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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The study of international affairs as an academic discipline no longer belongs exclusively to the specialists in that field; rather, its scope has been extended to include the work of other related disciplines in recognition of the fact that international problems are not exclusively political in nature. It is the purpose of this journal to speak on matters involving international problems with many academic voices. More important, it is the purpose of this journal to permit undergraduate students to try their wings in describing, analyzing, and possibly suggesting solutions to the problems that have vexed nations in their contacts with each other.

The underlying premise of this journal is that undergraduate students *can* contribute effectively to a reasoned, moderated, academic analysis of international problems and that such contributions will have a more profound effect on the study of international affairs as well as the student contributors to this journal than the passionate, partisan, and emotionally-charged outbursts which have in the past permeated American campuses.

Consequently, the *Journal* invites contributors to take an active interest in this publication. It encourages students as well as members of the Towson University faculty, and the students and faculty from other campuses to contribute articles, reviews, and other pertinent materials.

LONG LOST FRIEND OR FOE? THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EURO

By: Jennifer Worley*

January 1, 1999 marked the transition into the third stage of the European Union's plans for economic integration by way of the Economic and Monetary Union. On July 1, 2002, the French franc, Spanish peseta, and German mark became obsolete, as eleven participating countries from the European Union changed their currency to the euro. Now, in the face of a protracted domestic economic slowdown, increasing unemployment, and investor uncertainty in the stock markets, the recent increase in the euro's exchange value against the dollar raises questions in the United States about the euro's impact on the U.S. economy. Indeed, headlines such as those published in *The Wall Street Journal* that read, "Dollar falls against euro, stocks follow; U.S. currency weakness creates 4-day losing streak for shares; China trade adds to worries"¹ and, "As world economy revives, Europe struggles; the strong euro weighs on companies, offsetting good news from the U.S."² seem an ominous forecast.

Economists attempt to alleviate these concerns and debunk misconceptions about the euro as a competitive threat to the U.S. economy by arguing the matter from an economic perspective. However, it is important to approach the issue not only from an economic perspective, but an historical one as well. There exists a fundamental connection between the euro and the U.S. that dates back to the immediate post World War II era. The U.S., as part of its efforts in pursuing interests in European economic integration in post war Europe, helped to lay the foundations for the euro. Today the euro that was fifty years in the making is subject to harsh American scrutiny. However, contrary to misconceptions, the adoption of the euro has proven beneficial to the U.S.

When examining the role the U.S. had in European economic integration, one can approach the investigation much like that of a prosecutor building a case—establishing means, motive, and opportunity. In this instance however, they are addressed in the reversed order as opportunity, motive, and means. First, the U.S. had a major hand in shaping Western Europe following the Second World War. Years of war fought on its soil had left most of Europe in ruin, with its resources exhausted and countries buckling under the burden of crippled economies. As A.W. DePorte explains in *Europe Between the Super-Powers*, because of this feeble state,

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1 E.S. Browning, "Dollar Falls Against Euro, Stocks Follow; U.S. Currency Weakness Creates 4-Day Losing Streak for Shares; China Trade Adds to Worries," *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 November 2003, C.1. Retrieved from Proquest on 24 November 2003.

2 Christopher Rhoads, "As World Economy Revives, Europe Struggles; The Strong Euro Weighs On Companies, Offsetting Good News from the U.S.," *The Wall Street Journal*, 11 November 2003, A.16. Retrieved from Proquest, on 19 November 2003.

the U.S. found it much easier to secure European support for its reconstruction plans.³ Thus the opportunity presented itself for the U.S. to pursue its own interests in Europe.

The motivation for the U.S. efforts in encouraging and establishing European economic integration stemmed initially from the need to create stability in postwar Europe. After suffering significant losses from fighting two major world wars on the continent within a span of only 20 years, the U.S. was interested in preventing a third. There was a belief that strengthening European unity would help to prevent conflicts generated by nationalistic forces. A primary component of that unity was economic integration. Concerns about staving off communist expansion of the Soviet Union also followed the war. DePorte highlights that U.S. efforts, especially during the Truman administration, were fueled by the realization that an economically weak Europe would create chaotic conditions that would invite communist opportunists.⁴

Of course, there were also economic benefits of European economic integration that interested the United States. The U.S. economy had been heavily taxed by its participation in the war in Europe. Fred Block emphasizes in *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* that the costs of waging the war had been of one concern, but after the war the U.S. was faced with the problem of what to do with the surplus capacity of industry that had resulted from the war. Coming out of the Great Depression, America's primary concern was maintaining the strong economic growth and momentum it had coming out of the war.⁵ A strengthened and united Europe would benefit U.S. trade, as John Lamberton Harper suggests in *American Visions of Europe*:

Following Acheson's example, U.S. policy makers have with few exceptions been sincere supporters of European integration on the grounds that a united Europe would provide a growing market for U.S. goods and generate the resources and cohesiveness to allow Europe to share America's burdens both on the Continent and 'out of the area.'⁶

Although the euro would not come to realization until 1999, as far back as World War II and the post war era the U.S. saw European integration as the increased possibility of the much-desired European currency convertibility. Block defines convertibility as the "absence of exchange controls." Desires for currency convertibility served as precursors for the euro, which by its own virtue, eliminates such controls⁷ altogether.

These political and economic concerns combined and developed into what DePorte refers to as "the American passion for European unity."⁸ Coming out of

3 A.W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Super-Powers: The Enduring Balance*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 196.

4 Ibid, pp. 133-135.

5 Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder*. (London: University of California Press, 1977), 33.

6 John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 338.

7 Block, p. 255.

8 DePorte, p. 134.

the war, the growing hegemonic power of the U.S. and the weakened economic and political conditions in Europe allowed the U.S. to pursue its passion. What follows are just some of the means by which the U.S. would achieve its desires for European economic integration, and in doing so, lay the foundations for the euro.

U.S. efforts to secure economic stability in postwar Europe began even before the war ended. In July of 1944, delegates from forty-four countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to attend the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, later to become known as the Bretton Woods Conference. Out of the conference came the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and a plan for currency stabilization. Not only was the conference held on U.S. soil, but also as Block explains, the systems set in place were largely the design of the U.S. and Britain.⁹ Block argues that:

For both foreigners and Americans, the images of global reforms that sprang from the national economic planners served to legitimize the exercise of U.S. power on a global level. At home, many that had resisted the idea that the United States should extend its power internationally were convinced by images of an international New Deal. Abroad, the reality of U.S. foreign economic policy was effectively hidden by the skillful invocation of the rhetoric of the idealistic internationalists. The clearest example of this was the International Monetary Fund itself.¹⁰

Discussing the outcome of Bretton Woods, Block breaks down the design for the IMF by describing its different stipulations revolving around devices for transactions and the flow of capital, how the fund would work for countries with deficits, mechanisms for replenishing the fund, and currency exchange restrictions.¹¹

The outcome of Bretton Woods was by no means a perfect solution to post war economic stability. There were many problems with the system, chief among them was that, as Block explains, “the fund would not have resources to loan to countries to speed their abandonment of exchange controls. And until other countries abandoned their controls, the dollar would be the only currency in the fund that could be used.”¹² DePorte recognizes the double edge sword, that while the weakened European countries encouraged the support of the U.S. and permitted it great deal of latitude with postwar reconstruction, for the very reason that they were weak in the first place, the U.S. could not count on these European countries to be strong enough for the plans it wanted to implement.¹³ Thus the U.S. initially did not get the currency convertibility in Europe that it much desired. Though what was established at Bretton Woods was not the unified currency of the euro, and while in the 1970’s the Bretton Woods system would face collapse, as DePorte notes, it was an attempt “to prevent a recurrence of the disruptive monetary disorder of the thirties by establishing, for the first time, conscious international

9 Block, p. 51.

10 Block, p. 37.

11 Ibid, pp.51-52.

12 Ibid.

13 DePorte, p. 196.

European governments continued with their extensive system of trade controls, and the slow process of liberalization, mainly through the OEEC and the EPU, was carried at the regional level, thus implying a discrimination against American exporters. Economic necessity and long-term political objectives were behind the pragmatism and the generosity of the new U.S. policy towards Europe.¹⁹

While the outcome of the Marshall plan was not entirely the result that the U.S. desired, as Louise van Tartwijk-Novey recognizes in *The United States and the European Community*, it was a small but important step that marked the beginning of the extensive and direct U.S. efforts to promote and develop European unification.²⁰

President Truman's administration was not the only political office supporting unification in Europe. Indeed the Marshall Plan, via the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, and several other legislative efforts to support European recovery and stabilization through unification had been approved through Congress. Congress also had its outspoken supporters of European unity. Among them, as Ferrell writes, were Senators J. William Fulbright, Elberet D. Thomas, and Representative T. Hale Boggs. All three made speeches and proposed legislation in favor of a "United States of Europe."²¹

Outside of the government, other elements in the United States pushed for European integration. Among them was journalist Walter Lipmann, who was at the time, according to Ferrell, "the country's leading political commentator."²² Lipmann strongly and publicly favored integration, calling for in his own words, "a new European Settlement."²³ Mira Wilkins, for her contribution to *The United States and the Integration of Europe*, discusses how American oil companies and U.S. multinational corporations also had a part to play in unification efforts. Specifically she explains:

U.S. multinationals' postwar investments in Europe, gradual at first and then mounting, took advantage of the increasing moves toward integration, but also contributed importantly to them. It was a chicken-and-egg phenomenon: U.S. companies wanted a united Europe; saw opportunities and came to Europe; and, in turn, added to the prosperity of the united Europe; which, in sequence, resulted in more U.S. companies' entries and more economic growth and more unity.²⁴

Thus the sentiment and the efforts that laid the foundation for European economic integration, and subsequently the euro, were not limited to the work of presidential administrations or the U.S. government, and the desire for European unity clearly existed in the political and business interests of Americans.

19 Ibid, p.15.

20 Louise B. Van Tartwijk-Novey, *The United States and the European Community* (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1992), 102.

21 Ferrell, pp. 33-36.

22 Ibid, p. 31.

23 Ibid.

24 Mira Wilkins, "U.S. Multinationals," *The United States and the Integration of Europe*, ed. by Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 358.

control of the monetary system.”¹⁴ Though an early and important element, Bretton Woods was only one part of the U.S. efforts to establish the foundations for European economic unification and currency convertibility.

Responding to political and economic concerns during the post war era, the Truman administration made efforts on the integration front as well. Though, according to Robert H. Ferrell who writes in *The United States and the Integration of Europe*, Truman himself had significant doubts about the realization of European unity in anything but the long term. Truman made the chance comment during an interview in the spring of 1947 that he “favored a United States of Europe.”¹⁵ Whether or not he truly believed it would happen, in early 1947 the Truman administration picked up its efforts to stabilize Europe and promote unity. Much of this was prompted, as Ferrell explains, by Britain’s backing away from support of Greece and Turkey in February of 1947, leaving the two countries weakened and the threat of the Cold War mounted. As a measure of response to this and growing economic concerns, the Truman Doctrine was delivered in March of 1947.¹⁶ The U.S. now took on an even more active role in funding and supporting the stabilization of Europe.

In a speech made in March of 1952, Secretary of State of the New Federal Republic of Germany Walter Hallstein recognized aid from the Marshall plan as part of the first “impulse” for the U.S. to support unification after the war.¹⁷ The Marshall plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, was another effort to address European currency and trade concerns in the postwar period. U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the plan in his speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947. The initiative was realized in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which later led to the creation of the Economic Cooperation Administration. According to Loukas Tsoukalis in *The New European Economy*, America’s early contribution to integration efforts came through the funding on the part of the Marshall plan. Instead of European countries gaining recovery through the IMF as envisioned in Bretton Woods, a different approach was taken as the U.S. began to directly provide the funds to bail out Europe. In the plan, the U.S. provided aid to European countries hit hard by the war. However, the aid was contingent upon each country’s commitment to “co-operation” and “progressive liberalization of intra-European trade and payments.”¹⁸ Again, success was limited as the countries of Europe did not move swiftly and U.S. objectives for integration took a back seat. Tsoukalis explains that:

14 Ibid, p. 82.

15 Robert H. Ferrell, “The Truman Era and European Integration,” *The United States and the Integration of Europe*, ed. by Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 28.

16 Ibid, p. 33.

17 Walter Hallstein, “The Schuman Plan and the Integration of Europe,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* (15 May 1952). Retrieved 18 November 2003 from Academic Search Premier.

18 Loukas Tsoukalis, *The New European Economy: The Politics and Economics of Integration*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 14.

advancement of the Schuman Plan was in comparison to earlier attempts to foster European unity. Rather than simply agreeing to work cooperatively through formalized agreements on paper, this would be an actual arrangement that merged industries and moved beyond the bounds of any one nation. Hallstein recognized the precedent this set as it created, "a supranational structure on the pattern of Federal Union."³⁰ Ultimately Schuman's proposal was accepted and in April of 1951 the plan successively materialized under the European Coal and Steel Community. The first real step towards full economic integration was taken.

A.W. Lovett examines the significant role the U.S. played as negotiators of the Schuman plan in his work, *The United States and the Schuman Plan, A Study in French Diplomacy 1950-1952*. In his introduction, Lovett surmises that, "In terms of its origins the coal and steel community can be considered the product of a bargain struck between the Federal Republic and America, not France and West Germany."³¹ According to Lovett, taking on the monumental task of designing and implementing what would be the means of modernizing French industry and preventing another threat from Germany, Monnet and Schuman received substantial American assistance. A great deal of financial and capital support from the U.S. came by means of the Marshall plan. The U.S. gave France the funding and materials needed to implement the modernization of industry necessary to implement the Schuman plan according to Monnet's designs. It also served another purpose, as the support from the Marshall plan required the strengthened commitment of France to work in cooperation with the rest of Europe, including Germany.³²

In order to help Europe recover, and also maintain the American sphere of influence in Europe, the U.S. was committed to rebuilding Germany. Lovett explains that this motivated France to build up its own industry and cooperate with Germany, as Germany would not remain weakened, allowing France to seize its markets in its absence.³³ Threatened by the potential rebuilding of Germany under U.S. support, France came to the realization that it "could only influence German coal and steel through a partnership. France must play a trump card, a *European* card by offering to pool its coal and steel reserves with those of its neighbors."³⁴ Setting up the Schuman plan would be one challenge, and achieving German acceptance of the plan would be another.

Even though the plan received high praise when it was proposed in May of 1950, according to Lovett, difficult negotiations regarding the details of the plan's implementation soon followed. It became apparent that two major hurdles created an impasse between the French and German positions in these negotiations. First, though France and Germany had agreed to unify their coal and steel industries, they

30 Hallstein, pp. 460.

31 A.W. Lovett, "The United States and the Schuman Plan. A Study in French Diplomacy 1950-1952," *The Historical Journal*, Issue 39, Volume: 2 (1996), p. 425.

32 *Ibid*, pp. 427-8.

33 Lovett, p. 429.

34 *Ibid*, p. 430.

The United States was not alone in its work on European postwar recovery. The devastation had taken place in Europe, and European countries had their own visions for their future, though their visions ultimately still required the assistance of the U.S. Specifically, French General Commissioner for the Modernization Plan, Jean Monnet, and French Foreign Affairs Minister, Robert Schuman, devised a plan that, with proper U.S. support, would prove to be perhaps the most significant advancement towards European economic integration thus far. As Pascal Fontaine writes in *A New Idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaration – 1950-2000*, part of the U.S. effort to aid European recovery was to fund and rebuild a strong Germany. For the French, how best to deal with the possible resurgence of German strength and power fell onto the shoulders of Robert Schuman. The plan was built upon Jean Monnet's ideas, though he was not as prominent a public figure. Monnet's efforts in both the First and Second World War had made him, "one of the most influential Europeans in the western world."²⁵ On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman proposed Monnet's plan, described by Jones in *The Politics and Economics of the European Union, 2nd edition* as an entirely different approach to European unification. While others had argued in favor of a transition to European federalism as a whole, the Schuman plan focused initially on economic integration one step at a time, beginning with merging different industries from different nations together.²⁶ Under the plan, the coal and steel industries of Europe, specifically those of Germany and France, would be integrated. As Hallstein explained in his speech, all barriers to trade and taxes would be removed, and the coal and steel industries would be unified under the same standards and regulation.²⁷

It is important to recognize the ingeniousness of the directive targeting coal and steel. As William Hitchcock suggests in *France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan: 1948-1950*, they were the vital components, the "sinews of war."²⁸ Steel was a primary material used in shipbuilding, armor, artillery, aircraft, and rail transportation, and as such, it was a basic material necessary to wage war. Coal was the primary source of energy used in the production of steel and generation of electricity. Combining them ultimately limited the ability for the two countries to make war on each other, as reflected in Schuman's proposal. Steel was also important economically, as it had faced declining production demands following the end of the war. Coal and steel, according to the integration plan, would be sold on the world market "as a whole without distinction or exception" and it would be governed by an overarching international body known as the High Authority.²⁹ In his speech, the New Federal Republic of Germany Secretary of State Walter Hallstein emphasized the significant

25 Pascal Fontaine, *A New Idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaration – 1950-2000, 2nd ed.* (Belgium: European Commission, 2000), pp.10-11.

26 Robert A. Jones, *The Politics and Economics of the European Union, 2nd ed.* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001), p. 8.

