The Relative Integrity of National Borders (RINB): An Alternative Conception of Border Management

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Abstract: In the absence of physical barriers or guard posts, civilian communities are the de facto stewards of border enforcement. Yet, as states struggle to mitigate the influx of transboundary threats while managing economic constraints, the role of state legitimacy in border enforcement is often neglected. To enhance policy-making, this article introduces a new analytical framework for evaluating border porousness, namely the relative integrity of national borders (RINB)—the notion that an individual’s feelings toward state governance directly impact his or her respect for state borders. RINB, which is measured in terms of social inclusion, popular attitudes towards state decisions, and the efficacy of border policy enforcement, is tested through the application of three hypotheses to the cases of Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, and Argentina. This article finds, with the exception of Argentina, that Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine affirm my hypotheses, thus supporting the validity of RINB. Importantly, RINB demonstrates a link between state security and conventionally perceived ‘non-security’ policies such as infrastructure and public housing. Therefore, by focusing scarce resources on bolstering public services, states can still strengthen border security—for improved perceptions of state competence can inspire citizens to more actively report on or dissuade border violations.

Introduction

State security is profoundly impacted by the transboundary movement of peoples, ideas, and goods. Consequently, governments allocate resources and manpower to fortify their borders, all in an effort to mitigate the influx of threats such as pathogens, illicit goods, crime, conflicts, and terrorists. However, prevailing international challenges including globalization, the ongoing Syrian Refugee Crisis, the 2015 Crimean Crisis, endemic poverty, and the destabilizing criminal networks of Central and Latin America, have pushed state border authorities to their limit. In order to address the aforementioned threats while accommodating increasing budgetary constraints, states must explore the effects of perceived legitimacy on a previously unexamined aspect of border porousness—popular perceptions of state legitimacy. In essence, this article argues that a newly conceptualized aspect of border security, the relative integrity of national borders (RINB), will allow security analysts and policy-makers to better identify how extensively intertwined state border security is with public perceptions of state competence. Once this relationship is adequately underscored and understood, political officials will be incentivized to implement more prudent and effectual domestic policies, recognizing that doing so can inexpensively motivate civilian (nongovernmental) communities to help enhance border security.

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To elaborate, in the absence of physical barriers or guard posts, civilians (most often those living along national borders) are the de facto stewards of border enforcement. However, the effectiveness of civilian communities at managing transborder movements is contingent upon the perceived relative integrity of national borders (RINB). Integrity, in this sense, is a form of legitimacy referring to how an individual’s feelings regarding the quality of state governance and the enforcement of a state’s national borders directly impacts his or her respect for state borders. The novelty here lies in fusing the significance of perceived state governance with the empirical realities of border enforcement, for these phenomena are deeply interrelated.

Ultimately, relatively low levels of perceived RINB exacerbate border porousness by making citizens less apt to monitor, uphold, or report unauthorized border crossings—for citizens in such states are more likely to view national borders as an extension of an incompetent state unworthy of concern. Therefore, in order to minimize trans-national threats, border management policies must incorporate an approach for improving the view of state competence across civilian communities. Such an approach, like refining public services, will allow governments to reduce border porousness without expending a considerable amount of state resources deploying professional armed guardsmen. To demonstrate the aforementioned relationship between border management and the relative integrity of national borders, the cases of Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, and Argentina will be assessed in detail. However, before examining how RINB will be operationalized and studied, concepts such as legitimacy, sovereignty, and social inclusion must be made clear.

Core Concepts

Legitimacy, particularly state legitimacy, is the notion that a government or institution has the right to rule over a populace.1 Related to legitimacy is the contested concept of state sovereignty. Although integrity is most closely related to legitimacy, a brief discussion of sovereignty is necessary because it provides a firm theoretical foundation for the construction of RINB. In *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Stephen D. Krasner defines sovereignty in four senses: Westphalian sovereignty, domestic authority and control, interdependence sovereignty, and international legal sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty is the idea that a state government has the exclusive right to exercise its directives without meddling by external actors.2 International-Legal Sovereignty is the mutual recognition of authority over a territory by other states and entities.3 In essence, both International-Legal and Westphalian sovereignty largely address the legal attributes of states in the contemporary international system.

Meanwhile, domestic sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to provide order and exercise its will domestically, and interdependence sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to regulate transboundary movements.4 Domestic and interdependence sovereignty speak most directly to the subject at hand; for many civilian communities are unlikely to be concerned with the lofty legal distinctions of a state. Instead, local populations are more apt to judge state sovereignty as legitimate, if the government is viewed as a competent provider of domestic stability and a concerted effort to curtail transboundary threats is being made. Going forward, this study will

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3Ibid., 9.
4Ibid., 11-12.
utilize a fusion of Krasner’s international and domestic sovereignty with the idea of legitimacy, which will be termed the relative integrity of national borders (RINB).

In sum, RINB is the degree to which a state is perceived as the competent and rightful authority over a territory, due to its ability to earn support for state governance and curtail border violations. The “relative” aspect to RINB is significant because it implies that the perceived integrity of a state’s borders is subject to change and fluctuation across time and space. To be clear, no state is able to achieve high RINB across its borders and civilian communities at all times. Thus, the true utility of RINB is that it addresses the often overlooked relationship between a civilian community’s perception of governance and its likelihood to galvanize and rebuff or enable extraterritorial threats. On a separate note, going forward, the terms irregular, illicit, and illegal migration will be used interchangeably to denote unsanctioned border crossings.

