

HUMAN RIGHTS IDEALISM, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REALISM, AND HUMAN SOCIETY

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Man presently appears to be closer to the human rights ideal than he has ever been before; yet, he remains far from the realization of human rights. In order to facilitate the exploration of the ideal-real aspects of the human rights issue, I have divided this article into three parts. The first part is devoted to a review of the historical development of social processes and events that may have contributed to a posture that made possible the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The second section reviews, in part, how the implementation of human rights idealism is obstructed by national and international political reality. The third part offers an explanation of some social processes which may contribute to or detract from the universal implementation of human rights and presents new social concepts for possible usage in the future.

1. Historical Background and Declaration of Human Rights

Every society (whether simple or complex) is in the process of change. In some societies changes are slow and gradual. In other societies changes occur at a more accelerated rate. These changing processes generally have been toward the achievement of new social goals or the creation of new values and aspirations. Within the context of these changes, societies have experienced long historical struggles for various kinds of freedoms. Although the stories are not the same from time-to-time or place-to-place, peoples for centuries have been struggling for what they regard to be their rights (or what have been called their natural or inherent rights).

International concern with human rights has been traced by some western authors to the period following the reformation that occurred in the early 16th century. That religious and national minorities were guaranteed freedom in the treaties drawn up at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 is frequently cited. However, the historical background of efforts to deal justly with religious and minority groups can be traced to much earlier times. For instance, the proclamation of the freedom and rights of minority and religious groups by Cyrus the Great, "King of Kings" of ancient Persia, in 539 B.C. is the earliest recorded achievement in this area. He made the following proclamation on the occasion of the freeing of captive Jews and other minorities of Babylon:

I, Cyrus, King of Kings, son of Cambyses, grandson of Cyrus, whose dynasty has been blessed by the gods and whose reign is based upon the heart, when I entered the city of Babylon all the people welcomed me with joy. I assumed the throne of the king. Marduk, the god of Babel, whom I have taken in and whom I have loved, won the noble hearts

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of the people of Babel for me. My great army entered this city without incident. The holy places of the city moved my heart. I accorded to all men the freedom to worship their own gods and ordered that no one had the right to bother them. I ordered that no house be destroyed, that no inhabitant be dispossessed. The great god accorded to me and to all my army his benefits. From Babel to Assur, from Susa to Akkad . . . and in all the regions long inhabited on the other side of the Tigris, I wished that the temples that had been closed be reopened, that all the statues of the gods be returned to their place, and that they remain there forever. I reassembled the inhabitants of these regions and had their houses, which had been destroyed, rebuilt. I saw that the gods of Sumer and Akkad were returned to their palaces which are called "the joy of the hearts." I accorded peace and quiet to all men. (Written in cuneiform on the Cyrus Cylinder, British Museum, London.)

There is historical evidence that Cyrus followed or was influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster, the ancient Persian prophet who taught religious tolerance and free will. The declaration of Cyrus was unique in his time — an era when respect for and tolerance of the religious and cultural values of minorities and subjected peoples were not widely practiced. It is little wonder that his innovative actions won for Cyrus the praise and admiration of spiritual and intellectual leaders of the day.

The Old Testament refers to Cyrus as the "righteous man" (Isaiah, XLI-2). According to Herodotus, Cyrus "aspired always for the well-being and happiness of his subjects. . . ." Aeschylus wrote that Cyrus was "possessed of a great wisdom" and Diodorus Siculus called him "generous before his subjects." Plato called Cyrus "a great friend of his people . . . [who] gave to all of them the rights of free men. . . . If among his subjects there was found someone who could offer just and reasonable advice he was not angry; rather he gave the subject complete freedom of speech." Xenophon, in the *Cyropaedia*, called Cyrus "the friend of humanity."