27 Hallstein, pp. 460-1.

28 William I. Hitchcock, "France, the Western Alliance, and the origins of the Schuman Plan, 1948-1950", *Diplomatic History*, Fall 1997. Retrieved 18 November 2003 from Academic Search Premier.

29 Pascal Fontaine, *Europe – A Fresh Start.* (Brussels: Publications of the European Communities, 1990), pp. 44-45.

needed a mechanism to limit the potential for the individual sales agencies to monopolize the market. Specifically the French had concerns about Deutscher Kohlenverkauft (DKV), which had dominated the German industry. There was the danger that though each individual nation would pool its coal and steel resources and forfeit sovereign control of the industries, control could still be attained through any one agency that dominated the industry, and thus have power greater than that of the High Authority set in place to regulate the whole operation.³⁵ Second, just as in the U.S., the German steel industry through the turn of the century, had been prone to vertical integration with that of its coal mining industry. French steel had also become dependent on German coal, a problem exacerbated as Britain kept its coal at home for domestic use during and after the war.³⁶ The French would not accept integration under the Schuman plan unless there was a breakup of coal and steel cartels and the severing of the German coal and steel vertical integration. However the French found that they, "did not have complete freedom of manoeuvre, nor, as it turned out, the necessary force to extort from the Germans such a concession."³⁷ They looked to the Americans to solve this impasse. Help came, as Lovett explains, by way of diplomatic and negotiating efforts of W.M. Tomlinson, Robert R. Bowie, and John J. McCloy, who served as a voice for the Truman administration. America used its influence and position to insist on the breaking up of the cartels and restructuring of German steel and coal industries in a manner that would allow for both German *and* French final acceptance of the Schuman plan.³⁸

The sentiment of the United States as playing a vital role in getting the Schuman Plan implemented is again echoed in Hallstein's speech. He speaks specifically of High Commissioner McCloy and Ambassador Bruce and their "devotion to this task."³⁹ In arguing that the United States continued to support the Schuman Plan that it had helped to come to fruition, Van Tartwijk-Novey points out that the U.S. was the first country to show diplomatic support for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) once formed.⁴⁰ The impact of such support by the U.S. in the early stages of the Schuman plan, as well as the ECSC organization that developed as a result, was not to be confined only to the immediate postwar period.

For many reasons relative to the pursuit of American political and economic interests, and though not always overtly, the U.S. continually pursued, encouraged, and financially supported European economic integration, thus laying the foundations for the euro. As Truman had suspected, the road to economic integration and full European unity would take some time. The assistance the U.S. provided to Europe in the postwar era, while substantial, was not purely philanthropic. Naturally, as DePorte notes, it was tied to U.S. interests, and this

35 Ibid, pp. 435-6.

36 Ibid, p. 437.

37 Lovett, p. 440.

38 Ibid, pp. 441-453.

39 Hallstein, p. 460.

40 Van Tartwijk-Novey, p.102.

reality did not escape the Europeans.⁴¹ Ultimately the movement towards economic integration took place *in Europe* and was shaped by European efforts and interests. This evolution did not take place under the absolute control of the United States. Nevertheless, over fifty years the fundamental components of European economic integration and political unity to which the U.S. contributed and fostered remained in tact. The European federal foundation evolved, changed, and eventually produced a unified currency.

As was predicted by Monnet and Schuman, European economic and political integration would be built upon steps taken from the initial formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. The subsequent history of European integration is long and complex. However it is important to trace some of the key highlights in order to recognize the link between what happened in the postwar era and the European Union as it is today. Listed on *Milestones on the Road to European Integration*, a publication of the European Union, the next major development after the ECSC came six years later, with the Treaty of Rome. Following in the footsteps of the ECSC, the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were formed.⁴² The six countries included in these communities were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany.⁴³ Jones explains that both organizations were further application of Monnet's principles in the Schuman plan. Jones acknowledges that the treaty was an effort to further develop European unity, though the formation was established with specific economic goals in mind. Among them, establishment of a common market, removal of trade barriers and tariffs internally, and a common customs standard for imports and exports from those outside the community.⁴⁴ Also stemming from the treaty, as Jones explains, regulatory bodies similar to those established in the ECSC were created. These bodies included a Commission, Council of Ministers, Assembly, and a Court of Justice.

These three major communities were merged together on April 16, 1965, to form the European Community (EC). Jones notes that as a result, this "created a single Council and Commission for all three Communities."⁴⁵ Economic advancement in line with the treaty's original goals continued to develop, including the achievement of a customs union in 1968.⁴⁶ However a major obstacle to economic integration occurred with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. Though currency convertibility had been achieved in 1958, when the European countries involved generally recovered after the postwar period and their currencies had stabilized, as DePorte explains, the U.S. was faced a significant balance of payment

41 DePorte, p. 201.

42 "Milestones on the Road to European Integration." Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.eurunion.org/infos/euguide/milestones.htm>, on 17 November 2003.

43 David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, *The Emerging European Union*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Publishers, 2002), p. 1.

44 Jones, pp. 14-15.

45 Jones, p. 15.

46 "The EU and the 50 US States" Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/usstates/usstates.htm>, on 17 November 2003.

deficit during the Vietnam War and found no other solution than to come off the gold standard and float its currency.⁴⁷ As Jones states:

The Treaty of Rome did not refer to the goal of a single currency, or indeed to a system for co-ordinating monetary policy. But from the late 1960s, the need to secure greater monetary stability became increasingly apparent, following recurring crises in the international monetary system. The 'Bretton Woods' system of fixed exchange rates finally collapsed in 1971.⁴⁸

With a significant crisis at hand, the European Community attempted to recover. In *The United States of Europe*, Ernest Wistrich describes the efforts made by the EC to address the crisis. Wistrich writes that, "economic convergence cannot, however, be achieved with floating exchange rates."⁴⁹ After its initial efforts failed in 1972, the EC achieved results in 1979 with the establishment of the European Monetary System. An exchange rate mechanism was devised under the new system, wherein the EMS utilized a common currency unit (ECU) to which all members' currencies would be adjusted within plus or minus 2.25 per cent.⁵⁰ While this temporarily solved the crisis of the Bretton Woods collapse, the EMS was not a perfect system, and the EC would continue to work toward the unification goals with which it was established.

Seven years later, in 1985, efforts to develop a single market in Europe were well underway. As Wistrich explains, the "White Paper" plan set out distinct measures to be taken in order to achieve a single market planned for completion in 1992. What evolved was the Single European Act (SEA) that committed members to significant efforts to more fully integrate the European economy. These efforts were directed towards the removal of any remaining barriers to a single market, including those relative to "the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital." However the importance of the SEA goes even further, as Wistrich points out that:

The Single European Act marked a major step forward in the process of European integration. It removed the log jam that had built up through the failure of governments to take decisions that were not unanimous. It ended years of stagnation and relative economic decline...but an integrated market would not endure without the removal of one of the remaining principle barriers, namely the continued existence of separate national currencies and the lack of a clear common voice with outside countries. That is why, additionally, the Act called for progress to economic and monetary union (EMU) and the extension of the Community's responsibilities to foreign policy and security.⁵²

This was precisely the direction that Europe took as it entered into the 1990s. In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty established the European Union (EU). Evolution had taken place once more as the EU encompassed a body committed to both an

47 DePorte, p. 205.

48 Jones, p. 288

49 Ernest Wistrich, *The United States of Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 47.

50 Wistrich, p. 47.

51 Ibid, p. 4.

52 Ibid, p. 5.

economic and political integration and union. The EU was founded by 12 member nations, though more were expected to join.⁵³

By the time of the Maastricht treaty, the Three Stages Plan was well underway. In their work, *The Emerging European Union, 2nd edition*, David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada note that evidence of an effort to form an economic and monetary union could be seen as early as the failed Werner project in 1972. In 1989 European Commissioner Jacques Delors received a report that had been the product of study and investigation into the realization of the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe (EMU). The purpose of the plan was to set into motion the steps needed to secure a unified currency for Europe.⁵⁴ Wood and Yesilada emphasize that the plan included specific steps to be taken and deadlines for meeting each step in order to achieve unified currency by the turn of the century. Commitment to this plan and to the EMU was actually part of the Maastricht Treaty. Stage one was already in progress with the achievement in 1992 of the European single market. Stage two's purpose was to lay the groundwork for the full monetary unification that was to be realized in stage three. Central banks from member nations were to be made independent of their respective governments and European Monetary Institute (EMI) would become the Europe Central Bank (ECB).⁵⁵

With the adoption of a single currency and the official formation of the European Monetary Union on January 1, 1999, as explained by Yesilada and Wood, the final stage of the plan had been reached.⁵⁶ According to Jones, the transition of the euro to replace the currencies of the eleven participating countries would take place over three years. It would begin with the use of the euro for accounting purposes. Following this, the actual coins and bills would be introduced into circulation in 2001. By February of 2002 the euro would replace national currencies altogether.⁵⁷

The euro, as the European Union's *Guide for Americans* suggests, "represents the consolidation of European economic integration."⁵⁸ Some of the numbers from the publication give one a better understanding of the extensive and significant nature of the euro, and the progress made in the last fifty years. Everything relative to the national currencies of participating nations was changed over to the euro. All banking transactions, retail transactions, and accounting are now done in euros. The participating nations are economically united under the euro. Employing the same currency, these nations are no longer subject to fluctuating exchange rates and business can be conducted now more freely than ever across their borders.⁵⁹ However, not all members of the European Union (EU) chose to adopt the euro as their currency. Even as of 2003 Great Britain remains the front-runner of European nations that refuse to surrender their sovereign currencies and adopt the euro.

53 David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, *The Emerging European Union, 2nd ed.* (New York: Longman Publishers, 2002, p. 78.

54 *Ibid.*, pp.129-131.

55 Wood and Yesilada, pp. 132.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 125.

57 Jones, pp. 300-301.

58 "The Euro: Completing Economic Unity." Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.eurunion.org/infores/euguide/Chapter3.htm>, on 17 November 2003.

59 *Ibid.*

Initially implemented by eleven member nations, listed in the EU's Guide as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, the euro was promoted to other nations to encourage a more general acceptance. Greece joined the EMU and adopted the euro in 2001, as nations are permitted to join as they meet the "convergence criteria."⁶⁰ As the EU continues to expand to include countries of Eastern Europe, the door remains open for continued expansion of the euro. The European single market and the backing of twelve national economies under the euro makes the euro a significant force to be reckoned with in international currency. According to the EU in their *Guide for Americans*:

The euro-zone is roughly comparable in economic weight to the United States. The population of the twelve member states participating in EMU is about 290 million, and the euro-zone accounts for more than 21 percent of the world GDP. In 2000, euro-zone exports amounted to 14.7 percent of world exports, with the comparable figures for euro-zone imports at 13 percent. Beyond its economic impact, the euro has substantial political significance and adds to the EU's capabilities as an international actor.⁶¹

Indeed, replacing the German mark and the French franc, the euro holds the potential to rival that of both the dollar and the yen. Yesilada and Wood take the impact of the euro one step further by suggesting that the euro, dollar, and yen have the potential to simplify the current setup of the G7 and replace it under a new "tripolar monetary framework."⁶² In consideration of this sentiment, it is worth noting that the Group of 7 (G7), founded in 1975 to protect the stability of the international monetary system following the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements, and comprised of The United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, has been restructured to reflect the unification of the economic systems of those member countries that have adopted the euro. Representation by Italy, France, and Germany in G7 Finance efforts related to currency exchange has been consolidated to the European Central Bank and the Euro Group.⁶³

Clearly the euro represents major evolutionary development and achievement for Europe's efforts to realize economic integration, and undoubtedly the euro seems destined to attain significant status on a global economic scale. However, the question remains, what does this mean for the U.S.? Looking back fifty years reveals a deep-rooted connection between the U.S. and the euro. Even so, this history becomes obscured to much of the population by the current world economic situation and the frequent media comparisons between the economic power of the euro and the dollar. Do the rise of the euro and the size of the economy it represents create a competitive threat to the U.S. dollar? At first glance, one may believe that it does.

60 "The Euro: Completing Economic Unity."

61 Ibid.

62 Wood and Yesilada, p. 143.

63 "What is the G7 Finance?" Retrieved from the Internet, http://www.g7-2001.org/en/washington2/frames_c.htm, on 17 November 2003

When the euro was launched in 1999, its exchange rate opened high against the dollar (around 1.17USD to 1 euro), although it quickly dropped and stabilization efforts in 2000 on the part of the 'G7' helped the euro settle at a comparable exchange rate to the dollar.⁶⁴ Though the introduction of the euro was very much an important event among the 290 million Europeans, the change over to the euro and what followed in 2000 caused hardly a stir among the American public. However recently in 2004, the steady rise of the euro against the dollar, (As of November 2004 at 1.33 euro to U.S. dollar), has drawn more attention.

Though the current rate may *appear* threatening, the euro's higher exchange value over the dollar does not necessarily mean that the U.S. economy is in danger of losing its competitive edge. A "weak" U.S. dollar relative to the euro actually has benefits for the U.S. economy. Among those benefits, the exchange rate deters U.S. imports of European goods and at the same time there is the increased demand for the U.S. exports due to the lower price of U.S. goods. In the global economy, the weak dollar over the euro encourages outside investment to be directed to the U.S. This economic reality is echoed in articles from "To Europe's Chagrin, U.S. Economy Sits In the Driver's Seat" in *The Wall Street Journal*, to the "Greenback Game" in *Economist*. They reiterate that America should not be threatened by the euro's rise.⁶⁵ From "Diminished", an article published in the *Economist*, the author remarks, "nor is a currency's strength a reliable indicator of international confidence: despite the dollar's slide, few doubt that America's economic prospects, short- and medium-term, are better than Europe's."⁶⁶ In fact, it is often the Europeans, who are up in arms about the exchange rate.

The U.S. has reaped other benefits from the introduction of the euro. Just as in Europe, the U.S. gains from the breakdown of trade barriers between member nations. Writing on the need for international monetary reform, Fred Block emphasizes that the business of multinational corporations is hindered by having to operate in accordance with the standards and systems of many different governments. Block advocates efforts to reform this complex system.⁶⁷ The introduction of the euro is undoubtedly a means of such reform as it serves to solidify monetary union in Europe, and by extension, European economic integration. The euro reduces the cost of business operations through the elimination of currency conversions and fluctuation of currency value among participating nations. It also reduces accounting overhead associated with currency exchange and valuations among multinational corporations. All of these benefits apply to U.S. multinational corporations as well as those of Europe. These ideas are reflected in a speech made by former Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers in 1998, only two months before the euro's launch. In his speech Lawrence discusses the implications of the EMU and the euro for the United States. He welcomes the EMU and coming of the euro in saying:

64 Jones, p. 309.

65 Alan Friedman, "To Europe's Chagrin, U.S. Economy Sits In the Driver's Seat," *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 November 2003, A.2. Retrieved from Proquest on 24 November 2003. Matthew Benjamin, "Greenback Game," *Economist*, 13 October 2003, p. 36. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier on 11 November 2003.

66 "Diminished," *Economist*, 24 May 2003. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier on 17 October 2003.

67 Block, p. 212.

We have everything to gain and little to lose from the success of this momentous project. Now more than ever, America is well served by having an integrated and prosperous trading partner on the other side of the Atlantic. Europe will benefit greatly from a single currency that supports these ends – and if Europe benefits, this will greatly benefit the United States.⁶⁸

Summers goes on to discuss the specific benefits for the U.S., including the removal of trade barriers and the development of a unified system of standards in Europe.

The euro is neither the product of European conspirators bent on world economic domination, nor a weapon aimed towards the U.S. economy. At present, the euro does not have the potential to undermine the dollar as the world's foremost currency. An examination of the state of the European economy reveals that on its present course, even given America's weak economy, Europe's economy poses no threat. While certainly there exists the hope that launching the EMU and the euro would stimulate Europe's economy and encourage new growth, thus far that has not been the case. Europe's economy continues to slow down, and written in the article "Diminished" from the *Economist* is a caution that as Europe is currently faced with an already weak demand for European goods, a rise in the euro has the potential to "make a slow-moving economy stall altogether."⁶⁹ Europe is also hindered by its economic integration in that, it to some extent takes power away from the national governments, and limits their ability to react efficiently to economic problems that arise. This is the argument made by Alan Friedman in *The Wall Street Journal* article "The Economy; The Outlook: To Europe's Chagrin, U.S. Economy Sits In the Driver's Seat." Friedman cites high European unemployment levels, upwards of 10 percent, as areas of concern. He uses specific examples regarding labor restrictions and firing practices that limit the ability of individual European governments and businesses to make necessary adjustments to the economic conditions they are faced with.⁷⁰ Clearly, despite the potential for the euro to strengthen Europe's economy, there are a great many limitations. Economists therefore assure the public that the U.S. economy is in no danger of falling behind Europe anytime soon.

It is important to recognize however, that Americans cannot afford to become complacent in their current situation. While Europe's economy poses little threat to outperform that of the U.S., one must keep in mind that this could potentially backfire. As Deputy Treasury Secretary Summers points out, the U.S. benefits from a strong European economy.⁷¹ Thus while it may be good news that Europe poses no competitive threat, a European economy that is crippled by stagnation could also hurt the U.S. An out-of-control rise of the euro could cause real damage to the European economy, and subsequently plague the dollar. Summers reflects on both

68 Lawrence H. Summers, "Transatlantic Implications of the Euro and Global Financial Stability." (Remarks to the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Charlotte, NC, 6 November 1998. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/rr2807.htm> on 17 October 2003.

