

The Progression of Relationships Between the United States And Its Permanent Security Council Counterparts Since the War in Iraq

By Laura Glenday*

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the new global war on terror, rapid and important political changes have occurred in international politics. Following the September 11th 2001 attacks on the US by the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, actors on the world stage have experienced altered relationships with other actors, with new alliances being formed and old ones brushed aside. Arguably, the most notable changes since the US was attacked have occurred within international institutions. While NATO and the United Nations continue to play major roles in the global arena, there has been a considerable downplay of their necessity in international conflicts, especially by the United States. The UN Security Council (UNSC) was a central focus in the events leading up to the war in Iraq, and relationships between the five permanent members have been strained because of disagreements over the need for such a severe campaign. While the US and Britain have remained strong allies both within the UNSC and without, US relations with China, Russia, and, particularly, France have suffered some degeneration since the introduction of UN Resolution 1441, which outlined plans of the US invasion of Iraq. In order to properly understand international politics, it is imperative to explore how changed relationships between states can occur as a result of the policymaking decisions of one state. This essay will employ a Realist perspective to explore the relationships between the US and each of its Security Council counterparts, and how the US-led campaign in Iraq has affected those relationships not only within the vital UN organ, but more importantly, in the international community.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Realist theory is based on the idea that states seek power and security. To attain these goals, states form alliances with one another, if necessary, in order to maintain a balance of power and eliminate hegemonic situations. Realism suggests that an alliance will be formed when a group of states see the need to eliminate or counter a possible threat to the balance of power, and that these alliances will dissolve if and when the threatening entity has been eliminated, and the allied powers feel secure.¹ Additionally, states are pragmatic and self-serving in their decisions regarding foreign politics and create foreign policy based on national interest and power. A Realist believes that international politics are conducted in a state of total anarchy, and that

around the globe, including President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, one of only three countries who then recognized the Taliban's government and called for cooperation to end the "modern day evil" of terrorism.⁴

With such an outpouring of international support, it is not surprising that the United States' polite decline of NATO's direct assistance in the retaliatory effort in Afghanistan shocked the world. While the United States' decision may have been somewhat unexpected and seemingly foolhardy, in many ways it made perfect sense.

In 1999 the United States and NATO, partners in the Kosovo campaign, agreed that it was necessary to wage a military strike in the region in order to end the senseless killing of ethnic Albanians by Serb forces and allow displaced Albanian refugees to return home. On March 24, 1999, NATO launched the first air strikes in Kosovo, and the continued campaign targeted such locations as Serbian government buildings, radio relay stations, early warning radar systems, and surface-to-surface missile systems.⁵ While the air strikes were successful in removing Serbian troops from Kosovo, there were several military mishaps along the way, including the accidental bombings of civilian airports, heating plants, trains, and the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999.⁶ These unintended bombings caused the death or injury of hundreds of innocent civilians, and NATO's affiliation with the US in the campaign clearly tainted the reputation of the United States and sparked anti-American protests all over the world, particularly in China after the embassy bombing. A long-time supporter of improving Sino-US relations, California Senator Dianne Feinstein publicly condemned the bombings, saying, "The embassy bombing has sparked violent anti-American street protests in Beijing -- with tacit support from the Chinese government -- and has also damaged U.S.-China relations on several critical fronts."⁷ In this way, the joint US-NATO attack on Kosovo tainted the United States' military reputation worldwide and explains a large part of the reason the US might have seen NATO as a detrimental rather than a helpful ally in its campaign in Afghanistan.

Sino-US Relations Before the War in Iraq

In early 2001, prospects for improved Sino-US relations looked "cloudy"⁸ after Chinese authorities detained the 24 crewmembers of a US surveillance plane that landed in an unauthorized zone in China after "colliding with a Chinese fighter jet."⁹ The release of the crew on April 11, 2001 was considered a "clear victory"¹¹ for the United States, but left a damaging mark on US relations with Beijing. The incident occurred at a precarious time in Sino-US history, as the new Bush administration was in the process of making a decision on whether or not to sell US arms to Taiwan, which China viewed as a "renegade province."¹⁰ The relationship between the two economic powerhouses remained strained through the summer of 2001 because of the question of Taiwan and other tension-causing issues, including

