

## NEPAL THE LAMB

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The close ties that developed between Nepal and the Peoples' Republic of China in the early 1960's can be looked at as a culminating point of relations that existed between those two countries during the 1950's. It could be further said that those relations were a response to the Indian-Nepalese relations, as well as Sino-Indian relations especially in the 1950's.

Nepal and China have carried on some type of economic and political relations with each other since about 629.<sup>1</sup> Though these relations were not always of a benevolent nature, they still were maintained with a certain degree of regularity. As early as 1413 Nepal and China were exchanging diplomatic missions and were on friendly economic standing. The one main interruption to those friendly relations was the Nepalese invasion of Tibet (1792) which was a protectorate of the Chinese Empire. After the Chinese retaliated by an invasion of Nepal, a treaty of peace was signed whereby Nepal agreed to send tribute missions to China, in exchange for the return of the land in Nepal that the Chinese had occupied. China later was to declare that these tribute missions demonstrated Chinese suzerainty over Nepal. Nepal rejected this declaration as unfounded, the tribute missions were sent as per the treaty of 1792 and were the only relations between the two countries. There were several other attempts to bring Nepal under Chinese control. But, these attempts were blocked either by Britain, Nepal's declared protector after 1857, or by India. The friendly relations that existed between the two countries, China and Nepal, were again on the rise as a result of unsatisfactory relations between India and Nepal.

India and Nepal were politically linked with each other by way of friendly relations, primarily, due to two major reasons. First, the royal line of Nepal was primarily of Indian stock. This situation would, naturally tend to bring the two countries closer together. The second factor, both countries were under British dominance; India was a colony of Britain until 1947 and Nepal was a protectorate of Britain.

Thus, because of this relative situation between India and Nepal, the economic and political affairs of those two countries were harmonious. This harmony was shown in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship that the two countries signed in 1950, which read as follows: "the two governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between them."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The main source of this brief sketch of Chinese-Nepalese relations was taken from Hemen Ray, "Communist China's Strategy in the Himalayas. Nepal, a Case Study," *Orbis*, Vol. 11 (Fall, 1967), pp. 826-7.

<sup>2</sup> Ray, p. 828.

Another factor that helped to draw Nepal and India together was the establishment of a constitutional monarchy within Nepal and the usurping of the rule of the Ranas (ministers of state). After Nehru called for Nepal to align itself with the "democratic forces that are stirring in the world . . .",<sup>3</sup> the king of Nepal, Tribhuvan, was set to comply with this request and set up a constitutional monarchy. But, the Ranas who had control of the government put pressure upon Tribhuvan to prohibit such a measure. As a result of this, Tribhuvan was forced to seek refuge in India. From there he gained support of the India government and returned to Nepal to establish his new government. The Ranas were soon left without power due to conflicts they had with the Congress Party which was supported by India. Thus, India played a prime role in the ending of the oligarchical rule of the Ranas and the establishing of the congressional form of government in Nepal. Because of this, later Prime Ministers of Nepal felt a close relation with India.

Almost simultaneously with the closer ties being developed or those that existed being strengthened, relations with China were on the upswing as well. The Sino-Nepalese relations can be said to have become better during the 1950's, partially, as a result of the relations between India and Nepal getting better. Because the Ranas were overthrown by the constitutional monarchy of Nepal with the very important aid of, and sympathy from the Indian government, charges were made that Nepal was becoming a colony of India, or at least coming under some form of control by India. As a result of the public stir that was created because of this, the government of Nepal sent out feelers as to increasing the relations that existed between that country and China. From these feelers grew the trade agreements of 1956 and later years.

Another aspect of Nepalese-Indian relations helped to cause a shift toward better relations with China. In 1950, China sent a contingent of forces to Tibet to establish Chinese dominance over Tibet. Although India made verbal accusations concerning Chinese dominance of Asia, India did not physically surpress China's move. This had the effect in Nepal of questioning the amount of aid that India could give to Nepal if that kingdom were attacked by the Chinese. Treaties had been signed between India and Nepal, but it was doubted if India could help in any crisis in Nepal. Thus, it was believed that it might not have been wise for Nepal to side too greatly with India in Asian matters. For its own security's sake it was wise for Nepal to increase its relations with China.

