

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE AMERICAN VOTER: WHEN AND HOW DO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AFFECT VOTER CHOICE?

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I. Literature Review.

This paper will examine the questions of whether, when and how foreign policy issues affect voter choice, with particular attention to the role that policy toward the Soviet Union played in the 1980s. In many presidential election campaigns, foreign policy plays an important role. Today, the United States is the only superpower left, and must decide what role it is going to play in the world. But from the 1950s to the 1980s, there was a bipolar struggle between the U.S. and the USSR that was played out in a host of third parts of the world, and always carried the threat of escalation to full-scale war. It was the one constant in the post-war world. Determinations of what stance to take, specifically cooperation or confrontation, were determined largely by the presidents in office -- Nixon had detente, Reagan had confrontation. Presidents, of course, win elections by developing platforms and receiving enough votes. When the country wants a hard-line approach to foreign policy, the candidate whose platform most conforms to a hawkish foreign policy will win and implement that platform.

But most theories of voting behavior have purported that foreign affairs and foreign policy issues are unimportant or irrelevant to voter choice. The prevailing explanation is that foreign policy issues are largely removed from the average voter's daily life, and too confusing and complicated for him or her to fully understand. These issues take place in the complex international arena, so the theories go, and the average voter is unlikely to spend the time required to become fully knowledgeable about them.

Research has found that people generally do not follow foreign affairs, and find foreign policy issues to be of a "remote and complex nature."¹ "Public opinion polls . . . show that people do not follow foreign affairs closely and often do not know enough about the specifics of a particular issues to form opinions."² Gabriel Almond stated, "foreign policy attitudes among most Americans lack intellectual structure and factual content. Under normal circumstances the American public has tended to be indifferent to questions of foreign policy because of the questions' remoteness from every day interests and activities."³

Researchers have divided the public into three categories with respect to foreign policy issues: the "mass public" is unaware of foreign issues, the "attentive public" is aware of foreign issues but unable to make an intelligent argument, and the "opinion leaders" have some specific knowledge about foreign affairs.⁴ (Aldrich,

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1 John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 83, no. 1, March 1989, 125.

2 *Ibid.*, 124.

3 Mark Peffley and John Hurwitz, "International Events and Foreign Policy Beliefs: Public Response to Changing Soviet-U.S. Relations," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 32, no. 2, May 1992, 431.

4 Aldrich, 124.

p. 124). In 1961, James Rosenau estimated the size of the three groups at 75%, 15-20%, and 5-10%, respectively.⁵

Because most people know little about foreign affairs, their attitudes toward foreign policy are weak at best, and some have dubbed these attitudes "non-attitudes."⁶ The prevailing research determined "foreign policy attitudes . . . to be essentially irrelevant to important political decisions such as the vote choice."⁷ As Deborah Larson notes, "the public's attention span to foreign affairs is strictly limited; elections are not decided on foreign policy issues."⁸

Conversely, domestic issues, especially economic, hit closer to home. In 1950, Gabriel Almond's research showed that

most U.S. citizens knew very little about the remote issues of foreign policy and instead focused their attention on domestic issues. They did so because domestic issues often have more direct and immediate consequences on people's lives and their material well-being.⁹

The explanation is simple and intuitive. Domestic issues are more important to average voters because they are more likely to affect their daily lives directly than foreign policy issues. "The public is likely to have direct experience with problems such as inflation and unemployment, but . . . unlikely to have direct experience with arms negotiations or U.S. policy toward Central America."¹⁰ The cliché, "voters vote their pocketbooks," seems to say it all.

Some have argued that only when a "hot" foreign issue is present, can foreign affairs issues voting take place. A hot foreign issue is one that has "a strong domestic component that affect[s] daily life."¹¹ Stephen Hess and Michael Nelson dubbed these hot foreign issues, "intermestic" issues and argued that they were a factor only in 1952 with the Korean War, in 1972 with the Vietnam War, and in 1980 with the Iranian hostage situation.¹² Such "intermestic" issues are rare and unusual.

