

THE SOVIET NAVY: A GROWING FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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Many history books attest to the fact that Russia has sought for centuries to break from her geographical confines and to gain year-round access to the oceans of the world. The intolerable climatic conditions of her Baltic and Pacific ports and the Turkish domination of the straits leading from her only warm-water ports have stifled, until recently, any naval aspirations, military or commercial, that Russia may have had. Instead, Russia, and subsequently the Soviet Union, have traditionally placed their emphasis on land forces and neglected the development of the navy. But the recent emergence of a modern Soviet navy on the seas may signify a new age in Soviet policy. It is necessary to look back a few years and determine how this renewed interest in a navy came about.

The first significant opportunity came about in 1936 at the Montreux Convention. Black Sea powers were granted permission to send warships through the Dardanelles without limit as to the number or tonnage. Turkey did require eight days' notice before the passage of any ship.¹ According to the Convention, the Black Sea could not be used as an attack base for submarines for raids against Mediterranean shipping. Submarines of the Black Sea powers may leave that sea only for repairs in northern shipyards. They must, therefore, "touch base" in Russia's Baltic or Arctic ports before reentering the Black Sea.² Nevertheless, the opening of the Turkish Straits was of great interest to Stalin, who envisioned large, well-balanced Soviet fleets on all the oceans of the world. With such grandiose visions, Stalin readily appreciated the value of control over the Turkish Straits and undertook new efforts to gain this control.

The first attempt occurred in 1939 with the formulation of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. At this time Molotov, in behalf of the Soviet Union, stipulated that he would sign, on the condition that the "area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf" be recognized as the focal point of aspirations of the Soviet Union.³ The extremely vague wording of this statement makes it possible to infer two possibilities. First, the Soviet Union was attempting to establish hegemony over all eastern Mediterranean lands so as to insure the security of the Turkish Straits and guarantee continued Russian use of the Straits. The second possibility is that the Soviet Union was seeking to bypass the Mediterranean altogether and continue naval operations from the Persian Gulf. This last possibility was highly unlikely due to the strategic importance of the Mediterranean at the

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¹ Donald W. Mitchell, "The Soviet Naval Challenge," *Orbis*, XIV No. 1 (Spring, 1970), p. 144.

² "Soviet Sea Power," *U.S. News and World Report*, LXVII, No. 3 (July 2, 1969), p. 58.

³ Douglas Dodds-Parker et al., "Red Fleet off Suez- Mediterranean Challenge," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 80.

time and because of the existence of the port facilities and naval units already in the Black Sea. In either case, it must be noted that the area in question includes the richest oil producing center in the world and, quite apart from the naval aspect, Soviet control over this area would have been of considerable significance.

The second major Soviet attempt to gain control of the Turkish Straits occurred in the wake of World War II. In 1946 the Soviet Union placed some territorial claims on eastern Turkish provinces and northern Persian provinces. Demands were also made for bases directly on the Straits, giving the Soviet Union virtual control over this important waterway. Turkey and Persia did not yield to the Soviet demands and were shortly thereafter reinforced by vast quantities of western aid, a situation which the Soviets had sought to avoid.⁴

The ensuing years saw no abatement in western interest in the area. Instead, under the leadership of the United States, a policy of containment, directed at the expansion of Soviet power, was pursued. To carry out this policy, Great Britain and the United States introduced large permanent fleets into the Mediterranean and sought to seal off the area from Soviet expansion through a network of military alliances, most notably NATO. Faced with one setback after another, the Soviet naval interests were stifled throughout the 1950's.

During this period under the Khrushchev leadership, the Soviets relied almost entirely on submarines rather than surface vessels. But in the early 1960's several events occurred which forced the Soviets to reevaluate their naval policy. The first was the Berlin crisis in 1961. Both power blocs increased their military forces and embarked on widely publicized military maneuvers. While the Soviets could only exhibit land forces, the United States Mediterranean Fleet (6th Fleet) steamed to Turkey. An aircraft carrier and a cruiser paid a visit to Istanbul while two destroyers entered the Black Sea.⁵ These naval movements did far more than present a military threat to the Soviet Union. They helped reassert American support for the strategically exposed wing of NATO, Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, all of the nations of the Mediterranean were impressed with this visible show of power and the freedom of movement it possessed on the seas.