Thus, in the 1950's Nepal began to increase its economic relations with China in an effort to curb any possible Indian imperialism that many in Nepal felt was present, and it also increased these relations in an effort to keep itself from taking sides in what was becoming an Asian Cold War.

It should be understood that although Nepal was increasing its relations with China, the relations between India and Nepal were still very close. It seems that Nepal increased its relations with China without hurting those

<sup>3</sup> *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches: 1949-53* (Delhi: Government of India, Publications, 1954), p. 147.

with India; that is to the extent of actual lessening of economic trade between those two countries, as for political statements, there were numerous threats and counter-threats as to the aligning of Nepal with India or China. To demonstrate the closeness of the ties that existed between India and Nepal the Sino-Nepalese economic assistance treaty of 7 October, 1956 could be used. In this treaty it was stated that China would "make a free grant to the Kingdom of Nepal within a period of three years as from the date of the signing and coming into force of this Agreement in an amount of 60 million Indian rupees."<sup>4</sup> Because India stated that this was a massive move on the part of the Chinese to bring Nepal under their wing and Nepal was freely signing such an agreement Nepal immediately cut the amount of the assistance to 40 million rupees as a gesture of its concern over Indian-Nepalese relations.<sup>5</sup> Nepal seemed extremely careful in its relations with China so that it would not endanger its relations with India.

Thus, through the end of the 1950's, Nepal was attempting to maintain a neutrality between China and India. Nepal proved this by refusing to sign a defense agreement with India due to the particular reference, or inference, toward Chinese aggressions. But, after examining the role that Nepal played in its attempts to remain neutral it still seems that it favored India and seemed greatly effected by Indian official and public opinion.

As of 1960, however, this position of pro-Indian neutrality encountered a change. This change was due to situations that existed with relation to Indian-Nepalese affairs and also due to a more zealous Sino-Nepalese relationship. I would describe the time period and the events and factors examined below as a shift of Nepal from the sphere of influence of India into a more neutral position.

There are several reasons for the slackening of the close relations that existed between Nepal and India after 1960. The factor that caused a change in the relations between these two countries and also that effected the other reasons for this change seems to be the revamping of the government of Nepal. In 1955 King Mahendra came to power, after the death of King Tribhuvan. He ruled through the Congress of Nepal and particularly through the Prime Minister B. P. Koirala. In November of 1960, Mahendra decided to consolidate his own power within the state. As a result of this consolidation, the Congress was dissolved and many of the cabinet members, including Koirala, were arrested. Many other members of the Nepalese Congress were forced to flee to the Indian city of Calcutta.

This move by Mahendra had an ill effect upon the Indian-Nepalese relations. The Congress of Nepal was formed in 1951 after the Indian government had helped Tribhuvan to rid Nepal of the rule of the Rana class. The Congress was formed after the Indian parliament and even adopted many of the ideas of Nehru concerning the democratic-socialistic formulation

<sup>4</sup> "Agreement on Economic Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal," in G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar (eds.), *Documents on China's Relations With South and South-East Asia* (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private, Ltd., 1964), p. 334.

<sup>5</sup> Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 832.

of a country. Thus, the government of India was quite closely associated with the government of Nepal before Mahendra's consolidation maneuver. By Mahendra dissolving the Congress of Nepal he was disturbing one of the main advances that India had promoted and defended against the Ranas. This combined with Nehru's desire for a democratically oriented state in Nepal, instead of the monarchy that Mahendra was fashioning, had the effect of creating a sense of anger on the part of Nehru for the activities in Nepal. Thus, Nehru was opposed to the polity of Nepal as it existed after November of 1960.

As a result of the debacle of the Nepalese Congress as the ruling structure in Nepal another main factor developed that would tend to counter close relations between India and Nepal. Many of the members of the overthrown government, to avoid arrest, fled to Calcutta. In Calcutta they established the Nepalese Congress Movement. This movement was primarily a propaganda movement whose efforts were directed against Mahendra; but it was also a guerilla movement. Under the leadership of Subarna, this organization carried on guerilla raids across the Nepalese frontier from India, then it would return to India for refuge. These operations (which were carried out from the end of 1960 through December of 1962) infuriated Mahendra.

