

SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE

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In American terminology, "the Middle East dispute" has usually come to represent the conflict between Jews and Arabs over Palestine. However, this is only one of many conflicts in the Middle East which have aroused recent international concern. Others have been totally unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, at present there are major disputes between oil producing states and Western oil companies which vitally concern Europe. Russia still disputes the status of the Turkish Straits. In the eastern Mediterranean the threat of confrontation between Soviet and American fleets is in reality more a part of the East-West conflict than the Arab-Israeli dispute. With Great Britain's announcement of its intention to evacuate the Persian Gulf by 1971, Iran has proclaimed its aspirations to replace the "power vacuum" to be created when the British leave. Within the region there are also ideological disputes between the radical Arab states and the traditionalists. While the conflict between Israel and the Arab States is an aspect of some of these disputes, it is not integral to any of them. Each would probably threaten the *status quo* interests of Western powers had there been no Israel. Thus it is essential in discussion of Middle Eastern disputes to identify the conflict in question.

Some form of Middle East dispute has been a focal point of international relations ever since the 17th Century when Czarist Russia sought to expand its frontiers deep into the Ottoman and Persian domains. At the beginning of the 19th Century Napoleon sought to destroy British influence in the Middle East when he invaded Egypt. During the rest of the century the Western powers tried to prevent Russia from attaining a dominant position in the area. European diplomacy was plagued by the so called "Eastern Question" in which, then as now, the major powers disputed each other's roles in the Middle East, each attempting to strengthen its position there at the expense of its rivals.

By the beginning of the 20th Century imperial Germany had succeeded Russia as the principal competitor of Great Britain and France, each of which was seeking to maintain a kind of *status quo* to protect their respective vital interests in the Middle East. Both Germany and Italy sought to change the *status quo* established by the World War I treaties which partitioned the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into British and French dominated zones. The struggle for power balance in the area continues until today with new actors replacing those with traditional imperial interests.

The United States has replaced Great Britain and France as protector of the *status quo* while Russia continues as the principal protagonist of

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change in the power balance. Thus great power competition in the area is not new. The Middle East, as always, continues to be a focal point of confrontation between *status quo* and revisionist powers in their attempts to maintain or alter the world power balance through maintaining or altering it in the Middle East.

Palestine has frequently been involved in the history of these confrontations. Even before the modern era, the capture of the Holy City of Jerusalem symbolized domination of the region. From the time of the Crusades until the present Jerusalem has been a prize sought by all contenders. The Crimean War was sparked by religious disputes over control of, and rights in the churches of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem and the Nativity in Bethlehem. Kaiser Wilhelm II made a special point of entering Jerusalem, paying homage at the holy sites of Christendom and proclaiming himself "protector of Islam." Until today possession of the Holy City has remained a major goal of all aspirants seeking to dominate Palestine.

Since other participants in this program will be discussing the Arab-Israeli dispute, I will deal with suggested solutions to it. This conflict has many faces. It is a conflict that involves not only Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors. It also has inter-Arab aspects, and is closely related to the Soviet-American confrontation. Still another aspect has been much neglected is the tension between Israel and Palestine Arab nationalism.

During the past fifty years diverse solutions have been offered for the Arab-Israeli conflict. They might be divided into those seeking to keep Palestine intact and those which recommended division of the country, usually into areas under Jewish, Arab and international control.

Prior to establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 various international and British royal commissions recommended one or another form of a partition. Because of their insistence that Palestine remain intact, the Arab population and Arab governments of the surrounding countries usually found themselves at odds with the international community, the British mandatory authorities, and the Jewish community of Palestine.

Only a small group of Zionists at each end of the political spectrum opposed partition. On the one hand there were militant Jewish nationalists who opposed it because they wanted all Palestine to be Jewish. On the other hand Jewish binationalists opposed partition because they believed that the country should be neither Jewish nor Arab, but a nation of two peoples living in co-existence.

During the mandatory era nearly all Palestine Arabs agreed that Palestine be kept intact as a single country. Then, and until recently, most Arab nationalists were reluctant to concede that Jewish nationalism had any valid claims to even a part of Palestine. They envisaged a Palestinian Arab nation which would grant the country's Jewish minority equal rights within an Arab state. Until 1948 Palestinian Arabs were strengthened in their stand by virtue of the fact that they constituted the overwhelming majority of the population.

