UNITED STATES POLICY IN ASIA: CHALLENGES OF THE 1970'S IN SOUTH ASIA

Charles H. Heimsath*

In the approximately twenty years during which the United States experimented, defined and executed its policies toward the independent states of south Asia the following relationships emerged: With India, by far the most important state, regionally and globally, the United States established no durable, institutionalized collaborative ties of a political nature. Yet on ad hoc grounds American and Indian common interests were sometimes identified and promoted, to wit, during the latter stages of the Indonesian-Dutch struggle, during the early months of the Korean War, in the United Nations Congo operation, in the Laos settlement of 1962, in the Indian-Chinese war of 1962, in reaction to the Soviet Union's "troika" proposal for the United National Secretariat, and in concurrent economic efforts to keep Napal linked to the non-communist world. The sole Indo-American tie which lasted over these two decades and has been supported by consistent high policy decisions on both sides was and presently continues to be the purposeful cooperation in Indian economic development. That economic relationship places the United States in the misnamed role of aid dispenser and India in the vexatious position of recipient.[1]

The reasons why United States-Indian relations never jelled at a level above engaging "shirt-sleeves diplomacy" (invented during the first term in New Delhi of our most successful ambassador, Chester Bowles) can be summarily rehearsed: Nehru wanted India to be fully independent and hence nonaligned in global politics, whereas the United States regarded Asian (and perhaps European) states as potential subordinate allies in the bi-polar confrontation with Soviet communism. The best arrangement that the United States could offer newly independent India might have consisted in India's replacing China as the man bastion of American interests in Asia. But this certainly could not satisfy Nehru, and the suggestion may even have offended him.

With Pakistan, on the other hand, the United States managed to string out for a decade (1954-1963) a mutual adherence to the supposedly common interest in checking all pro-communist forces in southern Asia. The United States-Pakistan link, established by military treaties and accompanying economic transfers, actually resulted from Pakistan's desperate need to overcome its geopolitical

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* Professor of South Asian Studies, American University.

[1] When accounts are taken of the interest rates and repayment schedules on aid loans for development, of the advantages to American industries from the fact that most loans involve purchases of American goods, and the persistent American compulsion to find overseas outlets for its surplus agricultural production, then the characterization of transfers of material goods as "aid," in the Second World War sense of that term is faulty terminology. Unfortunately, four American administrations did not redefine the purposes of their aid program in India so as to base them on political and economic advantage to American interests. Perhaps they feared the loss thereby of what little public acquiescence existed in foreign aid programs dubiously wrapped up as American "generosity."

and economic inferiority vis-a-vis India. Pakistan's need did not precisely correspond to the American policy of containment of communist expansionism, but many United States officials thought that the fit was close enough, in view of the 'leanings' of India's prime minister. The United States-Pakistan attachment fostered on both sides strong personal commitments at official levels, particularly among military men. But it is not easy to show in what ways the divergent American and Pakistani state interests coalesced during ten years of fairly intimate contacts. Perhaps they never really did, as Pakistan's brilliant diplomat, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, began to notice after 1963. Still, by appearing to regard Pakistan's interests as closer than India's to American goals in south Asia the United States identified Pakistan as its only ally in that region. It thus placed a psychological and militarily exlosive impediment between itself and India, and no efforts of the most dedicated American could circumvent that obstacle. Pakistan eventually discovered, as Nehru knew from the beginning, that it desired 'friends, not masters': it phased out American installations and has been learning somehow since 1965 to live without heavy American arms deliveries. (Chinese and Russian supplies compensate to some extent.)

In two of the remaining south Asian states, Afghanistan and Nepal, the United States built up a justified reputation of wishing to promote independence, through economic strength, of countries directly bordering on the large communist-controlled empires. Avoiding political manipulation and hints of military-strategic involvements the United States furthered its own interests of blocking the extrusion of predominating Russian and Chinese influences and thus tangibly collaborated with the two governments in ways which are vital to both. In relegating Ceylon to a position of marginal or only potential importance to the United States, the American government sponsored no special or interesting relations with that island state, whose security seems irrevocably linked to its ties with India.

In broadly overviewing the 1950's and 1960's one notes the absence of a crisis atmosphere in the United States with respect to south Asia. Occasional spurts of concern, stimulated by an Indian famine or a military probe from China, failed to establish sustained American interests that are likely to carry over into the 1970's, even in economic development as it is presently understood. Population planning, to which the United States has made large physical contributions to India and Pakistan, may be an exception to this statement, when reviewed a decade from now, but that American interest has thus far been officially listed among lower external priorities; it is merely a cloud on the horizon in the American perception of its overseas responsibilities. The absence, from the American standpoint, of recurrent or persistent crises in south Asia has been the result of the area's remarkable political stability, India's non-aggressive and non-nuclear military posture, and the lack of powerful private American ties in the area (as exist in west Asia). Everyone has benefited from this circumstance, except probably American aficionados of south Asian cultures, who have wondered why the

country at large has not awakened to the splendors and excitements of the region of traditional Indian cultural sway.

John P. Lewis, director for five years of the United States Agency for International Development's mission in New Delhi, observed recently that there are few foreign countries which should matter more to Americans than India, but that in fact concern us less![2] He attributed this partly to the superficial familiarity of the place and partly to the myth that any national state even if it is "a vast subcontinental system" deserves a treatment approximately that given to any other. Pakistan ranks even lower in American concern than India, despite ten years of military alignment.

Thus in south Asia the 1970's are less encumbered by relics of American high policy intentions than in most other parts of the world, and therefore we are reasonably free to speculate on the challenges that the decade may offer.

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Let us first concentrate our attention on India, as I think American policy-makers will be doing when dealing with south Asia in this decade.