Shortly thereafter, in October of 1962, the United States' mastery of the seas was made eminently clear to the world as her warships blockaded the island of Cuba and turned back Soviet merchantmen carrying missiles. The Soviet navy could in no way challenge this American action, short of total war. The only alternative was the embarrassing retreat and removal of Cuban missiles which the Soviets undertook. Strong pressures arose from Soviet naval leaders for the development of surface ships, the value of which they saw exhibited by the United States. The problem of overcoming Khrushchev's usual opposition to surface ship construction was conveniently alleviated with his "retirement" in 1964. The new leadership authorized a vast increase in the construction and deployment of surface ships.

⁴ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis* (New York: Fredercik A. Praeger, 1966), p. 21.

⁵ Garthoff, p. 118.

The major assignment of this "new-look" navy was to advance and assert itself in the Mediterranean Sea. The general interest of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean area can be reduced to three major factors; the military-strategic location, access to the rest of the world, and oil.⁶ In view of these factors there are still other specific points which serve to explain the original interest of the Soviet leadership in the use of their new navy. These points are: (1) to avoid the continuous loss of prestige for failure to make even a pretence of contesting the 6th Fleet supremacy in the Mediterranean, (2) to add potential for deterring nuclear strikes from U.S. aircraft carriers and Polaris submarines, (3) to collect intelligence of 6th Fleet capabilities for general nuclear and limited warfare, (4) to afford naval training, (5) to support foreign policy objectives by maintaining a naval presence and by means of port visits to friendly and neutral countries.⁷

The Soviet move was swift and, to many western observers, quite alarming. From less than ten ships in the Mediterranean in 1964, the number rose to about thirty, just prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Immediately after the war the number rose to about sixty and since then has averaged between thirty-five and fifty ships.⁸ The immediate western reaction was (and still is to some extent) to view this Soviet policy as an attempt to outflank NATO. After all, Lenin and Khrushchev both predicted that the West would eventually be outflanked and taken in the rear from North Africa.⁹ The seriousness with which the West took this threat is exemplified by the announcement on January 3, 1968, in Bonn, West Germany, that the United States had sent a special ambassador, Mr. Julius Holmes, an expert on Mediterranean and NATO affairs, on a secret tour of NATO capitals. He was to make a study of the "new threat" resulting from the appearance of a large Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean.¹⁰ On January 22, 1968, the British hinted that they were considering a "return in strength" to the area, but this was to depend entirely on their financial situation following their "east of Suez" withdrawal.¹¹ It is not fully clear whether the British statement stemmed from the result of Mr. Holmes' study or not, but in either case, the British displayed only moderate concern over the Soviet increase.

1968 did mark the birth of the Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean (MARAIRMED). This was set up after a Reykjavik meeting of NATO ministers in order to coordinate air surveillance flights. It was joined by the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy and was directed primarily at Soviet submarines. There are hopes that Greece will join when she obtains

⁶ O. M. Smolansky, "Moscow and the Persian Gulf: An Analysis of Soviet Ambitions and Potential," *Orbis*, XIV No. 1 (Spring, 1970), p. 95.

⁷ Robert Waring Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 154-55.

⁸ Dodds-Parker, *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 82. At this date the Mediterranean fleet had on call approximately 10-12 submarines, 1 helicopter carrier, 2 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 5 destroyer escorts, 3 minesweepers, 4 amphibious vessels, 20 auxiliary craft.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁰ Thomas Anthem, "Russia in the Mediterranean," *Contemporary Review*, CCXII No. 1226 (March, 1968), p. 137.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

suitable aircraft.¹² The increased awareness of Soviet strength and capabilities afforded by MARAIRMED must force the West to attach more merit to the words of Admiral Gorshkov. He stated in 1963 in "Red Star" that the Soviet navy would support land operations and use its submarine fleet to cut the enemy's communications, all in the context of dealing "crushing blows at naval and land objectives over the entire area of the world's seas."¹³ At that time there was no indication of any strategic role for the fleet. This is indicative of the strength that the pro-army faction exerts in the Soviet Union. There was, and still is, an extensive effort being made to deprive the navy of any primary missions and to maintain it in a supporting role for the army.¹⁴