Since establishment of Israel the demographic character of Palestine has radically changed. With the influx of over a million Jewish immigrants after 1948, the country acquired a Jewish majority equal in proportion to the two-thirds Arab majority living there when Israel became independent. After the exodus of three-quarters of a million Arab refugees during the first Arab-Israeli war, and another quarter of a million from Gaza and the West Bank since the 1967 war, the population balance now stands at about one-third Arab and two-thirds Jewish. Furthermore, as a result of the 1967 victory, Israel expanded its control beyond the 1949 armistice frontiers to include all mandatory Palestine, as well as Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights.

These demographic changes have also altered political positions of the protagonists. Among a small minority of Jews the binational concept has been revived. They now believe that Jews and Arabs could coexist as two nations within the frontiers of a single state in a federation or a confederation of Palestine. At the other end of the present political spectrum are supporters of the Greater or Land of Israel Movement which seeks to establish Jewish dominion, not only over all Palestine, but over all territories acquired during the Six Day War relegating the Arab third of the population to a minority status in a Jewish state. Most Israeli Jews, cognizant of demographic realities, disavow the proposals of both the new bi-nationalists and of the Greater Israel Movement.

Various other proposals have been put forward by Israeli leaders for border rectifications that would, on the one hand establish "secure frontiers" by taking into account Israel's 1967 victory, and on the other hand, maintain a predominantly Jewish population and Israel's Jewish character. These include the so-called "Allon plan" proposed by the deputy prime minister which offered some degree of political autonomy to the predominantly Arab Gaza Strip and the West Bank; but at the same time assuring Israeli military control along all frontiers. Since the 1967 war until the present even the Israeli "minimalists" have asserted that security requires Israel to hold all Jerusalem, Gaza, Golan, and access to Sharm al-Sheikh. A few significant voices have called for return of all territory occupied in 1967 except Jerusalem, if a guaranteed and directly negotiated peace settlement with the Arab states could be attained.

There are many voices in Israel with diverse definitions of peace and security. In the words of a leader of the Association for Peace and Security, whose members are much concerned about the dangers of expansionism, territory is less essential to security than establishment of bona fide peace arrangements with the Arab states. This distinguished Israeli member of the Hebrew University law faculty declared that: "A border is secure when those living on the other side do not have sufficient motivation to infringe upon it . . . We have to remind ourselves that the roots of security are in the minds of men . . ."

The Arab equivalents of the new binationalism and of the greater Israel Movement are the Palestinian commando movements which call for establishment of a democratic, secular, and in some instances, socialist Arab state.

The concept includes the return of all Palestinians from the post 1948 diaspora and reestablishment of an Arab majority.

Since the Six Day War there have been significant changes in Arab perceptions of a realistic and acceptable peace settlement. They range from the recently announced willingness of the UAR to accept, not only the state of Israel, but negotiations for a peace settlement (this is a radical departure from the inflexible position maintained for over twenty years), to new proposals made by Palestinians living on the West Bank. These views, based on recognition of Israel's strength as a major Middle Eastern power, vary from support for a Palestine state on the West Bank; a Palestine to include Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza; to support for a binational Palestine in which both national entities would coexist within the borders of a single state. All depart radically from the most militant Arab nationalist views.

This wide spectrum of views within both Arab and Israeli political communities contradicts the polarized image that exists in the United States where the tendency is to regard Israel and Arab views as monolithic, ignoring the great diversity that actually exists. The result is a naive American political conception in which all Arab views are automatically regarded as anti-Israel; and pro-Israel statements or views sympathetic to Israel are automatically regarded as anti-Arab. This polarization so distorts rational political discussion of the Middle East and its problems, that reasonable settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict often seems impossible in the American setting.

Although they were fragile, opportunities for peace initiating existed even during the mandatory era. There were several occasions during the 1920's and 1930's when they could have been developed. True, these opportunities may not have borne fruit. But their neglect contributed to the present impasse threatening not only the lives and security of Jews and Arabs but of the whole world as the conflict escalates to the higher level of great power confrontation.

Fairly detailed political arrangements were devised by a small number of Palestinian Arabs and Jews in mandatory Palestine who sought to bridge the gap between their respective communities through some form of compromise. However, insistence by most Arab leaders that Palestine remain an Arab country and the determination of the Zionist establishment to create a Jewish state led to an impasse.