Like the United States, India is now facing such compelling yet uncertain transformations in its domestic life that expectations for it to undertake major external initiatives involving tangible resource commitments should be discounted. The far-reaching political repercussions of the last general election may appear as a quiet overture to the madding orchestrations of the 1970's, when the world's largest free populace fully exploits the possibilities of a constitutional system no longer dominated by a monolithic Congress Party. Governments may rise and fall at the center as they do now in the states, and law and order may increasingly come to depend on the army. After almost one quarter century's successful coping with secessionists and divisive movements the Indian state has become stabilized as a permanent entity, and any serious consideration of its falling apart should rightly be given up as a vain scholastic enterprise. But stresses and thundering strains there will be, as the innately conservative Indian people attempt vastly to reconstitute their lives without resorting to mass violence on a national level.

What emerges from the reconstruction now proceeding of family lives, caste and community associations, village and municipal orders, and at all levels of religious, artistic, and educational experiences will put democratic institutions to their greatest test in human history. The results will not be in by the end of the 1970's, or for that matter in the lifetime of any of us.

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[2] Lewis monograph, "Wanted in India: A Relevant Radicalism," Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, December 1969, p. 4. How otherwise explain the fact that India is about at the bottom of per capita aid from non-communist countries and multilateral agencies? (See Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development*, N.Y. 1969, p. 298, including chart.) Pakistan has received about twice as much economic aid per capita as India but still ranks among the lowest of recipients.

Therefore, the United States will not be likely to find itself in the 1970's trying to react to an India vigorously promoting its political interests abroad, as it did in the 1950's. India and the United States, both focusing inwardly, will continue to deal with each other politically at arms' length. The Indian people are unlikely to deplore that position: as a group they are out of personal necessity isolationist and do not relish for their society intimate involvements with outsiders.

In contrast with its remote political relationships with the United States and most Western states, India has been experimentally leaning toward closer relations with Asian states. In the latter part of the 1960's New Delhi, sensing the loss of global influence as Russia and America moved toward detente, upgraded its relations with countries in the Indian Ocean and Pacific regions. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's recent tours to the south and east demonstrated that this process of building regional ties is gathering momentum; it will continue far into the 1970's. India's program, still very vaguely defined, aims at helping to build internal strength in a region from which the Western powers are finally withdrawing. Additionally, the government is encouraging heavier Indian exports to Asian markets, in some of which Indian products once enjoyed booming sales. (A further plausible objective may be an Indian desire to regain for a collaborating group of Asian states some of the gobal prestige that the region lost when the exciting new African states appeared on the scene in the 1960's. The old-Arab-Asian grouping of the 1950's in the United Nations is dead, but something like it might emerge again.)

Casting itself in a leading role, though by no means leader, in a loose grouping of states, India is trying multilaterally to preempt establishment of Chinese or Russian spheres of influence in the vast arc stretching from Egypt to Japan. Of course American and British spheres are equally unacceptable. New Delhi repeatedly protests against Western powers' and opposes any state's setting up bases in the Indian Ocean, even for communications or refueling; the matter was even taken to the United Nations Security Council.[3]

The apparently genuine desire to keep the Indian Ocean in a state of military unpreparedness and free of nuclear weapons illustrates the extent of India's confidence in its own security vis-a-vis China. Not so long ago, in November 1962, Prime Minister Nehru felt driven to ask for American air defense in case of a Chinese air attack on Indian cities;[4] later, Indian spokesmen raised the possibility of an umbrella of nuclear deterrents furnished by Russia and America as protection for a non-nuclear India. India in the 1970's has moved far away from such postures of dependence. But some smaller states in south and southeast Asia would feel less secure than India does with the withdrawal of Western power. For them India says that

[3] See statements in the Rajya Sabha, Dec. 18, 1969; reported in *India News*, Washington D.C., Jan. 2, 1970.

[4] See details in a forthcoming book by Krishan Bhatia on India since independence, published by Simon and Schuster, New York.

it is promoting economic cooperation, which will "by itself" (sic) create the regional strength to fend off external pressures.[5] B. R. Bhagat, the Minister of State for External Affairs, stated the policy plainly:

> "What we want is a broad based economic organization of all countries in Asia so that no single country or group of countries from Asia or outside can dominate any country in Asia. We do not want such an organization to have any political undertones or military overtones for that would only divide Asia into conflicting groups and make them the camp followers and satellites of bigger powers. At the same time, we do not wish to gatecrash into any regional organization that may be there.[6]

This sounds very much like Nehru's policy in the 1950's, the failure of which had not a little to do with the Americans entering the area and undertaking their brand of containment through anti-insurgency operations which grew into a major war. The *panchasheel* shield was nothing but rhetoric: it could not stop the communists in Vietnam and Laos or the Chinese in the Himalayas, and it is no longer mentioned in New Delhi. But today, the Indians are prepared to contribute more than proclamations to the maintenance of Asian security: they will support a non-military economic grouping which is not specifically directed against a particular state or managed by a great power. Already they have made high-level bilateral political consulation with Asian states—Japan is the most important— a regular feature of their diplomacy. They are open to a wide range of multilateral schemes, the most innovative of which is the Indian-U.A.R.-Yugoslavia preferential tariff arrangement concluded in December 1967. Perhaps most important, they will continue to promote the notion of a *multilateral* convention that would acknowledge the integrity of present international boundaries in Asia, a kind of legal and moral commitment to noninterference along the lines of the dated *panchasheel* bilateral proclamations. In short, there is a new mood in Delhi of willingness to collaborate in tangible ways with middle and small states rather than primarily with the great powers, of identifying India's interests with those of other, mainly Asian, states, and a welcome absence of the moral posturing, the patronization and even disdain towards lesser states which frequently crept into Nehru's diplomatic style.

But, indeed, India's position in Asia today is probably evolving into a situation not much different from what it was in the late 1950's, that is towards political equidistance between Russia and China; and domestic political pressures on foreign policy have also not changed much. Periodic arousing of the image of a menacing China takes on a rather platitudinous tone, when in fact the government knows that a 'pearl harbor' sort of debacle in the Himalyas will not occur again. A stalemate has been reached on the Indian-Chinese frontier which brings India back to the military posture that it

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[5] Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh's statement in the Rajva Sabha, *idem.*

[6] From Lok Sabha debates, April 4, 1968; *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. XIV, 4, April, 1968. p. 97.

held at the beginning of the 1960's, now however with a realpolitik awareness of its power position vis-a-vis China. Possible nuclear threats from Peking aside for the moment, India's present and justified course as a status quo power in the triangular mainland Asian power structure is to practice nonalignment, as it did in the 1950's. It is true that the posture has almost no meaning today with respect to a bi-polar global power structure. But vestiges of real nonalignment adhere to India's present position in the Asian world, and these to a degree validate the government's proclaimed dedication to that posture.