69 "Diminished."

70 Friedman.

71 Summers.

sides of sides of the exchange issue. He notes that there are critics who argue that the euro has the potential to take over the dollar's role as the "world's reserve currency," while on the other side of the spectrum there are those that warn the euro's weakened position will make it too competitive for the dollar and draw away foreign investments and demand for U.S. exports. Summers concludes however that ultimately it will be the relative standing of the economies behind the currencies that will have the greatest impact.⁷²

There are also political costs associated with the euro. Friedman makes the connection that the rise in the euro further inhibits the European economy, limiting demand for European goods and leading to further unemployment. He insists then that this weakened state reminds Europe of its dependency on the U.S. economy and its market for Europe's exports as "one of the only reasons business confidence is slowly returning in France and Germany."⁷³ Friedman contends that this position of dependency does little to alter Europeans' frustration with the U.S. dominance of power. This tension, he reasons, has the potential to cause European leaders to react with political retribution, for example, coming out against the U.S. and President Bush on issues of U.S. foreign policy and Iraq. There is also the additional concern that the realization of the potential increase in European economic power as a result of monetary and economic unification under the euro will correlate to the EU's development of political power. Summers refers to this potential outcome, though notes that it is something in the distant future.⁷⁴

Ultimately the U.S. has a vested interest its connection to the European economy and the euro. The EU emphasizes this reality by noting, "in 2001 the EU invested over 800 billion in the U.S., accounting for over 60 percent of foreign investment in the U.S. It also mentions that the U.S. directly invested over 640 billion in the EU."⁷⁵ The publication maintains that the EU has an impact on U.S. employment, supported through employment and also investments 4.9 million U.S. jobs.⁷⁶ Offering a European perspective on the relationship, van-Tartwijk-Novey writes in the foreword to *The United States and the European Community*:

So when, from time, the headlines are dominated by conflicts between the United States and the European Community, let us also remember that we have much in common and in many respects we are treading the same path that the United States has also traveled.⁷⁷

DePorte also recognizes both the economic and political link between the U.S. and Europe, in his discussion on the history of the "Euratlantic subsystem."⁷⁸ Given such a connection, it is necessary that the U.S. give appropriate attention to the integration of Europe's economy and the development of the euro.

Indeed, the euro represents no small change. The market under the euro rivals that of the United States and has the potential for expansion into Eastern Europe.

72 Ibid.

72 Friedman.

74 Summers.

75 "The EU and the 50 US States."

76 Ibid.

77 Van Tartwijk-Novey.

78 DePorte.

Also, as the EU publication *The Euro: Completing Economic Unity* points out, there is the added impact that the euro "contributes to a broader sense of European identity."⁷⁹ Introduction of the euro means more than economic change, it also encourages further political unification in Europe. As Jones' reflects, the euro represents an important experiment as, "the first stateless currency."⁸⁰ Could this perhaps be a predecessor to the development of a global currency? Measuring the impact of the euro necessitates more than simply a look at where it stands in the present. Regarding the euro, having already been on a fifty-year road to realization, it will be interesting to see now where the euro's road will lead. A study of U.S. history and economics suggests that though unhappy at times, the U.S. will undoubtedly be a partner traveling on the euro's road.

As Matthew Benjamin reports in "Greenback Game", the near future could bring an even more dramatic rise of the euro. Benjamin cites expert Michael Rosenberg as predicting the euro may very well continue to rise to 1.40 against the dollar.⁸¹ If nothing else about the euro grabs the public's attention, this may. In *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, William Appleman Williams discusses the problematic outlook of American foreign policy on foreign and domestic economics. Williams argues that one consequence America suffers as a result of its flawed perspective:

This strong tendency to externalize the sources or causes of good things leads naturally enough to an even greater inclination to explain the lack of the good life by blaming it on foreign individuals, groups, and nations.⁸²

This misconception can readily be applied to the U.S. relationship with the euro. Ignoring the euro's roots in U.S. history, should the euro negatively impact the U.S. the tendency exists for the American public to begin pointing fingers at Europe. When rational economic explanations for currency fluctuations are no longer satisfactory to a frustrated and critical American public wanting answers, there is at least a historical argument to fall back on. American criticism of the euro, therefore, should begin at home. No matter what path the euro takes in the future, and the impact of its wake on the United States, America can be reminded of the part it played in laying the foundations for the euro to begin with.

79 "The Euro: Completing Economic Unity."

80 Jones, p. 287.

81 Benjamin.

82 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 15.

GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: THE UNITED NATIONS' ABILITY TO ACT FROM A NEOLIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

By: Emily Sciarillo*

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations is an international organization concerned above all with human rights, international peace, and national and international security. Many believe the United Nations has failed this purpose during certain international humanitarian crises; crises which some believe the UN exists to prevent. In 1994, while the world stood by, genocide was being rigorously and meticulously carried out in Rwanda. If the United Nations was either unwilling or unable to prevent or stop such a gruesome violation of human rights – one condemned by the same organization – then we must ask “what is its purpose?” If indeed, according to the member states of the UN, its purpose is to prevent such acts of genocide; if crimes against humanity are truly considered the responsibility of the world, than we must ask, “where does the UN fail and what assets does the UN lack for true cooperation?” Using a neoliberal model for determining the durability and effectiveness of an institution, these two questions, in regard to the events in Rwanda from before the onset of the genocide to the admittance of the UN and parties involved of their failure to act will be explored.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Celeste A. Wallander, an institution is defined by its maintenance costs, its members and its assets – being the norms, rules, and procedures that become institutionalized. Assets are what provide the effectiveness and adaptability of the institution. The character of these assets is determined by the purpose of the institution. By examining the types of ‘rules, norms and procedures’ and categorizing them as either general or specific, the effectiveness and durability of an institution can be understood.

The Member States of the UN provide its assets, which are necessarily related to those of the states themselves. The assets are determined by the purpose for creating the institution. The decision of cooperation among states in creating an institution that consists of their combined assets and serves a collective interest is based on the cost, or lack thereof, in solving problems. The adaptability of the institution rests in whether those assets it is given by the Member States are specific or general.

If the institution was created in the face of a clear and specific threat, then the assets provided will also be specific. The institution will then be equipped to deal effectively with that particular threat, but not for others. To address new threats, the

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institution must change its existing assets, which, based on the variety of different national interests of the member states, can be expensive and difficult.

If the purpose of the institution is to solve problems of instability and mistrust among states, like "nearby conflicts such as ethnic disputes, and humanitarian crises,"¹ its assets will be more general in nature, enabling the institution to respond to many different realms of instability and conflict. These general assets will address issues of resources such as information and basic mechanisms that promote communication, cooperation, and enforcement. This greater flexibility means that adaptation to changes in the global atmosphere is easier, yet the effectiveness to specific problems is weakened.

In order to deal with specific problems that are general, to insure an inexpensive adaptability both to changes in the international community and to the changes in the national interests of the member states, an institution that is effective and dependable through major changes in the world system must have assets that are specific. To guarantee that the institution is capable of serving their collective interest, mechanisms must exist which will minimize mistrust and competition within the institution. Organizational assets are required "to enable the alliance to discuss problems, to decide how to address them and to implement decisions."² Issues such as burden sharing, financial and military, must be addressed so that the decisions are carried through and that a lack of resources does not impede the institutions capabilities.

As globalization alters the nature of world politics, international peace and stability are being threatened by new and much more varied issues than what existed when the UN was created. Inter-state conflicts among the developed countries are much less common, while in the undeveloped areas of the world "security problems now arise from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes."³ If an institution is going to exist to address these issues, the political will of its participants must reflect an altered national interest, which will grant these issues the proper importance.

1 Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): p. 710.

2 Wallander, p. 726.

3 Wallander, p. 781.

OPERATIONALIZATION

The United Nations is a universal organization of states that, following World War II, have agreed to cooperate towards a new world order. Its charter was originally adopted by fifty states in 1945. The UN assumes responsibility in the "maintenance of international peace and security."⁴ Among the purposes and principles stated in Article I of the charter, the protection of human rights and universal peace are the foremost ideals. In the same year, the Member States signed the Genocide Convention in which they "confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace, or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."⁵

The capability of the UN to fulfill its roles lies in its assets – the rules, laws and procedures. In many cases, including the case of Rwanda, these assets have proven insufficient for solving those very problems to which the UN proclaims to dedicate itself. These assets will be explored; including whose interests they serve; the flexibility and effectiveness they provide; the influence they have over information and burden sharing among the member states; and their ability to address the issues of today, which are drastically different to those which existed when the UN was created.

An institution's purpose is determined by those who create it, and by those whose interests the institution will serve. The UN's operational power lies in the Security Council, whose role is to make binding decisions in regard to mandatory sanctions and cease-fires and can authorize military action in response to the threat of peace and security. It is made up of 15 members, 5 of them permanent and with a veto power. Because of the nature of the veto power, the cooperation of all Permanent Members is needed for any resolution to be passed and implemented. Therefore the 5 Permanent Members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States must agree on what is important according to their national interests in order to create the unity necessary for any action to take place. The capability of the UN to prevent human rights violations and maintain peace lies in these 5 states; meanwhile the UN claims to be an institution that represents the interests of 191 Members States. Therefore a common interest of all members is neither necessarily represented nor influential in decisions made.⁶

Another issue lies in UN enforcement capabilities. It has no assets with which to provide authority in its peacekeeping, whether it is in sanctions or cease-fire agreements, and when it comes to military intervention it has no real power to demand the participation of its members. "The council ... can only authorize Member States to take necessary action. It is too cumbersome, too diversified, and too insecure to play [a] part in planning and executing."⁷ The UN lacks authority

4 Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, ed., *United Nations, Divided World; the UN's Roles in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 8.

5 "United Nations Genocide Convention 1948," in CanText (Ottawa Researchers & Northern Blue Publishing, 1984-2002). Retrieved from the Internet, <http://207.61.100.164/candiscover/cantext/internat/1948unge.html>, on 30 November 2003.

6 Roberts, pp. 8-9.

7 Roberts, p. 118.

over not just its Member States, but over the parties of a conflict as well. If the parties are unwilling to cooperate, the UN is powerless. This is because of the UN's role as "the constituted guardian of the state system"⁸ where sovereignty is a highly respected institution.

The UN peacekeeping forces, whose control lies in the Security Council, play an important role in "interposition, policing, and humanitarian assistance."⁹ The criteria in Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter for peacekeeping operations include a cease-fire accepted by all parties, and states that the UN has a peaceful role. If fighting resumes, the forces can abandon their mission. These criteria make it almost impossible for the peacekeeping forces to be effective in those areas where they are really needed. As James Woods, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the US Department of Defense states, the UN "will only go where we're not needed."¹⁰

The UN faces many difficulties, as it has few general assets that allow the Security Council to demand resources from members. Because of the increased dangers and remoteness of the new types of conflict the Security Council must address, "States are proving reluctant to commit forces to enforcement action in civil war situations when significant casualties and protracted involvement may result."¹¹ Also an issue is that there are no clear guidelines for the sharing of information. As a result, mistrust prevails as the Member States often withhold information from the Council and from each other. As there are many branches and side organizations, procedures are missing which would assure the delivery of information from one part to the other. Either purposely or accidentally, information often does not reach those who are responsible for making decisions, thus hindering their ability to provide adequate solutions.

As conflicts become more internal and their nature becomes more unique to each culture and region, new specific assets to deal properly with the instabilities of today's world are necessary. The UN lacks specific guidelines and procedures for the array of different crises that it will face. If the UN is to continue to have credibility in the eyes of the world, it must find a cost-effective way in which to adapt its specific assets to accommodate the nature of conflict and human rights violations that exist today.

8 Roberts, p. 120.

9 Roberts, p. 9.

10 James Woods, "Frontline: The Triumph of Evil: Interviews," *PBS and WGBH/Frontline*, 1999. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html>, on 24 November 2003.

11 Roberts, p. 119.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

In August of 1993, Habyarimana, the leader of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development in Rwanda (NRMD), which gives preference to the Hutu people, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an organization dominated by the Tutsi people, signed the Arusha Peace Accord agreeing on a "coalition Hutu-RPF government"¹² with Habyarimana as president. A UN peacekeeping force of 2,500 troops was at that time assigned to Kigali, the Rwandan capital, under the United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR) mandate to ensure the implementation of this accord.¹³ On April 6th 1994, President Habyarimana was killed when Hutu extremists who opposed the implementation of the accord shot down his plane.

"Within an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard, elements of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and extremist militia (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambe) set up road blocks and barricades and began the organized slaughter, starting in the capital Kigali, of nearly one million Rwandans in 100 days time."¹⁴ It was an organized and meticulous killing of Tutsis and the Hutus who opposed the genocide, with the intent of destroying the group, which is clearly genocide according to the Genocide Convention of the United Nations in which all signatories "confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace, or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."¹⁵

As the genocide began, many members of the international community, including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and many human rights watch groups called for action by the UNAMIR to stop the massacring of innocent civilians. The reaction then, and in the following three months of decisions made in the Security Council regarding the genocide are nothing more than a complete failure of the UN to fulfill "it's prime objective ... to prevent such a conflict from ever happening again."¹⁶ Why was the UN unable to fulfill its stated purpose? There are many aspects – such as problems within the UN and the internal politics of some of the Member States – that led to this failure. By examining the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the specific and general assets of the UN, mainly in the Security Council, why cooperation in UN failed in the case of Rwanda will be determined.

UNAMIR, a peacekeeping force created by the Security Council in October of 1993, was mandated to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement

12 "Frontline: Rwanda Chronology," *PBS and WGBH/Frontline*, 1998. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html>, on 20 November 2003.

13 "Frontline: Rwanda Chronology."

14 William Ferroggiaro, ed., "The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book" in *The National Security Archive* (20 Aug. 2001). Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/Sciarillo.DOCNSAEBB53/index2.html> on 30 November 2003.

Documents 2, 3, 4, and 12; Source Freedom of Information Act release by the US Department of State. Document 8; Source Mandatory Declassification Review release by the National Security Council.

15 "United Nations Genocide Convention 1948."

16 Report by the Secretary-General, *Statement on Receiving the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, 16 Dec, 1999. Retrieved from the Internet, http://www.un.org/News/press/docs/1999/sgsm_rwanda.htm, on 30 November 2003.

and the cease-fire agreement.¹⁷ Armed with some 2,200 UN troops commanded by Canadian Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire, the peacekeeping force was entrusted with ensuring the stability in the region and monitoring humanitarian issues.¹⁸ On April 21, 15 days after the onset of the genocide, the Security Council adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR with the mission of securing a new cease-fire between the warring parties. The new mandate also included the responsibility to “assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible”¹⁹ – a rather weak and redundant statement given that the new mandate also reduced the force from 2,500 to only 270 military personnel without any actual troops.²⁰ During this time, Major-General Dallaire had reported to the Security Council “that with just five thousand well equipped soldiers and a free hand to fight Hutu power, he could bring the genocide to a rapid halt.”²¹

Almost one month later, on May 17, half way in to the 100 days of the slaughter of 800,000 Rwandans, the mandate was adjusted again, with the mission to protect citizens and refugees. The force was now given the 5,000 troops needed to halt genocide, but these UN troops were delayed because of disagreements in the UN as to who would pay for the force.²² In the report on May 31 by the Security Council on the situation in Rwanda, it is identified that the troops from the revised mandate of May 17 “cannot be dispatched until the proper equipment is provided by other governments.”²³ In fact, they were waiting for the 50 Armored Personnel Carriers that the United States was to provide.²⁴ By the time the UN force was prepared to do anything, the genocide had come to a halt as the RPF gained control of the country and the humanitarian disaster had changed to one of a mass refugee exodus made up primarily of Hutus who feared retaliation. In the face of this emergency, the UN and the previously reluctant Member States were quick and effective in their response and much more generous in their contributions in aid, troops, and equipment.

In 1999 an independent team conducted an investigation as to why the UN had failed to protect the some 800,000 innocent Rwandans. The Security Council was presented with a report that outlined the problems and recommended improvements. The failure of the peacekeeping mission was accredited to a “lack of resources,” the “lack of well trained troops and functioning material,” a “lack of will,” a “lack of political leadership,” the smallness of the mission, its slowness in

17 United Nations, Rwanda: UNAMIR; Mandate, (Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information). Retrieved from the Internet, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/unamirM.htm, on 30 November 2003.

18 United Nations, Rwanda: UNAMIR; Facts and Figures, (Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information). Retrieved from the Internet, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/unamirF.htm, on 30 November 2003.

19 United Nations, Rwanda: UNAMIR; Mandate.

20 United Nations, Rwanda: UNAMIR; Facts and Figures.

21 Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families; Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), p. 150.

22 “Frontline: Rwanda Chronology.”

23 Report by the Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda. United Nations Security Council, 31 May 1994. S/1994/640, p. 11.