After extended negotiations between a group of Jewish leaders led by Dr. Judah Magnes, American president of the Hebrew University, and Musa Alami, a respected Arab notable, Magnes reported: "The impression which we got was, that there was little desire on the part of the Jewish Agency to continue with the negotiations with the Arabs, but there is a tendency to bring about the failure of the negotiations, not on (the Jewish Agency's) side, but from the side of the Arabs." The history of frustrated attempts at solution are neither new nor are they one-sided. They go back to the beginning of the conflict and have continued to the present.

Given this unpromising background, where do we find ourselves today? Obviously any feasible solution must take into account existing realities. But each protagonist has his own hierarchy of realities. They include military, geo-political, economic, psychological, and power factors that extend far beyond the Middle East. The problem is to find a framework for settlement within which the realities can be fitted. Obviously such a framework must be very broad if it is to include the rights, the claims, the fears and the aspirations of all parties.

The framework for an inclusive solution was laid out in the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. Adopted unanimously by all members of the Council including the United States and the Soviet Union, nations which were friendly to Israel and those which were friendly to the Arab States, as well as by Israel, Jordan and Egypt, the resolution is broad enough to include the requirements for a settlement equitable to all parties. It takes into account the existence of all nations in the Middle East and all participants in the conflict. It also deals with the very controversial question of territory, recognition of the state of Israel, the Palestinian Arab refugees, and the quest for security.

Since the resolution was not too specific, it left room for negotiations; however, it is specific enough to deal directly with the major causes of the 1967 war, that is, the insecurity of the conflicting parties. It takes into account Israel's fear of devastation by surrounding Arab states and Arab fear of Israel's intent to expand its frontiers. The resolution calls for: "Termination of all claims or states of belligerence and respect for the acknowledgment of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." In further recognition of Israel's fears the resolution affirms, the necessity "for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area."

Arab concern about Israeli expansionism is recognized in emphasis on "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security [and on] . . . withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."

While a major shortcoming of the resolution was its failure to specifically mention the problem of Palestine nationalism, it does affirm the necessity "for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." Provision is made for "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones." Efforts to implement the resolution are relegated to a special representative, Gunnar Jarring, designated by the Secretary-General. His function is to "establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve peaceful and accepted settlements in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution."

The resolution thus covers within its broad framework nearly all aspects of the conflict including borders and security, international waterways, Arab recognition of the state of Israel and the refugee problem. Although two major aspects of the problem are not directly mentioned, these being Jerusalem and Palestinian Arab nationalism, the provisions are broad enough to encompass them. No doubt it would have been far better to have included specific references, but the resolution was drafted after prolonged negotiations resulting in compromise wording.

There are certainly more ideal possibilities for solution than those covered by the resolutions since it makes no radical departure from the *status quo*. However, a radical departure would require concessions of such magnitude that both sides would have found them unacceptable, beyond their respective conceptions of reality. For example establishment of a bi-national state, or of a democratic secular state would require elimination of the state of Israel in its present form. It is no more within the realm of present political reality to disestablish Israel than it is to disassemble Communist China or Russia. Political reality demands co-existence of regimes whose ideologies are repugnant to each other.

In the Middle East, reality demands acceptance of Israel despite its internal ideology, just as powerful regimes have acquired legitimacy as well as power and have been accepted into the world by anti-Communist nations. Since 1967, Palestine Arab nationalism has become another reality. Despite many setbacks and assertion by Israel's prime minister that the Palestinians do not exist, they too have galvanized sufficient strength to be accepted as a reality which must be included in any settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Jerusalem also possesses a serious dilemma. While Israel physically controls the city and has unilaterally stated its determination to incorporate it within the boundaries of the Jewish state, another reality is that neither the Arab residents, the Arabs of Palestine, the Arabs of the surrounding countries, nor the overwhelming majority of the international community is willing to accept unilateral Israeli decisions about the future of the city. How can the reality of physical possession be made to correspond with the reality of world sentiment? The publication, *Search for Peace in the Middle East*, prepared for the American Friends Service Committee refers to these special problems. "Jerusalem is unique, and a solution will have to be unique." The story of the last decades is a denial as much of the uniqueness of Jerusalem as of its holiness.

"Three religious traditions meet in Jerusalem. No non-Jew can enter into the feelings and emotions of Jews at the Wall of the Temple. No non-Muslim can realize the Muslim regard for the Dome of the Rock. For Christians certain special sites in Jerusalem arouse deep emotion.