Social inclusion, as defined by the World Bank, is the degree to which individuals (particularly poor or marginalized minority groups) are provided access to government services and opportunities. Significantly, social inclusion demonstrates a government’s willingness to accommodate the needs and interests of its citizens regardless of heritage or creed. It is reasonable to conclude that states with sweeping provisions, and accommodations for all subsets of society, are likely to be viewed as more legitimate to civilians than states that disproportionately accommodate access to select privileged groups. Scholars, such as Karleen Jones West, similarly contend that improving government access for neglected groups can improve perceptions of state authority and thus improve domestic security.

Lastly, affirmative action—policy that favors discriminated groups—is an alternative measure of social inclusion. Affirmative action demonstrates how much a state is willing to acknowledge overarching injustice and take action to involve discriminated victims in the enjoyment of benefits they were once socially excluded from (often pertaining to education). Although affirmative action is sometimes controversial, it is reasonable to argue that (in this modern era) states actively working to remedy structural injustices are more likely to be respected by civilians than regimes that overtly repress and discriminate against various groups. To be clear, social inclusion is not the sole determinant of public support for state governance, but it is a crucial factor. Furthermore, for the purpose of this study, what matters is not how much a state is willing to dispense as welfare or aid, but how well a state that provides any services equitably distributes benefits across its population.

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5In other words, RINB refers to a citizen’s perception of state competence (which is defined by both perceived governance support and empirical evidence of border violations) and how this perception of competence can incline or disincline a civilian community to engage in border management.


Methodology and Hypotheses

Three indicators will be used to evaluate the perceived integrity of national borders. The first indicator is the level of social inclusion within the state (ideally within border communities). This indicator will be measured using interviews, polls, media reports, and assessments of resource accessibility that shed light on the treatment, social mobility, and opportunities open to citizens across society. Before moving forward, the use of the equitable availability of potable water as a metric must be explained. International indices, such as the World Bank’s Human Opportunities Index, use water accessibility as a measure of social inclusion because childhood development and ongoing achievement is tied to one’s access to water and basic nutrients. Therefore, governments that disproportionately provide clean water to privileged communities are socially excluding underserved groups from the means of self-advancement (individual nutrition is tied to human survival, immunological vulnerability, and academic performance). As discussed previously with affirmative action, governments that provide more equitable access to key resources and services are more likely to be supported by civilian populations in this day and age.

The second indicator that will be used to evaluate RINB is the public’s attitude toward the decisions being made by the state (i.e. attitudes on state governance). This indicator will be measured by examining riot frequency, public opinion polls, and news coverage. However, it must be noted that indicators such as news coverage and public polls are not a perfect means of capturing public attitudes across an entire country. In general, based upon practical and logistical constraints, polling sources do not gather data on every member of society, and thus the insights gleaned from any poll should be examined with a degree of scrutiny. Furthermore, one cannot definitively verify if the opinions expressed in polls and interviews reflect a respondents’ true feelings. Nevertheless, considering the limited availability of data, measures such as interviews, polls, and protests are the most applicable and credible means of operationalizing this indicator of RINB.

The third indicator that will be used to evaluate RINB is the efficacy of border enforcement policy. This third indicator will be measured by examining official government statements, press releases, interviews, news coverage, and legal cases stemming from border crossing violations (through indictments, judicial rulings, and other legal documents). The underlying rationale for the use of such metrics is that a government is widely viewed by citizens as a major guarantor of border security. Consequentially, a high level of border violations demonstrates a failure on the part of a government to realize its role as a security provider. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that when citizens recognize a high level of border violations, they will likely surmise that proactively reporting violations of national borders to an incompetent state is not worthwhile.

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9It is difficult to disaggregate public attitudes and link said attitudes to particular border communities, because many comprehensive data sources conduct their studies on the national or provincial level (as opposed to the neighborhood or community level).

In terms of causality, I foresee that an increase or decrease in the level of social inclusion will produce an identical increase or decrease in RINB. I base this prediction on the idea that socially inclusive states, in most cases, are more likely to be seen by citizens as authorities worthy of respect. Thus, because national borders are an extension of the state, an improved respect for an inclusive state will likely motivate citizens to report on violations of respected national borders. An examination of media reports and polls will address how community members have vocalized their dissatisfaction or approval of societal treatment. Since states are deeply intertwined with societies, community members that approve of their societal treatment are more likely to value and view national borders as legitimate.

When addressing popular attitudes towards state decisions and RINB, I anticipate that as popular attitudes improve or worsen, RINB will increase or decrease in tandem. I base this prediction on the idea that, as civilian communities increasingly view state actions as rightful and effective, they are more likely to accept other elements of the state such as national borders. However, there is a negative relationship between riot frequency and perceived border legitimacy. The frequency of riots underscores public dissatisfaction. The more riots and poll results that demonstrate public dissatisfaction with state governance, the less likely civilian communities will perceive national borders as legitimate.

