

## NATO: AFTER THE HARMEL REPORT

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### (1) Harmel Report

The report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), as approved by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 14, 1967, was intended to be a bold and comprehensive decision based on far-reaching principles and long-range fixed goals. These principles were to act as guidelines for thorough investigations and dynamic executive measures necessary for the attainment and implementation of the desired goals. As originally proposed, it was to provide a broad analysis of developments since 1949 and to identify tasks of the future in an effort to strengthen NATO as an element contributing to a lasting peace. Mr. Harmel hoped for a concrete plan to improve cooperation and coordination in European political consultation, and specifically the areas of East-West relations, inter-allied relations, general defense policy, and relations with other countries. He even was venturesome enough to propose a "European Caucus," to be developed within the bounds of the North Atlantic Council, which would enable a single unified European voice to take a greater role in constructing overall policy vis-a-vis the United States.<sup>1</sup>

This grandiose if not unrealistic idea of original intent was almost certainly doomed to frustration considering the realities of the international situation. France, still a member of NATO's political activities, was willing to approve only a weak-kneed and unspecific proposal of NATO's future tasks. De Gaulle, after having recently removed France militarily, was not about to willingly submit any of his country's political prerogatives to an Alliance felt to be dominated by the United States.<sup>2</sup> This attitude, which has come to be something of far-reaching magnitude, had to be arbitrated because of a general desire by the majority of the remaining fourteen states to keep France, as a central geo-political area of strategic military and economic importance, as friendly and cooperative as possible. Western Europe in general, and particularly France, has and continues to experience strong tendencies towards individualism and nationalistic goals (i.e. Germany's *Ostpolitik*). NATO achieved such success in removing the fear of the confrontation of the cold war, that there exists significant misgivings as to its continued usefulness. Many expressed and do express the Gaullist attitude that NATO is a tool used by the U.S. for domination of West Europe,<sup>3</sup> economically, militarily, and diplomatically. The combination of a general relaxation of the fear of confrontation, a desire to break the bonds of U.S. hegemony in pursuit of more

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<sup>1</sup> Frances A. Beer, *Integration and Disintegration in NATO* (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 40-42.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> John J. McCloy, *The Atlantic Alliance: Its Origin and Its Future* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 30-31.



national internal and external aims, and a pragmatic view of retaining the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" as an effective yet not visible deterrent to any Soviet action (and a reassurance against the revival of West European insecurity), created an atmosphere in which the optimistic hopes of Harmel and others were to end up in a general plan that reaffirmed the necessity of NATO, yet called for few *specific* future commitments.

The "Harmel Exercise," beyond its original frustrations, did achieve a significant degree of success. Using NATO as the central apparatus, it broadened the political scope of the Atlantic Alliance and helped to revitalize national interest and commitment that its earlier regional military focus was too narrow to sustain. Its discussions eliminated some of the misunderstanding surrounding NATO's continued usefulness and demonstrated, by a united (if vague) reaffirmation of NATO's vital role in Europe's future, that their still existed a deep reservoir of good will that could be activated by sophisticated and candid consultation.<sup>4</sup>

The supposedly precedent-setting NATO Ministerial meeting of December, 1967, in their final communique and the Harmel Report, adopted several areas of concentration aimed at setting definite "future tasks" felt necessary to increase the Alliance's role as an element of a lasting peace. These areas include East-West relations, Inter-Allied relations and consultation, general defense policy, and Alliance responsibilities elsewhere in the world. These were to be areas where the controlled dynamic change in emphasis and scope of the Alliance were to take place. Investigations, executive action and consultations were to endeavor to answer the needs of these questions within the bounds of the Alliance.<sup>5</sup>

To summarize the topic of East-West relations, the Report defines several areas of agreement. First, "the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence."<sup>6</sup> Secondly, the Alliance must use this militarily supplied security to complement an active policy of *détente*. In East-West relations the Alliance will hopefully become a vehicle "to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved"<sup>7</sup> NATO should broaden its military base into the political sphere in an effort to contribute to the restitution of the major issues (Germany and the arms buildup) standing between peace and a stable settlement in European relations.

Inter-Allied relations is the point at which the Report's major weakness manifests itself. The Alliance will and can act as an institution for the expression and exchange of ideas hopefully contributing to the construction of a coordinated and realistic policy for the improvement of East-West relations. But, "As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their pol-

<sup>4</sup> David Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy: the U.S., NATO, and Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 76-77.

<sup>5</sup> "Final Communique of Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council of December 1967," *NATO Letter*, January, 1968, p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance," *NATO Letter*, January, 1968, p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance," *NATO Letter*, p. 26, para. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.



icies to collective decision.”<sup>8</sup> Although it also expresses the view that “the chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel courses,”<sup>9</sup> this area clearly shows the essential lack of interest among West Europeans in further political integration through the Atlantic Alliance on any other international body. And, as the then Secretary General of NATO Manlio Brosio clarified in his analysis of the Harmel Report, this statement on increased political activity within the Alliance is not intended to be the basis for the construction of a Community of Europe on a common binding European policy.<sup>10</sup> Rather it is designed to express a common desire to coordinate policy through consultation in the hopes that cooperation will enhance the chances of a comprehensive settlement of issues. But these words also characterize the strong duplicity of intent Western Europeans obviously feel. They want any possible benefits NATO may have to offer, but they do not desire to have the responsibility of a firm binding commitment placed on the cherished sovereignty of their nation.