But 1963 also bore indications of a changing attitude, however reluctant it may have been. Marshal Sokolovskii wrote in his *Military Strategy* that:

We must consider that up to three-fourths of all the material and personnel of the probable enemy are across the ocean. According to calculations of certain military theoreticians, in the event of war, eighty to one hundred large transports should arrive daily at European ports and 1,500-2,000 ships, not counting escorts, would be en route simultaneously.¹⁵

Should such a situation arise, the use of the Mediterranean as a staging area for attacks on Atlantic shipping would be invaluable. Yet all of these observations tend to bear out one fact — that the Soviet navy is still to be considered primarily a defensive organization. The constitution of the navy itself points to a stress on defensive capabilities.¹⁶ Indeed, the authors of the 1962 and 1963 editions of *Military Strategy* granted top priority to the destruction of aircraft carriers. Since 1964 the top priority was altered to the destruction of Polaris submarines and carriers were designated as the second priority.¹⁷

The question of whether or not this is a real military attempt to outflank NATO can be considered doubtful. The defensive nature of the navy has been mentioned but of even greater importance was (and still is), the overwhelming military superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces confronting the forces of Greece and Turkey. This fact alone renders an outflanking maneuver quite unnecessary. In fact, any non-nuclear conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces in this area would be over so quickly that both navies would be rather ineffectual.¹⁸ The strategic value of the Mediterranean is therefore more important to the United States and the West than to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's military policy has not so far resulted in the domination of the Mediterranean, for it is accepted that the 6th Fleet is

¹² Dodds-Parker, et al., *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 84.

¹³ "New Red Fleet," *The Economist*, CCXXIV No. 6467 (August 5, 1967), p. 485.

¹⁴ Herrick, p. 91.

¹⁵ V. D. Sokolovskii, *Military Strategy* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), p. 399, as quoted in Herrick, p. 100.

¹⁶ *Proceedings*, XCVI N. 6/808 (June, 1970), p. 129. There are approximately 380 submarines. 18 of 60 nuclear submarines and 35 conventional submarines carry an average of 3 ballistic missiles each. 25 of the nuclear and 22 conventional submarines carry anti-ship cruise missiles. The remainder of the submarines carry torpedoes. Surface ships are fitted with Styx, Shaddock and Strela antishipping cruise missiles.

¹⁷ Herrick, p. 97.

¹⁸ Lawrence W. Martin, "The Changing Military Balance," *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*, J. C. Hurewitz, ed., (New York: Columbia University, 1969), pp. 63-64.

still stronger. However, the Soviet navy has denied the freedom of movement to which the 6th Fleet had become accustomed.

The real significant results of the Soviet naval presence have been in support of foreign policy objectives. The Soviet Union has long recognized the importance of Turkey to the NATO structure. To the West Turkey means: (1) the shortest flight plan to Soviet industrial centers, (2) an offensive launch point due to a common border with the Soviet Union, (3) the vulnerability of Black Sea ports and fleets from Turkish based weapons, (4) control of the Dardanelles, and (5) the last link in the NADGE early air warning chain.¹⁹ The Soviet Union must tread a very delicate path. She dare not appear too militarily threatening for fear that this would intensify NATO concern and cause the local nations to reaffirm their NATO affiliation. Yet the Soviet presence, whether overtly threatening or not, does instill a sense of isolation from NATO allies in the minds of Greeks and Turks. They begin to doubt the extent to which the central NATO powers would come to their aid if they were attacked.²⁰ Turkey has therefore already begun to promote better relations with the Soviets. To show good faith, Turkey has permitted Soviet submarines to enter the Bosphorus an hour or more before daylight, a direct violation of the Montreaux Convention which restricts such passage to daylight hours.²¹