In reference to border policy enforcement and RINB, I foresee that an increase or decrease in border policy enforcement will produce an identical increase or decrease in RINB. I base this prediction on the idea that the better a state is able to demonstrate that its borders are rarely violated, the more likely civilian communities will view the national borders as real and legitimate. Conversely, there is a negative relationship between the frequency of border crossing violations (as demonstrated by government statements, legal documents, and interviews) and perceived border legitimacy. Logically, a large number of border crossing violations demonstrates to citizens that the national borders are not functionally existent or perceived as legitimate. With causality and the indicators addressed, an overview of the case studies is in order.

The states that will be subsequently explored—Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, and Argentina—were selected via a random sample from a population of ten states: Ukraine, Mexico, Paraguay, Lebanon, Greece, Angola, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Thailand, and Pakistan. The random sample was applied to mitigate regional selection bias (for the wealth of state data and border information on European countries made them particularly appealing). These ten states were selected because they each exhibited attributes associated with low RINB, including low state capacity, internal strife, low economic development, and poor infrastructure. Although, ideally, this study would include countries from both prospective low and high RINB states, the time constraints of this project inhibit such a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, this study is limited by the availability of relevant border management data, namely firsthand accounts from civilian communities detailing their role in preventing or enabling (licit and illicit) cross border movements.

**Case Study—Lebanon**

It is impractical to assess Lebanon’s RINB without contextualizing the security environment. Lebanon is an upper-middle income state, home to a confluence of cultures, religions, and enduring civil strife.11 Historically, the Ottomans and French have exploited

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ethno-religious cleavages by spurring sectarian strife in the interest of consolidating their rule as external overseers. Today, even as an independent state molded in the image of the French Third Republic, sectarian divisions have been entrenched in the Lebanese political system through the National Pact—a domestic agreement which requires Lebanon’s chief representatives to be apportioned based upon confessional designation. In essence, the President must be Maronite Christian, the Prime Minster must be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament must be Shiite. This system has undermined the competitiveness of elections and promotes pandering to narrow community interests. Furthermore, Lebanon’s weak government institutions struggle to effectively provide services and robust democratic representation to its population of 6.2 million. In recent history, the ongoing influx of Palestinian refugees, Israel’s 1982 invasion and occupation, and the Syrian Civil War have placed considerable burdens on a state with a GNI per capita of $7,930. In sum, the security environment of Lebanon is caustic and undermined by meager state capacity, the spillover of destabilizing conflict, and deep internal divisions.

In terms of social inclusion, Lebanese citizens have made a concerted effort to foster increased tolerance in spite of decades of deep ethno-religious cleavages and rivalries. In 2014, this was demonstrated by a rise in interfaith community gatherings designed to promote religious dialogue and cooperation. Unfortunately, comprehensive studies of Lebanese society have found that improvements to inclusion are eclipsed by enduring inequalities and mistreatments. The 2016 report on Poverty, Inequality, and Social Protection in Lebanon, conducted by the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, concludes that of the 117,062 Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon in 2015, 70 percent lived below the poverty line ($3.84 person/day). The conditions are even worse for the 503,070 Palestinian refugees and an estimated 30,000 unregistered refugees in Lebanon, who are often bared from applying for citizenship by fees and work permit prices. Legal status as a citizen is essential for refugees in Lebanon because it grants them access to relief programs such as the Emergency National Poverty Targeting Programme (ENPTP)—which provides partial payment of medical bills, school fee waivers, free books, and food assistance to the poorest. Furthermore, the report found that Palestinian refugees have been forced to live in ethnically homogenous refugee camps with extreme levels of poverty and few job opportunities. Consequently, some Syrian women have turned to prostitution to provide for their families. Unfortunately, these acts of desperation have fueled Lebanese allegations of Palestinian immorality, thus contributing to the high level of reported refugee harassment, work place abuse, arbitrary dismissal, refusal of service, and humiliation in schools.

13Ibid., 25.  
18Ibid.  
19Ibid., 18  
20Ibid., 17.
Furthermore, according to the UNESCO Report on Social Inclusion in Lebanon, the Lebanese constitution provides vague but overarching protections and support for social inclusiveness. However, this formal endorsement of inclusiveness has not translated into governmental regulations and social practices. For instance, the report notes that there is no mention of protections for “disadvantaged groups” in Lebanese laws, there is only a partial provision for a “framework law…promoting cultural pluralism and access to cultural life,” and there are no policies in place that “promote cultural development and creativity…among cultural minorities and disadvantaged groups…” In recognition of these shortcomings, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report designates Lebanon as a major under-performer of “Tolerance and Inclusion” in regard to immigrants and religious toleration. It is important to note that Lebanon’s lack of robust and equitable social provisions is not necessarily the result of outright malicious or intentional discrimination by the government. Instead, the likely motive is economic turmoil and concomitant public spending constraints. Nevertheless, based upon the index and report examined above, it appears that Lebanon maintains a significantly low level of social inclusion, at least among Palestinian and Syrian refugees (which adversely affects the RINB of Lebanon regardless of government intentionality).