China's bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games and the entry of China into the WTO.¹¹ China was careful to act in ways that would minimize US disapproval in the International Olympic Committee and kept "a low profile" regarding China's discontent over the visit of Taiwanese President Chen Shiu-bian to the United States in May of 2001.¹² China was surprisingly quiet on the issue, apparently in the interest of the IOC's upcoming decision for the venue of the 2008 Olympic Games, the announcement of which was scheduled for July 2001. Heightened tension over US skepticism of China's ability and intention to carry out the terms of the November 1999 agreement that made China a part of the World Trade Organization¹³ created a very strained relationship between the two countries, and by the time the terrorist attacks on September 11th occurred, Sino-US relations looked bleak.

September 11th, while an unquestionably tragic event, did have some positive effects on United States relationship with China. While the US sought to gain China's support in the global war on terror, Beijing saw "an opportunity to improve relations to extent that it [had] not perceived possible for over a decade." The expected route of China-US relations after 9/11 was one in which "two realist decision-making elites" would be cooperating with one another according to the needs of their respective national interests.¹⁴ China was clearly in agreement in the US' resolve against terrorist networks in Afghanistan and had moved troops into Afghanistan before the US mission even began. An estimated 5,000 to 15,000 Chinese Muslim troops were moved over Afghanistan's borders into Whakyir and Jalalabad.¹⁵ From a realist perspective, the early deployment of Chinese troops was implemented in the interest of maintaining China's strong standing on the international stage. The United States' military campaign in Afghanistan included the signing of a pact with Russia, and this agreement was seen by China as "the most significant shift in the global balance since the 1962 Chinese-Russian feud, with dangerous implications for China's world standing and its interests in Central and Southwest Asia."¹⁶ In order to counter this threat to its world power, China saw it as necessary to beat the US and its allies into Afghanistan.

Chinese support for the US-led war on terror has come in many forms since October 2001. Much of China's assistance has been political support, and according to the Council on Foreign Relations, China's diplomatic support of the war has been key in "making it easier for the United States to build an international coalition against terrorism."¹⁷ China's support for the war on terror in 2001 came in "sharp contrast" to its previous opposition of US military strikes, such as the one in Kosovo in 1999. This change in China's policy can be attributed to the Chinese campaign in the Xinjiang province. The Chinese government has been active in its effort to suppress "religious extremist forces" in this region, which makes up one sixth of China's land area and shares a border with Afghanistan.¹⁸ China has been trying to rally international support for its fight against the ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang for years and by joining the coalition against terror, could easily round up more

assistance in this battle. In addition, China's economic well-being would be severely threatened if the US campaign in Afghanistan failed and hurt the US economy.¹⁹ Chinese support in Afghanistan, then, can be attributed to protecting its economic and political interests.

Although China showed continued support for US efforts in Afghanistan and the resolve to eradicate terrorist networks, this supportive relationship fell short when the US proposed a preemptive strike on Iraq in 2003. The United States worked tirelessly to gain support from the Security Council in its resolve to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein by the use of force. China remained steadfast in its position that, like France, China believed that "all possible action must be taken to avoid a conflict."²⁰ China also claimed that an unprovoked military strike on Iraq would be a violation of international law and the disarmament agreements signed by Iraq that served as a peace agreement after the Gulf War.²¹ Pressure in the Security Council mounted in the months leading up to the US-UK invasion of Iraq, and while China did not sway from its anti-war position, Sino-US relations since the start of the Iraq war seem to have taken a turn for the better.

Sino-US Relations After the Invasion of Iraq

Almost two years after the United States and Britain launched a preemptive military strike in Iraq, China and the United States appear to be enjoying the friendliest relations the two economic leaders have had in 30 years. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated in an interview on CNBC in November 2004 "I would submit it's the best relationship that the United States has had with China in over 30 years,"²² Discussing improvements in Sino-US cooperation on a vast number of issues, Powell projected that the future of the United States' relationship with China is bright and outlined intended US policy toward the economic giant. "What we want to do is engage China, watch how they develop in the future, watch it with caution, but not with fear, watch it for the purpose of moving along with China and not trying to contain China."²³