24 Heather M. Fleming, “U.S. Steps Up Rwandan as Lawmakers Assail Pace,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 52 Issue 30, 7 Jul. 1994, p. 2.

set up, the “debilitating administrative difficulties,” a lack of “coordination and discipline,” and the fact that their mandate was – and remained until too late – “based on an analysis on the peace process which proved erroneous.”²⁵ The Security Council, because it lacked both specific and general assets, failed to provide the mission, the guidance, and the resources needed to be effective. Without any real authority or assets with which to unite national interests, members were able to manipulate the ‘rules, norms and procedures’ to accommodate their own agendas and avoid involvement of the UN where it was not conducive to their national interests. Before exploring where these interests lie and how they differ from those of the collective conscience of the UN, the three main areas in which the UN lacked its ability to respond effectively to the crises in Rwanda will be examined. The first failure was in the reduction of forces early into the conflict and the denial of the seriousness of the circumstance. The second is a failure in finance and preparedness to provide to the UNAMIR force the appropriate supplies and equipment to carry out their mandated mission. There were finally guidelines in place on the ground in Rwanda regarding crimes against humanity, but they were never put into effect due to the lack of resources.²⁶ The third lies in the complete lack of unanimity among the UN member states as to what the responsibility of the UN was.

UNAMIR was not equipped with any real guidelines to plan for the failure of the peace process between the parties. There was “no fall-back, no contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process did not succeed.”²⁷ The situation for which the mandate was created quickly deteriorated and recognition was never given to the new unfolding of events and of what political situation they consisted. In fact, the genocide was continuously referred to as an after effect of a civil war and the murdered were often referred to as being from both sides. Meanwhile the Hutu led authorities were carrying out an organized and carefully planned genocide and the RPF was focusing on saving lives, not fighting a war. Ignoring this reality, the UN, as well as the US and France, were giving more attention to a cease-fire between the two groups than to the massacring of innocent civilians. Therefore, the UNAMIR “was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide”²⁸

The UN, due to a complete breakdown in analyzing information, insisted that the party committing genocide and the party represented by and protecting those being targeted in genocide agree to stop fighting. Naturally the RPF insisted that “a condition for a cease-fire is that the Rwandan government forces commit themselves to halting the killings”²⁹ Due to a lack of general information-sharing assets, cooperation was thwarted and the proper facts were not available for a complete understanding of the circumstance. Many times, between the Security Council, the Secretariat, the UNAMIR, and the Human rights monitoring agencies, information was either withheld or misinterpreted.

25 Report by the Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. United Nations Security Council, 16 Dec. 1999. S/1999/1257, p. 30.

26 Report by the Security Council, S/1999/1257, p. 35.

27 Report by the Security Council, S/1999/1257, p. 31.

28 Report by the Security Council, S/1999/1257, p. 1.

29 Report by the Security Council, S/1994/640, p. 3.

The best example of how a lack of communication and coordination of information warped the reality of the situation was in the absolute and deliberate avoidance of the term 'genocide'. According to the Genocide Convention, if the term genocide was applied to the situation in Rwanda, the member states "would have been obliged to act to 'prevent and punish' the perpetrators."³⁰ While all parties involved blamed each other for not providing information proving that genocide was taking place, much evidence shows that individually, all parties were informally aware of the facts. Finally, in the report from the Security Council on May 31, 1994 on the situation in Rwanda, it is recognized that "on the basis of the evidence that has emerged, there can be little doubt that it [the situation] constitutes genocide."³¹

How is it possible that the Security Council could have been so ignorant of the real unfolding of events in Rwanda, of genocide that some claim had been 2 years in planning?³² Because the guidelines for the sharing of information were so vague, so general, the parties could choose what they 'knew' from what they saw. France, the US, Belgium, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh all failed to provide their information of the situation to the members of the Security Council until it was virtually too late to act. Additionally, acknowledgment of the facts that would lead to the use of the term genocide was deliberately avoided. In fact, many inappropriate phrases were used by various leaders, which not only sidelined the term but also insinuated the killing was 'tribal' or 'African' and out of the reach of comprehension in the developed world.

In the independent inquiry of the UN in 1999, it is recognized that the warnings of genocide were ignored and the situation was denied a proper response. On January 11, Dallaire sent a telegram to his superiors in the UN staff of the warning received by Pierre the night before, but its warnings were never taken seriously and never presented to the Security Council. In fact, until July 15, 1994, the UN "permitted the representative of [the] genocidal government to continue sitting in the Security Council, a council supposedly committed to peace."³³ Even if the UN, in appropriate time, had recognized the genocide, it is questionable as to whether or not a proper response would have ever been possible as the key States – those who hold the veto power as well as the economic resources needed for an appropriate mandate – were not willing to act. Nevertheless many inexpensive, non-military measures that could have been used by the international community were not considered.

The broadcasts, which were calling for the killings and often providing information as to the locations of Tutsis, could have been interrupted.³⁴ The UN could have imposed an embargo on arms to Rwanda much earlier than May 1,

30 "Frontline: Rwanda Chronology."

31 Report by the Security Council, *S/1994/640*, p. 11.

32 Woods, p. 6.

33 "International Responsibility; Rwanda Genocide," *Human Rights Watch*, 1999. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-05.htm>, on 20 November 2003.

34 Tony Marley, "Frontline: The Triumph of Evil: Interviews," *PBS and WGBH/Frontline*, 1999. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/marley.html> on 24 November 2003.

1994, when the embargo commenced. At the very least, a condemnation of the genocide by the public, the UN, foreign financial donors, and the World Bank may have given some incentive to those committing the crimes to stop.³⁵ When the international community formally recognized the genocide and finally provided UNAMIR the appropriate mandate, including rules of engagement allowing troops to use force to prevent the killings, it failed to provide the troops the resources needed to carry out the mission. Often lack of coordination plagued even the level of command on the ground. When there were enough troops to protect the thousand or more refugees seeking protection from the UN forces in the Don Bosco school, Dallaire was unable able to give them the orders to remain and defend those who were soon to be murdered, because the troops were national, not of the UN.³⁶ The lack of organization, sharing of information, resources, and assets specific enough to be useful and effective are the main elements which prevented the UN Security Council and the UNAMIR from reacting quickly and productively in the genocide in Rwanda. However the cause of the failure can also be explained by the lack of real authority the UN has over its members in demanding the participation and resources need to realize it purpose.

“Both realism and neoliberalism start from the assumption that the absence of a sovereign authority that can make and enforce binding agreements creates opportunities for states to advance their interests unilaterally.”³⁷ Some Member States acted in the interests of the victims in Rwanda in the period leading up to the decisions on action by urging intervention, such as Nigeria, Czech Republic, Spain, Argentina, and New Zealand.³⁸ Many Member States however were not willing to provide any resources to Rwanda. This lack of political will is the key factor in the United Nations’ incapacity to react to conflict and it is here more than anywhere that the future of United Nations is questionable. Political will is essential but so are financial and military resources. Of those States that were in the economic position to provide the UN with the resources, the political will was absent.

Along with lacking any authority to force participation in peacekeeping missions, the UN is also extremely deficient in the ability to make democratic decisions, especially in the area of peacekeeping. In an international organization created to maintain peace and security and prevent gross human rights violations, and as a coalition made up of 191 countries – many of whom are facing human tragedies and civil wars – “the notoriously undemocratic privilege of the veto” denies a “real voice to those whose fates are at stake.”³⁹ The UN can only act when those five privileged members believe it would be in their national interests and, in the case of Rwanda,

35 “International Responsibility; Rwanda Genocide.”

36 Colonel Luc Marchal, *Frontline: The Triumph of Evil: Interviews*. PBS and WGBH/Frontline, 1999. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/marchal.html>, on 24 November 2003.

37 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *International Security* Vol. 24 No. 1 (Summer 1999): 44.

38 “International Responsibility; Rwanda Genocide.”

39 “Why Does the World Ignore ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in Africa?” in *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 9 Issue 4, Fall 1992, p. 53.

the US, France, and Belgium believed it was not in their interests to prevent the genocide of 800,000 men, women, and children in a remote and insignificant corner of the world.

Belgium, although not one of the permanent members of the Security Council, played a large role in Rwanda as the former colonial power and a supporter of the Tutsis. In fact, many blame the cruel methods of rule used by Belgium – exploiting an ancient relationship of land owner/worker between a Tutsi minority and Hutu majority, by favoring the Tutsis, and by issuing identity cards – for creating resentment among the Hutu people. Belgium, however made a “unilateral decision to withdraw its troops in the wake of the tragic killing of the ten Belgian peacekeepers” on April 7, which “brought the United Nations mission near the brink of disintegration.”⁴⁰ The evacuation of the Belgian soldiers on April 11 from the school where they had over 2,000 Rwandan civilians under their protection left them vulnerable to their massacre only hours later.⁴¹

France’s involvement in the genocide and their lack of will to intervene stems from their very close diplomatic relationship with the Hutu government even during the genocide. Fear of bad publicity for their support for a genocidal government was enough to request that the perpetrators keep the killing from the media and public eye, but not enough to prevent or at least denounce such a violation of human rights.⁴² In June, the French were granted authorization to deploy French forces to create a ‘safe area’.⁴³ The killing, however, continued and many now believe the real French mission was to “secure safe passage for the genocidal command to cross, with the lot of its weaponry, into Zaire.”⁴⁴

The US perhaps holds the most responsibility for blocking the Security Council from acknowledging the genocide and from taking appropriate action to protect civilians. Several factors account for a lack of political will on part of the US to intervene. Some say the Clinton administration, having recently experienced Somalia, feared bad publicity from another possible failure. The argument that the public would not support a humanitarian mission was largely based on the high level of public ignorance of the situation.⁴⁵ Had the administration wanted the public sympathy that was needed to back such a mission, media coverage could have been created. However, there was virtually no coverage of the genocide. As a matter of fact, “once CNN and other media began portraying this [a cholera outbreak caused by the hundreds of thousands of refugees] disaster in Goma ... the public started leaning on Congress, [and] the U.S. government was forced to act.”⁴⁶ Even if the US was afraid of the bad publicity of the possible death of troops, that does not explain the failure of the military to provide the support of the non-military actions listed previously.

40 Report by the Security Council, *S/1999/1257* p. 36.

41 Report by the Security Council, *S/1999/1257* p. 67.

42 Gourevitch, p. 158.

43 “Frontline: Rwanda Chronology.”

44 Gourevitch, p. 154.

45 Woods, p. 5.

46 Marley, p. 8.

US apathy was not due to the lack of will to spend money in the region because after the genocide, during the refugee crisis, the US had no qualms with sending thousands of troops to refugee sites in surrounding countries and in pledging over \$170 million in assistance in July.⁴⁷ Had the administration used the term genocide, there is little evidence that the US would have behaved differently, therefore suggesting that the term was avoided only to escape public embarrassment, not the responsibility to act.⁴⁸ The decision had long since been made that the US would not involve itself in any UN mission in Rwanda, genocide or not; so any claim that lack of action was due to the unawareness of the gravity of the situation simply does not reflect reality. It is evident in recently declassified documents from as early as April 11, 1994, that although the risk of the death of thousands of civilians was clear, officials had already decided on the recommended withdraw of UNAMIR immediately.⁴⁹ Was the situation simply not important enough to dedicate time and attention by the administration? Had this been the case there would not have been the many "inter-agency teleconferences, being chaired by the participants at the National Security Council. The crisis in Rwanda was serious enough that it needed inter-agency attention."⁵⁰

The most plausible explanation that has been offered as to the neglect of international humanity demonstrated by the US and its pressure that the UN withdraw is the lack of essential, general assets needed for true international cooperation, the 'rules norms and procedures' which provide for the better coordination, provision of information, and trust.⁵¹ This deficiency in the organization in the UN allowed all parties to use the method of "diplomatic escape and evasion."⁵² There was a lack of official communication between the UN and the US Pentagon that led to the level of ignorance the US officially maintained on the situation and any requests made for help by the UN.

As a result of the catastrophe of the UN mission in Somalia, its ability to carry out an effective peacekeeping mission, and the intentions of other Member States, serious mistrust of the UN had developed among some of the more conservative officials in the US. In fact, Clinton had recently signed the Presidential Decision Directive 25, which essentially served as strict and unrealistic criteria for the US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions.⁵³ "The widely publicized killings of U.S. and other peacekeeping troops by Somali militiamen hardened attitudes among American policy makers and the public about the efficacy and costs of U.S. military intervention in Africa, the limitations of UN peacekeeping, and the ability of Africans to resolve their own conflicts. A mood of 'Afro-pessimism' and 'peace fatigue' has prevailed."⁵⁴

47 Fleming, pp. 1-2.

48 Marley.

49 Ferroggiaro.

50 Tony Marley, p. 2.

51 Wallander, p. 707.

52 Marley.

53 Gourevitch, p 150.

54 "The U.S. Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa: Special Report 11," United States Institute of Peace, Dec. 1994. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/USContr1.html>, on 30 November 2003.

The weakness of the UN to truly fulfill the purpose for which it was created can be attributed to those who provide its assets – the members. Their national interests are what will determine the real objectives of the Security Council, and internal conflicts in Africa, unfortunately do not make it on to the list of the most powerful states' agendas. The national interests of the US were – and remain – in key regions such as the Middle East and North Korea, not in a remote country such as Rwanda.⁵⁵ Although national interests generally lie in strategic, political, and economic issues, it would be wrong to neglect the issue of race when examining the national interests of the States that have the majority of the power in the Security Council. The fact that it was Africans being killed according to Dallaire, explains why Europe and the US turned its back to Rwanda as it gave great amounts of attention to the conflict unfolding in Bosnia.

“Who comprehends that more people were killed, injured, and displaced in three and a half months in Rwanda than in the whole of the Yugoslavia campaign in which we poured sixty thousand troops and the whole of the Western world was there, and we’re pouring billions in there, still trying to solve the problem. How much is really being done to solve the Rwandan problem?”⁵⁶

The UN charter speaks of “mankind,” “all people,” “international peace and security”, and “the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”⁵⁷ By ignoring the humanitarian tragedies of the non-strategic, nonwestern areas of the world, The UN fails to serve the whole international community and therefore fails its purpose.

55 Marley.

56 Philip Gourevitch, p. 169.

57 Adam Roberts, pp. 499-500.

SUMMARY

The world is facing a new type of conflict. Most of the wars today are fought within state boundaries “where government armies are fighting ethnic and other local rebellions.”⁵⁸ The legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of the world depends on its ability to not only adapt its assets to be able to more sufficiently deal with these types of conflicts but on its ability to overcome the control of those Member States whose national interests undermine the purpose of the United Nations. “The council must be enlarged, democratized, and made more transparent,”⁵⁹ giving more real representation to all the regions of the world. If the UN is to ever have the authority to enforce peace and human rights universally, leaders must reconsider the limits of state sovereignty. “No legal principle – not even sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against humanity,” said Secretary General Kofi Annan.⁶⁰ When many of the states of the world today consist of boundaries superimposed by a colonial power that do not reflect their real history and culture, the western concept of a sovereign state often fails to relate to the actual people of that state.⁶¹

It is clear that the UN lacks the assets specific enough to properly deal with the challenges it faces. While specific assets must be adjusted to enable the Security Council to respond to these new challenges, general assets must be adopted to ensure that quick and effective solutions are developed. These general ‘laws, norms, and procedures’ must involve information sharing as well as burden sharing to enable the UN to provide the resources needed for such solutions.

Why is the UN still in existence if it is failing in its purpose? If its purpose has become what those few states that have a real voice choose, then the UN is nothing more than a tool to use at their convenience, when it best serves their national interests. The future of international institutions lies in their ability to transform states’ national interests for a common goal. As long as the UN lacks the ‘rules, norms and procedures’ necessary to provide the trust and incentives for cooperation among Member States to maintain peace and stability in all the world, it will never truly become an international institution and its credibility will rapidly fade in the eyes of the world.

58 Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Peacekeeping No Longer Domain of Military Brass,” International Press Service, Security Council, 12 Mar. 2002. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2002/ngo.htm>, on 30 November 2003.

59 Michael Fleshman, Reform Plans Dominate Security Council Debate on Peacekeeping in Africa. Africa Recovery, Vol.14 (Oct. 2000): p. 1. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/143peack.htm>, on 29 September 2003.

60 Ibid.

61 “Why Does the World Ignore ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in Africa?” p. 2.

RUSSIA IN TRANSITION

By: Jared Sherman*

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, the people of Russia, including its government and its citizenry have been working toward achieving a democracy. Such efforts have often been met with hardships. This is primarily due to the fact that the country, ruled by Soviet decree for over 70 years, must find a way to transform its political system from that of totalitarianism to a democracy. Today, the future of Russia's political structure is of great importance to the international community.

Three proposed characteristics of a successful democracy will be examined to determine whether or not in the past ten years a democracy has begun to be cultivated in Russia: 1) The foundation of a civil society being mobilized to adapt to a new political system, 2) the success or lack thereof in the establishment of political parties; and subsequent voter satisfaction, and 3) the performance and self-determination of the mass media are three indicators of a successful democracy in Russia. Ultimately, recent developments in Russia will be used to conclude whether or not these three characteristics have been realized.

The research method used within this paper is predominantly qualitative. Scholarly works are cited to describe and discuss the three characteristics of a successful democracy. In addition, quantitative data and statistics used in the discussion of voter satisfaction in democracy provide depth on the issue.