In regard to public attitudes towards governance, Pew Research Center reports initially demonstrated a decline in public dissatisfaction with the Lebanese government. However, this positive trend has been reversed in recent years. For example, in 2002, polls found that only 25 percent of Lebanese citizens believed that their national government had a good influence on their life. In 2007, this positive outlook towards government increased to 61 percent. Similarly, in 2007, only 28 percent of Lebanese citizens were satisfied with their own life, yet 61 percent were satisfied with the national government. In contrast, a 2016 Gallup poll based on face-to-face interviews of 1,000 adults 15 years or older, found that approval of Lebanon’s leadership had dropped from 33 percent in 2014 to 25 percent. Furthermore, polls show that only 22 percent of the Lebanese citizens interviewed found that elections were honest. Most notably, 90 percent of those interviewed believe that corruption was widespread throughout the Lebanese government. Although the Gallup poll relies on a relatively small sample size, when viewed in conjunction with the other aforementioned poll data, it still provides key insights into current Lebanese attitudes towards governance.

Beyond polls, prevailing public sentiments towards the Lebanese government have been demonstrated through political behavior and violence. Notably, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005, allegedly by members of Hezbollah—a militant Shia Islam political

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22Ibid., 85.
23Ibid., 96.
26Ibid.
organization that exerts considerable sway in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{28} Beyond this case, Hezbollah has operated in Lebanon as an electorally entrenched paramilitary-political party, which refuses to forego its weapon stockpiles in spite of government demands for disarmament (thus undermining government authority).\textsuperscript{29} On another note, in August of 2015, thousands of “You Stink!” protesters gathered in the streets of Beirut to denounce government gridlock.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, in September of 2015, Lebanese security forces forcibly removed 30 protesters of the “You Stink!” anti-government movement that had stormed the Ministry of Environment in Beirut and began a sit-in.\textsuperscript{31} To be clear, the You Stink! Movement is a reaction to the Lebanese government’s failure to agree on waste-removal contracts due to political brinkmanship. In turn, garbage had accumulated throughout Beirut, thus sparking widespread denunciations of government incompetence, ineffectiveness, and corruption. In addition, that same year at a different event, a “You Stink!” protester was killed while throwing stones and bottles at police alongside 200 other protestors.\textsuperscript{32} Based upon mixed poll results and various traumatic protests, it appears that Lebanon has a moderate to low level of governance approval.

In terms of border enforcement, in 2000, 53 illegal immigrants were arrested while crossing Northern Lebanon in an attempt to reach a Spanish port.\textsuperscript{33} In 2015, Lebanese Army Intelligence successfully identified a five-member smuggling network that was using boats to smuggle migrants into Lebanon.\textsuperscript{34} In 2016, the Lebanese Army has continued its border enforcement efforts through the arrest of 49 Syrian refugees who attempted to illegally enter Lebanon.\textsuperscript{35} In contrast to these cases of successful border enforcement, the Middle East Institute found that in 2010 the number of irregular migrants (at least 400,000) outweighed the level of regular/legal migrants (302,315).\textsuperscript{36} This finding undermines the aforementioned evidence regarding effective border enforcement portrayed by the arrest reports and accounts alone. Therefore, in light of proactive efforts and enduring shortcomings, Lebanese border enforcement is moderately ineffective.


\textsuperscript{29}Hezbollah is a truly profound expression of, and contributor to, sectarian strife in Lebanon. For more information please see Berti, Benedetta. 2011. "Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in Electoral Politics: The Case of Hizballah." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34. No. 12: 942-962.


\textsuperscript{36}Phillippe Fargues, “Irregular Migration in the Arab Mediterranean Countries,” Middle East Institute, May 4, 2012, http://www.mei.edu/content/irregular-migration-arab-mediterranean-countries.
Overall, as demonstrated above, Lebanon has a significantly low level of social inclusion, a moderate to low level of governance approval, and moderately ineffective border enforcement. These characteristics collectively embody low RINB and, consequently, increased border porousness. However, to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, a case must be identified that ties these indicators to an actual instance of a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings to occur. In Lebanon, the impact of low RINB is highlighted in the town of Arsal—a major hub for human trafficking between Syria and Lebanon. In a *Vice* interview, a smuggler named Abu Hussein admitted to illegally funneling fighters from Lebanon into Syria. Hussein claims to use discrete off road routes to reach the Syrian-Lebanese border that has been left virtually unguarded since Syrian troops were recalled to fight rebels in 2011. This case seems to affirm my hypothesis, for Hussein’s decision to engage in smuggling is likely motivated by his perception that the Lebanese borders are undeserving of veneration and civilian policing (which represents low RINB), particularly since the Lebanese government cannot field ample border guards.

**Case Study -- Mexico**

Mexico is home to 123 million individuals and stands as a median between the economically developed North American countries and the developing countries of Central and South America. As such, Mexico is a major hub for both licit and illicit economic migration, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. Mexico has a GNI per capita of $9,710 and enjoys close economic ties with North America via NAFTA. Internally, modern Mexico suffers from the legacy of (and in some cases ongoing) government corruption, thus undermining the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state’s political institutions. The international War on Drugs has strongly impacted the internal affairs of Mexico. In some regions, this is evident through outright conflict between government forces and criminal organizations. In other cases, cartels and local criminals have bribed, coopted, or pacified law enforcement officials. The continued occurrence of civilian homicides, kidnappings, and deaths coupled with the election of Enrique Pena Nieto in 2012 has further flamed internal contentions. Yet, in spite of such tumultuous occurrences, the Mexican government has made considerable strides in curtailing migrant smuggling, in some cases through joint operations with United States’ DEA and border enforcement personnel.