Thus,

the prevailing consensus . . . is that the public possesses little information and only few, ill-formed attitudes about foreign affairs and is concerned deeply about these issues only when their daily lives are directly affected. As a result, such concerns are not terribly consequential in the voting booth.¹³

If this prevailing consensus is true, why do presidential candidates so strongly stress foreign policy in their campaigns? If the public responds directly to domestic issues and only weakly to foreign policy issues, then it would seem that presidential candidates would be wise to keep their campaigns largely within the borders. But Hess and Nelson found that "in virtually all recent elections, . . . foreign policy has been the candidates' dominant concern."¹⁴ Either the candidates believe foreign affairs can have some effect, and thus fail to grasp the conventional wisdom -- that

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Peffley, 431.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 124.

voters have direct experience with domestic issues but not with foreign policy issues -- or the candidates are on to something and the conventional wisdom underplays the role of foreign policy in presidential elections.

In fact, "there is some scholarly evidence suggesting that foreign policy issues do play an important role in electoral behavior" and "a few scholars . . . have argued that foreign policy attitudes play an enduring and important role in electoral behavior."¹⁵ In 1976, Ronald Reagan significantly cut into incumbent President Ford's lead in the Florida primary by shifting his focus from domestic to foreign policy.¹⁶ Hurwitz and Peffley have determined that "foreign policy, if measured as perceptions of general retrospective 'postures' taken by the administration, exerted a substantial impact on Reagan's approval ratings."¹⁷

John Kessel found that between 1952 and 1984, his "international involvement" measure and vote were strongly related in every election except 1968 and 1976.¹⁸ He also found "international involvement" to have a large impact in the elections, ranking near the most important in the majority of elections, and even exceeding "economic management" in a few.¹⁹

A series of studies has determined that the electorate actually exhibits considerable structure to its foreign policy beliefs and that many foreign policy attitudes are fairly stable over time and figure prominently into important political decisions, such as the vote choice.²⁰

Therefore, some scholarly evidence exists that the conventional wisdom underplays the effect of foreign affairs on voter choice.

If given enough thought, the conventional wisdom seems a bit simplified. After all, "many U.S. citizens have experienced, directly and indirectly, the impact of three major hot wars and one prolonged cold war."²¹ Therefore, many Americans have been directly affected by the foreign policy decisions of the government. In addition, "many of us have matured under the anxiety of the bomb and conditions threatening nuclear war," and it is worth noting that "these experiences, whether direct or vicarious, are certainly as potent as ordinary fluctuations in the macroeconomy."²²

Thus, the theory that foreign policy cannot play a significant role in voting behavior because foreign affairs are too remote and do not affect the average voter directly, seems a bit naive. The conventional wisdom may be shifting to thinking that foreign policy issues can affect voter behavior. But under what circumstances? The question shifts from whether foreign policy issues can affect voter behavior to when they can.

Angus Campbell has argued that three conditions must be met in order for foreign policy issues to affect voter choice.²³ First, the voter must be aware that a foreign policy issue does in fact exist. If a voter does not perceive that a foreign policy

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

18 *Ibid.*

19 *Ibid.*

20 Peffley, 431-432.

21 Aldrich, 126.

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*, 127.

issue even exists, it cannot possibly play a role in that voter's vote. In addition, the foreign policy issue must arouse some effect; that is, the voter must have an opinion one way or the other on that issue. Thirdly, the voter must be able to perceive a difference between the candidates on that foreign policy issue and determine that one candidate or another best represents the voter's position on that issue. All three conditions must be met in order for foreign policy issues to affect voter choice.²⁴

But simply because a voter satisfies these three conditions, does not mean he or she was influenced by a candidate's stance on a foreign policy issue -- a domestic issue could have been more important to him or her. To affect a voter's vote choice, the voter would have to rank the foreign policy issue as important, either to that voter personally or to the country as a whole. Polls indicate that foreign policy issues do rank as very important. In 1980 and 1984 Gallup Polls, over a third of the respondents said foreign and defense issues were the most important facing the country, and a fifth indicated that foreign and defense issues were most important to them personally.²⁵

Overall, from 1947 to 1973, the proportion of people selecting foreign and defense issues as the most important was never lower than 22%, and it was usually greater than one third, often surpassing the proportion that selected domestic issues.²⁶ Between 1973 and 1979, foreign and defense issues did not seem to pique the public's interest, but in the 1980s, the proportions resumed their pre-1973 level.²⁷