Although nominally pro-Russian, India is basically nonaligned in the Russo-Chinese bi-polar confrontation on the Asian mainland—ideologically and strategically. Whatever unpredictable events flow from that epic struggle for security, India will formulate its policies so as to remain unembroiled. Apart from an understandable desire to avoid the national costs of war, India almost intuitively refuses to commit itself in a Russo-Chinese struggle because it wants a flexible international system of political alignments. Such an unpredictability of factors influencing the outcome of a power struggle can serve to discourage opposing parties from taking the risks of all-out conflict: this is an axiom of Indian political behavior specially notable in foreign relations. Indians have long been practitioners of the recently coined American posture of 'keeping the options open'.

During the entire decade of the 1960's India habituated itself to a hostile relationship with China. The causes for that hostility rested on policies originating in New Delhi as well as in Peking. The lack of consistency and clarity in India's relations with Tibet from 1947 onwards probably contributed as much to the tension of the Himalayan frontier as Chinese aggressiveness. Because China refused to make a common cause with India in what Nehru termed the 'resurgence of Asia' and in fact nudged India rather brutally, and at one point spectacularly, out of its traditional Tibetan interests, New Delhi began to regard Moscow only as an important source of economic support but as an informal military ally against China. As long as Chinese-Indian hostility prevails there is nothing so valuable to India as its ties with the Soviet Union; it is presently India's major supplier of military equipment. Russia, in fact, is the ideal ally of any state having difficulties with the Chinese.

But the Indian government and public, disliking dependence of any kind on foreign states, would prefer to stand more nearly independent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This desire plus the high cost and risk of military preparedness in the Himalayas are prime reasons for India to examine ways of improving relations with China. Another motive is to gain relief from the prospect of a joint Sino-Pakistani pressure on India from the north and east. To these ends public overtures have been cautiously made, and the government has stated that it will "not be found wanting in responding" if China should seek "friendship and cooperation."[7]

[7] Dinesh Singh's statement in the Lok Sabha, April 8, 1969; *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. XV, 4, April 1969, p. 72. Prime Minister Gandhi's more flexible approach to China and apparent willingness to modify the Colombo proposals in negotiating with China on the Himalayan dispute is discussed by Selig Harrison in the Washington Post. Feb. 14, 1969.

A reconciliation with China would lessen India's present political dependence on the Soviet Union and open the way to resuming the posture of nonalignment. As it previously acted in a stabilizing role in conflicts between the Soviet and Western coalitions, so India may find itself standing in the middle and trying to minister to the cause of Sino-Russian peace, which also is vital to its own security. There is no sign at present that China might modify its deep suspicions about India's policies and even discuss a reconciliation. But the 1970's have just begun.

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From the American standpoint Pakistan's external political relations in the 1970's may require more attention than India's merely because they seem less predictable. Pakistan's form of domestic governance, the very structure of the state, will be evolving in this decade, and a great many possibilities are open to the people of that uniquely split up country. The years have ended during which Pakistan could depend on powerful external (American) support for its anti-Indian stance, and therefore that single-minded posture determining external policies is more difficult to maintain. The recent growing influence of the Soviet Union in Pakistan's affairs, strengthened by its decision to deliver military equipment, may be accompanied by more binding restrictions on Pakistan's freedom to provoke India militarily than were American verbal discouragements. Soviet purposes in cultivating the Pakistani government lie chiefly, however, in preventing Islamabad's exclusive reliance on Chinese support. American aid, meanwhile, attempts to keep open another external option for the Pakistanis.

The unpredictably wide range of choices in foreign policies that have been opening up to the Pakistanis could, if skillfully exploited and supported by domestic political unity and a continuing high economic growth rate, bring Pakistan much more prestige in international affairs than it has enjoyed in many years. Perhaps new leadership will direct the West Pakistanis—East Pakistanis do not need to be led—away from that trance-like preoccupation with the liberation of Kashmir that has locked foreign policy into a predetermined course for two decades. Opportunities for diplomatic maneuver in West Asia and Southeast Asia could result in more advntages to redefined national political and economic purposes than those which previous governments have earned.

The essential proposition underlying these speculations should be made explicit: Pakistan can no longer expect any major successes in its efforts to wrest Kashmir from India. There is no disposition in New Delhi to try for a reconciliation with Pakistan through compromising on that vital assset, the Kashmir valley. Partly as a result of the 1965 war India knows that it has overwhelming military superiority over Pakistan alone and perceives no present necessity to reduce a military threat from the northwest, although it would feel more comfortable if one did not exist.[8] In order for

[8] The Indian-Pakistani military force ratio is about three to one in terms of manpower.

both governments to act rationally in accordance with the dictates of India's subcontinental predominance they will have gradually to educate their electorates on matters of power capabilities and incapabilities, which may be more edifying than propagating communal distrust and using the other state as a permanent scapegoat.

What gains can Pakistan's leaders consider sufficient to compensate for giving up any immediate hope of incorporating Muslim Kashmir into West Pakistan? Perhaps the following: In the first place, a recognition of the status quo in Kashmir would certainly entail a quid pro quo from India in the form of settling several outstanding problems, including the Farakka barrage dispute, and of implementing the 1960 Indo-Pakistani agreement on the Berubari enclaves. Internationalization of the waters dispute in Bengal, which India presently opposes but might be induced to accept as a part of a broader detente, could attract the assistance of external agencies and result in a transformation of the economy of East Bengal. Secondly, the loosening up of the Indo-Pakistani military confrontation would reduce Pakistan's heavy defense budget and its reliance on foreign sources of military equipment. Funds could be reallocated toward industrialization, particularly in the neglected eastern wing. A related and third, compensation affecting the very existence of the state would be a possible strengthening of the ties between East and West Pakistan, with India cooperating in the growth of overland transport and convincingly reassuring the east that it is not an undefended, threatened wing of the state. Consecrating the unity of the 'two Pakistans' is the premier challenge to any national government. Maintaining the myth of the threat posed by India has not succeeded in binding the two wings into a truly national state; in fact it has been counterproductive to that end, because the east has always been militarily vulnerable to an Indian attack. A redirection of West Pakistan's preoccupation from the Kashmir problem to the solidification of the nation might be a challenge sufficient to attract the most ambitious Pakistani politician or political party. Finally, a great boon to the peoples of both Pakistan and India would derive from resumed commercial and cultural contacts between the countries and freedom for citizens to travel across the artificial boundaries that separate friends and families.