Ironically, the first real improvement in Turkish-Soviet relations occurred before the weight of the Soviet naval presence was really felt. This came surprisingly enough in 1964 at the height of the Cyprus crisis. The Turks wanted to invade the island but the Soviets warned that this would be in conflict with their interests. United States support for a Turkish invasion was requested and rejected during correspondence between Prime Minister Inonu and President Johnson. In anger the Turkish foreign minister flew to a conference in Moscow through an invitation which the Turks had refused a month earlier. The Soviets took advantage of the Turkish-United States rift, reversed their stand, and agreed with Turkey that Greek and Turkish communities on the island should be largely autonomous.²²

Not only did the Soviet Union use the Cyprus crisis to its own advantage, she has been blessed with numerous events falling right into her hands. First, the United States' overcommitment to South-east Asia has ruled out the possibility of a vigorous response to the challenge in the Middle East. Second, France's withdrawal from NATO has weakened NATO naval forces. France has also been more inclined toward the Arab states. Third, Great Britain's announced withdrawal from east of Suez provides a vacuum between Aden and Hong Kong. Finally, Spain has revived her claim to Gibraltar, a claim which the Soviets supported in the United Nations.²³

The greatest boon to the Soviet influence in the Middle East has been her support of the Arabs in their struggle against the Israelis. Soviet aid began

¹⁹ Martin Edmonds and John Skitt, "Current Soviet Maritime Strategy and NATO," *International Affairs*, XLV No. 1 (January, 1969), pp. 40-41.

²⁰ Martin, *Soviet American Rivalry in the Middle East*, pp. 64-65.

²¹ Ciro Zoppo, "Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean and the U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in the Middle East," *Orbis*, XIV No. 1 (Spring, 1970), p. 118.

²² Zoppo, p. 116.

²³ Mitchell, *Orbis*, XIV, No. 1 (Spring, 1967), p. 145.

flowing to Arab states after the 1956 Suez crisis, notably with the financing of the Aswan Dam. Between the years 1956 and 1967 the Soviet Union poured more than three billion dollars into Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria. Between 1967 and 1969, a period of eighteen months, Soviet aid passed the two billion dollar mark, most of which went to replace military losses in the war.²⁴ This extensive aid has placed some of the Arab nations in a state of almost complete dependency, a situation of which the Soviet Union would like to make full use. The Soviet leadership seeks to make Soviet help contingent on internal political reforms that would make the Soviet-oriented elements more influential and help prepare for revolutionary changes. To enact this policy, two schools of thought exist. On the one hand, the ideological position proposes to break up the old government machines and weed out the bourgeois elements, especially in the military. On the other hand, the pragmatic proposes going slow in pressing for revolutionary changes since the Arabs might view this as unnecessary interference in their internal affairs.²⁵

The Soviet Union has obviously chosen the pragmatic position, much to the dismay of local communist parties. These local parties have been severely attacked by the Arab governments and the Soviet Union has voiced very few objections. The tremendous success of the Soviet Union results not from a great Arab love for the Soviet Union, but rather from certain Western disadvantages: (1) western colonialism has spread wide hatred throughout the area. The West is also too closely identified with Israel which is seen as an expression of Western imperialism. (2) Western aid programs are filled with stipulations and conditions. The West has tended to offer aid only with specific objectives in mind. Soviet aid is offered with a "no strings attached" policy; that is, they accept any benefits that may arise and are willing to accept short term set-backs for greater gains. This policy is more realistic since even though the Arab leaders realize that the money is not given freely, the system allows them to save face with other leaders. (3) There appears to be a lack of unity of purpose among the Western powers. They cannot agree on policies or the best method of implementing them. The Soviets are not hampered by dissenting opinions from allies, public opinion, or an inflexible governmental system. They are able to readjust their policies as necessary in a very short time.²⁶

The Soviets have certainly taken advantage of the Arab hatred towards colonialism. With the surface navy they now possess, the Soviets can make a visible pretense of standing between the imperial powers and the oppressed. Marshal Sokolovskii stated in *Military Strategy*:

The CPSU has an international duty to aid countries in winning and strengthening their national independence and to assist all nations fighting for the complete destruction of the colonial system.²⁷

²⁴ Dodds-Parker et al., *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 80.

²⁵ Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 339-340.