Thus, if a voter is aware of a foreign policy issue, has an opinion on that issue, and can perceive one candidate as better representing his or her views, foreign policy issues can play a role in voting behavior. Data has shown that "foreign policy attitudes and perceptions are as available and appear to be as meaningful as attitudes on domestic issues [in voting behavior]."²⁸ Thus Aldrich and others have come to the conclusion that "the greater the foreign-defense attitude accessibility and the greater the distinctiveness of the candidates, the more important foreign and defense issues will be in voter choice."²⁹

But this conclusion needs some explanation. Basically, the international area is too complicated for most people to deal with on an individual issue basis, so voters simplify the complex world. As Peffley and Hurwitz point out,

none of this empirical work suggests that foreign policy belief systems are thorough, logical or based on complete information. To the contrary, the complexity of this domain both encourages and demands that citizens engage in simplification strategies to cope with an often puzzling globe.³⁰

One of these simplification strategies is for voters to rely on what Peffley and Hurwitz dub "postures -- or broad, abstract beliefs regarding the general direction the government should take in international affairs."³¹ Voters use these postures to reach positions on specific foreign policy issues "in a top-down fashion."³²

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 130.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 131.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 135.

³⁰ Peffley, 432.

³¹ John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, "Public Images of the Soviet Union: The Impact of Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 52, no. 1, February 1990, 4.

³² *Ibid.*

"The most salient feature of the postwar canvas, of course, has been the main U.S. adversary -- the Soviet Union."³³ Voters "were found to hold views on a variety of foreign policies (e.g., defense spending and support for nuclear weapons development) that were strongly consistent with their images of the USSR."³⁴ A voter's posture, then, on the Soviet Union was used to reach a host of specific policy views.

The negativity of a voter's posture held important implications for his or her specific policy preferences.

Individuals who believe the Soviets are bent on achieving global domination, for example, are likely to favor a militant posture of containing Soviet expansion. For this individual, increasing aid to the "Contras," greater defense appropriations, and negotiating with the Soviets from a position of nuclear strength would, no doubt, be seen as necessary strategies for responding to the Soviet threat. On the other hand, an individual who feels the Soviet state is motivated foremost by defensive (rather than offensive) concerns, would be less likely to support policies geared toward containment and more likely to pursue strategies of mutual disarmament.³⁵

Thus, "the most negative image-holders [have] substantially more 'hawkish' attitudes across these policies."³⁶

Research indicates that those individuals who believed that the Soviets' purpose was to achieve world domination considered themselves highly patriotic, morally traditional, and conservative and were likely to be members of the Republican party. For those who consider themselves very patriotic, "whether expressed as an unswerving love of country or a chauvinistic view of the superiority of one's nation," the Soviet Union "symboliz[ed] the antithesis of cherished core [American] values, including political and religious freedom and what might be termed an 'American way of life'."³⁷ These people preferred all that was American and felt that any system as inherently "un-American" as the USSR was a threat.

And those who considered themselves morally traditional, which is a "preference for traditional patterns of family and social morality that reflects a reverence for the past,"³⁸ also considered the Soviet Union a threat. A possible explanation is that "militant anticommunism has long been a part of the moral traditional agenda" and that sentiment was augmented by the "feeling that the USSR and its system of government [were] morally and spiritually bankrupt."³⁹ The Soviet Union was widely regarded in the U.S. as a godless, oppressive dictatorship, and moral traditionalists felt that the USSR was an "evil opponent that must be opposed by a righteous defender of virtue and morality."⁴⁰

Partisanship and ideology are related to positions on the Soviet Union in the expected way. Conservatives and republicans desire tougher stances with respect to the Soviet Union. In a study in 1987, Hurwitz and Peffley found that "republicans, conservatives, and those with the most intensely patriotic attitudes are consistently more likely to advocate hard-line policies."⁴¹

33 *Ibid.*

34 Peffley, 432.

35 Hurwitz, 7.

36 Peffley, 432.

37 Hurwitz, 8.

38 *Ibid.*, 9.

39 *Ibid.*

40 *Ibid.*

41 *Ibid.*, 19.