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37 In this case, “community” entails a single community member who facilitates illegal border crossings, but represents a broader collective. In other words, the actions of this community member underscores the potential for other community members to engage in the same behavior. Vice may have made contact with other smugglers, but were unable to receive permission to disclose their identities and practices.


In terms of social inclusion, media reports have shown an uptick in homophobia related violence in Mexico, despite government efforts such as tolerance campaigns. In addition, the 2016 World Bank Human Opportunities Index Report for Latin America and the Caribbean has found that, in 2012, 61.68 percent of the population had access to well or rain water—a common metric for moderate social inclusion (the unequal distribution of social benefits or services). Similarly, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report ranks Mexico in the “Very High Social Progress” level and designates Mexico as an average performer in terms of “Tolerance and Inclusion” regarding immigrants and religious tolerance. In contrast, the 2015 America Quarterly Social Inclusion Index poorly ranked Mexico 16th out of the 17 American countries measured in terms of affirmative action and inclusion. Therefore, due to contrasting reports across indices and news sources, Mexico appears to exhibit a moderate level of social inclusion.

Polls from 2007 and 2014 suggest that Mexicans are overall satisfied with state governance. In 2007, only 30 percent of Mexicans were satisfied with the state of the nation, but 70 percent were satisfied with their national government. This disparity suggests that dissatisfaction was rooted in non-state factors, most likely criminal activities and violence related to the embedded drug trade. A 2014 poll found that, in 2013, 68 percent viewed President Pena Nieto’s national government as good, but this decreased to 57 percent in 2014. The same poll found that in 2013, 30 percent viewed President Pena Nieto’s national government as bad, which increased to 41 percent in 2014. Although the recent decline in government support appears minimal, an examination of recent political behavior will provide greater insight.

In 2012, as President Pena Nieto was sworn in, massive protests were staged in front of the National Palace whereby protestors hurled Molotov cocktails and firecrackers at the defending security forces. In addition, a 2014 riot broke out in Mexico City after 43 college students were attacked by policemen and delivered to a local gang, which later dumped and burned the student’s bodies. The protest was carried out, once again, in front of the National Palace, by the relatives of the victims who were denouncing the atrocities committed by state police. In 2016, 55 officers and 53 civilians were wounded in a clash between teachers, police, and locals in the Mexican state of Oaxaca. The clash took place after seven days of street blockages by teachers protesting for national education reform. In short, considering both the polls’ depiction of government approval and enduring instances of public unrest, it appears that Mexico has a moderate level of governance approval.

50 Ibid.
In terms of border enforcement, a 2004 media report explains that the National Migration Institute (Mexico’s Immigration Agency) initiated an internal effort to improve its bureaucratic integrity after years of accepting bribes in exchange for the release of illegal migrants.\textsuperscript{52} Amnesty International found, in 2013, that irregular migration into and across Mexico had increased since 2012.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, in 2015, the news media had reported that President Pena Nieto’s “Plan Frontera Sur” had successfully decreased irregular migration along Mexico’s southern border at the cost of human rights observance. In other words, there were ongoing allegations of governmental mistreatment and outright abuse of illegal migrants.\textsuperscript{54} This is a unique case, for although the overall decrease in irregular migration is a testament to effective border enforcement, the inhumane means of achieving such security may lead Mexican civilians to find the enterprise of border enforcement to be distasteful and unworthy of their participation or support. Lastly, the US State Department has labeled Mexico as a Tier 2 Trafficking in Persons Country under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000—national legislation designed to allow the US to diplomatically assess and engage foreign governments in an effort to eliminate human trafficking.\textsuperscript{55} Tier 2 entails that although Mexico failed to meet minimum anti-trafficking standards in 2015, it has made minor improvements such as the conviction of 86 traffickers.\textsuperscript{56} In sum, considering the largely negative reports mentioned above, Mexican border enforcement is ineffective.

Overall, in the case of Mexico, the state demonstrates a low level of social inclusion, a moderate level of governance approval, and ineffective border enforcement. These characteristics collectively constitute moderate to low RINB. However, to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, explicit evidence must be provided that ties these indicators to a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings to occur. In this case, the connection to a single civilian community is not as overt, but still evident. To elaborate, Mexico’s low RINB is reflected by the ongoing success and ambition of polleros, Mexican human-smugglers. A pollero interviewed by Frontline explained that human smuggling from Mexico into the United States has become increasingly fruitful as average citizens are no longer able to illegally cross the more rigidly policed US-Mexico border without professional aid.\textsuperscript{57} In search of adrenaline and wealth, an increasing number of young and middle-age Mexicans are entering this illicit profession and innovating smuggling practices (developing more discrete human smuggling compartments in cars and discovering new and remote border weak points).\textsuperscript{58} The case of Mexico partially supports my hypothesis, for it is clear that economic interests play a major role in why individuals are facilitating the violation of borders, and because polleros operate across Mexico (but often in civilian communities). Still, one can infer from this activity that the polleros do not view Mexican national borders as deserving of veneration and

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.
protection, and this is likely tied to prevailing perceptions of government corruption and internal instability (which represents low RINB).