Most sources are secondary, although newspapers detailing recent events serve as primary sources. Literature reviews are used primarily to complement and contribute to a scholars' assertions. Contradictions are mentioned as well. In addition, the complements and contradictions the other scholars provide serve as a way to ensure validity.

CHARACTERISTIC ONE: CIVIL SOCIETY

In *The Politics of Change: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Union*, Carol Barner-Barry and Cynthia A. Hody maintain that "democracy is in essence, majority rule."¹ In addition, the authors suggest that a great number of a country's citizens need to help create favorable conditions for a democracy to thrive.² They go on to state that in an ideal democracy, citizens will participate, under the assumption that they all have the same rights and believe that they have control over their government.³ Essentially, the concept of a civil society, accepting and thriving in a political system is suggested.

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1 Carol Barner-Barry and Cynthia A. Hody, *The Politics of Change: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 212.

2 Ibid.

3 Barner-Barry and Hody, p. 225.

However, the very idea of a civil society supporting a democracy comes into doubt when Russia, a country that only recently became more acutely aware of democracy than it had during the Cold War, must be discussed. In *Russian Politics and Society: An Introduction*, by Catherine Danks, and *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, by Michael McFaul it is widely discussed with little debate that the process of channeling a civil society toward the establishment of a democracy in Russia remains a challenge. Also, William V. Smirnov's "Democratization in Russia: Achievements and Problems," written for Archie Brown's *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader* offers insight into the concept of a civil society. Smirnov confirms the concerns of Barner-Barry and Hody, Danks, and McFaul by asking "... will civil society, one of the necessary conditions for democratization and democratic consolidation, be created?"⁴

Danks contributes to Barner-Barry and Hody's view of a civil society by stating that a self-sustaining democracy can be realized "only when there is a civil society and a general belief in democratic values such as human rights and the rule of law."⁵ The author goes on to state that there exists a soviet tradition of authoritarianism within Russia that is simply not conducive to a mature civil society.⁶ Danks acknowledges that Russians truly are attempting to set up autonomous groups and networks, but that access to political groups is limited.⁷

Smirnov offers a brief overview of which components of a civil society were formed during the final days of the Soviet Union, including socio-political organization not linked to the Communist Party, the middle class, and the creation of both non-corporate and non-political groups.⁸ Smirnov also suggests that an appreciation of freedom for all citizens was nurtured, and that the concept of a market economy and representative democracy was "embedded in the mass consciousness."⁹

McFaul contributes to Smirnov's writings on the development of a civil society in Russia. First, McFaul suggests that in the early 1990's there was a large amount of overt political activity and citizen participation during the national anti-communist movement.¹⁰ However, McFaul says that although civic groups and nongovernmental organizations still exist and have even increased, they have "played less and less of a role in the organization and conduct of state policy."¹¹ Instead, they have pursued small, less ambitious goals in the private sector.¹²

4 William V. Smirnov, "Democratization in Russia: Achievements and Problems," in *Russian Politics: A Reader*, edited by Archie Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 521.

5 Catherine Danks, *Russian Politics and Society: An Introduction* (New York: Pearson Education, Limited, 2001), 191.

6 Danks, p. 192.

7 Ibid.

8 Smirnov, p. 521.

9 Ibid.

10 Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 319-320.

11 McFaul, p. 320.

12 Ibid.

In explaining why these developments have occurred, McFaul invokes the “communist legacy” and states that under the Soviets, all organized social groups were discredited while the private life was infiltrated with Soviet-crafted “social organizations that mimicked civic organizations.”¹³ In effect, a civil society, albeit thinly veiled, was created and the political system that nurtured it collapsed.¹⁴

McFaul also suggests that economic reforms hampered the development of a civil society because the Soviet-era civil society did not particularly match very well with a new economic system, as “a new market-embedded society [had] not sufficiently consolidated to market-embedded social organizations.”¹⁵ Essentially, it took a long time for a civil society to “change gears” and find new interests and supporters to identify with.¹⁶

The inability for a middle class to thrive is also a hindrance to the establishment of a civil society. Smirnov claims the small size of the middle class to be “one of the most serious obstacles to the development of democracy and civil society.”¹⁷ Prior to the financial crisis of August 1998, such a demographic made up only 20 percent of the population.¹⁸ McFaul suggests that, as a result of the August 1998 crisis, the transition to a civil society was further complicated.¹⁹ McFaul reasons that economic resources were scarce after the middle class – a key component to the civil society – suffered major setbacks in the economic meltdown.²⁰

A final hindrance to civil society development, as maintained by McFaul, is the political reforms implemented within Russia. It is said that when party development was suspended from 1991-1993, civic groups were left out of the political process.²¹ While the party system was left underdeveloped, so too was the civil society’s ability to contribute to it.²² By the time political discourse was restored in 1993, civic organizations saw little use or benefit in contributing to their unvalued input.²³

CHARACTERISTIC TWO: PARTIES AND VOTER DISSATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

The second topic of discussion involves the establishment of a multi-party system within Russia. All authors agree that the party system in the country is in need of both reform and more citizen participation, not to mention increased citizen confidence. Danks writes that “the existence of a plurality of political parties is a defining feature of representative democracy.”²⁴ McFaul agrees and writes that in pluralist democracies, parties are the most important part, for they collect issues and

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 McFaul, p. 321.

16 Ibid.

17 Smirnov, p. 522.

18 Ibid.

19 McFaul, p. 321.

20 Ibid.

21 McFaul, p. 322.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Danks, p. 193.

interests and represent them throughout the state.²⁵ However, McFaul also contributes by writing that “parties to date have played only a marginal role in interest intermediation between state and society. Without stronger parties, the state will never face real opposition.”²⁶

Smirnov is much harsher than McFaul, as seen by the following:

A genuine and effective multi-party system had not yet been established in the country. The majority of the many political associations formed during this period of “political enterprise” have not ... gone beyond being social movement private gatherings, proto-parties, or parties based around a single leader.²⁷

Such statements are said to be confirmed by “the [following] results of an empirical study of electoral-legal culture commissioned by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (TsKRF),” and conducted by Smirnov.²⁸

- Only 20.1 percent of citizens consider themselves supporters of any political party.
- The fact that a candidate supports a given political party is 7th on the list of criteria taken into account by voters when deciding whom to vote for.
- Only a quarter (25.7 percent) of voters taking part in the 1995 elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation were chiefly motivated to participate by the desire to support a candidate or party, while 10 percent had the opposite motive, namely to prevent a particular party or candidate from coming to power.
- Only 9 percent of the adult population favor elections conducted solely on party lists, while only just over 13 percent support a mixed electoral system that uses party lists to elect a section of deputies.

McFAUL'S EXPLANATIONS FOR POOR PARTY IDENTIFICATION

In an attempt to understand the reasons behind these poll results, McFaul claims that the causes are varied. First is the 70 years of Communist Party rule, which created a strong estrangement from party politics. In 1990, when Boris Yeltsin quit the Party and vowed never to return, he struck a chord with many Russians.²⁹ Also, prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, McFaul maintains, there was only limited knowledge of democracy, so after the Soviet Union's collapse there was “no party culture to resurrect.”³⁰

Second, according to McFaul, when the post-communist transformations started,

25 McFaul, p. 313.

26 Ibid.

27 Smirnov, p. 521.

28 Ibid.

29 McFaul, p. 315.

30 Ibid.

“old classes and interest groups [were] destroyed as new ones [grew].”³¹ The political environment also did not help, as rather than focus on economic concerns, interests were polarized into two basic camps: “those for change and those against.”³³

McFaul’s third explanation of poor party identification is that Boris Yeltsin’s economic reforms created an oligarchic capitalism in which capital is contained in but a few sectors, the amount of small business is limited, and most of the country’s assets are kept in Moscow. Essentially, an economy is largely run by big businesses, not the small businesses that may rely on political parties for support. As a result, the disenfranchised small business owner or worker does not have confidence in the political system, and does not contribute nor believe in political parties.³⁴

VOTER DISSATISFACTION IN DEMOCRACY AS EVIDENCED BY POLLS

In addition to offering explanations of poor party participation, McFaul also shows clear dissatisfaction with Russian democracy through polls taken between 1999 and 2000. Table 1 discusses whether or not the people of Russia are satisfied with their democracy.³⁵

Table 1: Public Opinion Survey (%)

<i>On the whole, are you fully satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied with how democracy is developing in Russia?</i>	
<i>Fully satisfied</i>	0.4%
<i>Satisfied</i>	11.0%
<i>Dissatisfied</i>	54.3%
<i>Completely dissatisfied</i>	24.3%
<i>Hard to say</i>	9.6%

Source: Surveys done by Michael McFaul and Timothy Colton from 1999-2000.

Once a conclusion had been made that there indeed was a degree of Russian dissatisfaction with their political system, McFaul conducted another poll, this time asking the Russian voter which political system they would most prefer. This poll³⁶ is seen in Table 2.

31 McFaul, p. 316.

32 Ibid.

33 McFaul, pp. 317-318.

34 McFaul, p. 318.

35 McFaul, p. 332.

36 McFaul, p. 333.

Table 2: Public Opinion Survey (%)

<i>What kind of political system, in your opinion, would be most appropriate for Russia?</i>	
<i>The Soviet system we had in our country before perestroika</i>	46.6%
<i>The political system that exists today</i>	11.3%
<i>Democracy of the Western type</i>	11.7%
<i>Hard to say</i>	18.5%

Source: Surveys done by Michael McFaul and Timothy Colton from 1999-2000.

If the proverbial slogan “the customer is always right” has any practical applications, then it appears that Russia’s democracy, based on this poll, is yet to be neither appreciated nor realized. As seen above, half of Russia circa 1999-2000 was dissatisfied with their democracy, and nearly half of those respondents favored a return to a Soviet-styled political system. Once again, based on these figures, there is still much to be done in cultivating a citizenry that would not only participate in the nation’s political affairs, but feels it worthwhile as well.

McFaul’s polls are supported by a 1998 *University of Iowa Political Parties Survey in Russia and Ukraine*, which may be found in “The Development of Party Identification in Post-Soviet Societies,” written by Arthur H. Miller and Thomas F. Klobucar of the University of Iowa for the October 2000 issue of the *American Journal of Political Science*. The data³⁷, reproduced to discuss only Russia, not Ukraine, is seen in Table 3.

37 Arthur H. Miller and Thomas F. Klobucar, “The Development of Party Identification in Post-Soviet Societies,” in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol 44, No, 4, October 2000 (Midwest Political Science Association, 2000), p. 669.

Table 3: Russian Citizens' Attitudes Towards Political Parties

<i>Parties Care About What People Like Me Think</i>		<i>Are You Satisfied with Political Parties?</i>		<i>Are Political Parties Necessary for Our System?</i>		<i>Is There a Party That Best Represents Your Views?</i>	
<i>Agree</i>	19	<i>Completely/Somewhat satisfied</i>	15%	<i>Necessary</i>	56%	<i>Yes</i>	55%
<i>Neutral</i>	15%	<i>Dissatisfied</i>	36%	<i>Neutral</i>	17%	<i>No</i>	45%
<i>Disagree</i>	66%	<i>Completely Dissatisfied</i>	49%	<i>Not Necessary</i>	27%		
<i>Total</i>	100%		100%		100%		100%

Source: 1998 University of Iowa Political parties Survey In Russia and Ukraine, accessed through Arthur H. Miller and Thomas F. Klobucar, "The Development of Party Identification in Post-Soviet Societies," in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol 44, No, 4, October 2000 (Midwest Political Science Association, 2000).

As seen by the above poll figures, with the exception of the findings that were yielded by the final question, there was little satisfaction in the Russian democracy in 1998. However, the response to the final question of whether or not there was a party that best represented one's views, does indeed suggest that the country's reform efforts should not be discounted in the least.

The previous discussions and polling information about party participation may sound bleak, but there are some reassurances. Danks, using the following polling data collected by Igor Kliamkin, in which he asks Russians what their political structure should be, shows that there are Russians who still believe in a democratic ideal, even if confidence in the political system is low.³⁸ Table 4 follows below.

38 Danks, p. 206.

Table 4: Post-soviet ideas

<i>Russia should be...</i>	<i>Percentage selecting statement</i>
1. A state of ethnically Russian people (Russian nationalists)	16
2. A strong military power (great-power advocates)	21
3. A multinational state of people having equal rights (internationalists)	35
4. Returned to the socialist system (restorers of socialism)	12
6. Reborn as a strong military empire having the same borders as the former USSR (imperialists)	7
7. A state whose strength and might are secured through an increase in citizens' well-being (post-soviet individualists)	52
8. A state with a market economy, democratic freedoms and the observance of human rights (western-oriented democrats)	41
9. An Orthodox Christian country (Orthodox Christians)	13

Original source: Tatyana Kukovets and Igor Kliamkin (1997) *Nezavisimaia gazeta*. Stsnari (1) 16 January, 2-3, translation available in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* XLIX (3) 1997, 4-7.

As seen in the above results, this poll counters McFaul's assertions that the vast majority of Russians favor a return to a Soviet-styled political system. However, it should be noted that this poll was taken prior to the August 1998 economic meltdown, as well as Boris Yeltsin's government shake up and the eventual demise of his presidency.³⁹ Therefore, each poll may be taken and accepted as the reader sees fit.

³⁹ Danks, pp. 103-112.

CHARACTERISTIC THREE: THE MASS MEDIA OF RUSSIA: SELF-CENSORSHIP

The mass media in Russia is the third and final topic in discussing the progress of Russia's democratization. There are several authors, each of whom eventually settles on the same conclusion that the mass media is controlled by the government and the oligarchs. In "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media," written for Archie Brown's *Contemporary Politics: A Reader*, Laura Belin describes an inconsistent progression of the media's fortunes. "Much of the development of an independent media," Belin writes, "was considered a clear success of the Russian political transformation."⁴⁰ The state no longer ran the media, so journalists possessed unprecedented flexibility in news coverage.⁴¹ Journalists took their new freedoms to heart. McFaul writes the following:

NTV, the first private television network ... provided a truly independent source of information that reached beyond Moscow. Defying government threats to its license and even personal threats against its founder [Vladimir Gusinsky], NTV earned its credentials as a serious news organization when it provided critical coverage of the first Chechen war. Private local cable companies also sprouted throughout the country.⁴²

UNITED AGAINST COMMUNISM

In what Belin calls a "tactical retreat," the private media joined the state run media in supporting Boris Yeltsin's 1996 re-election efforts against Communist opponent Gennady Zyuganov. In *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power*, Dimitri K. Simes, with intensity, describes, and in effect criticizes the coalition between media and politicians. Simes writes that "Russia's electorate was denied a meaningful choice," and that it was a "manipulation" that provided "artificial polarization."⁴³ Simes writes the following of what the media helped Yeltsin accomplish:

The purpose of this effort was to create a stark choice between Communists and anti-Communists, between dictatorship and democracy, between the past and the future, and between neoimperialism and a moderate foreign policy. This strategy was very successful for Yeltsin and his supporters, but soon after the Russian president's reelection it became apparent that the supposed choice was phony. The communists had never had a chance and their leader knew it.⁴⁴

Simes also writes that during this campaign, the national media, particularly television, was almost entirely government controlled, and that objectivity was

40 Laura Belin "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media," in *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader*, edited by Archie Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 323.