The final communique of the NATO Ministers Meeting introduced a new defense concept that was to become the major strategic element of NATO's military endeavors since 1968. Following a reaffirmation of the need to maintain NATO's military defense capacity as a foundation for the settlement of outstanding issues, they introduce the innovative concept of “flexible defense.”<sup>11</sup> This strategy emphasizes the necessity for the continuous adaption of NATO's defenses to current political, military, and technological developments in striving for “a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression.”<sup>12</sup> This enlightened concept is of tremendous importance in the evolution and implementation of NATO's defense strategy. It prevents the necessity of resorting to “ultimate weapons” in answer to aggression in the form of limited conventional weaponry. This realistic view has tended to increase NATO's defensive credibility in the eyes of its members and its prospective enemies. The Warsaw Pact would be more inclined to test any Alliance relying entirely on a nuclear deterrent for it is hardly feasible that either side would be willing to resort to such a conclusive response to a limited infringement on the territory of their respective spheres. This policy eliminates the continuous threat of finality exclusive reliance on the nuclear deterrent would engender. Another element of over-all defense/détente policy is the decision to actively pursue investigations on the possibility of disarmament through mutual balanced force reductions.<sup>13</sup> This idea has grown to be of increasing importance in the 1970's because of a strong desire on behalf of the members of the Alliance to reduce their defense commitments. Also the members of the Warsaw Pact (USSR), after a rigid early refusal to consider such a proposal, have become increasingly more willing to negotiate constructively on this issue. It appears that

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 7.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 7.

<sup>10</sup> Manlio Brosio, “An Analysis of the Harmel Report: Past and Future Tasks of the Alliance,” *NATO Letter*, March, 1968, pp. 9-13.

<sup>11</sup> “Final Communique NATO Ministers Council of December 1968,” *NATO Letter*, p. 25, para. 11.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 12.

<sup>13</sup> “Report on Future Tasks,” para. 13.



mutual balanced force reductions have the greatest chance of relieving the burden of maintaining large military organizations in continual readiness.

The final area of discussion, by the NATO Ministers and the Harmel Report, concerns NATO's tasks throughout the world. Acknowledging that NATO is a vital part of the world balance it vows to pay continued attention to crises as they develop on a global basis and to individually support other international organizations in the maintenance of global peace. As a specific topic of interest the Report makes a firm commitment to examine the problems originating in the Mediterranean area. The Soviet Union's naval buildup and continuing pressure on this exposed area (Southeastern Europe) should be studied in light of the possible effects any change in the structure of the area could have to the security of NATO. It also mentions the importance of the Middle East but leaves it in the realm of the United Nations (which they vow to support).<sup>14</sup> The net result of these statements is to project NATO beyond the borders of its treaty areas in recognition that crises throughout the world, and particularly in the Balkans, could have a profound effect on their security. It takes on questions too broad for the European members to deal with on bilateral basis.

In review, what roles did the Harmel Report project for NATO in the future? First, it makes a weak reaffirmation of NATO's continued vital role in the maintenance of European and global security while broadening its military scope to include the political goal of fostering a viable and lasting détente. It was not meant to be a drastic transformation. Its objective was to see how to strengthen and adapt the Alliance to meet the needs of the immediate and distant future. The Report also helped clarify issues and proposals for member governments to consider on a short and long-range basis, thus clearing up much confusion on what each member felt NATO's role was.<sup>15</sup> "The Allies were to 'examine,' 'study,' and 'consult on' the future of Germany, disarmament and arms control, NATO's south-eastern flank, and the extra-treaty area."<sup>16</sup> Beyond this clarification of goals, the Report indirectly affirms the basic parochial bent of Western Europeans. It specifically states that sovereign nations are not obligated to any decision NATO might make, while not including any specific commitments by the members. Commitments and specifics are to be *negotiated* in the future.

## (2) NATO, Europe, and the Czechoslovakian Invasion

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, on August 21, 1968, had a really profound effect on the Atlantic Alliance. NATO, at a very sensitive point in its development, actually benefited by this Soviet initiated move. On the verge of its crucial twentieth anniversary, and in an era of increasing security, optimism, and a détente oriented diplomatic setting, NATO was rapidly losing its sense of mission and with it the support of its members. The invasion surprised and shocked NATO's members, and placed the whole idea

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 14-15.

<sup>15</sup> Manlio Brosio, "NATO and the East-West Detente," *NATO Letter*, December, 1967, pp.

<sup>16</sup> Beer, *Integration and Disintegration in NATO*, p. 43.



of détente in jeopardy. Czechoslovakia vividly brought to light Russia's unwillingness to permit the socialist governments of East Europe to fall victim to national liberal tendencies and undermine the strength of Soviet control. Justified on the grounds of the post-invasion "Brezhnev Doctrine," the Soviet Union effectively reestablished her control of the situation and effectively reawakened the cold war insecurity of NATO's members.<sup>17</sup> It startlingly revealed that European and NATO calculations on the liberal policy of the Soviet Union towards her allies and West Europe were all wrong. The USSR had the power and the will to use her forces to keep the spread of such anti-socialist national revisionisms from getting out of hand in her "socialist bloc." NATO, as the guarantee of European security, consequently experienced a new surge of Allied interest.

An emergency early meeting of the Ministerial Council made a broad analysis of the effects of the invasion. They fall primarily into three areas. First, the ministers emphasized a necessity for political and military reassessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions. Second, they discerned a need to take appropriate military responses to preserve the deterrent capabilities that had been placed in serious jeopardy. And third, consideration was given to the question of the increased Soviet threat to the South-East European-Mediterranean area.<sup>18</sup> In an ambiguous but united stand, they also asserted that "any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis of grave consequences."<sup>19</sup> This elaborate and realistic evaluation, and unspecific but definite threat, is evidence of renewed vitality that NATO had received.