In May 2004, China and the US, the two largest energy consumers in the world, engaged in talks over oil consumption and energy solutions. The US-China Energy Policy Dialogue held in Washington, DC discussed issues such as "stockpiling, price premiums and environmental protection." China agreed to restrict lending to some of its industry sectors and confirmed plans to build a strategic oil reserve.²⁴

China and the US have also improved their relationship on the issue of nuclear weapons. Recently, the United States backed China's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an "influential group that controls nuclear exports." in spite of US disagreement with China's supplying Pakistan with nuclear reactors.²⁵ This step was a clear sign of growing trust between Washington and Beijing, showing China that the US has faith in China's non-proliferation

record. In the matter of the removal of North Korea from the nuclear club, the United States continues to rely heavily on Chinese support.

Economic ties between China and the US have been, and continue to be, a primary concern in Sino-US relations. Recently there have been several positive developments in this area, including the refusal of the US to back trade sanctions on China proposed by the AFL-CIO labor union in early 2004 on the grounds that China allegedly exploits its laborers.²⁶ The US refused to implement such policy against China because of the negative impact such actions would have on Sino-US relations. Robert B. Zoellick, the US trade representative, justified the government's decision stating, "Accepting these petitions would take us down the path of economic isolationism. That is a path we will not take." The US agreed that the best way to handle China-US trade issues was "through better communication and engagement rather than by further sharpening conflicts."²⁷

It is apparent that on many fronts, the relationship between China and the US, while still strained over issues such as Taiwanese arms and independence, has improved significantly since the invasion of Iraq. While it remains to be seen whether this growing bilateral cordiality will persist in years to come, analysts believe that by 2030, China will be the second largest economic power in the world and, therefore, will increase its military and political power accordingly.²⁸ Realism suggests that this threat to US power will be the cause of an inevitable conflict. Russia and the United States differ also over continued Russian supplies of nuclear technology to Iran and Russia's refusal to apply sanctions on Syria's use of terrorism in Lebanon.

US-Russia Relations Before the Invasion of Iraq

The relationship between Russia and the United States boasts a long and arduous history. The end of the Cold War seemingly promised improved relations between the two power giants, but the 1990s proved exactly the opposite. Russian concerns about US hegemony became increasingly severe, and by the end of the twentieth century, Russian public opinion of the US was overwhelmingly negative. Factors leading to this common Russian disapproval of the United States' power included US dominance in the UN and NATO. Russia's people saw the UN as "merely a shell for US world dominance" and believed that the dwindling Russian economy and security was a result of this alleged misuse of international organizations as well as the failure of Russian diplomats to assert Russia's interests in world politics. This feeling of inferiority makes Russia's permanent position on the UN Security Council all the more important to maintain a strong presence on the world stage. During the Cold War, the Security Council met rather infrequently because "no one could think of a reason to convene a meeting." Both sides often used their veto powers in the UNSC to block the passage of resolutions proposed by the other. More recently, although direct conflict has tapered, and the US and

Russia are more open in their discussion of their policies toward each other, the UNSC is often used as a “forum for resolving contentions between them on international security issues.”²⁹

Since Russian President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, the US has taken on a policy of “looking the other way” in regard to Putin’s gradual oppression of civil rights in Russia. It is important to US-Russian ties that instead of ignoring this suppression of free speech, freedom of the Russian press, and other such state-controlled violations of civil rights, the US adopt a more stringent Russian policy that promotes reform and change. However, such change would not be in the interest of US world power, and from a realist perspective, that is the reason the US has failed to implement such a policy to date. The main concern that can be launched against this policy is that by allowing Putin to suppress the freedoms of his people, the US is opening the doors to a second Soviet era, which could be detrimental to the national security of both the US and Russia.³⁰ The question arises then, is it correct for national leaders to create their foreign policy based on moral correctness or the best interests of their countries? Realism says “a country’s leaders should not be misled by moral imperatives, driven by cooperation for cooperation’s sake, or unduly constrained by international institutions if such policies would cause the leaders to neglect balance-of-power calculations or the rational pursuit of national interests.”³¹ According to the realist theory, neither Bush nor Putin should have to alter his foreign policy to interfere with the domestic policy of the other if it does not serve his country’s national interest, and therefore Bush is not bound to interfere with Putin’s oppressive rule in Russia.