Since these raids were coming from Indian territory, the relations between India and Nepal would surely be in jeopardy. But, what was even worse, the Indian government was accused of intentionally giving refuge to the guerrillas and also training those guerrillas. The head of the Mahendra cabinet after the dissolving of the Congress, Tulsi Giri, even stated that India gave its blessing to the guerilla activities, because if India did not, those activities would not occur. In short Giri claimed that Nehru still had a strong influence over the Congress, and if he did not condone the raids, they would have been stopped. According to one report, Giri was supposed to have said, "If India just whispered in Subarna's good ear (it seems as though he were partially deaf) 99% of the raids would stop."<sup>6</sup>

Thus, the combination of Nehru's dislike of Mahendra's dissolving of the Nepalese Congress and the Mahendra government's accusations pertaining to possible Indian support of the Nepalese Congress Movement, the move by Nepal from the sphere of influence position vis-a-vis India seems quite a rational maneuver. This drifting away from that sphere of influence combined with the factors mentioned below helped to bring Nepal into closer relations with China.

One of the prime factors to be considered in the relations between China and Nepal would be the threat that China, as a military aggressor, could present to the sovereignty of Nepal. In 1959, Chinese troops entered Tibet in order to demonstrate China's sovereignty over Tibet, and to put down the attempts by the Tibetan leaders to usurp that hegemony. This presence of the Chinese on the border of Nepal could be seen, and was seen by leaders in India, as a direct threat to the independence of Nepal. This threat was emphasized by Chinese entering Nepalese territory to claim that territory for

<sup>6</sup> "Nepal: War in the Mountains," *Time*, Vol. 79 (9 March, 1962), p. 33.

to an article in the *Economist*, dated 27 August 1960, Chinese troops had the Chinese government as rightly a part of Tibet and thus China. According entered the province of Mustang in Nepal and pressed the inhabitants of that area for provisions and also taxes for the government of China.<sup>7</sup> Since the maps of the area of the border between Nepal and Tibet were never in agreement (particularly those maps belonging to the different countries), it is quite conceivable that this was an honest mistake on the part of Chinese troops. But, regardless, many members of the government of Nepal as well as those of India were busy preparing themselves for the invasion that most surely would come.<sup>8</sup> The remembrances of the statement of Chairman Mao in 1939 in which he said that the "Western imperialists detached Vietnam, Burma, Korea, Nepal and Bhutan from the Chinese empire which were States tributary to China . . ." was used by many observers of the situation to explain what would happen.<sup>9</sup>

The invasion, however, did not come. In fact, China chose to end any disputes with Nepal over borders by calling for the establishment of a survey team consisting of members of both countries to lay the specific boundary between Nepal and Chinese territory. The agreement for the initiation of said surveying was signed in March of 1960, and the final border treaty, that resulted from this cooperative mission, was signed in October of 1961. This border was marked very clearly and the individual markings were described in the final treaty.<sup>10</sup>

What was China's reason for this action? Why had it chosen to honor the boundary between Nepal and Tibet when it did not honor that border between China and India? The reason seems to be threefold. First, China was seen by Hemen Ray as giving a reward to Nepal for remaining neutral during the Chinese occupation of Tibet. He stated, "India earned China's hostility for sympathizing with the Tibetans and for granting asylum to the Dalai Lama . . . Nepal, on the other hand, adopted a policy of neutrality in the Tibetan affair and did not support the Dalai Lama against Communist China. Its reward was that China showed special interest in solving the frontier issue and other problems in dispute with Kathmandu."<sup>11</sup> Nepal was, thus, spared any further border trouble because of its neutrality; whereas India's open support of Tibetan independence cost India peace along its northern borders.

Second, I find this move on the part of the Chinese a move quite in line with China's policy of increasing friendly relations between itself and Nepal. By the signing of the border treaty between those two countries, the danger of unintentional conflict was eliminated.<sup>12</sup> Thus, a main cause for friction between China and Nepal was eliminated, allowing for relations between the two countries to grow more friendly without the hampering of unnecessary

<sup>7</sup> "Between Indian and China," *Economist*, Vol. 196 (27 August, 1960), pp. 814-15.

<sup>8</sup> "Between Indian and China," *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Vidya Prakash Dutt, *China and the World*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966), p. 30.

<sup>10</sup> Refer to the "Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaty: 5 October, 1961," in *Documents on China's Relations With South and South-East Asia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-215.