Militarily it was clear that this extensive mobilization in Central Europe had been successfully carried out by the largest and most credible force to be fielded by Moscow since World War Two. These forces were farther to the west and therefore more threatening than at any time in the recent past.<sup>20</sup> This reality created many questions about the strategy governing NATO's political-military policies. First, would NATO have enough "warning time" to mobilize the reserves that were the real credible element behind the conventional deterrent? This question seriously imperiled the rationale behind minimum commitments and further troop withdrawals. Second, how willing or how unwilling was the Soviet Union to make continued progress towards détente? Although the NATO ministers expressed a strong desire to continue communication on all levels with East Europe, they acknowledged that the invasion cast serious doubts as to Russia's intentions. With surprising strength of commitment, NATO's answer was to adopt a new strategy to meet the new threat. Revolving primarily around military affairs, NATO was determined to re-establish the creditability of her total "flexible response" concept and show the Soviets that the Allies were willing to meet the new threat forcefully. To restore credibility, NATO made definite commitments to increase the size of her combat military

<sup>17</sup> Robert Ranger, "NATO's Reaction to Czechoslovakia," *The World Today*, January, 1969, p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," *NATO Handbook* (NATO Information Service, 1971), p. 66.

<sup>20</sup> General L. Lemnitzer, "Balance of Prospects after the Events of Last August," *NATO Letter*, January, 1969, p. 6.



forces in the forward areas and to streamline command and mobilization techniques to ascertain that rapid use of available reserve forces become reality.<sup>21</sup>

Politically, NATO's overly-inflated expectations of relaxation were temporarily obstructed. But, while noting that caution was necessary and that the question of disarmament was seriously challenged, the ministers, in NATO and at a national level, found no acceptable positive policy capable of replacing a willingness to continue to cautiously pursue the *détente* between East and West.<sup>22</sup> Given the basic generality of this reaffirmed political policy (Harmel Report), it once again reinforces the fact that politically NATO is still a hollow structure. Even in face of the seriousness of the Czechoslovakian threat, NATO still was not capable of taking anything but an unspecified attitudinal role in the evolution of East-West relations. West European nations could not agree on common and specific political remedies on this multilateral basis.

In summary, Czechoslovakia's invasion revitalized NATO's organization and support in a period when its disintegrating tendencies were casting uncertain shadows over its future. The invasion and Brezhnev's "Doctrine" temporarily restricted the strong national orientation that European and East-West relations were rapidly developing (it destroyed the basis of De Gaulle's policies). It also revealed the discomfort that the USSR was experiencing over the question of *détente*. Her action of intolerance disrupted Europe's political and military status quo. As a result NATO felt a new sense of brotherhood that helped carry her through her crucial twentieth anniversary. NATO made a comprehensive, if *not* fully implemented military response. But politically NATO under-went little change and once the stability was restored disintegration reappeared rather rapidly. Temporarily it appeared as if the Czechoslovakian invasion had provided the impetus for the completion of the military and political goals that the Harmel Report had designated but had not been capable of fulfilling. Once the threat and the general feeling of insecurity had passed, because of creditable military responses, the diversity reappeared. The desire for a broadened organizational scope as proposed by the "Report on Future Tasks of the Alliance," was prolonged but not fulfilled as a consequence of this event. In the eyes of its members, NATO remains primarily a military institution and not an organization suitable for political integration and leadership.

### (3) Regional Problems of NATO

NATO, as an international organization, is facing certain regional problems, among its members and those areas on its immediate periphery, that are of major consequence if NATO is to be a strong integrated body in the future. These regional issues, with emphasis on the Mediterranean-South-East European area, are typical of and major causes of the centrifugal tendencies that characterize relations within the Alliance. The priorities of each major geographical region are developing along diverse lines; none of which seem to

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> "Final Communiqué," *NATO Handbook*, p. 67.



be contributing to a more useful organization. The Northern, Central, and Southern regions of NATO all see the Soviet threat from different points of view. What appears to have developed in light of this regional differentiation is an undeclared policy of pursuing national or regional goals keeping NATO's big gun (U.S. power) in the background, with as little commitment as possible, in case things get out of control.

In the North area, among the wealthier (high standards of living) and more powerful states, defense policy is based on regional security among closely tied equals.<sup>23</sup> Here, where the overt threat of aggression is felt to be very small, the members of the Nordic Council, which includes Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, members of NATO, along with the other countries of the Baltic area, are in basic agreement in following a policy of neutrality with military power as a backup. In a consensus of strategy the northern region is trying and succeeding in maintaining maximum protection with limited provocation.<sup>24</sup> The Danish and Norwegian governments have pursued a policy unlike any other member of NATO. Following ideas characteristic of their area, they do not permit any permanent non-native forces nor any stocks of nuclear weapons on their territory. But, because of their exposed situation, and as a result of proximity to Soviet military and naval power, they feel the necessity to retain NATO's defensive power as a non-visible protective deterrent. Here is where the crux of the problem lies. Feeling little other need for NATO than as a background deterrent, they are not interested in expansion of NATO's integrative role or in problems concerning areas distant from theirs. Their primary desire is to pursue an independent policy, which includes a neutral stand of non-involvement in other areas, while retaining the benefits NATO has to offer. In light of this policy it is of little wonder that their tie to NATO is very weak in relation to expanded commitments on integration.