²⁶ Smolansky, *Orbis*, XIV No. 1 (Spring, 1970).

²⁷ V. D. Sokolovskii, *Military Strategy*, as quoted in Edmonds and Skitt, *International Affairs*, XLV No. 1 (January, 1969), p. 32.

This emotional appeal is just what is appreciated in an area already embroiled in an emotional struggle against an enemy equated with Western imperialism. But for the Soviet leadership, pragmatically oriented, this can hardly be the cause for such a complete Soviet commitment. The real prize seems to be oil.

The Soviets have large untapped oil reserves but the cost of developing these areas would be far higher than obtaining oil from the Middle-East. Soviet industrial demand for oil is rising ten percent faster than the expansion of domestic production. A Polish economist estimates that by 1980 all of the Soviet Bloc will need 730 million tons of oil per year, and internal production will only reach 630 million tons.²⁸ The Soviet Union recognizes the even greater dependency of the West on Mid-East oil. Soviet control over the oil-producing nations would constitute a major victory. King Hussein, speaking a few months before the six-day war stated:

I believe there is a new Soviet policy, and that this policy aims at the control of this area. I think the Soviets are prepared to go very far in this matter — almost to the point of a confrontation with the free world . . . What interests the Soviets is, first of all, to be able to get control of the natural resources of this area — the oil — so as to deprive the West of the oil that it needs.²⁹

Even as early as 1960 Soviet awareness of the oil issue was made known. Major General Lagovskii of the navy's supply service commented:

The problem of sea communications for the Western countries even today is recognized as one of the most important problems in the conduct of war. The solution to the problem of supplying the NATO European armed forces with fuel, for example, depends almost entirely on the operation of a tanker fleet to effect the shipment of oil from the Middle-East to Europe.³⁰

Lagovskii's statement would seem to dictate an obvious role for the Soviet navy — that of extending its power across these lines of communication enabling the Soviet Union to cut the oil flow in time of war. This is especially important at present, since, as yet, the Soviets have not extended complete control over the oil-producing states. Complete control, the ideal situation from the Soviet viewpoint, would permit them to raise the political and economic costs of European access to Mid-East oil.³¹ With any revival of cold-war animosities, the Soviet presence could also threaten all other European interests.

This threat to European interests has already resulted in attempts by some nations, notably Italy, to improve their relations with the Soviets through increased trade. The practice is sure to continue and in anticipation of this

²⁸ Dodds-Parker *et al.*, *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 81.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

³⁰ A. Lagovskii, "Economic and Modes of Armed Conflict," *Sovetski Flot*, February 6, 1960, as quoted in Herrick, p. 100.

³¹ Wolfe, p. 337.

the Soviet Union is building one of the newest and most efficient merchant fleets in the world. In a less threatening manner the Soviet navy's goodwill visits frequently foreshadow the development of economic ties.

The sudden rise in Soviet naval strength following the June, 1967 war may have been to restore some of the prestige in the Arab world by seemingly deterring Israel from any further serious military moves against the Arab states. The possibility that the show of force was designed to exert greater control over the client Arab states can also be considered.³² But Soviet ambitions extend further than just the Arab states. Apart from their present use of ports at Latakia, Syria, and Port Said and Alexandria in Egypt, the Soviets have made overtures to Cyprus and Malta. In Cyprus they hope to make inroads based on their support of both sides during the Cyprus crisis. The growing resentment against the British in Malta seems to be an open invitation to the Soviets. The Soviet Union is prepared to pad her bids with economic aid in an effort to improve relations.³³ The latest objective of the Soviet naval thrust centers on the massive French-built naval base at Mersel-Kebir, Algeria. Soviet shore parties and repair facilities may already exist there.³⁴ Use of this base would be a great complement to the existing Soviet technical control over all air bases in Algeria.³⁵

The fact that the Soviet navy has been merely inserting its influence in the wake of the departing Western powers, has forced the Soviet Union into a very delicate role. She cannot allow it to appear as if she is practicing the same sort of imperialism for which she condemns the West. It is for this reason that the Soviet navy confines most of its maintenance, replenishment and even minor repair activities to international waters.³⁶ In this manner they have been able to continue their campaign to rid the Mediterranean of the United States and NATO bases. On April 24th, 1967, Leonid Brezhnev, in a speech at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, concluded that, "The time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the United States Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean."³⁷ This has been a rather constant theme of the Soviet press since then.