<sup>11</sup> Ray, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> A. M. Halpern, "Types of China Policy," in A. M. Halpern (ed.), *Policies Toward China*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1965), p. 485.

friction.

Thirdly, it was better for China to settle the border dispute with Nepal than to carry through any further aggressive plans that might be in the making because the operation would be highly unprofitable for China. Nepal was definitely no match for the military strength of China, so it did not present a military threat to China. Because Nepal was so much weaker than its northern neighbor, China could capture Nepal, or pass through Nepal whenever it might see the necessity. Thus, why should China face added international condemnation and a possible deepening of the conflict with India and its allies for such an impractical venture. As one author stated, Nepal's weakness is its security.<sup>13</sup>

Regardless of the reason that initiated the Chinese attempts to end the border conflict with Nepal, since it was China's attempts that helped to start the negotiations over the treaty, this action did tend to have a favorable effect upon the relations between Nepal and China.

Another reason for the closer Sino-Nepalese relations being achieved during the first half of the 1960's would be involved with the make-up of the Mahendra cabinet after the government of Prime Minister Koirala was dissolved. Mahendra's Home and Foreign minister, Tulsi Giri, and many of the other members of the cabinet were accused of being of leftist orientation, particularly by the Indian government.<sup>14</sup> This would help explain why Nepal was more receptive to Chinese relations during the stay in office of Giri. Another reason that the cabinet might be inclined to increase the relations between China and Nepal would be its lack of linkage with India. The cabinet of the government of the Nepalese Congress owed its very existence to aid from India in the destruction of oligarchical rule. That Congress government was also established upon the principles of democratic-socialism taught by Nehru. The Giri lead cabinet felt no affinity to India for these reasons. One author stated that the influence that India had over the foreign and domestic policies of Nepal had been "replaced by that of younger men for whom pre-war contacts with India were less meaningful and whose main motive is independent nationalism."<sup>15</sup> Thus, the leftist leanings of the cabinet plus their lack of relationship with India helped to put Nepal on a more receptive level in its international relations, to Chinese influence and trade.

I find there to be still another possible reason for Nepal's better relations with China. Nepal was going through a stage during which it was expressing its independence. For years Nepal had been considered to be under heavy influence from the government of India. Since this influence was lifted due to the less friendly relations that were experienced between India and Nepal after the dissolving of the Nepalese Congress and the events and factors that were related to that maneuver by Mahendra, Nepal was more free to enact its own foreign policy. This could be evidenced in the increased trade throughout Tibet, Pakistan and Burma.<sup>16</sup> Trade relations with China not being the

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> "Nepal: Another Place for U.S. to Worry About," *U.S. News and World Report*, Vol. 50 (22 May, 1962), p. 76.

<sup>15</sup> Halpern, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

<sup>16</sup> "Between China's Toes: Himalayan Tito," *Economist*, Vol. 209 (23 November, 1963), p. 751.

only trade relations of Nepal that increased, this seems to be a sound thesis. Thus, since Nepal could only gain from relations with China it seems Nepal would have a perfect right to initiate such relations. Nepal was, then, acting in the manner of a nonaligned country. It was dealing with anyone that it felt could be beneficial to the growth of Nepal.

It is ironic that India was waging a verbal battle against the Mahendra government for acting in this manner. India had been doing the same sort of thing for years. It was trading with the United States and the Soviet Union at the same time, maintaining rather good relations with both. As a result of this U.S. officials claimed that India was becoming a communist country and was slowly breaking with the West. Nehru stated that India was merely acting in congruence to its policy of nonalignment, and that there were no political overtones to the relations with the Soviet Union. When Mahendra used this same idea in the running of Nepalese affairs the cry of communist advancement was coming from India. Nehru condoned his own actions because of the policy of nonalignment, but would not see that that policy could also be used by a country that was, supposedly, under its sphere of influence.

Regardless of the reason, or reasons, the relations between India and Nepal were in a slump, while the Sino-Nepalese relations were on an upswing. India's policy became, as a result of this shift, directed toward bringing Nepal back under its wing. India acted both politically and economically to reverse the situation.