Whatever direction is revealed in Pakistani politics in this decade, the United States would serve its interests in the subcontinental status quo best by remaining tolerant of Pakistan's effort to balance the influences upon it of the three largest Asian states and to seek benefits from all of them.

Already, for many years, the United States has been supporting the balanced posture in regional politics of Afghanistan and Nepal. Surrounded by states of middle or great power status these countries have successfully maintained a nonaligned stance vis-a-vis all major contenders for influence in the region and have established for themselves a kind of circumscribed independence in foreign affairs. Nothing presently indicates that they will be forced to abandon their useful status as buffer states in the 1970's.

Ceylon's role in regional politics is minimal. Overshadowed by its nearest, huge neighbor it has not, since the experiment in closer economic ties with China in the mid-1950's, had much to contribute to international political affairs. Nor does Ceylon ask for anything but to be left alone. For two decades Ceylon has not had to fend off external pressures, but if a powerful state other than India seeks to replace Britain's military presence in the Indian Ocean, Ceylon's vital interests as an island are touched. It then appears in the lead among regional states opposing any vacuum-filling move from outside. Although the United States has been able to ignore Ceylon, it should not treat lightly Colombo's objections to an American naval or air presence in the Indian Ocean. The states of the region, Ceylon included, do not expect the United States to disavow its present willingness to assist militarily in meeting overt aggression from either China or the Soviet Union—or, for that matter, from an India somehow transformed into an expansionist power. Therefore, a minimal or token American presence in the Indian Ocean, after a force reduction in Vietnam, should be anticipated. Despite Ceylonese and Indian objections, the United States cannot wisely reduce its prestige, i.e., its predictable power, to the point of allowing an unchecked Soviet or Chinese naval domination of the Indian Ocean. Until Indian naval forces can fulfill their rightful responsibility of patrolling that Ocean, the American navy, should maintain the open seas principle by a low profile presence in that area, preferably with inconspicuous base rights. But to meet partially Indo-Ceylonese objections, the United States should refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into the Indian Ocean.

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The introduction of the factor of nuclear weapons into international politics is often accompanied by elaborate intellectual revisions of standard analyses of the relations among nations, culminating in the building of hypothetical models that seem to be aimed at frightening statesmen and populaces into numbness or frenzied over-reactions. As usual, India is the only consistent exception to this observation. The Indian government simply refuses to become panicked by the development of nuclear weapons in a hostile state sharing a long common border. As a result, New Delhi's position on nuclear weapons strategy meets criticism from Indian experts in international relations, most of whom have been over-compensating for their past looseness of thinking on national security matters by exaggerating the alleged complacency of their government today in refusing the nuclear option. India, it will be recalled, has the capacity to build nuclear weapons but still refuses to do so. India's strategy in meeting a potential nuclear threat from China is too delicate a matter for the government to discuss openly in detail, although I have no doubt that careful reasoning has been employed in private discussions within the leadership of the country. Somewhat cryptically, Mrs. Gandhi has frequently explained the reasoning of her ministry:

Question directed to Mrs. Gandhi: "Is it clear to you what the policy and role of the United States would be in the event of threats against another country from a major power using nuclear weapons in Asia?"

Prime Minister: "As far as I understand, it is that should any country with nuclear power attack another country, then it does not remain a localized conflict. It becomes a much larger world war and, therefore, many other countries will probably get involved."

Question: "Does that mean that as far as you know there is no such concept as nuclear umbrella for this part of the world?" P.M.: "There is no nuclear umbrella. . . ."[9]

India cannot rely on specific external promises, such as those embodied in the multilateral treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, to assist in the case of a Chinese nuclear threat against India. No nation relies on such promises.

Instead, India can reason out its security position in this way: If China threatens to use nuclear weapons against India it will be the first such case of a nuclear—non-nuclear state confrontation. If the threat goes unchallenged from one or more major nuclear powers, China will be given free reign to introduce this novel element into its relations with all other Asian non-nuclear states, including Japan. Such a strategy of threat cannot be tolerated by the United States or by the Soviet Union if its succeeds in imposing a Chinese domination throughout Asia, that is if India or any other state should bend under Chinese threats. If, on the other hand, India, for example, refused to bend and received a warning nuclear attack from China, the original nuclear powers would have to retaliate or suffer inevitable eclipse by the only state apparently willing to engage in nuclear combat. India, in short, is protected by the nuclear counter-threatening capabilities of the Americans and the Russians, neither of whom will stand aside to permit China to dominate Asia. This calculus of nuclear diplomacy or military strategy seems to be one on which the Indian government can presently base an adequate national security policy. Such reasoning may lie behind Prime Minister Gandhi's assurance that "many other countries" are potentially involved in what less imaginative observers view as an exclusively Chinese-Indian confrontation. As a matter of fact, China's nuclear capability seems to have been developed as part of a strategy against Russia, not India.