The great praise and admiration bestowed upon Cyrus is not difficult to understand when one considers that, before his time, the only operative law for governing human relations among different peoples was the law of the strongest — the will of the victor. Burning conquered towns and villages, taking captives or slaughtering the inhabitants, sacking temples, and destroying or carrying off the statues of local gods was a common practice. The custom of that day is typified in the following inscription which is signed by Assurbanipal, king of Assyria:

On the order of Ashur and Ishtar, the great gods who protect me, I conquered in a single attack the city of Ginabou, thanks to my soldiers and war chariots. I decapitated 600 enemy soldiers on the spot and burned alive 3000 prisoners; I did not spare even one official to keep as a hostage. I carved up the governor with my own hands and, after impaling his body, hung it opposite the city wall. From there I left for the city of Ur. The inhabitants did not beg for mercy nor did they want

to submit. Therefore, I attacked the city and conquered it; I let 3000 people feel my sword; I grilled others on a fire; I cut off the hands, fingers, ears and noses of a large number of prisoners; ripped thousands of eyes from their sockets and tongues from their mouths; I made huge mounds of the bodies of the victims, and I exposed the cut-off heads of the city's losses. Then I conquered the city of Susa; I opened the treasures of the kings of Elam who had long been storing them away; I sent to Assur the gold, silver, rich costumes and palace furnishings that I found as well as the golden, silver, bronze and stone statues. Then I razed the temples to the ground and suppressed their gods. I transformed into a vast desert all of a region over a distance of a march of a month and 25 days; I sowed salt and thorns. I took to Assur the sons and sisters of the king and some princes, as well as all the members of the royal family, governors, officers, armourers, artisans, men and women, troops more numerous than the waves of locusts.

However, in more recent times, the focus of international rules and procedures for the support of human rights largely has been aimed at protecting foreigners against abuse by local authorities. Throughout the 19th century, international tribunals and claims commissions established minimum standards for nations to follow in the treatment of aliens.

Although international law usually does not claim jurisdiction over the relations between a nation and its citizens, this rule ceases to apply when the treatment of the population by the government violates the dictates of humanity and justice or shocks the conscience of mankind. Such was the case in the 19th century when slave trade generally came to be condemned. In Brussels, in 1890, sixteen states agreed to establish a comprehensive, internationally supervised system to enforce its ban. Between the years 1864-1929 international conventions specified in increasing detail the humanitarian requirements for the treatment of war wounded and prisoners of war. Such efforts of international organizations as the action taken during the inter-war years by the International Labor Organization and those of the League of Nations toward the suppression of white slave trade should also be recalled.¹

Even before WWII, leaders in the field of international law and relations were feeling the need for defining international standards for the treatment of individuals. There also began to develop a tradition of international definitions and responsibility in the field of human rights and freedoms. However, there was no international authority capable of preventing the violation of minority rights and human decency within nations. The outbreak of WW II lent urgency to the need to safeguard the political and civil rights of individuals everywhere and to satisfy their desire for economic and social security. In addition, there was a growing determination to establish an international institution capable of preventing such conditions as those which had led to the rise of the Nazi and Fascist regime and which might lead to more aggres-

¹ Moses Moskowitz, *Human Rights and World Order: The Struggle for Human Rights in the United Nation* (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958), pp. 16-17.

sion in the future. Governments and private organizations alike worked during the war years to devise appropriate international machinery for the protection of human rights. On January 1, 1942, twenty-six nations collectively declared as common objectives the defense of "life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom" and the preservation of human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in others.²

At the San Francisco conference of 1945 several delegations urged that provisions concerning human rights be included in the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter that was drafted did actually contain seven specific references to human rights. According to Article 1, one purpose of the United Nations is "to achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The United Nations authorized its Economic and Social Council to make recommendations for the purpose of "promoting respect for, and observance of these rights and freedoms" and to set up a special commission for the "promotion of human rights." This commission became known as the Commission on Human Rights. However, nowhere was the precise meaning of the phrase "human rights and fundamental freedoms" defined. As a result the provisions did not create clear and enforceable obligations.

