterterrorist military operations should be used in tandem with these nonmilitary efforts as a means of pushing terrorist groups out of areas before establishing command presence and improving the region through development projects.
Though the US recently established a new Sahel envoy to address concerns of terrorism in the region, the US government has indicated a shift in military priorities to addressing the threat of China rather than counterterrorism, thus placing the burden of restabilizing the Sahel on the French and its West African partners.[29] After eighteen long years of US intervention in Afghanistan with limited success, it is imperative for the French to prevent such a dangerous commitment while there is still the ability to do so. As the scope of terrorism shifts from the Middle East to the Sahel, the West must learn from its mistakes.
[1] Al Jazeera. “The Sahel: Key Things to Know as Security Crisis Spirals.” Africa | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, February 27, 2020.
[2] Ineke Mules, “Anti-French Sentiment on the Rise in West Africa as Security Situation Deteriorates: DW: 12.12.2019,” Deutsche Welle
[3] Al Jazeera. “UN’s Guterres Warns of ‘Impact’ on Sahel Region from Libya War.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, January 23, 2020
[4] Louis, Lisa. “Will New Measures to Fight Terrorism in the Sahel Region Be Enough?: DW: 13.01.2020.” Deutsche Welle. Deutsche Welle, January 13, 2020.
[5] Danielle Paquette, Joby Warrick. “Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Groups Are Working Together in West Africa to Grab Large Swaths of Territory.” The Washington Post. WP Company, February 22, 2020.
[6] Al Jazeera. “France and Allies Establish New Task Force in Sahel.” France News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, March 28, 2020.
[7] Al Jazeera. “The Sahel: Key Things to Know as Security Crisis Spirals.”
[8] Al Jazeera, “France and Allies Establish New Task Force in Sahel.”
[9] Pamuk, Humeyra. “U.S. Creates New Envoy Position to Counter Rising Terrorism in Sahel.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, March 6, 2020.
[10] Cooke, Jennifer G. “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?” Center for Strategic and International Studies , June 6, 2018.
[11] Al Jazeera, “France and Allies Establish New Task Force in Sahel.”
[12] Cooke, Jennifer G. “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?” June 6, 2018.
[13] Al Jazeera. “African Union to Deploy 3,000 Troops in Restive Sahel Region.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, February 27, 2020.
[14] Al Jazeera. “UN’s Guterres Warns of ‘Impact’ on Sahel Region from Libya War.” January 23, 2020
[15] Al Jazeera, “France and Allies Establish New Task Force in Sahel.”
[16] Al Jazeera. “The Sahel: Key Things to Know as Security Crisis Spirals.”
[17] Starkey, Jerome. “In the Sahel, Military Leaders Risk Repeating the Mistakes of Afghanistan.” The Telegraph
[18] Cooke, Jennifer G. “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?” June 6, 2018.
[19] Al Jazeera. “The Sahel: Key Things to Know as Security Crisis Spirals.”
[20] Al Jazeera “What’s behind the Upsurge in Violence in the Sahel?” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, December 17, 2019.
[21] Al Jazeera. “The Sahel: Key Things to Know as Security Crisis Spirals.”
[22] Danielle Paquette, Joby Warrick. “Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Groups Are Working Together in West Africa to Grab Large Swaths of Territory.” February 22, 2020.
[23] Louis, Lisa. “Will New Measures to Fight Terrorism in the Sahel Region Be Enough?“ Deutsche Welle
[24] Al Jazeera “What’s behind the Upsurge in Violence in the Sahel?” December 17, 2019.
[25] Al Jazeera “What’s behind the Upsurge in Violence in the Sahel?” December 17, 2019.
[26] Al Jazeera. “UN’s Guterres Warns of ‘Impact’ on Sahel Region from Libya War.” January 23, 2020
[27] Ineke Mules, “Anti-French Sentiment on the Rise in West Africa as Security Situation Deteriorates: DW: 12.12.2019,” Deutsche Welle
[28] Louis, Lisa. “Will New Measures to Fight Terrorism in the Sahel Region Be Enough?“ Deutsche Welle
[29] Pamuk, Humeyra. “U.S. Creates New Envoy Position to Counter Rising Terrorism in Sahel.” Reuters. March 6, 2020.