It is true, however, that voters' views of the Soviet Union were not the only foreign policy issues affecting voters in the 1980s. "Images of the USSR . . . [were] not completely determinative of foreign policy attitudes. "Clearly, Americans respond[ed] to a great many more stimuli than simply images of the Soviet Union . . . when formulating their foreign policy attitudes."⁴² However, many Americans viewed the Soviet Union as the principle threat in the 1980s. Therefore, "given the paramount importance of America's chief global antagonist, citizens' understandings of the USSR should [have] exert[ed] a profound influence on their foreign policy decisions."⁴³

Thus, those who considered foreign affairs in their vote choice in the 1980s were likely to consider the USSR. And those who favored a "militant posture of containing Soviet Communism" were likely to view the Soviet Union as intent on achieving world hegemony. These people were likely to consider themselves patriotic, morally traditional, conservative and republican.

Part II. Research Design and Hypotheses Tests.

This paper will examine two main hypotheses relating to voters' postures toward the Soviet Union and the actual vote, as well as a minor hypothesis relating patriotism and moral traditionalism to postures toward the Soviet Union.

The first hypotheses is that, among voters who could have used foreign policy issues as a guide in voting, those who had a militant "posture," that is favored a policy of militant containment of Soviet expansion, also supported a tough stance in negotiating with the Soviets, an increased defense, and increased aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. Since people view foreign affairs through the lens of their "posture" with respect to foreign policy, people will adopt positions on specific policy issues consistent with that posture. This holds true even if they have not thought out all the ramifications of their positions on specific foreign policy issues. Someone with a militant posture in foreign affairs will support a tough stance in negotiations with the USSR. And because they see the USSR as a threat, they will back an increased military and support for the Contras. It is the posture that determines the individual policy stances, and people with a militant posture in foreign affairs in the 1980s viewed the Soviet Union as an expansionistic, deceitful state that needed to be dealt with from a position of strength. Furthermore, a position of strength required a tough negotiating stance, an increased military, and the halting of expanding aid to the Contras. So a militant posture was related to all three specific policy positions. This hypothesis will be broken down in order to examine the data.

The second main hypothesis will be that these people -- those with a militant foreign policy posture -- tended to vote for George Bush in the 1988 presidential election. As stated, people with militant foreign postures would favor firm dealings with Russia, increased defense spending, aid to the Contras, and would consider themselves highly patriotic. In 1988, George Bush represented and campaigned on those policies and values, stressing his record as an effective and tough cold-war leader as Ronald Reagan's vice president, as well as his position as head of the patriotic, "family-values" based Republican party.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

The minor hypotheses will be that those who favored a militant foreign posture also considered themselves highly patriotic and were morally traditional. Those who have a great love of country or a sense of America's superiority will tend to resent the Soviet Union's denial to its citizens that which many Americans believe makes their country great -- freedom, especially religious freedom. These people would believe that containing Soviet expansion, indeed even rolling back of Soviet gains, is a worthwhile goal. A militant foreign posture toward the USSR could very well be the result.

Moral traditionalists viewed the Soviet Union as immoral and lacking in spirituality. It was a godless, untrustworthy dictatorship, and anything to prevent expansion of such an unscrupulous state was worthwhile. Again, support for containment and roll-back could result from this view as well.

To operationalize "posture," I will use the *U.S. Power and Security Index*, V93, from the 1988 University of Michigan National Election Survey. That variable is

an index of respondent's commitment to a strong national defense and an active anti-communist foreign policy, built from agreement with the following statements: The U.S. should maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation even if it means going to the brink of war; Any time a country goes communist, it should be considered a threat to the vital interests and security of the United States; and the United States should do everything it can to prevent the spread of communism to any other part of the world.

The index is a Likert scale from one to five, where one indicates a high degree of agreement with the statements and five indicates a low degree of agreement. I recoded the variable into a scale of three, where a one indicated a respondent on the high end of the scale (a response of one or two on V93), a two indicated neutrality (a response of three on V93), and a three indicated a respondent was on the low end of the scale (a response of four or five on V93). This "posture" variable broke respondents down into "hawks" (responses of one on the recoded variable), "neutrals" (two on recoded variable), and "doves" (three on recoded variable). If a respondent agreed highly that the U.S. should be dominant in the world, that a country turning toward communism threatened the U.S., and that the U.S. should do everything to stop the spread of communism, it is fair to say that he or she has a militant foreign posture.