The Commission on Human Rights had completed its work entitled the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by June, 1948. The Declaration which was adopted by the General Assembly in Paris in December, 1948 embodied general definitions, both of civil and political rights generally recognized in democratic societies and of several economic, social, and cultural rights. These included such rights as life, liberty, and security of person; freedom from hunger; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or beliefs; freedom of assembly and association; right to social security; right to work; right to education; right to marry and found a family; right to participation in the cultural life of the community; and right to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

To secure further the enforcement of national obligations with respect to human rights, the General Assembly of the United Nations instructed the Commission on Human Rights to prepare in treaty form two international covenants, one to deal with civil and political rights and the other with economic, social, and cultural rights. These covenants eventually were adopted by the General Assembly on December 16, 1966. However, they are binding only on those states that ratify, and ratification by each member state occurs by way of its own constitutional processes.

Under each covenant different types of obligation are undertaken by the ratifying states. In the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2-1) each state undertakes to respect and ensure the rights of the individuals

² *Ibid.*, pp 17-18.

within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. In the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights each state undertakes, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, to do its best to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights. The rights established by these covenants are not subject to any restrictions other than those which are provided by law and which are required for the protection of national security, public order, public health and morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.³

It should be recalled that, prior to the adoption of the covenants, the General Assembly had already adopted and urged the ratification of nine specialized conventions which, unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are binding treaties which impose legal obligations on the respective governments. These were: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (1948); The Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (1951); The Political Rights of Women (1952); The Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956); The Abolition of Forced Labor (1957); Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958); Discrimination in Education (1960); and The Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965).⁴

In short, the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and the specialized conventions adopted by the United Nations formally represent the internationally recognized rights of man. These ideal concepts, however, have faced and still face serious problems in implementation.

II. The Problems of Implementation

The problems of implementing human rights have been a cause of concern for students of international affairs. A variety of arguments and proposals for coping with the delivery of human rights have been articulated, but many scholars remain convinced that international laws with machinery for implementing those laws are necessary.

It can be perceived readily how the implementation of human rights conflicts with the values and interests of various societies and different sections of the world and how this conflict, in turn, affects and influences the decision making processes of international organizations. From its inception, the goals, values, and effects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has not been entirely clear. A general survey has shown that the representatives of the different states have different feelings, reactions, and interpretations regarding the Declaration. This was true even among some of the authors of

³ Egon Schwelb, "Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966," in *International Protection of Human Rights*, ed. by Asbjorn Eide and August Schou (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1968), pp. 105-115.

⁴ Vernon Van Dyke, *Human Rights, The United States, and World Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 144-145.

the Declaration. Charles Malik of Lebanon, stated that the principles embodied in the Declaration could not be considered a mere resolution since they represent "what my government pledged itself to promote, achieve, and observe" when it signed the Charter. On the other hand, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the United States representative, expressed the view that the Declaration "is not a treaty, it is not an international agreement, it is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation." According to the actual language of the United Nations Charter, each member state of the United Nations commits itself to give the Organization all possible support in its effort to promote respect for human rights by undertaking joint or separate actions in that regard. But, at the same time, the United Nations Charter (Article 2-7) recognized the domestic jurisdiction of states by providing for the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a member state. The recognition of domestic jurisdiction created a problem as to who or what organization has the authority to determine whether some matter belongs in the realm of domestic or international jurisdiction.⁵

The question of domestic jurisdiction has been reflected, from the beginning, in such cases as that of Spain and the Union of South Africa before the General Assembly of the United Nations. In the case of Spain, the question was not so much that of human rights as it was of a political regime whose policies might threaten international peace and security.⁶ The case of South Africa, at first, was related only to the treatment of Indians but, later, became concerned with the racial policy of that government. The irony of the situation is reflected by the speech in support of the international promotion of human rights that was delivered by South African Prime Minister Smuts shortly after WW II. Referring to that war, he declared:

We have fought for justice and decency and the fundamental freedoms and rights of man which are basic to all human advancement and progress and peace. . . .⁷