**Case Study -- Ukraine**

Ukraine is a country that has survived socialist rule and integration under the USSR, shares a historic cultural and ethnic bond with Russia, and is struggling to democratize to gain entry into the EU.59 Domestic and international forces, ranging from the desire to economically develop, to enduring military and political ties to Russian institutions, have given rise to an era of internal dissonance and turmoil. The unconventional proxy war waged against Ukraine by Russia, the 2015 Crimean Crisis, has shaped the security environment of modern Ukraine.60 In addition, political corruption and democratic aspirations (such as accountability and transparency) have resulted in destabilizing protests and uprisings, an overthrow of the established pro-Russian regime, and the countervailing response of Russian aggression and insurgency in Eastern Ukraine.61 For a country of 44.2 million and a GNI per capita of $2,620, the tumult of constant political uprisings has severely eroded infrastructure and housing, exacerbating the challenges facing a resource stricken government that is struggling to provide relief to its citizens.62

In regard to social inclusion, recent Gallup polls attest that, between 2008 and 2013, the percentage of Ukrainians that believe tolerance for people of different nationalities is worse than in the Soviet Days has increased from 16 percent to 30 percent. Similarly, when this same question was posed with the term “nationalities” replaced with “religions,” the percentage between 2008 and 2013 increased from 12 percent to 19 percent.63 In other words, the polls suggest that Ukrainians believe they are becoming increasingly intolerant towards those of different nationalities and religions. In contrast, the World Banks’ 2016 Human Opportunities Index states that Ukraine provides 65.17 percent of its population with equitable accessibility to piped water.64 This fairly moderate percentage suggests that there is a small but important uneven distribution of services across Ukrainian society. In line with this assessment, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report also ranked Ukraine as middling in terms of “Tolerance and Inclusion” regarding immigrants and religious tolerance.65

Additionally, a 2009 European Commission Report found that the Ukrainian state has tried to strengthen social protections to excluded groups, but these efforts have been stifled by economic turmoil. The report adds that social exclusion is greatest in Ukraine among

homosexuals, the homeless, drug-consumers, HIV/AIDs victims, and ethnic minorities. 66

Uniquely, unlike in Lebanon and Mexico where social exclusion was made manifest through violence and degradation, Ukrainians socially exclude minority groups by advocating for their social isolation. 67 Social isolation differs from social exclusion in that it entails the pressuring of deviants to live in geographically compact enclaves, as opposed to simply excluding deviants from social and economic programs without promoting de facto segregation. The UNDP 2012 report found that 37.75 percent of Ukrainian households experience acute social exclusion, which is particularly problematic because social exclusion of minorities limits their economic life, restricts opportunities, and often translates to low standards of living (which collectively foster societal grievances and deviance). 68 In the end, although polls demonstrate that Ukraine expresses an interest in promoting inclusiveness, the reports examined largely suggest that Ukraine exhibits a moderate to low level of social inclusion.

In terms of attitudes towards governance, polls have portrayed public dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s government, particularly concentrated in the eastern regions. For instance, a 2007 Pew poll found that only 32 percent of Ukrainians were satisfied with their own lives, and 31 percent were satisfied with their national government. 69 A 2014 poll found that 77 percent of Ukrainians wanted to remain united and 14 percent wanted to secede, but the desire to secede was greatest in the Eastern regions. To be precise, only 4 percent of Ukrainians in Western regions of Ukraine wanted to secede, while 18 percent of the Eastern Regions wanted to secede. 70 In addition, the same poll found that while 41 percent of Ukrainians feel that their current government has a good influence on events in Ukraine, 49 percent felt that the government actually has a bad influence. Though polls are instructive, a richer understanding of governance support requires one to delve deeper.

In 2013, 30,000 Ukrainians took to the streets, calling for the resignation of President Victor Yanukovych in response to his last minute pivot from EU integration to closer ties with Russia. 71 Roughly 70,000 Ukrainians gathered in Kiev in 2014, and once again advocated for the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych. 72 In 2015, 260 secessionist protesters clashed with riot police, and one protester even tossed a grenade at the security forces. 73 Furthermore, militias

67Ibid., 140.
have clashed with police in 2016, namely veterans of the Orange Revolution who were calling for a “Third Maidan Revolution.” In sum, in light of both the poll results and frequent protests, it appears that Ukraine has a low level of governance approval, particularly in the eastern region.

In terms of border efficacy, a 2006 report by the International Centre for Policy Studies (Kyiv, Ukraine) Institute for Public Affairs found that illegal migration detentions in Ukraine grew from 25,539 in 2004, to 32,726 in 2006. In addition, the report concluded that only 5-10 percent of all illegal migrants transiting into and across Ukraine were actually detained. The report notes that the ethnicity of irregular migrants was shifting from South East Asian and African descent to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nationals including Georgians, Russians, Chechens, Uzbeks, Algeris, Moldovans, and Armenians. In 2016, the BBC found that the Ukrainian security service disbanded a migrant smuggling ring. Meanwhile, the Border Monitoring Project Ukraine, an online media platform that compiles reports of unauthorized border crossings, has cited numerous border violations across 2015 and 2016. For instance, in 2015, 22 irregular migrants were arrested en route to Hungary through Ukraine (four women, three children, and a baby), and that same year a helicopter containing illegal migrants took off in Ukraine and crashed in Slovakia (killing seven). In 2016, the site highlighted reports of 207 illegal migrants caught at the Ukrainian-Slovakian border and 40 captured at the Hungarian Ukrainian border. Based upon these findings, it appears that Ukrainian border enforcement, despite notable successes, is largely ineffective.