The South-European-Mediterranean area, is rapidly developing into the region where crises are most likely to develop in the East-West conflict and where NATO's broadened scope of responsibility is being put to a severe test. The basic problem lies in the unsettling developments taking place in the Balkans, the Middle East and the whole strategic area of the Mediterranean Sea. Numerous new national states (Yugoslavia, Israel, Rumania, Bulgaria and even Greece) are developing in this area and have yet to define their international role on a coherent basis. As a result of no firm Alliance among themselves or to any big power, (for the most part) each party interested (NATO, Warsaw Pact, U.S., USSR, China) is trying to establish a relationship most favorable to their own interest.<sup>25</sup> This area is also, beyond political or ideological desires, one of *crucial* importance to the major parties involved. The Maritime dominated Mediterranean area is a vital communication and shipping link for NATO's Southern members while being an irreplaceable petroleum area for all of NATO's European members. For the Soviets, this

<sup>23</sup> Paul R. Schratz, "Strategic Theory and Action: The Southern Flank of NATO," in *NATO in the Seventies*, ed. by Edwin H. Fedder (St. Louis: Center for International Studies University of Missouri, 1971), p. 127.

<sup>24</sup> Nils Andren, "The Special Conditions of the Baltic Subregion," in *Europe and the Superpowers* ed. by Robert S. Jordan (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), pp. 214-215.

<sup>25</sup> Waldemar Besson, "The Contemporary West German National Outlook," in *Europe and the Superpowers*, ed. by Robert S. Jordan (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 133.



area, particularly the Dardanelles, is of strategic importance to the expansion of their military and non-military power throughout the world.<sup>26</sup> They also have a strong interest in securing influence in an area on their Southern periphery that has been of great historical significance to Russians. These conflicts of interests have manifested themselves in heavy concentrations of naval and military power combined with continuously recurring explosive situations. It has led to the development of a regional policy in line with the present situation. Italy, Greece, and Turkey, NATO's Southern members, have a strong interest, based on different national motives, in desiring a continued, if not strengthened, NATO presence in the Mediterranean. Turkey, because of her proximity to Russia and areas that Russia is very interested in, maintains close ties to NATO for its deterrent capabilities, while following a middle of the road diplomatic policy in an attempt to maintain peaceful relations with all. But she is committed to using NATO as a security guarantee against the evident threat of the Soviets.<sup>27</sup> Greece and Italy, have similar reasons for seeing continued NATO presence in the Mediterranean. Each, cut off from the rest of NATO geographically, depends on the sea lanes for communication and shipping that is the life line to their countries. In addition, Greece is in an extremely precarious position with regard to Soviet land pressure in Southeastern Europe.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, here where the Soviet threat is greatest and growing, the countries of the area are for a strong visible NATO commitment as an active deterrent. It is plain to see that the countries of this region are pulling on NATO in a different direction than the North and Central regions. They want active visible power and commitments to be their first line of defense.<sup>29</sup>

What about the areas not directly aligned with NATO (leaving the Middle East to be considered outside of NATO's realm of responsibility although they maintain a watchful eye)? Southeastern Europe is a region of flux and confusion where nationalism is the dominant political force that is re-emerging from an era of communist suppression.<sup>30</sup> The Balkan countries themselves, considering their new level of national status, are trying to remain out of direct Soviet pressure while not aligning with NATO. They want freedom to straighten out their own confused relationship nationally and internationally.<sup>31</sup> But it may turn out to be the best place to begin "Bridge building" to the East. Because of its transitory state it has not yet been as incorporated into the standoff confrontation of Central Europe and may yet, supposing a negotiable attitude on both sides, become a point of agreement among the principle parties. But it would not be an easy endeavor to accomplish. The Brezhnev Doctrine vividly depicts how strong Soviet interest is in the area and how important it will be to develop a favorable response from the Russians if any progress is to be made. Beyond this, NATO has yet to define any clear common Allied objective in the Balkan-Mediterranean area other

<sup>26</sup> Pierre Hassner, "Europe West of the Elbe," *Europe and the Superpowers*, pp. 128-130.

<sup>27</sup> Victor Meier, "Nationalistic Interests in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean," *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 164.

<sup>28</sup> Meier, *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 162.

<sup>29</sup> Schratz, *NATO in the Seventies*, p. 128.

<sup>30</sup> Meier, *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 153.

<sup>31</sup> Jordan, *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 133.



than the improvement and strengthening of their military capabilities.<sup>32</sup> They have activated NATO's Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean and Command Maritime Airforces Mediterranean as the major elements of their response to the Soviet buildup in the region.<sup>33</sup> But the concept of military security is insufficient, NATO must develop friendlier political and economic relations, based on a clear long-term policy, in an effort to begin the *détente* that is the real basis of a lasting peace. So far, NATO has been unable to fill this political leadership role.<sup>34</sup>

In NATO's important Central region, where the Treaty movement had originated, the growing disintegrating tendencies are assuming their most amplified expression. Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany not only are involved in interregional diversity, by attempting to circumvent their called for commitments and eliminate United States' hegemony over their political, military or diplomatic policies, but also, are involved in intraregional differences that emphasize very nationalistically oriented goals in opposition to any common NATO or European strategy. NATO has been and continues to be an essential element of the relatively stable atmosphere that Central Europe is now enjoying. But, although it still fulfills a necessary military function, it now seems evident that its goal of a broadened political role has not been reached. The Central Region is representative of the diversification that has undermined the effectiveness of NATO and similar multilateral political organizations.