The other concepts I will be using operationalize rather straightforwardly. Stance on the USSR is the *Cooperate with the USSR* variable, V94, which places respondents on a scale from one to five, with the response to one being "we should cooperate more with the USSR" and five being "we should be tougher in our dealings with Russia." Views on whether defense should be increased come from the *Defense Spending Scale*, V88, which is a scale running from one to five, where one is supporting the reduction of defense spending and five is supporting the increasing of defense spending. *Aid to the Contras* is on a scale of one to three where one is supporting increased aid and three is supporting decreased aid.

The *Patriotism Index*, V115, asks how one feels to see the flag flying or hear the national anthem, and how strong is one's love of country and pride in being an American. The index runs from one to four, where one is high and four is low. It will be used to measure patriotism.

The *Lifestyle Tolerance Index* will be used to operationalize moral traditionalism. It asks whether respondents agree that society should change our standards of moral behavior to meet a changing world, that we should be tolerant of those who adhere to a different moral code, that the country would have fewer problems if we emphasized traditional family ties, and that newer lifestyles are contributing to the

breakdown of society. The index is coded on a scale from one to five, where one indicates high tolerance and five indicates low tolerance. People with scores of four and five can be said to be morally traditional because the index covers questions that if answered in the negative (resulting in a score of four or five on the index), show a desire to go back to the values and norms of the past.

It must be noted that in examining the three hypotheses, only respondents who could have used foreign policy issues to guide their vote will be regarded. People seemed to have the need to perceive Bush as tougher than Dukakis on issues related to the USSR. I looked where respondents placed Bush on the *Cooperation with USSR Scale*, V95, and compared that with where Dukakis was placed on that scale, V96, creating a variable, COOPDIST, by subtracting the score for Dukakis, V96, from the score for Bush, V95. I then created a variable, CDIST2, with five values, and placed two values of COOPDIST into each variable of CDIST2 so that values of four or five on CDIST2 indicated the respondent viewed Bush as tougher on the Soviet Union.

In examining the data, I only looked at respondents who scored a four or five on CDIST2. Those who scored a three could not perceive a difference between Bush and Dukakis, so they could not have used foreign policy issues as a guide in voting. Those who scored one or two thought Dukakis was tougher on the USSR, which leads one to deduce that they, too, neglected to use foreign policy issues as a guide to voting.

In testing the first hypothesis that those with a militant foreign posture tended to support a tough stance with the Soviet Union and increased defense of and aid to the Contras, I will use cross-tabulation. I will examine V94, *Cooperation with USSR*, V88, *Defense Spending Scale*, and V92, *Aid to Contras* separately, each time using the POSTURE variable I created by collapsing V93 into three categories as the independent variable. I will only look at those respondents who perceived Bush as tougher on USSR than Dukakis, that is their score on CDIST2 would be greater than or equal to four.

First, I examined whether a voter's posture toward the Soviet Union was related to his or her stance on negotiating with the Soviet Union. Table 1, a cross-tabulation analysis of V94 (*Cooperation with USSR*) by POSTURE, identifies a relationship between hawkish foreign postures toward Soviet Union and a tough stance in negotiations with Russia. Of hawks (those who ranked a one on the POSTURE variable), 54.63% preferred a tough stance with the Soviet Union. The chi-square value is 101.34, which means a less than five percent probability of error when rejecting the null hypothesis. Since both variables are of the ordinal variety, and it is not a square table, Tau-C tells us that the strength of the relationship is -0.400 -- a fairly strong relationship.

A look at Table 2, which lays out a cross-tabulation of the *Defense Spending Scale*, V88, by POSTURE, will show that there is also a relationship between hawkish foreign postures toward the USSR and advocating increased defense spending. Here, 51.35% of hawks favored increased military budgets. The chi square value is 101.14, again allowing reasonable probabilities in rejecting the null hypothesis, and the Tau-C value of -0.39 shows reasonable strength in the relationship. And Table 3 shows cross-tabulation from *Aid to the Contras*, V92, against POSTURE. Although only 29.86% of hawks supported increased aid to the Contras, that proportion was much higher than the 18.58% of all respondents who favored an increase. The chi-square value of 75.51 allows rejection of the null hypothesis, and

the Tau-B value of 0.34 indicates a relatively strong relationship.