There are important peripheral considerations as well, some of which may lead to a shift in nuclear arms policies in the future: First, Pakistan might seek and acquire nuclear capabilities if India

[9] From Prime Minister Gandhi's press conference in New Delhi at the time of President Nixon's visit to India. *Indiagram*, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1, 1969. The "nuclear umbrella", protection by nuclear powers of non-nuclear states threatened by other nuclear powers, was proposed by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri but did not receive explicitly favorable responses in the USSR and the US. Most recently, President Nixon has put forward an American "shield if a nuclear powers threatens the freedom of a national allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole." Report to Congress, Feb. 18, 1970; White House press release, p. 41.

did so; or it might manage to obtain nuclear strike capabilities first. But no reasonable leader in the subcontinent could look with comfort on a regional nuclear arms race, or "balance of terror". Second, by abjuring nuclear weapons production now, India of course does not close off their eventual or secret development. The Prime Minister has made that point clearly. Meanwhile, India is perfecting its scientific rocketry. As a further, third, consideration, India's present image of its role in Asia as a medium-sized power is not compromised—perhaps it is improved—by its remaining non-nuclear weapons capabilities. However, if New Delhi were to try militarily to counterbalance Peking's influences on third countries, by collaborating within Asia with countries such as Japan and Indonesia (as an Indian Naval Staff study recently recommended), the lack of nuclear weapons might appear to be a handicap: the militarily deterring capabilities of regional big powers might lack full credibility among the small states if nuclear threats had to go unanswered. Finally, one must refer to the nonproliferation treaty. India's refusal to sign appears to be final, despite pressures being exerted by the United States and the Soviet Union, notably the latter. Its two main reasons for refusing have met with no satisfying answer from the treaty's sponsors: the treaty imposes unequal restraints on nuclear powers (which can continue their "vertical" proliferation) and non-nuclear powers (which are denied the right to obtain nuclear weapons and thereby to proliferate "horizontally"); also the treaty might be used to impede peaceful uses of nuclear energy in non-nuclear signatories. Citing these objections India easily defends its case—and, of course, retains the ultimate nuclear option!

To summarize this analysis of political developments in South Asia of concern to American interests in the 1970's, all the states of that area are steering firmly independent courses, have sound plans for meeting threats to their survival and integrity, and do not look to the United States or any major power for political support. This is a very healthy state of affairs, much to be admired and sharply in contrast to the disturbed scenes in the regions to the west and to the southeast.

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The strategic interactions of the post-war period, intense as they have been, may be seen as a passing phase in the centuries-long movement in human events known as the 'meeting of east and west'. The intellectual denouncement of this historic east-west interplay will certainly not appear in the 1970's. But we are surely in the midst of a major chapter in this vast process, which might someday be entitled "The Diffusion of Technology". America stands on the eastern horizon of Asia as the embodiment of the technological age, which is rapidly encompasing southern Asia and China as it has already penetrated to the roots of Japanese culture. The American people, promoters, whether they like it or not, of this global revolution, are being swept into the process of technological diffusion and will hopefully begin to face its inevitable implications and oppor-

tunities, when the traumatic yet comparatively simple preoccupations of military-political involvements have faded.

Let us focus on a partial aspect of this vast perspective, which makes immediate and concrete the philosophical point of view just expressed.

An inexpert observer of Indian cities and landscapes is joined by professional economists in reaching the judgment that India will in this decade rank among major industrial powers. Already it does not require from abroad capital equipment to build an industrial complex as much as it does parts and raw materials to keep running the diversified and self-generating manufacturing sector already in existence. In the 1970's India's export capacities should bring an important influence to bear on world trade in manufactures, while the home market will continue a growth in its demand for imports. Sensing India's growing economic power and its compelling needs the government has been for several years laying most stress in its external relations on economic interests. The convening of the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in New Delhi in 1968 was illustrative of the fact that major Indian initiatives in foreign relations are now economic, not political. Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh identified the government's purposes in a Lok Sabha statement of April 8, 1969: "It is my intention," he said, "to infuse greater economic content in the conduct of our foreign policy. We have in the Ministry an Economic Division which is paying special attention to the problem . . . it will be our effort now to strengthen this Division. . . ."[10] The increasing emphasis on economic questions in the External Affairs Ministry mildly reflects the government's current sensitivity to the public insistence on more effective and more radical movement toward general prosperity—per capita, not only national increases in income.

Even with respect to that long-debated external subject, India's responsibilities for the security of southeast Asia, the government has defined an economic formula: "What we need to build is the economics of these countries to be able to resist aggression, and not to plant a few ships here and there to be able to say that we also have a presence."[10a] In identifying its south Asian interest in the decade at hand the American government will have to assess this more pressing economic strategy emanating from New Delhi and other capitals.

The novelties of India's present approach to external economic relations are, first, its decision to adopt multilateralism in pressing its demands on the industrialized countries' interests; and, second, its down-grading of traditional aid programs in favor of other devices aimed at extracting benefits from advanced economies. The great achievements of the first three five-year plans in the realm of foreign collaboration derived from India's ability to negotiate loans and grants through bilateral contacts with the great powers and their allies. India's peculiar posture as the leading nonaligned state gave

[10] Reply to a foreign affairs debate, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. XV, 4, April 1969, p. 71.
[10a] Dinesh Singh, *ibid.*

it special bargaining power, which it would not have possessed as merely the largest of the group of underdeveloped claimants for international attention. It much preferred to make its own deals for aid than to accept a share of a loan/grant package allocated, as were Marshall Plan funds in western Europe, by some rational criteria defined by the financers and recipients all together.[11]

For several years, while the United States-Soviet detente has been undermining competitive coexistence, the external funding for India's economic development has been declining, as it has for most other aid recipients. Furthermore, in the United States domestic priorities are advancing rapidly ahead of external responsibilities, and within this decade almost all Congressionally-authorized financing for south Asian development may well be phased out. A suprisingly large number of Indians do not regret this development and wish only that a cutting off of all aid could be initiated from the Indian side. However, the government, though increasingly reluctant to base its planning on external financial allocations, has not been able to terminate its reliance on aid. But its negotiating posture is changing, towards a multilateral demand along with other developing states for benefits from the developed states. This merging of its no longer very special negotiating power with the seventy-seven developing countries which signed the Charter of Algiers in October 1967, prior to UNCTAD II, illustrates India's recognition that only in concert can developing states hope to gain concessions from stronger powers.