"The world should establish inviolable rights to access for Jews in perpetuity to the Wall, for Muslims to the Dome. Both must assure freedom of access for Christians to their holy sites.

"In time it should be possible to create some sort of federal condominium to govern an undivided and demilitarized Jerusalem. Meanwhile,

the most satisfactory arrangement would seem to be separate Jewish and Arab boroughs, with certain shared municipal services, under some coordinating United Nations agency. That the city should be undivided and demilitarized is obvious common sense. That it should be united under exclusive Israeli control seems unlikely to ever be acceptable to most Muslims and Christians of Palestine. Jerusalem must not again become a divided zone of conflict as it was for twenty years. It cannot peacefully become a sole possession of one religion or one national state."

The Palestine Arab refugee problem is another aspect of the conflict that has plagued the world for nearly a quarter of a century. Today the refugee problem has become an integral aspect of the question of Palestinian Arab nationalism. Without a solution for Palestine nationalism it will be difficult if not impossible to solve the refugee problem. In the two decades they have lived in the Arab diaspora surrounding their former homes, most refugees have become more fervent Palestinian nationalists, fueling the irredentism at the heart of the conflict. Even refugees who succeeded in leaving the camps and ascending the socio-economic ladder in the surrounding Arab world, as well as many Palestinians who were never classified as refugees and who fared well in business, commerce, education, and political life of the surrounding states, maintain their Palestinian identities. Indeed it is this younger generation which achieved status in the surrounding countries who have become leaders in the nationalist movement.

According to the secretary general of Israel's largest and most influential political group, the Israel Labor Party, Mr. Arie Eliav: "The Palestine nation is identifiable as a national entity by a national consciousness, by continuous territory where most of the Palestinians live, by a history of several decades replete with battles and wars, and a diaspora which maintains a link with the Palestinian homeland. At the same time it is conscious of a common national catastrophe, sacrifice, suffering, heroes. It has dreams and a start of a national literature and poetry."

The refugee question is not one that can be resolved by economic development alone. Even if the Palestinians attain a national home, making possible return of all refugees who desire to settle in a Palestinian state, there will remain the hard core of an unassimilable and unemployable older generation who can no longer be rehabilitated. By and large the men and women in this category include most of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who are in camps administered by the United Nations in Gaza, Israel, East and West Bank Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. A Palestinian Arab state would have to receive assistance to provide for the remaining years of these people who are not unlike the large welfare constituency which even our own country with its vast resources has been unable to assimilate.

The June War revealed to many Palestinians realities of the last twenty years. After the war many who remained in the West Bank were able to visit their former homes in Israel to see for themselves how their homeland had changed: Where once there was an Arab orange grove near Jaffa there now was a large housing development; the grain fields formerly surrounding

Beisan or Acco are now filled with new urban developments including shopping centers and streets of new cities; even where former homes remained intact the neighborhood character has completely changed. Many who had the opportunity to see the changes of twenty years, had second thoughts about returning to live in a Jewish state and many were willing to consider payment of compensation for their property as part of an equitable solution.

The Palestinian cause is endangered by that most traditional of characteristic ills which has plagued Arab politics, that is, the great divisiveness which fragments the national movement. The commando organizations from which the movement has grown are divided into a dozen factions separated by differences created by personality, ideology, tactics, priorities, and alliances with one or another Arab country. Not only have the Palestinians failed to develop a unified leadership, but their views range from those of groups seeking to completely radicalize Arab politics, destroying "reactionary" regimes throughout the Arab East, to views of groups who give increasing attention to possibilities of coexistence between Jewish and Arab national entities.

The Jordan civil war in September 1970 and in July, 1971 was a severe setback for the Palestinians, although their cause was not totally destroyed. Defeat did lead to second thoughts among many commandos who have more realistically been appraising their political objectives, concluding that even though the state of Israel and its ideology may be repugnant, it cannot be destroyed; that Palestinian Arab nationalism must find some form of coexistence with the Jewish state.

The major failing of peace proposals in the Arab-Israel conflict has not been their lack of imagination, insight, or omission of the key issues. More importantly, they have lacked means of implementation. No proposals for settlement in such a dispute can be self-enforcing, especially when emotions run so deep and the antagonists are so far apart on fundamental principles.