Overall, Ukraine exhibits a moderate to low level of social inclusion, a low level of governance approval, and ineffective border enforcement. In sum, these traits constitute low RINB. Still, in order to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, a link between the indicators and a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings must be identified. For Ukraine, the firsthand accounts of illegally smuggled cigarettes known as “cheap whites” demonstrate how elements of low RINB, like ineffective border enforcement, can drive civilian communities to promote or permit illegal transboundary movements. A Vice interview with a low tier smuggler and the regional head of a Ukrainian drug-trafficking cell revealed that a black market for cheap cigarettes has emerged across the EU.

The low tier smuggler described how the illicit goods are hidden in horse-drawn wagons and moved across the countryside of Ukraine and into Poland. Alternatively, the high tier operative described how makeshift aircraft are sometimes launched from Ukraine and illegally

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78It is important to note that, because most of the sources on the site are in Cyrillic and are from local Ukrainian news centers, I was unable to find any additional English language accounts of these violations to validate each of the illegal crossings cited. However, it is reassuring that each of the cases were reported on by multiple Russian language news agencies.
drop cigarettes into Poland.\textsuperscript{79} The operatives specified that the smuggling was predominantly conducted within rural towns along the Ukrainian-Polish border—sometimes under the gaze of civilian townspeople. Although it is unclear if the townspeople are directly involved in the smuggling, it is clear that they have made no concerted effort to report the unauthorized border crossings to government authorities. Like in the case of Mexico, it seems that economic gain was a major driver behind the smuggling in Ukraine. However, it should not be understated that the interviewed smugglers did not venerate or view Ukrainian national borders as being worthy of protection, and this is likely tied to the internal corruption and ineffectiveness of the state (which represents low RINB).

Case Study -- Argentina

Argentina boasts a particularly unique security environment, one underpinned by pervasive poverty and domestic instability—oddly accompanied by an enduring openness towards incoming goods, peoples, and ideas. The state has experienced a tumultuous history of autocratic socialist and/or military regimes coupled with its status as a rentier state whose stability and economic foundation relies upon the extraction and exploitation of a high demand commodity—in this case being crude oil.\textsuperscript{80} Today, with a population of 43 million\textsuperscript{81} and a GNI per capita of $12,460,\textsuperscript{82} Argentina’s government struggles to reign in exceptionally high crime rates and drug trafficking in spite of deep deficits and the overarching pressure of challenging economic conditions.\textsuperscript{83}

In terms of social inclusion, media sources report that Buenos Aires, became a bastion for the Hebrew language and culture in 2001.\textsuperscript{84} In 2014, media reports have also called attention to an anti-immigrant xenophobic campaign directed towards Bolivians that has swept the country.\textsuperscript{85} The 2010 World Bank Opportunities Index Report for Latin America and the Caribbean states that Argentina, in 2004, provided 98 percent of its children age 16 or younger with access to piped or rain water, without disparities in access. This is a considerable feat considering the country’s ongoing economic turmoil. In addition, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report ranked Argentina as middling in terms of “Tolerance and Inclusion” regarding immigration and religious tolerance.\textsuperscript{86} In contrast, the 2015 America Quarterly Social Inclusion Index ranked Argentina as the 9\textsuperscript{th} state out of 17 American countries in terms of Ethno racial inclusion (which is based on

\textsuperscript{82}The World Bank, “Argentina,” accessed October 5, 2016, \url{http://data.worldbank.org/country/argentina}.
surveys concerning affirmative action and inclusion legislation). Essentially, in light of mixed reviews on Argentine inclusiveness, Argentina boasts a moderate level of social inclusion.

In regard to attitudes towards governance, polls have shown a mixture of Argentinean support and distaste for their government. To be precise, a 2007 Pew poll found that although only 39 percent of Argentinians were satisfied with the state of their nation, 61 percent were satisfied with their national government. It is unclear what drove this disparity, but one theory is that there are societal ethnic cleavages that have undermined confidence in Argentina as a unified nation, while vindicating the government as a separate administrative entity not necessarily accountable for such issues. Moreover, between 2002 and 2007, the percentage of Argentineans that believed the national government was good increased drastically from 7 percent to 61 percent. Yet, the same poll found that 75 percent of Argentineans viewed corrupt political leadership as a major issue—this paints a rather unclear picture of public sentiment towards governance.

Going beyond the polls, in 2012, 500,000 anti-government protestors stormed the streets of Buenos Aires in opposition to the government administration. The protest was due to the Argentine government’s failure to alleviate high levels of inflation, corruption, media controls, and allegations of a planned tenure extension for President Fernandez. In 2015, thousands of citizens ardently protested in opposition to enduring cases of sexual abuse and violence against women, many protestors denouncing the Argentine government for not keeping comprehensive records on femicide. In 2016, thousands of protestors took to the streets to voice their dissatisfaction with President Mauricio Marci’s economic austerity measures, which have led to the dismissal of nearly 20,000 unionized public sector workers. In the end, the mixed results of government approval polls and the cases of political demonstration suggest that Argentina has a low to moderate level of governance approval.