In the absence of larger aid packages, the main concession being sought by India and states with similar economies is more equitable treatment for weaker competitors in international trading systems. As Dr. Raul Prebisch, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, and India's economic emissaries have long pointed out, the developing nations have very little economic bargaining power when dealing—as they must—with the richer economies, and therefore they are slipping behind annually in the global struggle for economic benefits. The terms of trade favor the products of industrial states, which are forced to grant concessions to each other but not to the raw material producing nations. New manufacturing industries in erstwhile backward areas usually cannot market their production on equal terms with established industries in advanced countries: some of India's main exports, *jute* goods, cotton textiles, coin products, hand-woven carpets, and light manufactures, encounter peak tariff barriers on entering countries of the European Economic Community; the United States has quotas on imports of Indian cotton textiles as well as prohibitively high duties on many of India's most promising export products.

For the developing countries as a whole, their share in world exports fell from 34 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1966. As a result, "the developing countries are able to buy, for a given volume

[11] Thus in 1955 the American-backed Simla Conference of Colombo Plan aid recipients agreed that the countries would rely on bilateral negotiations with external financers, because the group felt that more could be gained or less lost, in so doing. Smaller states feared Indian predominance in a possible regional economic planning body; India in turn, saw no advantage in tying up its requests with those from states having less political leverage in the global arena.

of their traditional exports, almost one-fifth less imports than was the case a decade back. The loss in purchasing power in the developing countries has amounted annually to approximately $2.5 billion, which is roughly half of the flow of total foreign aid extended yearly by the developed countries. . ."[12] There are invisible obstacles also to enhancing the competitive position of India and other developing countries. These countries lack overseas marketing facilities; do not have easy access to short-term financing from lending institutions abroad; suffer from having to depend on shipping, brokerage, and insurance services mostly established in richer nations; and, worst of all, have to rely on one or a limited range of products to earn most of their foreign exchange.

These disadvantages cannot be met by increasing foreign aid, even if advanced states wished to rely on that mechanism to appease temporarily the frustrations of developing nations. India, as an example, faces in the 1970's having to repay foreign debts at an annual charge of the equivalent of one-third of its export earnings.[13] Rescheduling of loan repayments may reduce this burden somewhat, but one can recognize here the reason for my earlier hesitation to use the word, aid, in discussing the financing arrangements made with India in the 1950's and 1960's. Foreign loans or even gifts will not of themselves bridge the gap between rich and poor nations. The latter must, instead, be integrated into international economic structures of trade and services so that they do not remain an isolated, resentful majority witnessing the growing affluence of the minority of the world's population. The productive people in developing nations must be given jobs in the international economy, with living wages to compensate them; they must be allowed to join the 'mainstream' of comtemporary global culture—to borrow a famous phrase from American domestic life.

The American people need to be informed, in the words of one Indian, that "economic cooperation between nations is not merely a matter of transfer of goods and services, nor a sacrifice on the part of one and gain to the other. It is an expression of the convergence of interests of both the rich and the poor. It is time we recognized that in most cases what is commonly known as aid today is hardly anything more than an export promotion scheme of the donor countries, although it may be necessary for our development."[14]

In the 1970's India and its developing associates in UNCTAD will surely press with greater than ever force for the specific concessions on trade with developed states that emerged from the two UNCTAD conferences: the granting of preferential tariff treatment to manufactured goods from developing countries, stable and remunerative prices for primary commodities, reduction and elimination of quotas aimed at limiting exports from developing states, assured

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[12] Manubhai Shah, *Developing Countries and UNCTAD*, Bombay 1968, pp. 9-10.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[14] From Dinesh Singh's reply to a foreign affairs debate, Lok Sabha, April 8, 1969; *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. XV, 4, April 1969, p. 70.

purchases of certain raw materials on whose sale entire economies must depend. They want, in other words, to pay their own way towards economic development, to as great an extent as they are able, by selling their goods abroad.

This economic strategy is likely to achieve world publicity and to mobilize the joint political energies of the poorer nations in the way that the anti-colonialist crusades of the 1950's did. But post-second World War anti-colonialism as well as the contemporary struggle for greater economic equality in the world have often occupied the position of a slow freight train marooned at a rail crossing while a fast express carrying very important politicians debating ideologies and security alignments passes through. Is it possible that the United States will give high priority in the future to narrow political and strategic perspectives and therefore ignore the pressures from India and others towards restructuring of the global economy? Will America's domestic needs deafen it to the increasingly insistent proposals that the richest country in the world collaborate with others in solving the problems of the poorest countries?

The hopeful response, that the United States will discern its irrevocable inclusion in the common man's economic destiny in this world and boldly and imaginatively offer interlocking schemes to solve internationally the major problems of physical existence cannot now be given. Such an idea, perhaps more revolutionary than that "most unsordid" American invention, economic assistance to war-torn countries, is not yet even being discussed widely in this country, but it *is* being discussed, in the highest circles. President Nixon showed that he is cognizant of part of the problem and willing to broach a solution, when he announced on October 31, and elaborated on November 10, 1969, his intention to "press vigorously with the developed countries for the adoption "of" a liberal worldwide system of generalized preferences for all developing countries."[15] This policy responded in part to unified Latin American complaints about American unwillingness to support concretely its principled commitment to economic development. All developing states must have noted the positive results that followed from a concerted presentation to a rich government by a regional group of states with common economic problems.

Perhaps we can hope that the still poorly defined American economic policy towards the world's poor countries will reach definitive formulation in Congressional and public discussions during the 1970's. Definitions of new global policies for the American people are currently out of style and are probably undesirable, if they carry with them the presumptions of omnipotence that previous American global objectives have borne. But our own domestic needs are leading us irresistably towards new, interdependent relations with the developing countries, relations of a non-political order for the most part. Because all of us are together going to be overwhelmed if we do

[15] *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 17, 1969, p. 409; Dec. 8, 1969, pp. 493-94. Nixon hopes to move west European countries in this direction and instructed accordingly American delegates to the December 1969 Paris meeting of OECD.

not master the physical crises of the second half of this century. Three of these crises link the United States in varying critical ways with the poorer countries: the maldistribution of the world's resources, the pollution and exhaustion of our physical environment, and the overgrowth of the world's population. Affecting each nation differently, these crises have their common roots in man's physical relationship to his environment and their common method of solution in man's capability of using his scientific knowledge for humane purposes.