Israel has insisted that peace cannot be imposed by outside powers, but must come through direct negotiations with the Arab states. Implicit in this assumption is lack of great power involvement, and at least a minimum of mutual confidence and trust essential to direct diplomacy. However, these conditions do not exist in the Arab-Israel conflict.

The great powers are and have been involved in the Middle East throughout modern history. They have been involved in every major change in the *status quo* going back to the eighteenth century. All major territorial changes and the status of waterways such as the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal have involved the major powers.

Without great power participation in a peace settlement, the danger of continuing conflict would threaten any arrangements that might be reached. Thus, integral to any settlement is relaxation of the tensions between the powers that are backing local contestants. As long as the Soviet Union and the United States regard the Middle East as vital to their own international interests, they will continue to back their respective clients; and these clients

will continue to regard great power support as a valid reason for refusing to bargain away what each considers to be its vital national interests.

Essential to any long term or permanent settlement is agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on their own legitimate interests in the region; what they will and will not do, and what they will or will not permit their clients to do. As long as the United States and the Soviet Union continue to provide massive armaments to their clients, the clients will be far less inclined to seek a settlement based on compromise than one based upon what each believes to be superior or potentially superior military strength.

As long as Egypt can rely on Soviet missiles to prevent an Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal, and as long as the Egyptian army can rely on the hope that Soviet military trainers and advisors will provide their armed forces with an offensive potential, there is little if any reason for the country's leaders to accept compromise solutions which could create great internal tensions and perhaps disrupt the existing political systems.

As long as Israel can rely on massive American military supplies paid for by low interest loans and backed by American opinion supporting an administration with a strong pro-Israel position, there is no reason why that country's political leaders should disregard the advice of their military advisors not to surrender any strategic advantage gained through the territorial acquisitions of 1967.

Failure of the great powers to either halt or limit arms supplies to their Middle East clients can only lead to further escalation of the arms race. While many Israeli voices warn against the obvious dangers to Israel's democratic society from over reliance on military security, the mainstream of Israeli public opinion continues to think in terms of day-to-day security needs rather than of long term threats to the country's democratic system.

The cost of military security has more than doubled since the Six Day War. Only four short years since the war fought to guarantee the country's security, defense expenditures absorb a third of the country's gross national product, one of the highest proportions of GNP devoted to defense expenditures in the modern world. Well over half the population is employed either directly in defense or in defense related employment.

Egypt too is among those nations which devote a major part of its national resources to security needs. In Israel the pressures are less obvious because of the war boom which has eliminated unemployment, created a burst of inflation, and has created an illusion of prosperity. Egypt on the other hand is obviously in the throes of a major economic crisis greatly exaggerated by the massive population explosion which devours increases in agricultural and industrial productivity.

Continued supply of arms by the great powers to their Middle East clients is thus a major obstacle to any solution based upon compromise. It is an obstacle to any solution at all for it guarantees continuation of the no-war no-peace status in which each side is reluctant to undertake major

military operations against the other on the one hand, and on the other, feels that it can continue to resist compromise as long as it is provided with arms it regards as necessary to resist changes which might undermine security or national aims.

The obvious way out of this impasse is an arms control and limitation agreement which is applicable in the Middle East as it would be elsewhere. Arms limitation agreements on a larger scale between the United States and the Soviet Union would be imperiled by continuation of the arms race in the Middle East, and without arms limitation agreements within a larger framework it will probably be difficult if not impossible to attain such an agreement in the Middle East itself.

Since the end of World War II both the United States and Russia have become global rather than regional powers. Consequently both have legitimate interests in the Middle East. The legitimacy of Russian interests is determined by history as well as by geography. As noted earlier, Russia did not burst into the Middle East last week, last month or even last year, but has been in the region since the 17th Century. Appearance of the Russian fleet is no new phenomenon. The Russian navy established a power position in the Eastern Mediterranean long before the United States existed. In reality Russia not only adjoins, but is part of the Middle East. Its southern republics contain larger Muslim populations than those in any Arab country. The legitimacy of Russian presence in the Middle East was recognized by the major Western powers as recently as World War I when they signed the secret Constantinople agreement granting Czarist Russia not only a sphere of influence, but actual territorial enclaves and control over the Turkish Straits. Russia's appearance in the Middle East during the 1950's is in reality a reappearance after a hiatus of a third of a century during which, under Stalin's dictatorship, the USSR turned its attentions elsewhere. With the emergence of Russia as a world power at the end of World War II, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean were regarded as no less vital to its interests than the far East and the northern Pacific.