The Federal Republic of Germany, in return for the security and protection that the forces of NATO and the nuclear "umbrella" of the United States have provided, has paid the price by conforming to NATO/U.S. foreign policy dictates.<sup>35</sup> As the second most significant member of NATO, in terms of military expenditures and economic strength, and as probably the most dependent member, for defensive and diplomatic reasons, it has been one of the Alliance's strongest supporters.<sup>36</sup> But the change in the international atmosphere has led West Germany to seek to cautiously re-evaluate their policies. The prospect of a *détente* replacing the *confrontation* atmosphere, that has been the major characteristic of East-West relations, has caused the Federal Republic's leaders to seek, both independently and in coordination with NATO and the United States, to re-orient their policy in the direction of a secure and stable relationship between West Germany and the major antagonists in East Europe. They feel that the goal of achieving equality and responsibility in West Europe through a close relationship with NATO has been fulfilled.<sup>37</sup> Germans have begun to fear that exclusive identification with America's hegemony in NATO and Europe, which had earlier been unde-

<sup>32</sup> Stefano Silvestri, "NATO and the Mediterranean Situation," in *NATO and Security in the Seventies*, ed. by Frans A. M. Alting Von Geusau (Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971), p. 57.

<sup>33</sup> Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean," *NATO Letter*, January, 1969, p. 8.

<sup>34</sup> Second Exercise of Mediterranean On-Call Force," *NATO Letter*, July/August, 1971, p. 13.

<sup>35</sup> Silvestri, *NATO and Security in the Seventies*, p. 56.

<sup>36</sup> Besson, *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 140.

<sup>37</sup> Lewis J. Edinger, "The German Federal Republic and NATO: Problems and Prospects," *NATO in the Seventies*, p. 39.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.



nably in their best interests, must be altered to allow them to negotiate from a German standpoint. In the face of the progress being made towards a bipolar Soviet-American entente, West Germany wants to be sure that the negotiations are not carried out at their expense.<sup>38</sup> Despite risking America's recalcitrance, Germany has been moving in decidedly European and nationalistic directions.

What is this new NATO-West German relationship? First, in light of the German Federal Republic's new political initiatives, it appears that German leaders now consider NATO to be a framework in which to maintain a close bilateral relationship with the U.S. to act as a guarantee of continued U.S. troop and nuclear protection.<sup>39</sup> Second, with regard to political relations with NATO, West Germany, with United States support, has been working to use NATO to achieve greater *West German* and West European political responsibility. But West Germany is approaching the subject differently than what the United States might hope. While pursuing continued cooperation among West Europeans on all levels, they are pragmatic enough not to be attempting to force the submergence of national views into a common political structure.<sup>40</sup> They are working more for a Europe politically cooperative but free of U.S. hegemony, while retaining U.S. military arsenals, than for a NATO with political control of the whole area.

West Germany's Eastern policy, that is so inexplicably tied to the success of the East-West détente and America's bilateral agreements (specifically the Four-power agreement of Berlin, the European Security Conference, and Mutual Balanced Force Reductions), is today on the verge of success in the form of the Bonn-Moscow treaties negotiated by Brezhnev and Brandt. In an apparently successful attempt to cultivate a negotiable attitude from the East, Germany has accepted the communists of East Germany to be Germans rather than enemies,<sup>41</sup> has accepted the status quo with regard to East-West boundaries,<sup>42</sup> and has attempted to establish conciliatory attitudes economically and politically before expecting any real success on the "big issues" (unification and disarmament). Despite domestic difficulties, this enlightened policy has contributed to the creation of a generally more favorable atmosphere in the entire realm of East-West relations.

Britain has just recently begun to accept the fact that her political and diplomatic power has declined precipitously with the loss of resources, military and economic, necessary to fill a world role. The British mentality only slowly caught up with reality and consequently there has existed a confusion in its policy towards NATO and the Western European area.<sup>43</sup> A reluctant acceptance of its restricted capabilities has been paramount in Britain's realization that its future role in the world is closely tied to its relationship with Western Europe. For this reason it has been pursuing a policy designed to improve relations, through NATO, the EEC, and cooperative defense initiatives, with the Central Region.

<sup>38</sup> Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy*, p. 52.

<sup>39</sup> Edinger, *NATO in the Seventies*, p. 50.

<sup>40</sup> Besson, *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 140.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>42</sup> "Stalemate on the Rhine," *Time*, May 5, 1972, p. 34.

<sup>43</sup> Walter Goldstein, "British Strategy and NATO: Prospects for the Seventies," *NATO in the Seventies*, p. 90.



Viewing its connection with the United States, in respect to the Gaullist influence in Europe, Britain has endeavored to use NATO for a dual purpose. First, Britain sees NATO as an element to promote European efforts, and especially British-European coordination, in the diplomatic-political sphere. Second, it enables Britain to retain her "special relationship" to the U.S. nuclear capability while dispelling the view that she is simply America's mouthpiece in European affairs.<sup>44</sup>

Because Britain sees her future to be tied to a closer relationship to Western Europe, she hopes to use NATO to increase West Europe's cooperation militarily, politically, and economically, to ensure a greater European influence and contribution in the Alliance. The possibility of herself and West Europe being caught between relations of the U.S. and USSR must be circumvented by increasing the European role in the Alliance. Central to this idea, of greater responsibility and freedom, is what has up until this time been futile efforts to expand West Europe's nuclear function in the Alliance.<sup>45</sup> This is seen to be the real basis of the deterrent and an increased European nuclear capacity and integration would be more relevant in answering the needs of Britain. A European nuclear force would be of greater utility and accountability than the nuclear force of the U.S. with its world wide commitments.<sup>46</sup>

Britain's stand on relations with the East is apparently closely aligned to the policy the U.S. has defined for NATO. Western Europe's policies, to be successful in this area must be clear and coherent. NATO provides, to the British, the best stage to clarify these policies. Central to Britain's desires for NATO's role in pursuing a détente, is the prospect of negotiations, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, aimed at reducing the conventional military burden and creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence in which to discuss the outstanding political issues.<sup>47</sup> Britain sees cooperation in Europe and NATO as most advantageous to their situation. They wish to increase West Europe's military responsibilities, and with this its political latitude, to strengthen Europe in relation to both of the superpowers. In the East, they favor multi-lateral negotiations, through NATO, in an effort to foster détente. NATO's role is part of a broader concept to improve cooperation between Britain and her European neighbors.