The preceding analysis has shown that the first hypothesis stated is reasonable. Among those who understood foreign affairs enough to perceive Bush as tougher than Dukakis on the Soviet Union, and those who had a militant posture toward the Soviet Union, were more likely to favor a tough stance in negotiating with the USSR, increased defense spending and increased aid to the Contras versus those who did not favor a militant posture. However, the analysis is defective in that it is impossible to tell if the same people who favored a tough stance, favored increased defense spending, and also favored increased aid to the Contras. This was predicted in Part I. However, the three concepts are nonetheless related.

The evidence also supports the minor hypotheses. Table 4 shows a cross-tabulation of the *Patriotism Index*, V115, by POSTURE. 69.28% of hawks considered themselves highly or very highly patriotic. The chi-square value of 77.19 allows rejection of the null hypothesis, and the Tau-C value of 0.33 means the relationship is fairly strong. Thus, those who had a militant foreign posture and the ability to use foreign policy as a vote determinant, considered themselves highly patriotic.

Table 5 shows cross-tabulation for the *Lifestyle Tolerance Index*, V117, against POSTURE. 51.55% of hawks had low or very low tolerances on the lifestyle tolerance index, meaning they were morally or very morally traditional. The chi-square value of 75.36 allows rejection of the null hypothesis, and the Tau-C value of -0.27 shows the relationship to be moderately strong. Therefore, hawks tended to be moral traditionalists.

These last two analyses together prove the minor hypotheses to be correct. People with militant postures toward the USSR are, in fact, more patriotic and morally traditional. The literature of Hurwitz and Peffley has been proven correct, as far as 1988.

Finally, all this leads up to the third hypothesis: hawks tended to vote for Bush in 1988, and this was a possible contribution to his victory. Table 6 shows cross-tabulation results from comparing choice of votes, V2, and POSTURE. 71.04% of hawks voted for Bush in 1988. The chi-square value of 58.49 allows rejection of the null hypothesis, so a relationship does exist between posture toward the Soviet Union and vote choice in 1988. A relationship also exists between a dovish foreign posture and votes for Dukakis. Unfortunately for the former Massachusetts governor, hawks outnumbered doves by more than 17% in 1988 as can be seen by the frequency table (Table 7). Also unfortunate for Dukakis was that the majority of those with neutral foreign postures supported Bush, 59.79% to 40.21%. Obviously, in 1988, the public was leaning toward a tough posture with the Soviet Union, and Bush benefitted from that.

So from the sample data in 1988, voters with militant postures toward the USSR were more likely to favor a tough stance in negotiations, increased defense spending, and increased aid to the Contras. They were also more likely to consider themselves patriotic and morally traditional and were more likely to cast their ballot for George Bush. This quantitative study had the advantage of quantifying the relationships observed. One could know exactly how much a militant posture affected voters' stances on the USSR or defense spending, or what proportion of hawks considered themselves patriotic.

But there are problems using sample survey data, as with all sample research. In a survey, one never knows if the respondents are being truthful. Perhaps they could be clueless on a question and just randomly pick responses. Thus, a researcher can

never have absolute faith in the data.

The non-quantitative research, on the other hand, has the advantage of being filtered through many levels. This attempts to make the accuracy of the claims indisputable. Many researchers attack the same questions with different data and biases, thus reducing the biases and inaccuracies. But these are still present. Researchers often prove what they set out to, and thereby are colored by their biases.

Appendix

Table 1 - Cooperation with USSR Scale, V94, (Dependent variable) by POSTURE (Independent variable).

Cooperation with USSR: 1 = cooperate more. 5 = be tougher.

POSTURE: 1 = hawk. 3 = dove.

Table 2 - *Defense Spending Scale*, V88, (Dependent Variable) by POSTURE (Independent variable).

Defense spending scale: 1 = reduce. 5 = increase.

POSTURE: 1 = hawk. 3 = dove.

Table 3 - *Spending on Contras*, V92, (Dependent variable) by POSTURE (Independent variable).

Spending on Contras: 1 = increase. 3 = decrease.

POSTURE: 1 = hawk. 3 = dove.