41 Ibid.

42 McFaul, p. 323.

43 Dimitri K. Simes, *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 167.

44 Ibid.

abandoned “in the name of saving the nation from a Communist comeback.”⁴⁵ In addition, a study by the European Institute of the Media is cited, in which Simes states that Yeltsin received 53 percent of the media coverage, while Zyuganov received 18.⁴⁶ Moreover, Yeltsin’s coverage was extremely positive, while Zyuganov’s coverage was highly negative.⁴⁷

McFaul presents another component to the election assistance provided by the media when he writes that NTV general director Igor Malashenko “blurred the lines of division between campaign and media when he joined the Yeltsin reelection team without resigning from his television post.”⁴⁸ Belin contributes to Simes’ assertions and writes that the media helped the campaign present itself as a two-way contest between Yeltsin and Zyuganov.⁴⁹ As a result, says Belin, voters saw Yeltsin as “the only barrier to a Communist return to power, rather than an unpopular incumbent seeking reelection.”⁵⁰ The media coverage certainly helped, as Belin writes that Yeltsin won reelection with 53.8 percent of the vote while Zyuganov garnered only 40.3 percent.⁵¹

MASS MEDIA UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP

As much as the media helped Yeltsin, it ultimately hurt itself, as McFaul writes, “Russia’s major media outlets never fully recovered their reputations as independent sources of information. Instead, they [were] viewed as mouthpieces of their owners.”⁵² During the election, the journalists had operated under the assumption that they would regain their independence once the threat of Communism was neutralized.⁵³ However, according to Belin, they did not take into account the oligarchs’ realization that the media, if used properly, could be a powerful weapon in influencing public opinion, not to mention publicizing any political viewpoint.⁵⁴

Soon after the election, corporations began to purchase many publications.⁵⁵ Although the journalists never expected or desired dependence on bankers, industrialists, and governments (they indeed did become subservient to them), there are reasons for such developments.⁵⁶ In the years after the election, the economy began to shrink, making it more difficult for businesses to run a media outlet.⁵⁷ Feeling the most pressure were the print sources, which were especially tough to

45 Simes, p. 172.

46 Simes, p. 173.

47 Ibid.

48 McFaul, p. 323.

49 Belin, p. 324.

50 Ibid.

51 Belin, p. 325.

52 McFaul, p. 324.

53 Belin, p. 325.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Belin, p. 326.

57 Belin, p. 325.

maintain, due to the abundant television and radio outlets.⁵⁸ However, so too did the electronic media feel pressure, mostly due to the medium's high operating costs and low advertising options.⁵⁹

GOVERNMENT INFLUENCED CENSORSHIP

Since the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the presidency, the media has seen a large degree of "self censorship." Belin writes of a developing pattern toward repression and censorship of the media on part of the Putin government. First, in May of 2000 tax police searched the headquarters of Media-Most – a powerful media outlet – headquarters.⁶⁰ The following month, Vladimir Gusinsky was arrested on charges of embezzling as a result of the acquisition of a St. Petersburg area television company.⁶¹ Belin writes that even if the charges were true, they appeared to be politically motivated – as if the government had a particular vendetta against Gusinsky.⁶²

Danks supports this theory by writing that Gusinsky opposed the Chechen wars, supported the opposing political party to Putin's in the December 1999 Duma elections, and had openly questioned Putin's commitment to democratic ideals.⁶³ Belin also supports this suggestion by writing that in June, following Gusinsky's arrest, a senior Media-Most executive was blocked by Russian border police from attending an international conference in Salzburg, even though he had never been arrested or charged with any crime.⁶⁴ Also, Belin alleges politics to be in play when explaining how the case was "abruptly closed" once Gusinsky signed an agreement to a controlling stake in Media-Most.⁶⁵

In addition to dubious and perhaps politically motivated charges on media executives who publicly oppose Putin, the Chechnya war has inspired a greater degree of censorship within the media. In January 2000, Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky, while in Chechnya, was seized and detained by the Federal Security Service, which denied having him in their possession for two weeks.⁶⁶ His ordeal included not being allowed access to family, colleagues, or legal assistance.⁶⁷ Babitsky was eventually given over to a pro-Moscow Chechen group, in exchange for Russian soldiers held prisoner by Chechen fighters; during this ordeal, Babitsky was once again unable to contact the outside world.⁶⁸ Once in this group's hands, he was given a false passport and taken into Dagestan, where he was arrested

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Belin, p. 335.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Danks, pp. 235-236.

64 Belin, p. 335.

65 Ibid.

66 Belin, pp. 336-337.

67 Belin, p. 337.

68 Ibid.

for using a false document.⁶⁹ Eventually, Babitsky was allowed to return to Moscow, but was then denied the ability to travel abroad or speak of his experiences.⁷⁰ Danks contributes by claiming this incident, along with a decision in January 2000 to strengthen an “information blockade against western journalists conducting ‘subversive work’ in Chechnya,” to be “ominously reminiscent of the CPSU’s approach to the media.”⁷¹

Other incidents implying that of a freedom of press under siege include reports that media groups were threatened following their broadcasting interviews with the Chechen president, as well as one involving *Moskovskiy komsomolets* staffer Alexander Khinshtein.⁷² The interior minister intended to commit Khinshtein to a mental health facility, based on the very minor and dubious crime of possessing a false driver’s license.⁷³ Only when international watchdog groups began to pay attention to this unusual story of overzealous investigations of the media were the charges dropped.⁷⁴

In “Evaluating Russia’s Democratization,” Archie Brown in a way concludes this topic by writing the following:

Self-censorship in the central mass-media [is] becoming more prevalent, especially on television, and there [are] strong pressures, not excluding physical assaults, on journalists prepared to write about corruption in the Kremlin. The attacks on Gusinsky ... are an assertion of central state power against rich and unpopular businessmen who have wielded independent influence over public policy and the mass media.⁷⁵

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Danks p. 235.

72 Belin, p. 337.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Archie Brown “Evaluating Russia’s Democratization,” in *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader*, edited by Archie Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 553.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On December 8, 2003, the Russian people went to the polls to vote in the parliamentary elections. There is no better way to reiterate and bring the three aspects of a democracy together than to discuss the immediate results of this election. Steven Lee Myers, writing for the *New York Times* has described the election in great detail. Prior to the election, in his article "Russian Parliament Elections Could Add to Putin's Power," Myers wrote that United Russia, the party that supports Putin and which Putin reciprocates his support to, benefited from more than just Putin's support.⁷⁶ United Russia also enjoyed "vast resources of state and regional authorities," such as abundant coverage from state television networks that were reported to nearly ignore the opposition parties.⁷⁷ In addition, Myers also writes that Interior Minister Boris V. Gryzlov had appeared on television on many occasions, almost as much as Putin himself.⁷⁸

Also, it is said that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which had sent a contingent to observe the election, issued a report that mentioned there being a "clear bias" in media coverage, as well as abuses of government materials for United Russia's benefit.⁷⁹ Myers writes that candidates from other parties had been taken off the ballots by regional authorities sympathetic to United Russia, had been harassed by police and other officials, and had their campaign materials taken down by municipal workers and rivals.⁸⁰

Perhaps as a result of the practices described by Myers, United Russia enjoyed large victories in the election. In "Russia's Voting for Parliament Bolsters Putin," Myers covers the victory. The party had won 36 percent of the vote, "more than double that of any party."⁸¹ The Communist Party leader Gennady Zhuganov did not have many kind words to say about the election, for he suggested voting irregularities and "the United Russia's widespread use of government resources to throw opponents off the ballot, while promoting its supporters" and stated "the shameful farce which is currently being shown to us has nothing to do with democracy."⁸²

Yabloko Party leader Grigory A. Yavlinsky joined Zhuganov in his denouncing of the election, which he too thought was heavily influenced by the government resources offered to the Unity Party.⁸³ "We are living in an authoritarian regime, Yavlinsky said."⁸⁴ Myers also writes that state television displayed "disproportionate coverage of Putin and United Russia, reporting little on opposition parties as the voting progressed."⁸⁵

76 Steven Lee Myers, "Russian Parliament Elections Could Add to Putin's Power," the *New York Times*, 7 December 2003. Accessed 13 December 2003 from the World Wide Web, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Steven Lee Myers, "Russia's Voting for Parliament Bolsters Putin," the *New York Times*, 8 December 2003. Accessed 13 December 2003 from the World Wide Web, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

In "Putin Calls Elections Fair Despite Observers Criticism," Myers describes OSCE's report on the results of the election. The report had much to say in regard to the use of media resources, said that the results "reflected the extensive use of the state apparatus and media favoritism to benefit the largest pro-presidential party" and expressed wariness and doubt at Russia's said commitment to "move towards European standards for democratic elections."⁸⁶ Bruce George, president of OSCE's parliamentary assembly called the vote a "regression in the democratization process."⁸⁷ In addition, Yavlinsky, saying that the country had had no such thing since the days of Brezhnev, suggested, "we now have, again, a one-party parliament."⁸⁸ Yavlinsky has said this because the party is expected to control at least half the seats immediately, with the possibility of more seats being filled by United Russia.⁸⁹

The Opinion/Editorial page of the *New York Times* produced, without much surprise, an opinion that favored the results of the election and one that did not. In "Russians Inch Toward Democracy," several concessions are made. First, it is written that there are 23 parties and "lots of furious campaigning."⁹⁰ Second, it is admitted that the Kremlin truly does control the national television, but that there are newspapers and websites to provide "lively commentary and criticism."⁹¹ In what appears to be another concession that the election was less than fair, the *Times* writes that such results are a product of "what the Russians now call 'managed democracy.'⁹² The ballot box is said to still remain paramount and present in elections and it is admitted that "it may take years for the Russians – voters, politicians, parties, and oligarchs alike – to get a handle on the process, and to learn to treat it with more respect."⁹³

Columnist William Safire's "The Russian Reversion" offers no concessions and is quite blunt in its criticism of the election. First, rather than calling it an independent party, Safire cites Putin's party as a "collection of government officials."⁹⁴ Second, he claims there are two reasons for the electoral victory that he would rather call the "powerhouse over the opposition that builds genuine democracy," "money and media."⁹⁵ In essence, Safire suggests that the oligarchs, fearing the same fate as Gusinsky, supported the efforts of United Russia, while the media, perhaps with little self-determination of their own, provided all the resources it could to the government.⁹⁶ Essentially saying that Russia is not a democracy, Safire goes on to

86 Steven Lee Myers, "Putin Calls Elections Fair Despite Observers Criticism," the *New York Times*, 8 December 2003. Accessed 13 December 2003 from the World Wide Web, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Opinion page, "Russians Inch Toward Democracy," the *New York Times*, 8 December 2003. Accessed 13 December 2003 from the World Wide Web, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 William Safire, "The Russian Reversion," the *New York Times*, 10 December 2003. Accessed 13 December 2003 from the World Wide Web, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

write, "once again we see that there can be no democracy without a rambunctious and unfettered press. Putin has made certain that media freedom no longer exists in Russia."⁹⁷

Based on the *Washington Post* article "Bush Changing View on Putin: Administration that Hailed Leader Alters Course," by Peter Slevin and Peter Baker, it appears that there is indeed more to be desired in Russia's democracy. Slevin and Parker report that the Bush administration, citing the widely criticized results of the parliamentary elections, had begun to "question Putin's intentions."⁹⁸ The article cites McFaul, who is recognized as a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. McFaul suggests that a debate over Putin and earlier assumptions of his presidency is emerging in Washington.⁹⁹ The fact that such a debate is stirring, after President Bush had said he had gained "a sense of [Putin's] soul" in July 2001 and "I admire President Putin" just in September 2003 may truly suggest that Russia's track toward democracy needs to be reassessed.¹⁰⁰ In addition, Slevin and Peters cite an anonymous U.S. diplomat who had said, "we're certainly seeing some more worrisome signs about the direction that Putin is taking the country in terms of civil society."¹⁰¹ By acknowledging the international uproar over the election – which includes the media, political parties, and citizen participation – and discussing their concerns over civil society, the Bush administration has essentially confirmed that the three premises of democracy are yet to be fully developed in order for Russia's democracy to succeed.

CONCLUSION

In assessing Russia's efforts toward democratization, there is much work to be done. Perhaps due predominantly to recent developments in Russia, all three characteristics of a successful democracy have yet to be realized. Not only is a civil society not yet cultivated and adapted to a new political system, but also the political system itself may be seen as a great manipulator of the civil society. Together, government and media bombarded the civil society with their own messages, making it difficult for the society make a decision on its own. Furthermore, based on the results of the recent election, it appears that political parties too are weakened, as the government governed by mostly one dominant party; pluralism is indeed left to be desired. As a result, it can be expected that voter satisfaction in this political system will once again be limited; they may feel "duped," just as many feel they were following the 1996 presidential election. Finally, since the media is seen to have been a major partner in the electoral logistics, and based on the mentioned incidents involving the Chechnya war, a free, open, and impartial media is unattained. Therefore, it may be said that Russia still has much to do in order to claim they are a successful democracy

97 Ibid.

98 Peter Slevin and Peter Baker, "Bush Changing View on Putin: Administration that Hailed Leader Alters Course," the *Washington Post*, 14 December 2003. Accessed 14 December 2003 from the World Wide Web., <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

THE U.S. ETHANOL INDUSTRY: CAN IT LOWER DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL AND BOOST NATIONAL SECURITY?

By: Candice Stokes*

INTRODUCTION

During World War II, the United States was a leading exporter of petroleum, supplying the Allied Forces with the necessary fuel for naval fleets to win the war. However, as the congressional representative in the neighborhood became the congressional representative you don't know, and as intricate highway structures and bright shiny affordable automobiles became common in every family, people began to move away from the cities where they worked into what are now called suburbs. Thus, the United States became a nation of commuters with a mass transit system that is mediocre in comparison to the undergrounds of the United Kingdom and France.

During the first oil crisis of 1973, American consumers vowed to make lifestyle changes. However, this sentiment ended when the oil crisis ended. Following the 1973 crisis, U.S. oil consumption grew rather than declined, with imports increasing from 1/3 of oil consumption to more than 1/2 today.

Today, the United States consumes 25% of total world petroleum output. Two-thirds of the petroleum the United States consumes goes into the transportation sector, which is currently dependent on petroleum fuel and only 5% dependent on alternative fuels like ethanol. The United States imports more than half of its petroleum—only 4% of the world's total reserves—and 25% of the 50% it imports, comes from the Arab world.¹

Much of the support for alternative fuels can be attributed to environmental, political, and national security interests. Much of the opposition that stagnates the growth of alternative fuels in the United States can be attributed to environmental, political, and market factors. The problems seem obvious: environmentalists have a problem with everything—there is no such thing as a 100% non-polluting energy source; politicians flip flop—they are responsive to public opinion and it is impossible to secure a state based on public opinion, as the average citizen is oblivious to the actual political context in which they live but simply react to things that to them seem to adversely affect their right to the “pursuit of happiness;” and finally the market is only concerned with numbers, not with quality of life, national security, or the environment. With all of these forces colliding, it becomes extremely difficult to promote a relatively young industry that may satisfy some but not all of these criteria.

The Ethanol industry is one such industry that could possibly satisfy some but not

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1 Boyden Gray, John D. Podesta, and Timothy E. Wirth, “The Future of Energy Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* (Gale Group Inc. and Council on Foreign Relations Inc., 2003)

all of these criteria. In this paper, the political characteristics, environmental effects, alternative oxygenates, market factors, political variables, and national security implications of the ethanol industry in the transportation sector will be traversed in order to assess the real advantage of pursuing an energy policy that seeks to promote ethanol as the primary source of energy in the United States.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The demand for ethanol as a gasoline additive is based on the physical characteristics of ethanol. Ethanol is grain alcohol “made up of a group of chemical compounds whose molecules contain a hydroxyl group, -OH, bonded to a carbon atom.”² From its chemical property breakdown (CH₃CH₂OH) we see the presence of oxygen molecules. Thus we understand that ethanol can be used as an oxygenate. Oxygenates are often added to fuels, particularly gasoline, because the blend burns cleaner emissions and improves octane values. The common blend ratio for ethanol in gasoline is E10, i.e. a 10% ethanol 90% gasoline blend.

The presence of oxygen in ethanol spawns an increasing demand for the product. In the United States, areas that do not meet Federal air quality standards are required to use oxygenated fuels. “The U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 requires that gasoline marketed in regions with high concentrations of atmospheric ozone and carbon monoxide is reformulated with an oxygenate to improve fuel combustion and to reduce the emission of volatile organic compounds, toxic elements, and other materials that degrade air quality.”³ The provisions of the act are enforced by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, which “requires that only oxygenated gasoline may be sold in regions that are not in compliance with national air standards.”⁴ Many states and towns in the U.S. are affected by the mandate, particularly big cities in New York and California. The mandate fuels the demand for fuel oxygenates like ethanol, thus stimulating the market.

Presently no fuel is 100% ethanol. As stated, the common blend is E10, but there are also E85 (85% ethanol, 15% gasoline) and E95 (95% ethanol, 5% gasoline) blends available as automotive fuels. Automotive vehicles that can operate with E85 or E95 fuels are called Flexible Fuel Vehicles (FFV's) and more than 3 million—a relatively small number—of such vehicles have been sold in the United States to date.⁵ Increasing production of FFV's could potentially substantially decrease petroleum dependency.

Ethanol is a less-potent alcohol that when blended with gasoline improves octane values. “Each volume percentage of an oxygenate added to a typical unleaded

2 “What is ethanol?” [Alternative Fuels Data Center](http://www.afdc.doe.gov/altfuel/eth_general.html). Retrieved from the Internet, http://www.afdc.doe.gov/altfuel/eth_general.html.

3 Ellen Burnes, Dennis Wichelns, and John W. Hagen, “Economic and Policy Implications of Public Support for Ethanol Production in California’s San Joaquin Valley,” *Energy Policy*, Jan. 14, 2004.

4 Ibid.

5 “Ethanol,” [Automotive Fuels Data Center](http://www.afdc.doe.gov/altfuel/ethanol.html). Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.afdc.doe.gov/altfuel/ethanol.html>.

6 M. Guatam and D.W. Martin II, “Combustion Characteristics of higher-alcohol gasoline blends,” *Power and Energy*, 10/02/2000, Vol. 214, Is 5, p. 497.

gasoline... increases the blend octane rating in the range from 0.1 to 0.3.”⁶ For clarification, octane refers to a “low quality of fuel combustion”⁷ and “octane rating of a fuel is a measure of its ability to resist detonation [the undesirable effects of], ping, pre-ignition, or knock.”⁸

Ethanol can be produced from sugar bearing materials, celluloses, or starches. Depending on the source used to produce fuel-ethanol—i.e. cane, or corn—ethanol can be a cost effective oxygenate, source of octane, or source of fuel. However, there is potential that it can be more expensive to produce than it is worth. The economics of production will be explored later.