France, as the most militant member of the Atlantic Alliance and the Central Region, has, because of the heritage of De Gaulle, had extreme influence on NATO and the whole area of European/world relations. As one of the first statesman to recognize the possibilities inherent in the U.S.-USSR strategic balance, De Gaulle had entered into a new policy of nationalistic reawakening; hopefully with France in the forefront. He felt, in the era of standoff and relaxation, that the time was right to extricate Europe from the bonds of superpower hegemony and restore vitality to a balanced European community. His advocacy of freedom of choice by responsible nations found many friendly ears throughout the world; and is frequently reiterated in the

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 94 & 110.

<sup>45</sup> Ian Taylor, "The Dilemma of Great Britain," *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 182.

<sup>46</sup> Denis Healey, "Britain's Role in NATO," *NATO Letter*, July/August, 1971, p. 13.

<sup>47</sup> Taylor, *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 186.



70's. But his strong policy to assert France's leadership, depended on a strong and stable domestic political and economic situation. Pompidou has not found this to be the case.<sup>48</sup>

France has had to re-evaluate the policy that led to their withdrawal from NATO's military circles (in hopes that it would disintegrate and France would be left in a leading position in Europe), to a policy much less assertive and much more cooperative.<sup>49</sup> The national and international situation has changed markedly. Pompidou must face the realities of a weak economy and military that are not easily lent to a role of world leadership. Also, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia has revealed that De Gaulle overestimated the possibilities of his national policies. The U.S. begrudgingly retreated before the spread of nationalistic reassertion, but Russia, with its Brezhnev Doctrine, showed that it was not willing to allow Eastern Europe the same luxuries. Czechoslovakia also created a whole range of threatening possibilities to France's security in Europe and the Mediterranean area.<sup>50</sup>

This change in situation has caused a change in strategy. France's military weakness, in combination with the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean (naval power) and Central European areas (Czechoslovakian invasion) and a U.S. desire to retreat from burdensome commitments in NATO (primarily as a result of France's own strategy) has led to a parallelism in French-NATO defense policies. Not in an attempt to rejoin NATO or reintegrate under U.S. hegemony, but on an *ad hoc* basis where they have recognized the utility of closely aligned strategic endeavors.<sup>51</sup> French inability to carry on Gaullist policies and continue in a world power role, has caused her to retreat from the Mediterranean and African areas and to take a much more interested view in European cooperation on a basis of equality. Although they still maintain illusions of filling a leadership role in these areas, new realities have compromised former Gaullist militancy.

Czechoslovakia's invasion effectively destroyed any hopes that De Gaulle's nationalistic appeals would succeed in determining events towards détente in East-West relations. Since the failure of Gaullist concepts and in light of contemporary West German progress, France has projected her Eastern policy in support of Germany. There exists no giant plan to solve everything in one stroke; France follows Germany and NATO in negotiating on what is negotiable and using this as a basis for a progressive improvement in relations.<sup>52</sup> Realities here again dictate a low-key approach.

France of the Seventies is not the De Gaulle of the Sixties. Practical evaluations of a new environment has forced the French to accept the limitations that insufficient resources have placed upon them. Regional European responsibilities among interdependent nations, independent of U.S. hegemony, has been the characteristic of Pompidou's strategy. France has lost much of her militancy towards NATO, but still views it as too U.S. oriented to suit her

<sup>48</sup> Wolff Mendl, "After De Gaulle: Continuity and Change in French Foreign Policy," *The World Today*, January, 1971, p. 13.

<sup>49</sup> Walter Schutze, *European Defense Co-operation and NATO* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1969), p. 33.

<sup>50</sup> Mendl, *The World Today*, p. 15.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.



policy on a European scale. In East-West relations, she follows the generally accepted European strategy of progressive negotiation. In the final analysis, France, without De Gaulle, finds much of NATO's strategy to be useful on a regional scale while having little use for NATO's structure itself.

In summary, serious diversity between NATO's principle regions, and those members within these regions, has developed into a major factor contributing to NATO's loss of support. Each area continues to remain amicable to the NATO/U.S. military presence, visible or non-visible, in response to the acknowledged Soviet threat, but politically there appears to be little interest in acquiescing to any increased political integration under NATO's guidance. NATO's policies have in most instances been subservient to regional and national interests. In the North, regional cohesion on basic diplomatic, economic, and strategic issues, has rendered NATO, in its military role acceptable, unacceptable as a political or diplomatic element. Therefore this area plays little part in NATO's broadened political scope. In the South-Eastern-Mediterranean region, despite inter-member national diversity and confusion (Cyprus etc.), there is a common desire for a strong NATO military commitment to the area. But, outside of the military function, NATO's three Southern members feel little proximity with NATO's political-diplomatic endeavors. On the periphery of the Central European area, which NATO's new political role was primarily constructed to serve, the Southern region is interested more in national self-determination than bloc integration. The Central Region, NATO's "life blood" area, is where the greatest diversity comes to the surface. On different national criteria, France, Germany, and England, all feel that mutual West European cooperation is beneficial. But, they do not view this cooperation as eliminating the prerogatives associated with a sovereign nation. NATO, because of U.S. hegemony, is increasingly being seen as not serving West European intentions for political consultation. Although it still has a weakening military function, politically NATO serves little practical function. There is much consultation among its Central European members, but none of it corresponds to any serious plan to increase NATO's integrative character. NATO's regions, while maintaining NATO as a structure, are not supporting it except as it meets their own utilitarian purposes. They do not see NATO in a current or future role as a political integration.