Prime Minister Smuts noted that the peace for which they were striving and which they were taking great pains to safeguard was "a peace of justice and honor and fair dealing as between man and man . . ." But later it became apparent that the South African concept of man differed from that held by most of mankind.⁸

As Van Dyke points out, spokesmen for dictatorships and democracies alike joined in the view that men have, or should have, civil and political rights. He notes that although the right to life is acknowledged by virtually everyone the right to live or the right not to be killed remains a basis for marginal controversy. To illustrate, the draft of the inter-American convention

⁵ Milan Markovic, "Implementation of Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction of States," in *International Protection of Human Rights*, ed. by Asbjorn Eide and August Schou (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1968), pp. 52-54.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

⁷ United Nations, *Conference on International Organization*, Vol. 1, pp. 425-426.

⁸ Latif O. Adegbite, "African Attitudes to the International Protection of Human Rights," in *International Protection of Human Rights*, ed. by Asbjorn Eide and August Schou (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1968), p. 71.

on human rights specifies that the right to life "shall be protected by law from the moment of conception" while, on the other hand, the Proclamation of Tehran declared that "parents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children." The latter was adopted unanimously in 1968 by delegates attending the official world conference commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁹

Similar kinds of confusion and controversy extend into the areas of self-determination and minority rights. Although the Charter of the United Nations endorses self-determination in principle, neither the Charter nor the Universal Declaration indicates that the questions of self-determination and minorities occupy an important place in discussions of human rights. In fact, the Charter does not mention minority rights and the Universal Declaration says nothing about either self-determination or minorities. As a result, neither term is clear. The "selves" who are entitled to self-determination are undefined and there is no precise concept of what constitutes a minority.¹⁰ The questions of minority rights and self-determination are likely to remain sources of conflict for a long time to come even though self-determination finally was recognized (1966) as a human right through the adoption of the Covenants.

Self-determination has been classified into two types—internal and external. Internal self-determination is concerned with sovereign states and their control over political life. It relates to such things as freedom from foreign intervention and the question of representative government by majority rule. External self-determination, on the other hand, has to do with political entities that lack sovereignty and is related to their rights to gain it. Governments generally sanction freedom from foreign intervention. Although no state lays a general claim to the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states and no state admits that it is under the control of a foreign power, the principle of internal self-determination is at times violated¹¹ even by those who endorse it and the violation is rationalized.

For instance, among the several cases in point that are cited by Van Dyke are the Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. After the Czechoslovakia intervention, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in speaking of "those who are tempted to try to roll back the socialist commonwealth" said flatly that the Soviet Union would not permit it to happen. In 1943 President Roosevelt said that "the right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter does not carry with it the right . . . to make slaves of its own people or of any other peoples in the world." More recently (1965) President Johnson, when confronted with the Dominican Republic crisis, stated that "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere." These are incidences when the United States, too, has imposed limits on the right of internal self-determination. Portugal also has

⁹ Van Dyke, p. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

her own interpretation of self-determination and defines it as "the consent of the people to a certain structure and political organization, . . . by participation in administration and by participation in political life," of course, not necessarily through the process of free election. What proportion of the population, in what manner, and on what basis the people must participate is not clear and is left to the Portuguese themselves to determine. Qualifications of several sorts are placed on the endorsement of external self-determination. In 1963 the United States played two different roles in this matter. On the one hand, the United States endorsed self-determination for South-West Africa and, on the other hand, opposed immediate independence for Angola because of her lack of "educated and trained people."¹²

The question of self-determination for dependent territories differs markedly from the question of whether segments of a population have the right to self-determination. The Security Council by its acts has implicitly denied that the right of self-determination is a right of secession. In 1961 it "strongly deprecated" secessionist activities in Katanga and authorized actions to bring about their cessation.