HISTORY

In the early 1900’s, automotive engineers found that the iodine-gasoline blend positively affected combustion by improving octane values and eliminating knock, but it was “corrosive and prohibitively expensive.”⁹ In 1917, Charles Kettering and Thomas Midgely discovered that a grain alcohol-gasoline blend could be a viable fuel and as stated earlier, ethanol also improved octane values and eliminated knock. Other advantages of ethanol were improved air quality from cleaner emissions and greater horsepower. However, by 1925 the young ethanol industry—at that time introduced as Synthol, had died, with the phenomenon never having been much more than an idea in a lab (except for limited use during WWI), due to competition from the up and coming Tetraethyl Lead industry which also prevented knock (TEL).¹⁰

In retrospect, the preference of TEL over ethanol was a big business blunder that has benefited neither the interest of the American consumers nor national security. “Oil companies preferred TEL to ethanol because addition of ethanol to gasoline would have reduced vehicle’s use of gasoline by 20-30%, thus making cars less dependent on petroleum products. TEL did not have a significant effect on gasoline consumption of vehicles.”¹¹ At the time of this decision, the United States was still a major producer and exporter of oil – today the United States is a major consumer of oil. At the time of this decision, the Seven Sisters, half of which were American companies, still manipulated the oil market. Today, the Seven Sisters are puppets of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which manipulates the oil market and exploits the vulnerabilities of energy dependant states like the United States. In 1925, a time of little government interference in oil concerns, the goal of the Seven Sisters controlled oil industry was oil dependency at home and abroad. Today, with the United States Government heavily involved in the affairs of the energy market and with a dependable flow of oil to the United States being vital to national security, the tables have turned. Today the goal is to move away from

7 Farhad Nadim, Peter Zack, George E. Hoag, and Shili Liu, “United States Experience with Fuel Additives,” *Energy Policy*, January 2001, Vol 29, Is 1.

8 Paul Huizenga, “What is Octane?” Tech-Weisel.com: *Enlightenment for the Car Enthusiast Since the Turn of the Century*. Retrieved from the Internet, <http://www.techweisel.com/articles/octane.htm>.

9 Nadim, Zack, Hoag, and Liu.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

energy dependence, and the United States is far behind.

The downsides of the TEL industry were almost immediately evident. In 1923 alone, several studies conducted by the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) and “medical authorities at leading universities, including Reid Hunt of Harvard, Yandall Henderson of Yale and Erik Krause of the institute of technology, Potsdam, Germany,” warned of the adverse effects of lead, particularly the harms that could be caused from lead in gasoline.¹² The USPHS concluded, “each liter of gasoline burned would emit 1g of lead oxide that would build up to dangerous levels along heavily traveled roads.”¹³ However, further research of the matter was left up to the TEL industry due to the USPHS’s concerns of research costs. Not surprisingly, the warnings went largely ignored by the industry. There was no incentive for the TEL industry to conduct research that, based on previous studies, would likely harm the industry’s market rather than promote it. Therefore, the harmful effects of lead went largely unknown and were not researched until the near end of the century.

The TEL industry had peaked in the 1970’s, manifesting the widespread and obvious effects of lead poisoning, prompting President Nixon to begin the process of phasing out the use of leaded gasoline in the United States. The harmful effects of lead became widely researched and publicized in the 1980’s and by 1990 the TEL industry had nearly vanished in the United States. In 1996, “the use of leaded gasoline for highway vehicles was banned in the United States.”

During Nixon’s phase-out, the automotive industry was faced with the task of finding a new fuel additive to replace TEL. In 1979, Methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) –an oxygenate–became widely used as a TEL replacement. In 1990, the government mandated a Reformulated Gas Program in which gasoline must be 2.0% oxygenated in order to support clean air legislation and improve octane values. “This requirement could be met by the addition of either 11% MTBE or 5.7% Ethanol by volume,”¹⁵ – at the time the additive of choice by most oil companies was widely MTBE.¹⁶

The rationale in preferring MTBE to ethanol, despite the fact that two times more MTBE is needed to serve the same purpose as half that amount of ethanol, was “gasoline blended with ethanol has a higher RVP [Reid Vapor Pressure] than MTBE-blended gasoline.”¹⁷ In order to comply with the standards of the RFG program of reducing air toxins, lower RVP is necessary. “Additional costly steps are needed to reduce the RVP of the base gasoline to which ethanol is added.”¹⁸

Presently, due to research showing the adverse effects of MTBE, those costly steps are being taken, and legislation is being passed to phase-out MTBE usage and to promote the Ethanol industry. This trend will continue, of course, until the adverse effects of ethanol are deemed too noxious.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

Several states throughout the union have enacted legislation and/or begun the process of phasing out the use of MTBE as a gasoline additive due to adverse effects on the environment, particularly the contamination of ground water. A 2002 study of 7,200 wells in Los Angeles found MTBE, present in 82.7% of water tested, to be the leading oxygenate to cause ground-water contamination.¹⁹ Banning MTBE would substantially revitalize the ethanol market and thus has sparked controversy over the advantages and harms of both these oxygenates.

New York, California, and Connecticut banned the use of MTBE as a gasoline additive in 2004 and more than sixteen other states are in the phase-out process.²⁰ Arguments in favor of MTBE are largely economical because even the Oxygenated Fuels Association (OFA) cannot argue against the facts—MTBE has been proven harmful to the environment via contamination of ground water. In many areas, especially areas with Karst terrain, ground water is the primary source of drinking water.

The ethanol industry has largely promoted the product on the platform of environmental friendliness. Advocates argue that ethanol provides cleaner fuel for a brighter future. However, the OFA (the U.S. trade association for the MTBE industry) and other Petro-Chemical organizations – clearly biased in favor of MTBE – seek to exploit the environmental hazards of ethanol, its leading competitor. “OFA contends that replacing MTBE with ethanol would harm air quality, worsen purported global warming, and lead to higher gasoline prices.”²¹

Similarly, the less biased Environmental Protection Agency—at least when it comes to choosing one additive over another—concur with the OFA. The EPA boasts of how environmental advances made in the years post the transition from TEL to MTBE. “Air quality continues to improve as it has done for decades,” in spite of the fact that “U.S. energy consumption increased 42%, and vehicle miles traveled increased 155%.”²² Ozone pollution has continued to diminish, [and] only one area of the country fails to meet the NO₂ standard—Columbia Falls, Montana [NO is oxides of nitrogen that harm the ozone and the standard for reducing the toxin was mandated under the Clean Air Acts]²³ while “emissions of volatile organic compounds [like NO] fell by 40%.”²⁴

Because the ethanol-gasoline blend “increases NO emissions... [and] boosts evaporative emissions of volatile hydrocarbons”²⁵ the case for cleaner air is clearly in favor of MTBE. In fact, the Oil and Gas Journal calls the energy bill that would mandate the doubling of ethanol volume in RFG a “NO[x]-filled bomb.” Similarly, the statistics show that since California began the transition process from MTBE to

19 “Alternative Oxygenates May Pose Risks to Groundwater,” *Global Refining & Fuels Report*, January 21, 2004.

20 “Ban on MTBE Gasoline Causes Price Spike,” *CS Online News*, February 4, 2004. Retrieved from Lexis Nexis.

21 Jeannie M. Stell, “Ethanol 101,” *Oil & Gas Journal*, January 12, 2004.

22 Ozone and Ethanol,” *Oil and Gas Journal*, October 27, 2003.

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Ibid.*

26 *Ibid.*

ethanol, violations of the federal ozone standard have doubled.²⁶

A case study conducted in 1995 also showed ethanol to be the greater of two evils. In areas that did not meet air quality standards in the Midwest, gasoline was oxygenated with ethanol. In areas that did not meet air quality standards in all other regions of the country, gasoline was oxygenated with MTBE. Although ozone depletion increased in all areas, depletion increased more in the ethanol test areas.

Environmental arguments against ethanol extend beyond motor vehicle to plant emissions. Ethanol detractors hold that ethanol production plant emissions also add to this environmental damage, emitting more carcinogens than legally allowed. However, in ethanol's favor, current ozone depletion is decreasing in areas where ethanol-gas blends are used. The ethanol opposition however attributes this success to other measures taken to reduce air pollution.²⁷ It would be fallacious to assume increased air quality is a result of ethanol. This assumption does not take into account factors not related to the industry. The facts show that ethanol has a high RVP, and increases NO emissions. Thus, it would be an equal disservice to advocate that ethanol is environmentally friendly.

ALTERNATIVE OXYGENATES

Taking into account the aforementioned arguments against the use of ethanol, the question, "what other options are available?" comes to mind. The most obvious answer is MTBE, but as shown earlier, MTBE causes ground-water contamination. Because most of the earth's water is high in salt content and not suitable for human consumption, where as most ground water is fresh, it would not be wise to promote an industry that decreases the amount of drinking water Americans have available.

Tertiary Amyl Methyl Ether (TAME), shares less than 8% of the gasoline additive market with three other industries. TAME has so little of the market for good reason—little research has been done on the effects of TAME to sufficiently market it as safe and environmentally friendly. Also, TAME, like MTBE, has been shown to contaminate groundwater. In the 2002 Los Angeles study of 7,200 monitoring wells, TAME was found to be responsible for 18.3% of groundwater contamination.²⁸ And even worse, TAME when tested on lab rodents, adversely affected reproduction in males. The toxic affects on reproduction were related not to consumption but rather to vapor.²⁹ This means that regardless of ground water contamination, emissions from TAME would contaminate the air and could possibly affect the reproductive systems of male humans.

Tertiary Butyl Alcohol (TBA) also causes groundwater contamination. In the 2002 Los Angeles study, TBA was found in 61.1% of ground water tested. Additionally,

27 "Ethanol Use in Gasoline Should be Banned, Not Expanded," *Oil & Gas Journal*, September 9, 2002.

28 "Alternative Oxygenates May Pose Risks to Groundwater."

29 "Toxicology: Inhaled Tertiary Amyl Methyl Ether Vapor Affects Reproduction in Male Rodents," *Drug Week*, January 16, 2004.

30 Joe McGee, "Town Wants to Be Added to Pollution Suit; Class-action Case Targets Manufacturers of Gasoline Additives," *The Patriot Ledger*, November 6, 2003.

studies show that TBA “is five times more toxic” than MTBE.³⁰ If, despite these dangers, the industry decided to attempt to expand the TBA market, “the substance is not in sufficient supply to meet potential demand.”³¹

Di-Isopropyl Ether (DIPE) is the next oxygenate on the long list of ground water contaminants. In the 2002 Los Angeles study, DIPE was found to be present in 23.7% of ground water tested.

Ethyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (ETBE) is comprised of ethanol and isobutylene. ETBE boasts the same advantages of ethanol without the high RVP because ETBE is only 42% ethanol. However, ETBE is also on the list of ground water contaminants. In the 2002 Los Angeles study, ETBE was present in 8.9% of groundwater tested.

Together TAME, TBA, DIPE, and ETBE make up only 8% of the oxygenate market. Because of their adverse environmental effects, none show any evidence of cornering a larger sector of the market in the near future.

MARKET FACTORS

The market factors of ethanol are clearly linked to its physical characteristics. As stated earlier, ethanol can be produced from sugar bearing materials, starches, or celluloses. United States Ethanol production is based on starches – i.e. the Great American Corn Belt. Currently, the United States is a major corn exporter, exporting 20% of all corn produced. Expected growth in the ethanol industry – as a result of legislation, the phasing out of MTBE, and the constructing of new ethanol facilities – would decrease corn exports by 15% as a result of an expected short-term increase of U.S. corn demand by 15%, leaving only 5% of U.S. corn to be sold in the international market. In the status quo, “ethanol capacity would have to increase dramatically to meet blending requirements if federal legislation mandating a 2% gasoline oxygen content is not lifted, as MTBE is banned at the state level.”³² In the long term, as more FFV’s are sold to make the E85 and E95 blends more common, the United States’ role of primary corn exporter would surely be reversed to that of a major corn importer. Economists predict that a “decrease in corn exports [will also lead to] ... higher corn prices, which could, in turn, undermine the economics of ethanol as a motor fuel.”³³

The ethanol industry, however, would stimulate the agricultural industry in the United States, providing incentives to farmers and tempering the 20th century trend of abandoning farming as a way of life for business and industry. Secondly, ethanol could potentially decrease U.S. petroleum dependency if the sufficient lifestyle changes are made – i.e. a move toward fuel-efficient vehicles, and mass transit. However, the pluses of the industry bring obvious minuses. Although the desire to go back to the farm will be revitalized, corn prices are likely to increase as a result of growth in the ethanol industry, and thus consumers would foot the bill for the industry. Thirdly, although potentially decreasing United States petroleum dependency on foreign states, corn or other ethanol producing resource dependency

31 “Moving to Ethanol Use Instead of MTBE to Have Major Impacts,” *Oil & Gas Journal*, August 20, 2001

32 *Ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*

on foreign states would increase.

Another market factor of the ethanol industry in the United States is cost effectiveness. As already discussed, because of the RVP inefficiency of ethanol, MTBE is cheaper to produce than ethanol. However, more importantly, the use of corn for ethanol production is inefficient. Ethanol is most efficiently and most cost effectively produced from sugar cane – a product the United States does not possess nor control in large quantities. Large amounts of sugar cane are found in South America and Africa, with Brazil the largest producer of ethanol. Sugar-ethanol can be refined into a pure ethanol fuel whereas corn-ethanol must be blended with another fuel. For this reason, ethanol in the United States is manufactured in E10, E85, and E95 blends.

The advantage of sugar for ethanol production over corn is that the “carbohydrate content [of sugar – bearing materials] is already in the fermentable, simple sugar form and they also produce their own source of fuel for processing in the form of bagasse (the sawdust-like byproduct of milled sugar cane). Starches contain carbohydrates of greater molecular complexity, which have to be broken down to simpler sugars by a saccharification process, which adds another process step and increases the capital and operating costs.”³⁴

Sugar for ethanol production is derived from cane. If the sugar from the cane is used for consumption rather than ethanol production, and ethanol is produced from the molasses derived from the cane, the production of ethanol will be less efficient than if the sugar is used to produce ethanol. However, ethanol produced from molasses is still more efficient than ethanol produced from corn.³⁵

Sugar and molasses are abundant in many developing states and virtually non-existent in the United States and Western Europe. Unfortunately many areas of the world with potential ethanol fuel production from sugar materials still use leaded gasoline – long ago proven unsafe and phased out in the developed world. However, the transformation to an ethanol industry, though cost effective in the long-term would be too costly in the short-term. Most states in the developing world lack the capital to fix infrastructure and build and/or upgrade refineries. However, in the interest of the Western World, this stagnation of the developing world hurt the West’s hegemonic economic power because “sugar-derived ethanol is one of a number of technologies that could provide some developing countries with the opportunity to ‘leap frog’ past the experience of the northern industrialized countries.”³⁶ Growth of the ethanol industry in the developing world coupled with increasing United States dependence on ethanol producing products would lead to the emergence of an exploitative OPEC-like organization (Organization of Ethanol Exporting Countries perhaps?). A shift in dependency would not solve the energy problems of the United States; it would simply redistribute the problems.

Aside from potential foreign market competition and dependence, the immediate

34 Valerie Thomas and Andrew Kwong, “Ethanol As a Lead Replacement: Phasing Out Leaded Gasoline in Africa,” *Energy Policy*, November 2001, Vol. 29, Is 13.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

problem is the fact that it costs more to produce corn-ethanol fuel than it sells for on the market. "The BCR [benefit-cost ratio] of ethanol is approximately zero."³⁷ Because of this, the market is heavily subsidized. Ethanol "receives a 53 cents/ gal exemption from the Federal gasoline tax [and therefore E10 at the pump]...is taxed at the rate of 13.1 cents/gal."³⁸ Over the years, government tax breaks, subsidies, and support for initiatives into the ethanol industry have cost the government more than \$6 billion.³⁹ Opponents of the subsidy argue that the necessity of the subsidy proves the industry is obviously not competitive to the regular gasoline market or MTBE. Furthermore, opponents say the figures show that "even after 20 years of massive support, the ethanol industry would collapse without the federal subsidy, thus it has yet to produce social benefits."⁴⁰ Opponents also claim that continuous gasoline tax increases are caused by the ethanol subsidy and while large portions of gasoline taxes go toward maintaining highway infrastructure, the less subsidized ethanol taxes go into private pockets.

However, the arguments of the opposition, though valid, are much exaggerated. Fluctuations in the petroleum market, such as the 4%, decrease of oil production by OPEC, the war in Iraq, and the government's apprehension of an oil shortage, are more likely the causes of higher gasoline taxes than the ethanol subsidy. Secondly, because ethanol is more expensive to produce from corn than it is worth on the market, the subsidized taxes must go into private pockets in order to feed the industry the capital that it needs to create technology that will make production more cost-effective. Therefore, the trade-off between subsidies and highway infrastructure is not as direct as opponents claim. Finally, oil and gas companies receive incentives much like subsidies that make the comparison misleading and unfair. "Oil and gas companies [have] access to low-cost reserves on public lands, the Strategic Petroleum Reserves, anti-trust exemptions, price protection, and research subsidies."⁴¹

Proponents of ethanol subsidies argue that the industry will revitalize American agriculture, decrease unemployment, and decrease petroleum dependency. Although it will not actually increase the capital within the states, it will improve the quality of life throughout the nation. Figures show that expected growth in the ethanol industry "would benefit producers, but would cost an estimated \$2-3 billion in subsidies... in a 2-3 year time frame."⁴² Though "the cost to add the new ethanol capacity to replace MTBE is estimated at nearly \$1.9 billion... [it will] generate more than 47,800 new jobs throughout the entire economy."⁴³ Furthermore advocates argue, "Public subsidies can be justified, economically, when an activity

37 Richard Duke and Daniel M. Kammen, "The Economics of the Energy Market Transformation Programs," *Energy Journal*, 1999, Vol. 20, Is 4, p15-64 Econ Lit search,

38 Bob Tippee, "Congress Should Kill Ethanol Subsidy, Not Hike Fuel Tax," *Oil & Gas Journal*, June 2, 2003.

39 Duke and Kammen

40 Ibid.

41 Raymond G. Friend, "Politics and Ethanol," *Oil & Gas Journal*, November 13, 1995.

42 "Moving to Ethanol Use Instead of MTBE to Have Major Impacts."