#### **(4) NATO, the United States, and Europe, In A New Decade**

U.S.-European relations, as expressed through the organization of NATO, have been experiencing mutual dissatisfaction in recent years. As a result the United States has made minimal revisions in its NATO-European policy. The basic European attitude, which runs deeper than any influence De Gaulle may have had, is that NATO was and continues to be a major vehicle of U.S. military and political hegemony over West European affairs. After World War Two, because of its utter weakness in the face of demobilization and the Soviet threat, West Europe was forced to identify its interests and policies with the United States as the only guarantee of security. But in the 1970's, when it appears that the likelihood of aggressive action by the Soviet Union in Central Europe is very doubtful, West Europe has taken the oppor-



tunity to pursue more parochial policies on all levels. While in most cases giving token approval (to keep the nuclear and military deterrent of the U.S. in the foreground) to strategy the U.S. designs for NATO's implementation, the Allies of Europe generally pursue policies oriented more to suit their own ends. When in agreement on issues, Europeans tend to use the multi-national European institutions to meet their common needs. Concentrating more on economic and inter-European affairs (with limited discussion to derive general political and military orientations) the Allies have removed themselves from the constraints of the United States.<sup>53</sup> Consequently NATO, as the major element of U.S. hegemony, has experienced increasing decomposition.

The United States, in response to this European breakaway, has recently initiated a new more realistic policy regarding Europe and NATO. First, American hopes for a European-American partnership contained within NATO's superstructure have been shelved in favor of the vague concept of a "caucus." This seems to be the only thing acceptable to the European Allies because it calls for no specific commitments or compromising of sovereignty.<sup>54</sup> As vague as this concept may be, it still guarantees continued European/U.S. consultation on the basic issues in an atmosphere favorable to the U.S. Second, the U.S. has determined to and succeeded in continuing their strategic military concept of "flexible response." This has been a major irritant to our European Allies, but in the recent study on "Allied Defence for the Seventies" they went so far as to adopt a rather firm commitment to assume greater responsibilities in supplying the men and weaponry necessary to see that the concept of flexible response is credible.<sup>55</sup> Although the implementation of this commitment is still being carried out, I find three possible reasons for the Allies' consent to this program. (1) To answer the increasingly alarming Soviet buildup on the Southern flank of the NATO area. (2) This very possibly may have been the cheapest way to prevent American withdrawals (and with these the probable disintegration of NATO and its deterrent capabilities (nuclear) ), motivated by strong pressure (i.e. Mansfield Amendment) internally. (3) More than 50% of the program allotments were for improvements in national forces and if desired circumvention would be rather easy.<sup>56</sup> From the U.S. point of view, a conventional or even tactical nuclear struggle on European soil is more desirable than the idea of "massive retaliation" which would immediately endanger their vital interests. It is the only way the U.S. sees to "be capable of dealing . . . with aggression and incursions with more limited objectives associated with intimidation or the creation of *faits accomplis*, or those aggressions which might be the result of accident or miscalculation."<sup>57</sup> Third, President Nixon has apparently realistically accepted that the Western European Allies have no intention of subjugating their Eastern policy to NATO or U.S. auspices on anything but a broad basis. While they agree with the idea that Eastern policy should be détente oriented,

<sup>53</sup> Geusau, *NATO and Security in the Seventies*, p. 32.

<sup>54</sup> Schutze, *European Defense Co-operation and NATO*, p. 15.

<sup>55</sup> Ten Nation NATO European Defense Improvement Programme," *NATO Handbook*, p. 64.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>57</sup> "Extracts From President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to Congress of 25 February 1971," *NATO Letter*, May/June, 1971, p. 23.



the specific's are developed primarily on national and bilateral bases. The United States has appraised it to be so and has accepted it as the only workable policy.<sup>58</sup> Fourth, there is a close alignment between issues the U.S. defines as those of major importance and those issues of similar declared importance by NATO. Common to annual policy declarations of both NATO and the United States (Ministerial Communiqué's and Nixon's Foreign Policy Address's) are similar proposals to pursue the solution of mutual balanced force reductions, the problems of the Two Germanys and Berlins, the grounds for a General Conference on European Security, and a general commitment to pursue negotiation and communication with the Eastern bloc on *all* levels. Given this similarity of policy, and the begrudging acknowledgement of West Europeans, it is apparent that NATO continues to be an institution for the elaboration of U.S. foreign policy in Europe, and that Europeans, although loosely committed to NATO, still feel a close tie to U.S. interests. Finally, the U.S. has acknowledged that "A wide variety of contacts and negotiations are proceeding today, involving different participants in different forums on several issues."<sup>59</sup> Bilateral (SALT), multilateral (MFBR), and Four Power (Berlin) negotiations are simultaneously occurring and all contribute to a general reproachment with the East. While emphasizing that consultation should continue, European independence of policy is understood to be a vital element of the East-West relationship. The U.S. has departed from trying to make West Europe adopt a common political policy with NATO as the forum. Also, given the significant contribution of West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, which has and is creating a favorable atmosphere for all levels of East-West negotiations, it is hardly possible for the U.S. to do anything but acquiesce to success.

To review, the United States continues to see West Europe and NATO as vital elements in the protection of its interests. In a more mature policy it has accepted the realities of the European situation and yet still retained an element of support for NATO. By compromising U.S. demands for policy coordination President Nixon has carried through the strategic U.S. plan of "flexible response," with Europe picking up more of the burden. But, by acknowledging all the realities of the European situation, President Nixon has also acknowledged that NATO is not a viable European body, but rather a forum for bilateral U.S.-European consultations.