Regarding the question of special rights for minorities within the state, most members of the United Nations take the view that minority groups should not have special rights or status. In 1954, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities proposed that the term minority "include only those non-dominant groups in the population which possess and wish to preserve ethnic, religious, or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different from those of the rest of the population."¹³ In 1965, an inter-American conference reaffirmed "the goal of all the governments to develop a policy tending toward complete integration of all elements of their citizenry, without distinction of any nature based on racial origin." Although the thrust has been toward assimilation within a framework of respect for individual human rights, some notable exceptions have occurred in relation to minorities. For example, the 1947 General Assembly recommendations for the future of Palestine were not assimilationist but, rather, were pluralistic. Group rights were asserted in the provision that "the State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions." In 1950 the General Assembly also recommended that Eritrea should have autonomy within Ethiopia. In another case, in 1959, Greece and Turkey reached agreement on both individual and group rights in Cyprus whereby the Greek and Turkish communities were to vote separately for members of the House of Representatives.¹⁴

In the processes of international relations, thus far, the principle of internal self-determination has not been a major source of international difficulty as has been the question of external self-determination. It is not as yet a settled issue but, to date, the main achievements have been against the force of colonialism.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 80-82.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

As far as the protection of the individual is concerned, the desired objectives originally espoused by the authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have not become a reality despite some desirable results by such specialized agencies of the United Nations as the International Labor Organization and UNESCO. Almost everywhere there have been continuous violations of human rights and the judicial system of the United Nations remains unable to effect guarantees. The International Court of Justice at the Hague continues to be static and traditionally oriented because only states — not individuals — have access to the international court. As a result, the most significant accomplishments in the protection of individuals are being achieved on the regional level, particularly in Europe.

The beginning of the cold war in 1948 and the Berlin blockade forced the United Nations and its related organizations to abandon all serious activities directed toward creating human relations machinery that would be truly effective. Since world-wide cooperation was no longer feasible the Council of Europe was founded. The Council directed its attention toward developing a judicial system for protecting private individuals, corporations, associations, and political groups from the arbitrary treatment and actions of states. The European Convention on Human Rights provided by treaty that basic rights and freedoms may not be infringed upon by any sovereign state, whether the individual be a citizen of the offending nation, an alien, or even a stateless person.¹⁵ The Council of Europe has changed the classical international standard. The injured individual has both the right to petition a supranational entity and the right of action. He is able to obtain a hearing regarding his claim and secure a legally binding decision.¹⁶

The regional movement that began in Europe in 1948 has subsequently spread to other parts of the globe. Each regional organization has effected some change in international law. Particularly worthy of attention are the contributions of the continent of Africa — the creation of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963 and the proposed African Convention on Human Rights with its implementing African Court of Human Rights.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights failed to present a standard code of human rights that has been universally adopted and made enforceable at national, regional, and international levels. This failure is reflected also in the absence of a dynamic international process based on universal values which govern and define international behavior and relationships.

III. A Sociological Explanation

Thus far, the development of human rights and some of the problems of its interpretation and implementation have been discussed in part. Now I shall present some sociological concepts and interpretations of processes that I relate to these problems.

¹⁵ Paul W. Gormley, *The Procedural Status of the Individual before International and Supranational Tribunals*. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 1-8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

First of all, it is apparent that sociology is faced with some "limitations of rhetoric" with respect to the fields of international relations and behavior and, particularly, in the area of human rights. The reason, at least in part, is due to the absence of interest and lack of deep involvement in these fields on the part of many sociologists. Although recently some sociologists have shown interest, there are a limited number of sociological studies related to human rights and international relations, and most of these have been done by European sociologists. There is not even a single term which refers to the population of the globe in its present collective social setting that is generally accepted. The collective population of the globe has been called by such various terms as world community, world society, community of man, human society, society of mankind, global society, global community, nation of man, and others.

It is my intention to introduce in the present article a sociological concept in this area. I have called this concept "universociety." Other terms which are associated with universociety (universalization, universal culture, universocietal, and universocentrism) are also suggested for the first time or are given different usages and meanings.