American involvements in the region are equally valid and legitimate. American oil interests are of vital national concern not primarily because of income they produce for the American economy, but because of the energy they provide for the industry of Japan and Western Europe. When these oil supplies are threatened through closure of the Suez Canal or through major political upheavals such as those resulting from the Arab-Israeli wars, there is valid reason for the United States to be concerned. Interests of sentiment and emotional ties with Israel are, as Senator Fulbright has pointed out, no less valid than more tangible oil interests. While the United States is bound by no formal security treaties with either Israel or any Arab State, Turkey and Iran are both signatories of security agreements which bind the United States to maintain their national integrity should they be threatened by an outside power.

Are then Soviet and American aspirations and claims and those of their respective clients in the Middle East irreconcilable? They are no more irrec-

oncilable than similar claims and aspirations in other areas where Soviet and American interests converge. Convergence of interest does not in and of itself necessitate conflict of interest. The major dilemma facing the United States and the Soviet Union here, as in many other regions of the world, is to prevent these converging interests from escalating into war.

A major obstacle to reconciliation of these interests is the failure of each power to recognize that the other has legitimate interests in the Middle East. When an American Presidential advisor talks in terms of expelling the Soviet Union from Egypt it shows little if any realistic understanding of history or for that matter of politics. It is sheer adventurism and as dangerous as is the adventurism and inflammatory rhetoric of communist party functionaries who talk in terms of expelling American imperialism from the region.

Far more realistic would be an attempt by the United States and the Soviet Union to do in the Middle East what they have done in many other areas of the world, that is, to strive for some measure of accommodation. Just as both countries recognize the serious dangers of confrontation resulting from conflicting interests in the nuclear arms race, in Germany, in the Far East and in Southeast Asia, it is essential that they reach accommodation in the Middle East. If one power seeks to expel, or to undermine the vital interests of the other, local conflicts are exacerbated and conflict in the region could well undermine efforts toward accommodation elsewhere.

Neither power has yet defined clearly, either its own interests or those of the antagonists which it considers to be legitimate. The failure to clearly define Soviet and American interests in the Middle East frequently creates situations in which symbols of aggression are treated as actual aggression, thereby leading to escalation of tensions between the powers which in turn is transmitted to a lower level of escalating tension within the region.

The Sixth Fleet is to the Soviet Union a symbol of American aggression although in reality American naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean have had little effect on internal politics of any Arab country or on the Arab Israel conflict itself. There is serious danger however, that miscalculation in the use of these military symbols to support flamboyant rhetoric could lead to an incident that might spark a series of escalations which neither the Soviet Union nor the United States desire. Therefore it is incumbent upon both powers to draw clear distinctions between the symbols, and the reality of power; to clearly define what each believes to be the legitimate interests of the other in the Middle East and to recognize that the vital interests of both powers converge there.

Although the superpowers have indicated willingness to reach accommodation in other potential conflict areas—through the SALT talks, by striving for a workable arrangement in Germany and by avoiding direct confrontation in Asia,—since 1967 they have frequently threatened to embark upon a collision course in the Middle East. It is therefore urgent that the present cease fire be maintained and used to deescalate the conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

Maintenance of the existing cease fire is essential to create the climate for settlement at both the local and the superpower levels. If the superpowers can reach accommodation on their own vital interests in the area then there will be little reason for them to continue to escalate the Arab-Israeli arms race.

Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East involves not only the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, but recognition of mutual interests elsewhere in the area. Until today the number of American troops and technicians in Turkey and in Iran nearly equals the number of Soviet military advisors in the Arab states. Since the 1950's the United States has provided military assistance to Turkey and Iran in quantities approximately equal to the military assistance provided by the Soviet Union to Egypt and other Arab States. It will be difficult to reach accommodation with the Soviet Union on matters related to the Arab states and Israel without similar arrangements and mutual recognition of interests in Turkey and Iran, for they are in as vital a position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as Mexico is in relation to the United States.