In terms of border enforcement, it is difficult to uncover any precise information regarding contemporary Argentine illegal migration statistics, due to the acceptance of immigration as a human right in 2004. The most recent available data states that, in 1996, at least 200,000 illegal migrants resided in Argentina. In the end, based upon the fragile economic conditions, limited government capacity, and a lack of explicit data on border violations, one cannot conclude that Argentina is overall ineffective at border enforcement even though prevailing knowledge suggests that it is so. However, the caveat is that Argentina as a state and a society does not prioritize rigid border enforcement (the state recognizes migration as an inherent

89Ibid.
human right). In turn, it is to be expected that Argentina is less effective at managing its borders than countries such as the United States or even Mexico.

Overall, in the case of Argentina, the state boasts a moderate level of social inclusion, a low to moderate level of governance approval, and is seemingly ineffective at border enforcement. Collectively, these characteristics make up low RINB. Yet, in order to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, evidence must be identified that ties the indicators mentioned above to an instance of a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings. Out of the four states studied, Argentina is the only case where evidence linking RINB to actual border violation is not readily available. It is unclear if this shortfall is due to a dearth of English language investigative reporting on Argentine border security issues, or if the societal acceptance of migration in the state has made illegal crossings the status quo (and thus unworthy of being reported to the media or local authorities). In any case, due to the lack of available information on Argentine border management, this case does not lend weight to or necessarily detract from my hypotheses.

Conclusion

With the exception of Argentina, the case studies of Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine appear to affirm my hypotheses. To elaborate, the findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between social inclusion and RINB, a positive relationship between governance approval and RINB, and a positive relationship between border enforcement effectiveness and RINB. Polls, national surveys, think-tank assessments, and scholarship suggest that, in Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine, social inclusion is widely dismal or middling in performance. The exclusion and abuse of minorities, like the Palestinians in Lebanon, has contributed to low RINB and could expand border porousness beyond communities such as Arsal to Palestinian refugee camps. Reports of frequent protests and polls on corruption and governmental support in these three states have demonstrated that government support is overall poor, with some fluctuation. In essence, widespread dissatisfaction with government administration, an aspect of low RINB, undermines the public’s willingness to obey or uphold state border policies. Consequently, low RINB increases the likelihood that illicit trans-border activities—such as the movement of “cheap whites” across Ukrainian borders—will take place.

Furthermore, media reports, nongovernmental watchdogs, and state press releases on Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine suggest that border enforcement is largely ineffective. Ongoing and frequent failures by state authorities to restrict border crossings, an element of low RINB, incentivizes smugglers from within and without border towns, like polleros, to challenge border authorities in the interest of economic gain. As the polleros have highlighted, low RINB (a negative perception of a state’s governance and capacity to dissuade border violations) is not the only driver of illegal transboundary movements. Endemic poverty and low standards of living are more widely examined push factors that inspire individuals to engage in illicit transboundary migration and drug trafficking (to improve the livelihood of self and kin). This example underscores, that the concept of RINB should not be viewed as a replacement for explanatory variables concerned with economic aspirations (such as economic development, poverty, and unemployment).

Instead, RINB is a means of explaining how perceptions of state competence are integrally tied to the management of national borders. By utilizing RINB assessments, while considering other factors like economic development, policy-makers will be able to better
identify and understand why border porosity is variable across time, and how changes to
domestic policy and public perceptions can greatly improve border management. In sum, this
study provides insight into the conceptual utility and significance of RINB, while highlighting
enduring challenges to research such as the lack of available first-hand accounts on civilian
community sentiments and trafficking experiences. By extension, additional research could build
upon RINB and provide an even more robust explanation of border porosity. Still, there are
several virtues unique to RINB.

Although RINB is a fledgling concept, its political implications can positively impact all
states within the international system—for the concept underscores how non-security polices
conventionally unassociated with border management can profoundly impact border porosity.
To elaborate, domestic policies that provide and enhance important basic services such as
reliable infrastructure, affordable housing, and clean water, are deeply tied to public satisfaction.
In other words, these public service polices often foster a great deal of governance support when
they succeed, and elicit ardent condemnations when they fail. Thus, when this relationship is
considered in conjunction with RINB, policy-makers will be more apt to recognize the
significance of allocating resources to developing prudent basic service policies (since RINB
suggests that doing so can incline civilian communities to better report on or inhibit unauthorized
border crossings).

On a similar note, national governments can use the notion of RINB to help justify
investment in basic services, reframing the service programs as security issues during times of
economic strife when moral appeals for increased investment in infrastructure and social
development programs prove insufficient. Lastly, RINB underscores how the power of popular
perception can bolster border security by galvanizing unpaid civilians to more ardently dissuade
or report on border violations (thus reducing border defense expenditures). Ultimately, RINB
offers a more holistic approach to enhancing border security—one that promotes decreased
border porosity without investing large sums of government resources in guard posts and
physical barriers, at the expense of public services.
Bibliography