Where does NATO stand in this new decade? How have the "Future Tasks of the Alliance" been developed? Spheric relaxation and parochial policies have been the major characteristics of the international atmosphere since the Harmel Report was introduced. These influences have contributed to the general failure of NATO to significantly increase its political role in the early 1970's. Although NATO has undergone notable military reorientations, politically the most it has accomplished is a general reiteration of policies commonly agreed upon but pursued through channels other than NATO. The increasing East-West reproachment is causing increasing disintegration in the bloc set up. And NATO, as the major military institution of the United States sphere, is also disintegrating. The general success of NATO's military

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.



guarantee and the various levels of negotiation are increasing security and with it diversity. European integration is still a very live issue, but the urgent need for strength in unity is losing a great deal of its appeal. The interest that West Europeans have in integration revolve more around European developed institutions than around the U.S. guided institution of NATO. The combined communities of *ECSC*, *EEC* and *Euratom* could be the *apex* or milestone in the road to integration.<sup>60</sup> But either way, NATO serves only two main purposes. It remains the major institution for the continued military coordination and defense of the Western Sphere of Europe; and, it also acts as a forum for coordination of U.S.-West European foreign policy. This does not imply a binding commitment or agreement, but a thrashing out of various national policies to keep trust and communication viable. Policy announcements on diplomatic-political issues are simply areas of broad agreement that are generally negotiated on other than NATO's multilateral basis.

The Harmel exercise elaborated that "The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe"<sup>61</sup> and "to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations."<sup>62</sup> Obviously this broad statement of intent acknowledged a common commitment towards a peaceful solution of major East-West issues, but the question is, how were they implemented. The Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council that was conducted at Brussels in December 1971, "took note with satisfaction . . . the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin . . . that German arrangements to implement and supplement (Bonn Moscow treaty) the Quadripartite . . . the negotiations between the U.S. and USSR on strategic arms limitations (SALT)."<sup>63</sup> These statements draw attention to several specific routes of negotiation that have been defined, but each one excludes NATO as an intermediary. NATO still expresses moral support, but plays a rather insignificant role in the determination of these events.

The concept of mutual balanced force reductions was one of the tasks designated by the Harmel Report to be an element of NATO's future. This is one area in which NATO has made a determined effort to provide leadership. Although briefly mentioned by the Harmel Report, it has grown to be a major interest in NATO's East-West policy on a political-military level. As the institution of common defense for this bloc, it is natural that reductions should be pursued on a Europe-wide basis with NATO as the forum. At the Reykjavik Minister's meeting and again in Rome in 1970, MFBR's were given strong emphasis as an element of NATO's Eastern policy. There are two sides of the Allied approach: first, continuous investigation on how to pursue this policy and once negotiated how to implement it in such a way as to preserve the security of both sides; and second, the Allies in 1968, 1969, and 1970 have repetitiously reiterated their commitment to pursue this policy to its fulfill-

<sup>60</sup> Jordan, *Europe and the Superpowers*, p. 252.

<sup>61</sup> "Report on Future Tasks of the Alliance," *NATO Letter*, p. 26.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>63</sup> "Final Communiqué of Ministerial Session of NATO Council at Brussels," *NATO Letter*, December, 1971, p. 5.



ment.<sup>64</sup> After several years of little concrete progress, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, in May 1971, initiated a chain of reactions that indicate a Russian willingness to open the path for negotiations that could lead to serious consultations on mutual balanced force reductions.<sup>65</sup> Consequently, at a high level meeting on MBFR in October 1971 at Brussels, the countries participating in NATO's Integrated Defence Programme appointed former Secretary General Manlio Brosio to act as "explorer" in investigating the viewpoints and criteria that must be understood before negotiations can be undertaken.<sup>66</sup> This breakthrough remains in the exploratory stage and the results are quite unpredictable. But it appears to be a new dimension for NATO in the political realm. Brosio, as NATO's representative is attempting to set up multilateral negotiations with NATO as the intermediary.

With regard to "Future Tasks" in the military realm, as earlier mentioned, "flexible response" has remained the principal over all strategy. As part of this, NATO's military staffs have continued to assess Soviet capabilities to maintain the balance at each level and in each region (i.e. Mediterranean Naval Activity).<sup>67</sup> Military affairs has been and continues to be the area where NATO experiences a real leadership role.

To conclude, NATO in the 70's is simply not capable of filling an integrative political role. Because of numerous national, regional, and trans-atlantic differences there is little common ground on which to bring Europe together. Deep-rooted West European resentment of what is felt to be U.S. exploitation contributes to this negative atmosphere. In an era when NATO's military function is being fulfilled reasonably credibly, Europeans have embarked on political roads of their own. And, in the face of the success of these nationally initiated policies, NATO has had negligible function in East-West relations. The Harmel report introduced broad areas for NATO to consider in the future. In the future, NATO has made significant headway militarily, keeping the deterrent viable, but politically, to all parties, NATO is a dead letter. There is and will not be any common European policy or U.S.-European partnership as NATO now stands. And its evolution is progressing on diverse rather than integrative political lines.

<sup>64</sup> Roger J. Hill, "Mutual and Balance Force Reductions: The State of a Key Alliance Policy," *NATO Letter*, September/October, 1971, pp. 17-18.

<sup>65</sup> "Soviet Response to Long-standing NATO Initiative on MFBR," *NATO Letter*, July/August, 1971, p. 29.

<sup>66</sup> "High Level NATO Meeting on MBFR, Brussels, 5-6 October 1971," *NATO Letter*, November/December, 1971, p. 24.

<sup>67</sup> "Alliance Defence for the Seventies," *NATO Handbook*, p. 87.