What do I mean by *universociety*? Briefly, the term is formed by a combination of the words "universe" and "society." It literally means "the society of the universe" and specifies the human part of the universe. It is the "society of societies." It encompasses all societies established by man whether their members are located in different communities, regions, continents, or even on the moon or other planets (as may be the case in the future). In universociety, members interact on the basis of shared norms and values (such as human rights) and in accordance with behavior patterns that are generally understood and predictable.

In somewhat the same way as the concept subculture — the culture of subgroups in a society — is associated with clusters of behavior patterns which are both related to and distinguishable from the general culture — the culture of society — I relate general cultures to the culture of universociety. I label this supra-general culture *universal culture*. Here, universal culture does not refer to the cultural universal that is generally used to explain the content of a particular culture, rather, it indicates the culture of universociety. Just as a society may embrace subcultures universociety contains a large number of general cultures.

Each general culture contains complex values of its own but each also includes some of the values of universal culture. If there is to be orderly social interaction in universociety certain universal values and meanings must be understood and shared by all members. The values of universociety also may be reinforced through general cultures by their offering a variety of ways in which the members of those societies may respond to universal values such as human rights while, at the same time, retaining ties with their particular society.

It is unlikely that achievement of the values and goals set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will be possible except under favor-

able social conditions at the *universocietal* level. For instance, since human rights and freedoms can be guaranteed only in times of peace, the right to peace and the right to claim peaceful policy are regarded as fundamental human rights. Therefore universal peace is a manifestation of universociety. However, universal peace may be threatened by the elements of hunger, poverty, disease, or ignorance. Because of this, actions leading to the eradication of these elements fall within the scope of universal peace, human rights, and universal norms.

While violations of human rights and freedoms may occur less often in the more industrially and economically developed societies, in the less developed and developing countries these rights either have been ignored or denied to large segments of their populations. Food and agricultural statistics indicate that nearly half of the world population lives in a permanent state of hunger. According to WHO, millions of people do not live to reach their 30th birthdays. UNESCO reports that many millions of children have no opportunity to attend school and, as a result, most of them remain illiterate for life. They stay in the lower strata — poor and ignorant. Studies have shown that these conditions are vitally important factors related to the feelings and attitudes which people have about democratic life.

Democratic values, beliefs, and behaviors are social and like other social values, beliefs, and behaviors are acquired through the socialization process. Individuals whose lives are surrounded by indifference, ignorance, provincialism, social isolation, and geographical distance from intellectual centers acquire democratic values slowly. Even in societies that generally achieve democratic values there are many people who continue to have only a very rudimentary understanding of democratic values and ideology. Some of these democratic societies fail to socialize adequately substantial numbers of their people for democratic values.

Public opinion surveys in thirteen different countries illustrate that persons from the lower strata are less committed to democratic norms than are persons from the middle classes. These findings are supported by psychologically oriented research which has studied the social correlates of the "authoritarian personality." Many of these studies have shown a consistent association between authoritarianism and lower-class status.¹⁷ Other studies have shown that the poorer classes everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic matters — they are in favor of higher wages, graduated income taxes, support of trade unions, and more welfare state measures. But, they tend to be less liberal and more intolerant on non-economic matters.¹⁸ The problems of human rights and freedoms are different in economically deprived countries and less developed societies from those in affluent societies. Similarly, poorer social classes differ from upper-economic classes.

Suggestions for coping with these and other problems of human rights include strong recommendations for international laws and law enforcement

¹⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1963), pp. 95-96.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

bodies capable of compelling conformity to these laws. International laws help to create a formal pattern of behavior and relationships, but social sanctions cannot be fully guaranteed until such legal values are internalized by the people and become part of the norms and values of the general cultures of universociety. This can be achieved only through the process of *universalization*. Here, I define universalization as a process whereby universal values and norms are built into the members of universociety. It is the process by which conformity with those norms is made possible and is guaranteed. The universalization process develops a reciprocal need between universociety and its members. It influences the socializing processes of the members of general cultures in favor of universally integrated feelings of common humanity which I label *universocentrism*. Universalization gives new positions, roles, ideas, and values to the individual as an ultimate member of universociety and creates a universally sanctioned pattern of behavior that supports international laws concerning such matters as human rights.