No one state can meet these crises successfully by itself or with its allies alone. They demand international action, obviously. As illustration, the United States cannot directly control population growth in south Asia, and yet its interests are in certain ways affected by it. An uncontrolled expansion of the numbers of Indians and Pakistanis will largely negate gross national income growth and commit the two peoples to continued physical misery, low purchasing power for domestic and foreign goods, and possibly lead to aggressive policies of national desperation which might involve other states anxious to preserve the international political status quo. I cannot predict any widespread moral discomfort among Americans who learn that numbers of south Asians have to subsist in physical deprivation worse than America's animal population experiences. But a frustrated, embittered, yet aspiring people, such as live in south Asia today, may ultimately become outwardly aggressive, and wars may thereupon ensue within the area or within the whole of Asia. American interests cannot be isolated from such events, as President Nixon's Report to Congress stated very plainly: "We remain involved in Asia," he wrote. "We are a Pacific power. We have learned that peace for us is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia."[16] Facing population growth and economic frustrations from this perspective, therefore, intense interactions between this country and south Asia are present, or looming as future possibilities. Furthermore, the United States economy benefits from trading with those countries whose national incomes are rising the fastest and have reached the highest levels. Our exports to Japan in 1968 were four times as great as our exports to India, a country of five times the Japanese population.

Not as areas of interaction, but as recognized common predicaments, pollution and resource exhaustion confront this country as well as India and Pakistan. India's parliament set up a commission in 1968 to study acute pollution problems such as are now present in the Ganges River and recommended ways of avoiding the environmental contamination typically found in industrial states. Depletion of natural resources has progressed further in the subcontinent than in any area of comparable size in the world. Many scientists believe that our survival beyond the next few generations depends upon common efforts by all major states to reverse the rapid deterioration of man's only habitat, the earth. All nations can benefit from each other's research and technology aimed at rehabilitating the global

[16] Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 39.

environment. Problems of urban deterioration, similarly, should be studied simultaneously in every country in which they occur.

International procedures to solve the problems of physical existence and try to enhance the quality of everyone's life would have endless ramifications and could never be spelled out in advance. Clearly, a word-wide organization to coordinate governmental programs and undertake some on its own is required, if only to soften the impacts of one country's policies on another. A packaged list of goals, some of higher priority in one state than in another, could be negotiated on the basis of a commonly perceived advantage in reaching over-all agreements. In the case of the United States and south Asia, scope exists to expand enormously the research underway on population limitation and to continue the work accomplished already on improved agricultural practices, notably new seeds and better use of fertilizers and pesticides. International scientific collaboration in oceanography has recently taken place in the Indian Ocean, with leading American participation, and such experiences ought to be repeated. In a few years the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will move a communications satellite into place over the subcontinent and thus collaborate with India in the first nation-wide experimental television broadcasting network, whose purposes include a lowering of the birth rate, mass rural education, and national integration.

Tremendous scope for the more traditional multilateral development schemes exists in harnessing the water power of the Himalayas, and the current Indo-Pakistani quarrel over the lower Ganges waters could be internationalized and thereby resolved in an Indus Valley-type project, as noted earlier. The politically embarrassing rupee credits in India and Pakistan owned by the United States and resulting from sales of P.L. 480 agricultural products, could be siphoned off into such a project to pay for local labor costs and materials. American collaboration in what is now called "social development," as opposed to strictly economic development, notably in the area of residential construction, could well attract American public support in a way that big dams and fertilizer plants never did. Research on a very large scale needs to be done on how societies change economically and technologically. Most applied research today enlarges the gap between the poor and the rich nations because it is sponsored and used by the latter. The United States and other advanced states could move into research specifically directed towards solving problems of backward economies, as the Canadian government's International Development Research Center in Ottawa will soon be doing.

To return to the broader theme and restate it, in the 1970's the high policy decisions that the United States will be making with respect to south Asia will be decisions on economic cooperation. Those decisions could naturally be combined with domestic and other international policies on environmental control and population planning, both of which already attract the concern of many Americans. Multilateral instruments have to be invented in order to cope with these problems, which would preclude the United States mounting on its

own great foreign operations edifaces, which neither the American people nor most foreign nations desire. As Governor Nelson Rockefeller's report to the President on Latin America pointed out, the United States can exert economic and scientific influence with great constructive effect without direct involvement of large numbers of American officials—not to mention armed men—in the lives of other peoples.[17] What would be appealing about the refashioning of American foreign policy around economic, scientific, and technological objectives is the much lower costs in pursuing such ends than in building and handling great war machines. The intensity of individual, creative endeavor, furthermore, would be greater than in the execution of political-military stategies and the personal satisfactions more lasting to a great number of people.

The challenge from south Asia that the United States is least likely to meet successfully in the 1970's is the request—demand is the verb more accurately employed—for trade concessions that would permit increasing sales in the American economy. Yet for India and increasingly for Pakistan the greatest long-term possibility for expanding American collaboration in economic development lies precisely in this area, while a critical minimum of traditional export loans or grants levels off and is gradually phased out altogether. Undoubtedly, any American government's lowering of import barriers and even assisting in opening and expanding markets for the products from south Asia and other developing countries would receive more concentrated and spirited opposition than the blunt-nosed, bored negativism that greets requests for foreign aid. Although the costs to American industries of abolishing certain tariffs and quotas can be made out to be marginal, and to the consumer there would be sayings; in a few cases, such as cotton and silk textiles, American industries would suffer from such a move. No such tariff and quota elimination program as UNCTAD proposes have ever come close to approval by the American Congress. Nevertheless, some gains may be achieved by Asian countries if they approach trade negotiations with a united front. In this way Latin American's recently received at least verbal recognition of their demands; but of course the north American economy is much more closely tied to tropical Latin American products than to any imports from Asia.