Table 4 - *Patriotism Index*, V115, (Dependent variable) by POSTURE (Independent variable).

Patriot Index: 1 = high. 4 = low.

POSTURE: 1 = hawk. 3 = dove.

Table 5 - *Lifestyle Tolerance Index*, V117, (Dependent variable) by POSTURE (Independent variable).

Lifestyle Tolerance Index: 1 = high. 5 = low.

POSTURE: 1 = hawk. 3 = dove. Table 6 - *Vote Choice*, V2, (Dependent variable) by POSTURE (Independent variable).

Vote choice: 1 = Bush. 2 = Dukakis.

POSTURE: 1 = hawk. 3 = dove.

Table 7 - Frequency table of POSTURE. 1 = hawk. 3 = dove.

TABLE 1
TABLE OF FREQUENCIES

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL
1.00	26	28	74	128
2.00	21	22	38	81
3.00	56	27	40	123
4.00	51	17	18	86
5.00	73	24	5	102
TOTAL	227	118	175	520

TABLE OF COLUMN PERCENTS

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL	N
1.00	11.45	23.73	42.29	24.62	128.00
2.00	9.25	18.64	21.71	15.58	81.00
3.00	24.67	22.88	22.86	23.65	123.00
4.00	22.47	14.41	10.29	16.54	86.00
5.00	32.16	20.34	2.86	19.62	102.00
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
N	227	119	175	520	

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DF	PROB
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE	101.74	8	0.00
LIKELIHOOD RATIO CHI-SQUARE	113.80	8	0.00

COEFFICIENT	VALUE	ASYMPTOTIC STD ERROR
PHI	0.44	
CRAMER V	0.31	
CONTINGENCY	0.40	
GOODMAN-KRUSKAL GAMMA	-0.50	0.04
KENDALL TAU-B	-0.37	0.03
STUART TAU-C	-0.40	0.03
SPEARMAN RHO	-0.44	0.04
SOMERS D (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	-0.33	0.03
LAMBDA (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.22	0.04
UNCERTAINTY (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.10	0.02

TABLE 2
TABLE OF FREQUENCIES

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL
1.00	21	20	73	114
2.00	17	15	33	65
3.00	70	39	42	151
4.00	60	26	18	104
5.00	54	14	8	76
TOTAL	222	114	174	510

TABLE OF COLUMN PERCENTS

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL	N
1.00	9.46	17.54	41.95	22.35	114.00
2.00	7.66	13.16	18.97	12.75	65.00
3.00	31.53	34.21	24.14	29.61	151.00
4.00	27.03	22.81	10.34	20.39	104.00
5.00	24.32	12.28	4.60	14.90	76.00
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
N	222	114	174	510	

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DB	PROB
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE	100.14	8	0.00
LIKELIHOOD RATIO CHI-SQUARE	102.79	8	0.00

COEFFICIENT	VALUE	ASYMPTOTIC STD ERROR
PHI	0.44	
CRAMER V	0.31	
CONTINGENCY	0.41	
GOODMAN-KRUSKAL GAMMA	-0.50	0.04
KENDALL TAU-B	-0.37	0.03
STUART TAU-C	-0.39	0.04
SPEARMAN RHO	-0.42	0.04
SOMERS D (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	-0.33	0.03
LAMBDA (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.24	0.04
UNCERTAINTY (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.09	0.02

TABLE 3
TABLE OF FREQUENCIES

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL
1.00	66	23	5	94
2.00	63	33	26	122
3.00	92	57	141	290
TOTAL	221	113	172	506

TABLE OF COLUMN PERCENTS

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL	N
1.00	29.86	20.35	2.91	18.58	94.00
2.00	28.51	29.20	15.12	24.11	122.00
3.00	41.63	50.44	81.98	57.31	290.00
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
N	221	113	172	506	

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DB	PROB
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE	75.51	4	0.00
LIKELIHOOD RATIO CHI-SQUARE	85.34	4	0.00
MCNEMAR SYMMETRY CHI-SQUARE	108.21	3	0.00