As part of social experience, of course, total conformity is not possible and some degree of deviation is to be expected. Every society has an ideal culture and a real culture. The ideal culture includes systems of established and approved norms and values that society wishes to observe and expects its members to follow. The real culture consists of those norms and values that are actually practiced in that society. Real culture may deviate from the ideal culture, but it usually enjoys a certain amount of tolerance and "de facto" acceptance on the part of society. A clash between ideal culture and real culture usually is prevented by some kind of rationalization.

Many United Nations member states which have signed and formally approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights publicly support it, but at the same time are domestically unable or unwilling to observe or practice it. One instance of this may be found in the voting and post-voting behavior of colonial powers. When the European colonial powers voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights they responded, so to speak, to the ideal universal culture. When they continued to deprive their Colonial subjects of those rights, they were practicing real culture. The rationalizations of their behavior have been based on the "unpreparedness of their subjects," the need of their subjects for their assistance, or even their own contribution to peace and civilization!

As a matter of fact, the United Nations through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contributes to the frustration resulting from the ideal-real culture conflict of many societies. Since acceptance and approval of the Declaration is required of all member states, it becomes part of the ideal aspect of the culture of those societies. Because of this the Declaration gives new ideas, values, and aspirations to people, and yet the United Nations Organization is not in a position to protect those individuals or groups who take up these new values, try to conform to the Declaration, and thereby get into trouble because of conflicting local political practices. Rationalizations of this deficiency by the United Nations Organization are the principle of non-intervention and the concept of self-determination of the individual states.

There are some governments whose survival may be threatened by the full implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since these governments are protected by the self-determination and non-intervention principles of the United Nations Charter those societies and their members will remain unable to take part in the dynamic process of universalization and therefore will not become responsive members of universociety.

A major source of much conflict is poor communication or a lack of effective communication. Communication cannot be effective unless it is reciprocal. Reciprocity will not be possible except under conditions of appropriate social interaction among members in societies that are capable of permitting free expression. There is likely to be a serious problem regarding mutual and effective communication under non-constitutional, non-democratic, and non-representative governments which are more secure in social and cultural isolation. Isolation tends to lead to strong feelings of sociocentrism which, in this case, could foster an inability to appreciate universal values and norms. Sociocentrism prevents intersocietal tolerance and decreases outer cooperation. Sociocentrics fail to possess a feeling for a common humanity and prefer social isolation which can be used in the name of national sovereignty. Such states want no part of provisions that would in any way obligate them to accept international or universal supervision.

If the answer to the problems of implementing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be (as some scholars have recommended) the establishment of strong international laws then these laws need to have the stalwart support of universal mores. In order that the values of international laws may become part of the norms of total universociety they need to be included in the process of universalization. Without such a supporting base even such laws as might be adopted by all states would not receive the needed and necessary sanctions and the emotional support that other norms are expected to have.

One of the problems that presently exists for the implementation of international laws lies in the fact that the United Nations Organization does not enjoy the power over general cultures that societies have over their own subcultures. Although many subcultures are in conflict with the general culture, these conflicts with social norms tend to be limited in scope. A society would not tolerate serious challenge or deviation by a subculture — especially when the deviation adversely affects social values that are related to the mores, security, welfare, or survival of the society. This limitation to tolerance is wholly understood by subgroups through the process of social interaction with the society. If the subculture is to enjoy societal tolerance toward its values, then it must be aware of and conform to certain expectations of the general culture. The United Nations Organization is not in a similarly controlling position over all societies and their general cultures. Therefore, with the existence of universociety and its controlling role over general cultures, human rights will receive universocietal sanction and the implementation of international laws will be made possible.