Internal Russian politics were not the only area in which Russian opinion on the US has dwindled. Russian discontent over the United States’ dominance in international organizations and its disregard for increasing the role of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) in European security issues have also fueled anti-American sentiment in Russia.³²

Before September 11, 2001, Russian-US ties were shaky at best. The terrorist attacks, however, marked a turning point in the relationship. On September 11th Vladimir Putin sent a telegram to George W. Bush that read, “Dear George, such an inhuman act must not go unpunished.”³³ Putin was one of the first world leaders to offer his country’s full support in fighting the parties responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and the world watched with amazement—as in the years following, the US and Russia have come closer together than ever before. Initially refusing to allow a US military presence in Central Asia in the campaign in Afghanistan, President Putin later relented and “used Russia’s all-powerful influence in the region to pave the way for American bases, and ultimately, the military campaign in Afghanistan.”³⁴ Relations continued to improve after September 11th, yielding new agreements and treaties between the former enemies regarding nuclear weapons. In May 2002, the US and Russia signed a nuclear reductions treaty to cut nuclear arsenals by two-thirds by

2012. President Bush stated that the signing of the treaty would “liquidate the legacy of the Cold War” and reduce the number of nuclear warheads possessed by each country from about 6,000 apiece to approximately 2,000 each.³⁵ Weeks after the treaty was signed, Russia signed a cooperation agreement with NATO, creating a new NATO-Russia Council and bringing Russia closer to its former international enemy than ever before.³⁶

The friendly ties between Russia and the US remained strong between 9/11 and early 2003, when the US and Britain proposed a military strike in Iraq. Russia was strongly opposed to the war in Iraq and along with France and China, voiced its disapproval of the planned preemptive attack in the confines of the Security Council. Russia has significant oil interests in Iraq,³⁷ as well as strong business and military ties with Baghdad. Moscow had long supplied Iraqi troops with weapons and assisted in the training of Iraqi military leaders after the Gulf War. Iraq has been a large consumer of Russian arms over the years,³⁸ so Russia, therefore, would be working against its own economic and regional interests by joining the US in the attack on Iraq.

US-Russian Relations After the Invasion of Iraq

Since the attack on Iraq, the United States and Russia have disagreed on many issues concerning the aftermath of the Iraq war. Russia has expressed skepticism regarding the United States’ ability to properly transform Iraq from an oppressed and economically unstable country into a successful democracy.³⁹ Relations between the former Cold War enemies seemed to have taken a few steps backward since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as disagreements and conflicts regarding a wide range of issues have come between Russia and the US. Most recently, the election in Ukraine, which was won by pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich, has caused additional tension in US-Russian ties. President Putin announced that the United States’ military presence in Ukraine was part of “Western attempts to influence Ukraine’s presidential election,” and “were discriminatory and used the promotion of democracy to infringe upon Russia’s sphere of influence.”⁴⁰ From a realist perspective, Russia will take any feasible action necessary to ensure the election of Yanukovich in the December 26 repeat election because his presidency would maintain Russian influence in the region. Alternately, if the opposing pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, won the election the second time around, Russia’s power in the region as well as in the international system would be decreased. This incident may be yet another factor in the seemingly diminishing relationship. Russia and the US differ also over continued Russian supplies of nuclear technology to Iran and Russia’s refusal to apply sanctions on Syria over Syria’s use of terrorism in Lebanon.

US-UK Relations Before and After the Invasion of Iraq

The United States and the United Kingdom have a history of cordial relations in the modern era. Allies in both World Wars, the two world powers have had few major disagreements in the last century. Close personal relationships between American Presidents and British diplomats have persisted throughout the later half of the twentieth century. Reagan and Thatcher, Blair and Clinton, and currently Blair and Bush have been in close contact and cooperation on transatlantic matters, building personal as well as political relationships.⁴¹ The relationship before September 11th was no different, except for some minor disruption in the UK regarding Britain's entrance into the Bush administration's National Missile Defense system. The system proposed by the newly elected President, nicknamed the "Son of Star Wars," was a matter of some concern in the UK public eye, because of fears that engaging in the program would "spark a new arms race" and "make the UK a prime target."⁴² In the same January 20th interview with BBC Radio, UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook described the UK-US relationship as "uniquely warm" and called America the UK's "oldest friend and closest ally."⁴³