When Russia and the United States, accommodating their own Middle East interests stop supplying weapons which have made the area a tinder box, Israel and its Arab antagonists will become less dependent upon a military solution to their problems; and the weapons they now possess will become increasingly obsolete. Both Arabs and Israelis will have to rely less on military solutions to their respective security problems than upon diplomacy and direct negotiations. As the possibilities of conflict between the Arab states and Israel lessens, the likelihood of a Soviet American confrontation inadvertently sparked by smaller nations in the Middle East will diminish; thus the vicious circle that links Soviet American conflict with the Arab Israeli war will be broken. Hopefully, as their dependence upon outside sophisticated weaponry declines, nations in the area will turn from war to diplomacy to resolve their differences.

Both superpowers therefore have roles to play in the diplomacy leading to settlement and in the maintenance and guarantee of any settlement that is concluded.

Because of their long term interests and involvements in the Middle East both the United States and Russia will have continuing roles to play in the region after peace has been established. It is doubtful that either Arabs or Israelis will have sufficient trust in each other to maintain those provisions of the 1967 Security Council resolution which call for secure and recognized boundaries. While the resolution affirms the necessity for guaranteeing political inviolability of frontiers, "through measures including establishment of demilitarized zones" there is no definition of the extent of such zones or of how they are to be maintained. Experiences since the 1949 Armistice Agreements militate against demilitarized zones that are policed by the parties themselves. A major cause of the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars was the failure of the parties to agree on definitions of demilitarized zones. Both Syria and Egypt constantly charged that Israel failed to maintain those

provisions of the armistice agreements establishing demilitarized zones whereas Israel denied that demilitarization involved any infringement upon national sovereignty, feeling free to establish police forces in the so-called demilitarized areas.

The function of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in relation to demilitarized zones was very ambiguous. At best the organization could merely report to the UN Secretary General when one side or the other charged that there had been violations. The major deficiency of the United Nations Emergency Force established on the Egyptian side of the armistice lines in 1957 was that its legal position was also ambiguous and its presence on the Egyptian side of the frontier was subject to approval of the UAR government. Furthermore the fact that it was stationed on the Egyptian and not on the Israeli side, was a constant source of irritation and embarrassment to Cairo which frequently was charged by other Arab governments with having surrendered Arab sovereignty. Any new demilitarization arrangement should include specific guarantees against unilateral cancellations by any party of either the demilitarized areas or the forces policing them. Demilitarized areas would of necessity have to be on both sides of any frontiers established in a peace settlement. Such forces could be removed only by mutual agreement of countries on both sides of the demilitarized frontier, and by the United Nations Security Council. Thus no nation would have a veto over the authority of such an international force.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have indicated willingness to participate in such security forces. While Israelis have been skeptical of Russian participation because of the anti-Israel position maintained by the Soviet Union for two decades, and because of general suspicion of any international forces present on Israeli territory, the United States is in a position to exert a moderating influence on Israeli resistance. The UAR on the other hand is equally suspicious of American presence on its soil for very similar reasons.

A way out of this dilemma might be for American forces to take the responsibility for maintaining demilitarized areas on the Israeli side, and for Soviet forces to maintain similar responsibilities on the other. To assure that each power maintains its responsibility they might be joined by third world or Scandinavian forces which would have parity of control in the demilitarized zones. Eventually if such arrangements work to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, Israeli and Arab units might join the international peace keeping forces set up in the demilitarized zones. Ultimate responsibility for these international forces would lie with the United Nations Security Council which would be responsible for financing and administering their operation on both Israeli and Arab soil.

Another area of potential cooperation between the superpowers is in supervision and maintenance of arms limitation agreements. The powers have the hardware and the technical competence to implement any such agreements and to guarantee that they are enforced. However, a major requirement of

arms limitations agreements is their extension beyond the Arab Israel area to include sensitive areas along the Soviet frontier such as Turkey and Iran. Obviously the Soviet Union could hardly expect arms limitation along its frontiers to be applied unilaterally; it would be necessary in such an agreement for the Soviet Union to also limit its forces along frontiers with its Middle Eastern neighbors.

Looking hopefully into the future at a time when recognized frontiers have been negotiated, arms limitation has been agreed to, and an environment conducive to peaceful development of the region has been established, the superpowers could undertake through the United Nations, a process of peace development. Soviet and American economic and technical assistance to the area could then be channeled through the United Nations in a Middle East Institute for Research Planning and Development. Until today there has not been established a Middle East Bank for development. Both Russia and the United States could make valuable contributions to establishment of such an institution whose assistance would cut across Arab, Israeli, Turkish and Iranian frontiers helping to develop the Middle East into a region attuned to international progress and development.