Economically India's effort was to pump its own foreign aid into Nepal, thereby hoping to outdo the efforts by China. Such a maneuver would show Nepal, supposedly that India had more to offer to Nepal than did China so that it would be to Nepal's advantage to return to the formerly close relations that it had enjoyed within the Indian sphere of influence. Thus, India began to increase its, already massive, aid program directed toward Nepal. It, along with the United States were stepping up their aid in order to outstrip the aid by China. From World War II to 1967 the aid the U.S. had given to Nepal amounted to \$98 million. The greater part of this aid came during the period after 1960.<sup>17</sup> It involved the United States building schools, approximately 810 schools, helping to control malaria, initiating rural development projects and aiding in the establishment of family planning agencies. India's aid was said to be even greater than that of the U.S.<sup>18</sup> India had built a road between Nepal's capital, Katmandu, and Calcutta to increase the viability of trade between the two cities. It also promised, as part of its aid to Nepal, defensive weapons and the training of Nepalese troops in Indian schools.<sup>19</sup>

Chinese aid to Nepal, by way of comparison, during the 1960's was somewhere in the neighborhood of \$21 million a year. This aid was spent in the building of warehouses and a shoe factory and in the construction of a road between Katandu and the capital of Tibet, Lhasa.<sup>20</sup> The Soviet Union

<sup>17</sup> "Nepal: A Neutral Cockpit," *Time*, Vol. 90 (3 November, 1967), p. 26-29. Referred to herein as "Neutral."

<sup>18</sup> "Nepal: another Place for U.S. to Worry About," *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> "Neutral," *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>20</sup> Tibor Mende, *China and Her Shadow*, (London: Thomas & Hudson, Inc., 1961), p. 210.

to back the effort of China was giving aid to Nepal, on a minor scale as compared to the efforts of the other countries involved, consisting of a sugar refinery and a cigarette factory.<sup>21</sup> Thus, there existed a real competition between the communist powers, and the noncommunist powers.

One author had described the situation as follows: "He (the author is referring to Mahendra) has not only managed to keep his landlocked, Wisconsin-sized nation from being swallowed up by its giant neighbors, but has turned Nepal into a highly profitable 'neutral cockpit' — as admiring diplomats call it — by letting the world's great rivals pay handsomely for his friendship."<sup>22</sup> It was pointed out in the same article as that from which this last quote came that the bidding for favors was going to such an extent that Nepal was getting more aid than it could use.

As to the political aspect: India in December of 1962 stated its displeasure over the continuation of the guerilla activities directed by the Nepalese Congress against Nepal. I think this was due at least partially to the fact that such activity by the guerilla forces was having little effect upon the polity of Nepal, except for the fact that India was seen in a bad light by that polity. Thus, the attacks stopped. This ended a main source of friction between India and Nepal, thus, allowing for Indian influence to again take root.

The shift back toward better relations with India and a cooling off of the relations with China was a long process for Nepal. Between 1962 and 1968 the foreign policies of Nepal were involved in this shift. The main reason for this has to do with a new awakening of the fear, on the part of Nepal, of Chinese aggression.

One cause for this reawakening of the fear of aggression centers around the Katmandu-Lhasa Road. The road had originally been built to carry small commercial trading vehicles from Tibet to Nepal as a means of reopening the trade relations between those two countries that had existed for centuries. But, it was found that the road was secretly being fortified by Chinese engineers to be able to carry heavy equipment, especially of a military nature.<sup>23</sup> This helped to bring concrete evidence to the fear that people in Nepal and India had expressed as to the use of that road for the purposes of invading both Nepal and India. Since China had also initiated plans to build a road system throughout Nepal, this would mean even more easy accessibility of Chinese troops to the rice fields of Nepal.

Another cause of this fear had to do with the rumors that Peking was training revolutionaries to overthrow the Nepalese government. Since many hundreds of Nepalese students were in schools in China this seems like a justified rumor. In the years of 1966-1968 numerous mass demonstrations were started in Nepal to protest the objectives of the rumor.<sup>24</sup> In 1966 evidence was given to show that this may not have been just a rumor. An

<sup>21</sup> "Neutral," *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> "Neutral," *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Robert C. North, *The Foreign Relations of China* (Belmont, California: Dickenson Publications Co., Inc., 1969), p. 129.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.



assassination plot failed to take the life of King Mahendra. This plot was found to be at least partially sponsored by the Chinese government.<sup>25</sup>

As a result of this attempt on the life of the King of Nepal, Mahendra dissolved his cabinet, the one that had existed since 1960. Tulsi Giri and many other ministers were jailed; if they could they sought freedom in Peking. As a result of this dissolving of his cabinet, Mahendra found it necessary to place the majority of the national work load upon himself: it was said that he did not trust the new cabinet he had set up.