When September 11th opened the doors to a new kind of international problem, the United Kingdom and the United States had all the more reason to engage in a close alliance. Two of the greatest military powers in the world, Britain and the US quickly joined forces to plan and implement the retaliation effort in Afghanistan. A largely successful effort, Afghanistan has not been the source of much conflict in the relationship between the US and Britain. The issue of Israel, however, has apparently caused some tension in the House of Parliament regarding the failure of President Bush thus far to pursue a policy more favorable to Palestinian interests.⁴⁴ The April 2004 assassination of Hamas leader Abdel-Aziz al-Rantissi was a matter of disagreement between the two when Tony Blair criticized the act and condemned it as an act of terrorism, while the Bush administration refused to condemn al-Rantissi's murder.⁴⁵ In spite of the small disagreements between the two world powers, relations between the US and the UK have remained closer than ever since 2003, when the US proposed the attack on Iraq. The United Kingdom was the one ally the US had in the Security Council while attempting to gain UN support for the campaign. From the outset, Tony Blair was a supporter of ousting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, prompting President Bush to hold off on the idea until after the campaign in Afghanistan was already well under way.⁴⁶

Britain was on the side of the US regarding Iraq from the beginning and has remained so throughout the still-raging campaign despite widespread opposition from both American and British civilians and politicians. Britain has many reasons to support the US in Iraq, not the least of which is the prevention of an America-dominated world. In an address to the European Union, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw commented, "I say to France and Germany and

all the other EU colleagues to take care. We will reap a whirlwind if we push Americans into a unilateralist position in which they are at the centre of this unipolar world."⁴⁷ From a realist perspective, the UK joined forces with the US in Iraq not only to secure economic benefits from the profitable reconstruction of Iraq after the war, but also to prevent the United States from becoming a unilateralist power on the world stage.

Franco-US Relations Before the Invasion of Iraq

The United States has a long history of diplomatic conflict with France. In the last half of the twentieth century, the two states have experienced rifts regarding several political incidents. The Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 is one of the most significant Franco-US disagreements of the twentieth century, sparking anti-US and anti-French sentiments on either side of the Atlantic. The decision to attack Egypt in an attempt to prevent General Nasser from seizing control over the essential waterway was met with "a furious response from the USA"⁴⁸ President Eisenhower's public condemnation of the attack was part of an international sentiment that eventually caused the Anglo-Franco forces to withdraw from Egypt,⁴⁹ which gave rise to significant anti-US frustrations in France. These frustrations persisted when in 1958 De Gaulle proposed that France should withdraw from NATO and "establish new relations with the USSR and China to achieve better understanding and cooperation with eastern bloc countries." This policy change was inspired largely by the nuclear tensions between the US and Russia, which meant that US nuclear arsenals were not a source of protection for Europe. When the US proposed setting up a "regional defense system" located on French land, France refused to allow such a step, rationalizing that it would cause serious rifts between the USSR, China, France and the US.

Tensions eased for a short while during the Kennedy era, as France supported the US in the Cuban Missile Crisis despite its previous policy of non-involvement. The withdrawal of France from NATO in April of 1969 was a source of discord because France adopted a new industrial policy in which its primary partners were underdeveloped countries, breaking many ties with major companies in the UK and America. France and the US further distanced themselves diplomatically when the issue of Vietnam came into the political spotlight. France condemned US involvement in the conflict, insisting that the proper way to resolve it was through diplomatic action. Further French attempts to curb US world power have been made since then, including efforts to reduce the power of the US dollar, decrease US influence in Latin America, and lessen the role of the US-dominated NATO.⁵⁰

The relationship between the US and France before September 11th was still relatively icy, but the terrorist attacks in the United States brought a new sense of camaraderie between the two powers. When French President Jacques Chirac learned of the attacks, he pledged France's unconditional support in

the fight against the parties responsible, publicly assuring President Bush of his "total support."⁵¹ France was very active in the military effort in Afghanistan, supplying aircraft, naval, and troop support and sending ground troops into Mazar-e-Sharif "as early as December 2, 2001."⁵²

The attacks on September 11th seemed to create a new kind of relationship between the US and France, setting aside differences and allying for a common cause. This agreeable relationship would not last long, however. In 2003, France was one of the most avidly opposed members of the UN Security Council to the United States and Britain's resolution that called for UN support of a military strike in Iraq. France, among others, believed that an attack on Iraq was illegal under "existing UN resolutions."⁵³ Discord in the UNSC over the issue of Iraq have translated into continued frosty relations between the US and France since the attack was carried out in early 2003.