The best hope of acceptance by the United States of the main UNCTAD proposals and other suggestions for collaboration in meeting problems of physical survival lies not through traditional trade negotiations but in an American conversion to a belief in international economic interdependence. The post-Second World War American administrations taught the people that their political institutions could not be isolated from revolutionary forces and wars in foreign countries, that the world had become politically interdependent. The administrations of the 1970's can convey with equal persuasion the message that only by greatly increasing the interchanges of technologies, of scientific research, and of commercial products

[17] The report is contained in the *State Department Bulletin*, Dec. 8, 1969.

among all the world's peoples can the United States expect to solve its own problems of physical security and survival.

The leaders of all sectors of American society realize that all of the world's peoples are interlocked in a common physical and moral destiny, that the astronauts' vision of a common world community is an inescapable reality, and that the people of the United States can be moved to act on this realization. The challenge of the 1970's rests on this leadership to define a new international posture which places America's talents and resources in the service of mankind's struggle for a decent survival. Such a posture would have an immediate and beneficial effect on United States relations with the people and governments of south Asia.

DR. FIRMAN'S COMMENTS*

Professor Heimsath's optimistic forecast of economic and political trends in South Asia during the 1970's is refreshing. It reflects a spirit of hope often expressed by a number of scholars who recognize the impressive social, economic, and political developments made by South Asian nations since independence. More often, however, one encounters generally pessimistic accounts on the future of South Asia, ranging from simplistic news articles to such penetrating works as Myrdal's *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations.* Undoubtedly, the average observer of South Asia, as well as many scholars, must find it very difficult to properly assess contemporary events in this world important region of conflict and development. It is even more difficult to visualize trends in this part of the world in the already turbulent 1970's.

The descriptions and interpretations of past United States policy in Asia and analyses of major future challenges that confront the countries of South Asia that are presented by Professor Heimsath are certainly comprehensive in scope and well-supported. Unquestionably, he is a scholar who has been involved in study and research on South Asia for many years, as well as an individual who displays deep feeling for the cultures and political integrity of South Asian nations. As a discussant, and long time student of South Asia, I must say that I agree with most of Professor Heimsath's views and can only offer several general and specific remarks which follow.

The absence of "durable institutionalized collaborative ties of a political nature" between the United States and India is certainly a valid observation. It should be pointed out, however, that failure to establish such ties has been due largely to the resistance of India and not to reluctance on the part of the United States. Specifically, India's desire to follow a policy of nonalignment may be singled out as the basic factor which precluded stronger cooperation on political matters.

Also, I would concur with Professor Heimsath's view that the principal Indo-American links which have been sustained over the past two decades are those associated with cooperative economic development in India. These activities did indeed work to the advantage of both nations by providing India with low interest rates on loans, by the application of rupee credit to the United States, and by benefiting U.S. industry, which became involved via contractual arrangements to supply machinery, technical personnel, and certain raw materials. The extension of U.S. economic aid to South Asia generally resulted in the construction of many vitally important projects in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Rupee credits acquired by the United States enabled great numbers of scholars and students to participate in several exchange programs, which in turn served effectively in providing much needed exposure of Americans to South

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* Chairman and Professor of Geography Department, Towson State College.

Asian cultures and presumably in developing some understanding of the distinctive characteristics of the region.

Pakistan's special, additional relationship with the United States for about a decade, as stated by Professor Heimsath, was based mainly on its desire to maintain a military alliance as security against potential Indian aggression. At the same time, it should be noted that the United States was interested in seeking political alignments in South Asia because of its decision to restrict the spread of communism in Asia. This policy, developed during the 1950's, continues to be a powerful force in guiding our present strategy in Asia, despite statements to the contrary in some quarters.

The observation that both India and the United States will very likely continue to be plagued by internal problems and that this will reduce the chances of expanding political activities between the two countries appears to be reasonable. India's desire to play a leading role in South and Southeast Asia and to develop closer political ties within these regions is certainly a valid assessment by Professor Heimsath.

Statements on Pakistan, United States, Soviet relations during the 1970's are well-formulated. However, much will depend upon the evolving political leadership, which will have to be sufficiently skilled to handle the political attentions of three major world powers simultaneously. It will be interesting to see if any future leader in Pakistan will be capable of reducing the intense preoccupation with the liberation of Kashmir or the Farakka Barrage dispute and devote the nation's attention and energies to both internal economic and political problems and to smoother relations with India. Professor Heimsath's suggested possibilities of the consequences of improved relations between India and Pakistan are well taken; if adjustments can be realized, then the heavy outlay of funds for defense can be rechanneled towards the solution of economic problems.

In my opinion, social, economic, and political changes in South Asia during the 1970's are not easily predictable. In the case of India, "exploiting the possibilities of a system no longer dominated by the National Congress Party. . . ." is fraught with great uncertainty and danger. We are aware, of course, of the tremendous strides that have been made by India and Pakistan through the introduction of new varieties of rice and other crops, the expansion of irrigation facilities, increased use of fertilizers, and by emphasis on industrial development. Certainly Pakistan's economic growth has been outstanding among Asian nations; considerably less economic success has been observed in India. Several five-year plans in both countries have produced remarkable to stunning results in some areas of development, but the distribution of the effects of these accomplishments does not seem to be adequately widespread, and much more time is needed to absorb the benefits of the plans. Meanwhile the rates of growth of the present populations in South Asian nations, especially India and Pakistan, are high. Moreover, such growth in population is not being accompanied by corresponding rates of economic growth generally, and more important, not in the vital area of food produc-

tion. When this situation is taken into consideration along with other critical factors, such as social unrest, a trend towards political instability, and regional inter-nation disputes, then one cannot readily be optimistic about South Asia in the 1970's. The key to the avoidance of excessively difficult times during this period may very well be the maintenance of political stability and brilliant management of population growth.

The concluding statements of Professor Heimsath forcefully indicate the logic of international cooperation as the primary means of achieving some balance in the political and economic well-being of South Asia. Continued participation on the part of the United States in cooperative economic development in South Asia in the 1970's will, of course, be of great importance, although it appears that such participation will tend to occur on a lesser scale than in the past two decades.