It must be acknowledged that the Soviet navy will serve to extend far greater Soviet influence throughout the world. The Soviet Union has finally come to realize the invaluable effect of "showing the flag" with increased regularity. She has been somewhat hindered in her efforts due to the fact

³² Wolfe, p. 342.

³³ Eugene Hinterhoff, "The Soviet Presence in the Mediterranean," *Orbis*, XIII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 267.

³⁴ Mitchell, *Orbis*, XIV No. 1 (Spring, 1970), p. 146.

³⁵ Dodds-Parker *et al.*, *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, VII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 85.

³⁶ L. L. Lemnitzer, "The Strategic Problems of NATO's Northern and Southern Flanks," *Orbis*, XIII No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 105. Sheltered anchorage of the Mediterranean used by the Soviet navy:

1. Kithara in the Aegean
2. Gulf of Hammamet off Tunisia
3. Hurd Bank off Malta
4. Gulf of Sirte off Libya
5. Alboran Islands off the Straits of Gibraltar.

³⁷ Mitchell, *Orbis*, XIV No. 1 (Spring, 1970), p. 148.

that she does not control any of the three exits from the Mediterranean. But with the increased sophistication and skill of her diplomacy the Soviet Union will continue to extend her reach. It must be remembered that the concerted effort being made to increase both military and commercial navies simultaneously will be difficult for the West to match. It must become clear to the West that the post-war concept of containment is no longer realistic in a world where Soviet expansion of interest is accomplished primarily through competitive means. The Soviet Union can no longer be underestimated, either militarily or economically. The Western objective throughout the world has consistently been the maintenance of the status quo and has consequently been outstripped by a more progressive opponent.

The first part of the history of the United States is the history of the thirteen original states. These states were the result of the British colonial system in North America. The British colonies were established in the seventeenth century, and they grew in size and number throughout the eighteenth century. The colonies were governed by the British crown, but they had a great deal of self-government. They elected their own legislatures and they had their own courts. The British government was often in conflict with the colonies, and this led to the American Revolution. The colonies declared their independence in 1776, and they fought the Revolutionary War. The war ended in 1781, and the British evacuated the colonies. The colonies then met in Philadelphia to write a new constitution. This was the Constitution of 1787, which is still in effect today. The Constitution established a new government for the United States, and it provided for a system of checks and balances. The new government was a federal republic, and it was the first of its kind in the world. The United States has since grown in size and power, and it has become a leading nation in the world. The history of the United States is a story of freedom, democracy, and progress.

The second part of the history of the United States is the history of the westward expansion. The United States has always been a nation of immigrants, and the westward expansion was a major part of its history. The first immigrants came to the United States in the seventeenth century, and they settled in the eastern part of the country. As the population grew, the need for more land became apparent. The United States began to expand westward in the eighteenth century, and this led to the discovery of gold in California in 1848. The gold rush led to a massive influx of people to the western part of the country, and it helped to develop the west. The United States continued to expand westward throughout the nineteenth century, and it reached the Pacific Ocean in 1846. The westward expansion was a difficult process, and it involved many hardships. The pioneers had to travel long distances, and they often faced dangerous conditions. Despite these challenges, the westward expansion was a great achievement, and it helped to shape the United States into the nation we know today.

The third part of the history of the United States is the history of the Civil War. The Civil War was a major conflict in the history of the United States, and it was fought between the North and the South. The war began in 1861, and it ended in 1865. The North won the war, and the South was forced to accept the results. The Civil War was a turning point in the history of the United States, and it helped to establish the United States as a single nation. The war was fought over the issue of slavery, and it led to the abolition of slavery in the United States. The Civil War was a difficult and bloody conflict, but it was necessary to preserve the Union. The United States has since grown in size and power, and it has become a leading nation in the world. The history of the United States is a story of freedom, democracy, and progress.