Franco-US Relations After the Invasion of Iraq

Since the invasion of Iraq by US-UK forces, the United States' relationship with France has been a matter of great confusion. Popular French opinion is decidedly anti-American, with a poll showing French approval ratings of the US decreasing from 63% in May of 2002 to only 37% in March of 2004.⁵⁴ While the French public clearly rejects the legitimacy of the US presence in Iraq, French politicians have seen some good come of the war. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said in December 2003, after the capture of Saddam Hussein, that the ousting of the Iraqi leader could be beneficial to relations in the international community. He expressed hope that a democratic state in Iraq would "allow the international community to 'regain its unity.'"⁵⁵ France has also seen some doubt expressed over its previous decision not to join the military effort in Iraq because of the loss of potential economic opportunities in post-war Iraq. In 2003 a senior adviser for the French Institute of International Relations reported his belief that France would pay "a very real price" in its decision to opt out of war in Iraq because in doing so, also opted out of "the spoils of war."⁵⁶

President Jacques Chirac's decision was clearly made in the interest of France's internal peace and national security. France is home to a large Muslim community, and support of a war in Iraq could easily have caused major upset in the country. Additionally, France would suffer major economic setbacks with the ousting of Saddam's regime. France's Banque Paribas handled "all the money that [was] collected by Iraq" in the UN Oil for Food program, which was worth \$70 billion to the French bank.⁵⁷

These reasons and more are all legitimate, and clearly important factors in the French opposition to the war in Iraq, but realism suggests that a more fundamental reason exists. The alliance of the US and Britain in such a major military undertaking would create a serious shift in the world's power balance. France, while protecting its own national interest, saw it as necessary

to combat this kind of blow to its own influence over Iraq in order to protect French power in the Middle Eastern region.

SUMMARY

Each of the permanent Member States in the United Nations Security Council made a conclusive decision about its involvement in Iraq based on national interest. The Security Council served merely as a forum for formal decision-making and the expression of these decisions. Whether or not the Security Council even existed was of little or no consequence in such a decision, as the countries discussed in this paper would have made the same decisions regardless. France had economic and political ties to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which when severed would damage internal affairs in France as well as create a significant economic setback. France's historical opposition to US hegemony made French opposition to the campaign in Iraq almost a given. The Franco-US relationship has not changed much since the war in Iraq, and realism suggests that this historically icy relationship will persist as long as the United States maintains its position as the dominant world power. Russia and the United States have not improved their ties since the US and Britain went ahead with their military strikes in Iraq, but much of the tension between the US and the former Soviet power are not related to Iraq at all. Instead, Russia is concerned about US interference in Russia's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, specifically in Ukraine as the Presidential elections pose a threat to Russia's power in the region. China and the US have improved their ties since the start of the war in Iraq, despite Chinese opposition to the proposal in the UNSC. China and the US have important economic ties to protect, each relying heavily upon the other for continued economic power. The United States and Britain continue to share a friendly relationship and, as the leaders of the Iraq war, have taken a huge step in securing a powerful influence in the Middle Eastern region, as well as in the world. If the transition of Iraq into a democratic state is successful, the US and the UK will have significant power boosts. The UK's most important realist motive for entering Iraq alongside the US is to ensure a continued British and European power on the world stage.

It is evident that the role of the Security Council in the Iraq war had little or no impact on these bilateral relationships, and that each Member State would have made the same decisions if the Security Council did not exist. The decisions were made based solely upon maintaining national power and securing economic interests where necessary, while trying to avoid US hegemony.

Notes

*Laura Glenday is the Senior Copy Editor of the Towson University *Journal of International Affairs* and a 2005 graduate of Towson University.

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