43 John M. Urbanchuk, *Ability of the U.S. Ethanol Industry to replace MTBE*, prepared for the Governor's Ethanol Coalition, March 20, 2000.

generates public benefits that are not considered by producers and consumers in normal, market transactions [such as] ... public values [of] maintaining agriculture and reducing unemployment rates in rural areas."⁴⁴ As a result of growth in the ethanol industry and increasing demand for corn, farmers would have incentive to harvest more corn to meet the supply needs of the United States. Although consumers would foot the bill for increased demand, limited supply, and foreign import dependency, more consumers would be in an economic position due to higher employment rates to foot the bill. Thus, although draining some of the wealth of the economy, the subsidized ethanol industry would more fairly distribute the wealth.

In addition to impacts on society, trade, production, consumption, and agricultural, the ethanol industry will have severe effects on the petro-chemical industries that it will largely replace. During the phase-out period of MTBE, the chemical industry began investing capital into transforming equipment used to produce MTBE, into equipment that could serve other purposes. With respect to the continuous shift to ethanol rather than MTBE, the petro-chemical industry has lost most of its market – all it has left is a narrow methanol market.⁴⁵

Furthermore, after many failed attempts to persuade states that have banned MTBE to reverse their decisions, the OFA has closed down and the MTBE industry is beginning to accept its fate as a failed industry. The OFA and petro-chemical industries warned New York that “allowing the ban to go forward could mean gasoline price spikes because the state will be forced to rely on fuel ethanol to meet the 2% oxygenate mandate under the federal clean fuel rules.”⁴⁶ However, consumers should expect to see quite the contrary. Perhaps in the short-term during the transition period consumers will see gas prices increase as a result of ethanol fuel shift, but in the long term with 69 ethanol production plants and growing, and so long as subsidies persist, consumers should see lower prices at the pump when buying E10.

Finally, the last, and potentially the most harmful market factor of the ethanol industry is its monopolistic character. “Through production and capacity agreements, four companies control 95% of America’s ethanol supply.”⁴⁷ If the United States is truly going to wean itself away from foreign petroleum and shift to an ethanol energy market, it would be in the best interest of consumers for the industry to be either severely restricted under government mandate or for there to be a plethora of companies significantly influencing the market. In the absence of competition, big businesses could potentially skyrocket prices and manipulate energy crisis much like OPEC does today.

44 Burnes, Wichelns, and Hagen.

45 “Moving to Ethanol Use Instead of MTBE to Have Major Impacts.”

46 “U.S. District Court rejects producer request to strike down MTBE ban,” *Oil & Gas Journal*, December 8, 2003.

47 “Ethanol Use in U.S. Gasoline Should Be Banned, Not Expanded.”

POLITICS

Ethanol technology has been in existence for nearly a century, yet ethanol accounts for only 1% of the fuel market. Throughout the 20th Century, the U.S. has focused on securing a supply of oil from foreign markets to meet domestic demand rather than promoting alternative fuels and/or lifestyle alternatives to decrease petroleum dependence. A key problem that interferes with alternative fuels initiatives is the electoral process. U.S. presidents and congressional representatives are elected for restricted, relatively short terms, and therefore tend to focus on the short-term rather than the long term. In the short-term, a president who keeps the economy afloat and keeps gasoline prices down wins re-election. A president who looks to the future and asks the American people to conserve fuel is voted out of office. The fact remains that the ethanol industry could potentially create foreign import dependency similar to that of today's petroleum import dependency and cause just as much pollution as the petroleum industry. Conservation is key, but no politician wants to be the one to propose fuel conservation. They would rather vow that they will be the one to change the structure of U.S. energy concerns and lead the way to domestic energy production. Thus in the end, incentives to change are negligible and the problem remains unsolved.

Journalists who have studied the way in which presidential and senatorial candidates address ethanol concerns near election year believe "opposing ethanol... can doom a presidential bid almost before it starts."⁴⁸ In times of energy insecurity, candidates with differing ideologies, Republican, Democrat, and Independent, all seem to agree on one thing – ethanol: decreasing oil dependency and stimulating U.S. agriculture. Before North Carolina Senator John Edwards was knocked out of the presidential race in early 2004, he "unveil[ed] his plan for 'revitalizing rural America... and declare[d] his support for 'clean, homegrown energy... instead of buying oil from the Middle East,'"⁴⁹ at the same plant that President Bush made virtually the same vow when he was campaigning in 2000. Despite the support of the government, the ethanol industry remains an under-developed, over-subsidized, high polluting, waste of money.

Since the adverse effects of MTBE began to come to light and after the events of September 11th, politicians have all been riding the proverbial "energy independence train." However, no matter how the politicians spin the facts, the fact remains that the U.S. ethanol industry at most can only decrease oil dependence. It would not provide the resources to be energy independent—corn ethanol must be blended with another fuel and with an increase in ethanol demand from the ban of MTBE, the Clean Air Acts, and the move to FFV's, the U.S. will surely become an importer of ethanol and thus will never achieve energy independence from the industry alone. In order for the U.S. to actualize energy independence, the American people should make drastic life-style changes as the U.S. shifts to an ethanol market. However, politicians learned from Jimmy Carter that if they campaign on a

48 H. Josef Herbert, "Opposing Ethanol May Doom Election Bids," *Associated Press*, June 3, 2003.

49 Ibid.

“carpool” platform, they would surely lose.

As of 2004, an energy bill has stagnated in Congress, where it could not accumulate the votes needed to become legislation. The bill’s stagnation was due largely in part to the fact that it was overflowing with highly controversial subsidies and tax breaks—including a tax break for ethanol—and no environmental fuel efficiency standards. Citing many of the same environmental harms of ethanol that are explored in this paper, opponents of the bill believe that rather than being overly optimistic about the ethanol industry and forcing a shift to an ethanol market, the government should assess the harms of ethanol and force the industry to meet higher standards.⁵⁰

Finally, the greatest potential political influence on the ethanol industry stems from the dichotomy that exists in the government. The United States government has been heavily involved in oil matters for the greater half of a decade, and thus can be expected to be heavily involved in the regulation of the next phase in energy politics—ethanol. The ethanol subsidies and tax breaks are to be expected of the government, just as the government allowed oil companies to claim money given to Arab exporting countries as tax write-offs in order to keep the peace as the U.S. militarily supported Israel, the ethanol industry as it grows will too have a friend in Washington—no matter how much money is wasted with little economic return.

NATIONAL SECURITY

In order to thoroughly assess the impact the ethanol industry would have on United States national security, we must first assess the state of U.S. energy usage and dependence on foreign energy. As stated earlier, the focus has been on decreasing U.S. energy dependence in the transportation sector, because two thirds of oil consumed in the U.S. goes into the transportation sector and the transportation sector is currently 95% dependant on petroleum. As East Asia’s population and petroleum dependence continue to grow, and as the expected petroleum dependency approaches that of the United States, increased demand for this commodity presents itself to be a future problem.

The pattern of the United States has been to look abroad for more oil as reserves at home are depleting and demand is increasing. “[W]hen oil was in short supply, major companies supported by the U.S. government looked outward to Latin America and the Middle East rather than seeking domestic alternatives. These initiatives reduced any sense of urgency to explore synthetic fuels; as long as foreign oil could be obtained at reasonable prices, the difficult task of developing synthetic fuels could be averted.”⁵¹ Today, with gasoline prices rising to \$2.00 or more a gallon, the price of foreign oil is no longer reasonable.

The United States is a super power because it is the only state that meets the three criteria – excellent economy, excellent military, and political stability. The United States has one of the smallest armed forces – i.e. man power – of the great military

50 “Optimism Absent From the Energy Bill,” *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, March 28, 2004.

51 William Beaver, “The U.S. Failure to Develop Synthetic Fuels in the 1920s,” *Historian*, Winter 91, Vol. 53 Is 2, p. 241.

states. What gives the United States Military an edge over other militaries is technological capabilities – i.e. weaponry. In wartime, however, weapons need to be transported, and therefore without foreign oil, jets, naval fleets, and practically all U.S. military capabilities will be paralyzed. As early as 1920 the government “feared the time might come when U.S. security would be threatened because the navy did not have enough fuel oil to power its ships.”⁵² That time has come. The United States is currently waging costly military campaigns while OPEC continues to decrease production.

So long as the U.S. ethanol industry relies on corn it will not be able to accommodate for the loss of Middle Eastern reserves. So long as production costs for ethanol exceed expected revenue, the industry will continue to be a fragile industry.

Proponents of the ethanol industry argue that ethanol increases U.S. national security because ethanol at the very least replaces MTBE in gasoline, and most U.S. MTBE is imported from abroad – 70% from Saudi Arabia. In order to replace the MTBE market the U.S. would have to produce 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year,⁵³ a number the U.S. currently meets and upon completion of several production plants under-way plans to surpass. Though replacing MTBE with ethanol may decrease U.S. dependence on the Middle East, relieving a 2 million gallon per year MTBE import, it by no means comes close to tempering a \$20 million+ barrel per day oil dependence. \$11.07 million in oil is imported per day, \$5 million of which comes from the Middle East.⁵⁴

Secondly, the figures show that East Asia – particularly Japan and China – which already imports 69% of its oil needs, will be importing 79% of its oil needs by 2010. This will be more than 15 million barrels per day, making the region the number one importer of oil. By 2010 the U.S. is also expected to be importing less than East Asia’s 79%. East Asia is expected to be dependant on the Middle East for nearly all of its imported oil and the U.S. is expected to depend on the Middle East for at least 2/3 of its imports. The resulting increase in demand for oil is expected to lead to sharp price increases, and insecurity in the United States.⁵⁵ As the population of East Asia grows, so will its military man-power, and increased energy consumption will spawn research into arms capabilities that could allow the region to acquire a larger and more powerful military than the United States. However, these figures are speculative and it remains to be seen how the energy needs of both regions are met. The greater warrant here is that not only will continued foreign dependency cause insecurity because of an unpredictable flow of oil, but it could jeopardize the United State’s position as a super power, thus spawning years of conflict between the U.S. and East Asia. The ethanol industry would have to multiply its production capacity several times to completely eliminate United States dependency on foreign oil to eliminate such a future threat and even if the U.S. could build enough production facilities to meet this demand, the U.S. does not have enough corn to meet this demand.

52 Ibid.

53 Urbanchuk.

54 Mamdough G. Salameh, “Quest for Middle East Oil: U.S. Versus Asia Pacific Region,” *Energy Policy*, Vol 31, Is 11, September 2003, pp. 1085-1091.

55 Ibid.

CONCLUSION

Recognizing that the United States' corn-ethanol product cannot itself act as a pure fuel, but must be used as a gasoline oxygenate at E10 levels or as a gasoline blend at E85 or E95, means the United States cannot depend on ethanol as the primary source of energy at this stage. Relative to the number of vehicles in the U.S. FFV's are small in number, and E10 is the common ethanol gasoline blend for that very reason. It would take years to phase-out all cars that are not capable of running on E85 or E95.

Secondly, when used at E10 levels solely for the purpose of an MTBE replacement oxygenate, ethanol decreases U.S. foreign import dependency by less than 2 billion gallons per year and does not ameliorate petroleum dependence. Furthermore, a 2 billion gallon per year oxygenate independence is not comparable to a 11 million barrel per day dependence on energy imports.

Third, corn-ethanol is not cost productive – it has a zero BCR. The U.S. government spends much of its money subsidizing an industry that does not turn a profit. Also, if ethanol production continues to increase, the U.S. will have to start importing corn, which would only redistribute foreign energy dependence, not eliminate it.

Fourth, although ethanol decreases carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere it increases nitrogen oxide emissions into the atmosphere and therefore constitutes a pollutant just like petroleum and MTBE. In fact air quality standards decrease when areas transition to ethanol as an oxygenate.

Renewed efforts to search for alternative fuels are nothing more than the panicked reaction of the government to the insecurity posed by recent terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq. The American people largely believe that the war in Iraq was about oil and they need to be lulled back into a false sense of security by the vows of politicians to decrease oil dependence to avert future conflict. Regardless of the genuineness behind the government's support of the ethanol industry, the fact remains that the promise of increased security and environmental protection as a result of the ethanol industry is at worst dangerous because the subsidies drain the economy and the promise of energy independence provides a false sense of security. Additionally, the environmental and national security interests served by the ethanol industry are also at best circular, and at worst adverse because ethanol causes as much if not more pollution than it claims to prevent and does little to decrease import dependency – only 2 million gallons per year– but will potentially increase import dependency – via corn for the growing market. The only viable way to decrease energy dependence is for Americans to make lifestyle changes, go back to the days of only driving the family car on Sundays and taking the mass transit to work. Until that day comes, after many oil crises and terrorist attacks, the U.S. will continue to back peddle to push the ethanol industry: the dream that will not die.

interests and represent them throughout the state.²⁵ However, McFaul also contributes by writing that “parties to date have played only a marginal role in interest intermediation between state and society. Without stronger parties, the state will never face real opposition.”²⁶

Smirnov is much harsher than McFaul, as seen by the following:

A genuine and effective multi-party system had not yet been established in the country. The majority of the many political associations formed during this period of “political enterprise” have not ... gone beyond being social movement private gatherings, proto-parties, or parties based around a single leader.²⁷

Such statements are said to be confirmed by “the [following] results of an empirical study of electoral-legal culture commissioned by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (TsKRF),” and conducted by Smirnov.²⁸

- Only 20.1 percent of citizens consider themselves supporters of any political party.
- The fact that a candidate supports a given political party is 7th on the list of criteria taken into account by voters when deciding whom to vote for.
- Only a quarter (25.7 percent) of voters taking part in the 1995 elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation were chiefly motivated to participate by the desire to support a candidate or party, while 10 percent had the opposite motive, namely to prevent a particular party or candidate from coming to power.
- Only 9 percent of the adult population favor elections conducted solely on party lists, while only just over 13 percent support a mixed electoral system that uses party lists to elect a section of deputies.

McFAUL'S EXPLANATIONS FOR POOR PARTY IDENTIFICATION

In an attempt to understand the reasons behind these poll results, McFaul claims that the causes are varied. First is the 70 years of Communist Party rule, which created a strong estrangement from party politics. In 1990, when Boris Yeltsin quit the Party and vowed never to return, he struck a chord with many Russians.²⁹ Also, prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, McFaul maintains, there was only limited knowledge of democracy, so after the Soviet Union's collapse there was “no party culture to resurrect.”³⁰

Second, according to McFaul, when the post-communist transformations started,

25 McFaul, p. 313.

26 Ibid.

27 Smirnov, p. 521.

28 Ibid.

29 McFaul, p. 315.

30 Ibid.

interests and represent them throughout the state.²⁵ However, McFaul also contributes by writing that “parties to date have played only a marginal role in interest intermediation between state and society. Without stronger parties, the state will never face real opposition.”²⁶

Smirnov is much harsher than McFaul, as seen by the following:

A genuine and effective multi-party system had not yet been established in the country. The majority of the many political associations formed during this period of “political enterprise” have not ... gone beyond being social movement private gatherings, proto-parties, or parties based around a single leader.²⁷

Such statements are said to be confirmed by “the [following] results of an empirical study of electoral-legal culture commissioned by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (TsKRF),” and conducted by Smirnov.²⁸

- Only 20.1 percent of citizens consider themselves supporters of any political party.
- The fact that a candidate supports a given political party is 7th on the list of criteria taken into account by voters when deciding whom to vote for.
- Only a quarter (25.7 percent) of voters taking part in the 1995 elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation were chiefly motivated to participate by the desire to support a candidate or party, while 10 percent had the opposite motive, namely to prevent a particular party or candidate from coming to power.
- Only 9 percent of the adult population favor elections conducted solely on party lists, while only just over 13 percent support a mixed electoral system that uses party lists to elect a section of deputies.

McFAUL'S EXPLANATIONS FOR POOR PARTY IDENTIFICATION

In an attempt to understand the reasons behind these poll results, McFaul claims that the causes are varied. First is the 70 years of Communist Party rule, which created a strong estrangement from party politics. In 1990, when Boris Yeltsin quit the Party and vowed never to return, he struck a chord with many Russians.²⁹ Also, prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, McFaul maintains, there was only limited knowledge of democracy, so after the Soviet Union's collapse there was “no party culture to resurrect.”³⁰

Second, according to McFaul, when the post-communist transformations started,

25 McFaul, p. 313.

26 Ibid.

27 Smirnov, p. 521.

28 Ibid.

29 McFaul, p. 315.

30 Ibid.