COEFFICIENT	VALUE	ASYMPTOTIC STD ERROR
PHI	0.39	
CRAMER V	0.27	
CONTINGENCY	0.36	
GOODMAN-KRUSKAL GAMMA	-0.53	0.05
KENDALL TAU-B	-0.34	0.03
STUART TAU-C	-0.31	0.03
COHEN KAPPA	-0.22	0.03
SPEARMAN RHO	-0.37	0.04
SOMERS D (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.35	0.04
LAMBDA (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.17	0.05
UNCERTAINTY (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.08	0.02

**TABLE 4
TABLE OF FREQUENCIES**

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL
1.00	81	30	20	131
2.00	76	39	37	152
3.00	43	24	37	104
4.00	25	24	79	128
TOTAL	225	117	173	515

TABLE OF COLUMN PERCENTS

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL	N
1.00	36.00	25.64	11.56	25.44	131.00
2.00	33.78	33.33	21.39	29.51	152.00
3.00	19.11	20.51	21.39	20.19	104.00
4.00	11.11	20.51	45.66	24.85	128.00
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
N	225	117	173	515	

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DB	PROB
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE	77.19	6	0.00
LIKELIHOOD RATIO CHI-SQUARE	78.26	6	0.00

COEFFICIENT	VALUE	ASYMPTOTIC STD ERROR
PHI	0.39	
CRAMER V	0.27	
CONTINGENCY	0.36	
GOODMAN-KRUSKAL GAMMA	0.44	0.05
KENDALL TAU-B	0.32	0.03
STUART TAU-C	0.33	0.04
SPEARMAN RHO	0.36	0.04
SOMERS D (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.29	0.03
LAMBDA (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.19	0.03
UNCERTAINTY (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.07	0.02

TABLE 5
TABLE OF FREQUENCIES

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL
1.00	8	16	58	82
2.00	54	30	34	118
3.00	47	24	31	102
4.00	43	26	27	96
5.00	73	21	24	118
TOTAL	225	117	174	516

TABLE OF COLUMN PERCENTS

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL	N
1.00	3.56	13.68	33.33	15.89	82.00
2.00	24.00	25.64	19.54	22.87	118.00
3.00	20.89	20.51	17.82	19.77	102.00
4.00	19.11	22.22	15.52	18.60	96.00
5.00	32.44	17.95	13.79	22.87	118.00
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
N	225	117	174	516	

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DB	PROB
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE	75.36	8	0.00
LIKELIHOOD RATIO CHI-SQUARE	77.45	8	0.00

COEFFICIENT	VALUE	ASYMPTOTIC STD ERROR
PHI	0.38	
CRAMER V	0.27	
CONTINGENCY	0.36	
GOODMAN-KRUSKAL GAMMA	-0.35	0.05
KENDALL TAU-B	-0.26	0.04
STUART TAU-C	-0.27	0.04
SPEARMAN RHO	-0.30	0.04
SOMERS D (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	-0.23	0.03
LAMBDA (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.17	0.03
UNCERTAINTY (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.07	0.01

TABLE 6
TABLE OF FREQUENCIES

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL
1.00	130	58	42	230
2.00	53	39	102	194
TOTAL	183	97	144	424

TABLE OF COLUMN PERCENTS

	1.00	2.00	3.00	TOTAL	N
1.00	71.04	59.79	29.17	54.25	230.00
2.00	28.96	40.21	70.83	45.75	194.00
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
N	183	97	144	424	
TEST STATISTIC	VALUE			DB	PROB
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE	58.49			2	0.00
LIKELIHOOD RATIO CHI-SQUARE	59.89			2	0.00
COEFFICIENT	VALUE		ASYMPTOTIC STD ERROR		
PHI	0.37				
CRAMER V	0.37				
CONTINGENCY	0.35				
GOODMAN-KRUSKAL GAMMA	-0.56		0.06		
KENDALL TAU-B	-0.34		0.04		
STUART TAU-C	-0.39		0.05		
SPEARMAN RHO	-0.36		0.04		
SOMERS D (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	-0.39		0.05		
LAMBDA (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.20		0.05		
UNCERTAINTY (COLUMN DEPENDENT)	0.07		0.02		

TABLE 7

	CUM COUNT	PCT	CUM PCT	POSTURE
05	805	47.0	47.0	1.00
07	1212	23.8	70.8	2.00
99	1711	29.2	100.00	3.00