The liquidating of the cabinet of Nepal in 1966 by Mahendra and the massive work load that he had set up for himself, were other reasons for the worsening of relations between China and Nepal. Mahendra had a heart attack in 1968 and was partially disabled for close to a year. According to one article Mahendra, was forced out of sheer necessity to depend more highly upon his new cabinet. Thus, during the time of his illness, the cabinet was in charge of the workings of the government. The way that this effected the relations between China and Nepal was that the new cabinet was not of the leftist inclination that the Giri cabinet was. In fact, the cabinet was more prone to favor closer relations with India than with China.<sup>26</sup> Thus, China found itself in almost the same relationship that it found itself in before the Nepalese debacle of 1960.

In fact, the role of the cabinet that was set up in 1966 in the affairs of Nepal would act as a good explanation of why Indian relations became closer and the Sino-Nepalese relations cooled off. The cabinet was made up of men who were outwardly anti-Chinese, or at least quite cautious in their dealings with the Chinese. This make-up was intentional on the part of Mahendra because of the rumors and fears of Chinese aggression, which were demonstrated by the supposedly, Chinese planned attempt on the life of Mahendra.

On 30 October, 1968, former Prime Minister Koirala and the other members of that earlier cabinet were released from prison. The members of the Nepalese Congress Movement were given royal pardons and allowed to come back into Nepal. The reason for this was that Mahendra, being physically weak, could not afford to have public support withdrawn from his government. Since he could rule the country with the efficiency with which he once had, he had to depend on full public support. Since a segment of the public was not in support of the government, because they favored Koirala who had become a hero to them while he was in prison, Mahendra released Koirala in hopes of regaining that support. In fact, after releasing many of the former Congress members, many were returned to jobs within the Nepalese government. Some even gained the cabinet seats back that they had lost.<sup>27</sup> Since these men were pro-Indian in respect to international relations, it negated any political and economic advances the Giri cabinet had made with respect to Sino-Nepalese relations.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> "Nepal: Revolution, but No. Re-evaluation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, (February 1967), pp. 97-101.

<sup>26</sup> Frederick H. Gaige, "Nepal: Compromise and Liberalization," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9 (February 1969), p. 98.

<sup>27</sup> Gaige, *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

Therefore, there is an almost complete circular effect taking place. India and Nepal were extremely close before 1960. The shift was made toward better Sino-Nepalese relations at the cost of Indian-Nepalese relations by the end of 1960. By 1969 Nepal had again assumed good relations with India, this time at the expense of China.

What is significant about this situation is Mahendra's statements that Nepal was an independent country that was able to formulate its own policies with whomever it liked. But, I find this not to be the case. It seems the sketch that I have given of the events of the 1960's that Nepal's foreign policy was not formulated by itself, but by the actions of India and China. Mahendra, to a major degree, did not limit relations with India because he wanted to express his country's independence; instead he limited these relations because of India's support of the Nepalese Congress, not by his own power. India had limited relations because of its actions, not because of the actions by the government of Nepal. If India would have maintained its support of the Mahendra government instead of placing its sympathies on the overthrown Congress, it is possible that the limiting of the relations between India and Nepal might not have occurred and the turn to China might not have been as great. Since India and Nepal were not on the best of relations with each other, and since Nepal was a landlocked country, it had to extend its trade through some other country; thus, the closer Sino-Nepalese relations.

Because of the Indian and Chinese competition over Nepal, Nepal was put in the middle of the argument merely as a recipient of favors from both sides. Its neutrality was only existent because the other two countries were trying to match favor for favor.

The lessening of the relations between China and Nepal came about because China was over playing its political hand. It had done what it did in many other countries besides Nepal. China had gained good relations with countries in Africa only to find these relations cut back drastically because of suspected or real Chinese subversion in those countries.

Thus, Mahendra may have made the decisions as to Nepal's relations with India and China, but between themselves, India and China determined Nepalese foreign policy.