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Dear Reader,

I enthusiastically present to you part two of the forty-ninth volume of the Towson University Journal of International Affairs. This issue showcases the writings of two exceptional undergraduate students, in addition to a Towson University Professor. Firstly, Josh Norris conceptualizes a novel way to measure the porosity of state borders, beyond the effectiveness of traditional enforcement methods. Through numerous case studies, Norris articulates how state legitimacy impacts border security, measuring the aggregate causal variables as the Relative Integrity of National Borders. Secondly, Sarah Chin follows with an analysis of how foreign direct investment in China may have the opposite effect that it is conventionally thought to have. Chin explains how the Chinese Communist Party is able to adapt to foreign direct investment in a manner that actually bolsters its stability. Her analysis challenges the popular notion that liberal political systems always follow liberal economic systems. Lastly, Dr. James Roberts presents a highly original synthesis of constructivism and rational choice theory. The formation of identity is highly debated and crucial to understanding human behavior even outside of international relations, in addition to being the foundation of Constructivist Theory.

Sincerely,
Ruhley Michaelides
Editor in Chief
TOWSON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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The Relative Integrity of National Borders (RINB): An Alternative Conception of Border Management

Josh Norris*

Abstract: In the absence of physical barriers or guard posts, civilian communities are the de facto stewards of border enforcement. Yet, as states struggle to mitigate the influx of transboundary threats while managing economic constraints, the role of state legitimacy in border enforcement is often neglected. To enhance policy-making, this article introduces a new analytical framework for evaluating border porosity, namely the relative integrity of national borders (RINB)—the notion that an individual’s feelings toward state governance directly impact his or her respect for state borders. RINB, which is measured in terms of social inclusion, popular attitudes towards state decisions, and the efficacy of border policy enforcement, is tested through the application of three hypotheses to the cases of Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, and Argentina. This article finds, with the exception of Argentina, that Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine affirm my hypotheses, thus supporting the validity of RINB. Importantly, RINB demonstrates a link between state security and conventionally perceived ‘non-security’ policies such as infrastructure and public housing. Therefore, by focusing scarce resources on bolstering public services, states can still strengthen border security—for improved perceptions of state competence can inspire citizens to more actively report on or dissuade border violations.

Introduction

State security is profoundly impacted by the transboundary movement of peoples, ideas, and goods. Consequently, governments allocate resources and manpower to fortify their borders, all in an effort to mitigate the influx of threats such as pathogens, illicit goods, crime, conflicts, and terrorists. However, prevailing international challenges including globalization, the ongoing Syrian Refugee Crisis, the 2015 Crimean Crisis, endemic poverty, and the destabilizing criminal networks of Central and Latin America, have pushed state border authorities to their limit. In order to address the aforementioned threats while accommodating increasing budgetary constraints, states must explore the effects of perceived legitimacy on a previously unexamined aspect of border porosity—popular perceptions of state legitimacy. In essence, this article argues that a newly conceptualized aspect of border security, the relative integrity of national borders (RINB), will allow security analysts and policy-makers to better identify how extensively intertwined state border security is with public perceptions of state competence. Once this relationship is adequately underscored and understood, political officials will be incentivized to implement more prudent and effectual domestic policies, recognizing that doing so can inexpensively motivate civilian (nongovernmental) communities to help enhance border security.

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To elaborate, in the absence of physical barriers or guard posts, civilians (most often those living along national borders) are the de facto stewards of border enforcement. However, the effectiveness of civilian communities at managing transborder movements is contingent upon the perceived relative integrity of national borders (RINB). Integrity, in this sense, is a form of legitimacy referring to how an individual’s feelings regarding the quality of state governance and the enforcement of a state’s national borders directly impacts his or her respect for state borders. The novelty here lies in fusing the significance of perceived state governance with the empirical realities of border enforcement, for these phenomena are deeply interrelated.

Ultimately, relatively low levels of perceived RINB exacerbate border porosity by making citizens less apt to monitor, uphold, or report unauthorized border crossings—for citizens in such states are more likely to view national borders as an extension of an incompetent state unworthy of concern. Therefore, in order to minimize trans-national threats, border management policies must incorporate an approach for improving the view of state competence across civilian communities. Such an approach, like refining public services, will allow governments to reduce border porosity without expending a considerable amount of state resources deploying professional armed guardsmen. To demonstrate the aforementioned relationship between border management and the relative integrity of national borders, the cases of Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, and Argentina will be assessed in detail. However, before examining how RINB will be operationalized and studied, concepts such as legitimacy, sovereignty, and social inclusion must be made clear.

Core Concepts

Legitimacy, particularly state legitimacy, is the notion that a government or institution has the right to rule over a populace. Related to legitimacy is the contested concept of state sovereignty. Although integrity is most closely related to legitimacy, a brief discussion of sovereignty is necessary because it provides a firm theoretical foundation for the construction of RINB. In Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Stephen D. Krasner defines sovereignty in four senses: Westphalian sovereignty, domestic authority and control, interdependence sovereignty, and international legal sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty is the idea that a state government has the exclusive right to exercise its directives without meddling by external actors. International-Legal Sovereignty is the mutual recognition of authority over a territory by other states and entities. In essence, both International-Legal and Westphalian sovereignty largely address the legal attributes of states in the contemporary international system.

Meanwhile, domestic sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to provide order and exercise its will domestically, and interdependence sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to regulate transboundary movements. Domestic and interdependence sovereignty speak most directly to the subject at hand; for many civilian communities are unlikely to be concerned with the lofty legal distinctions of a state. Instead, local populations are more apt to judge state sovereignty as legitimate, if the government is viewed as a competent provider of domestic stability and a concerted effort to curtail transboundary threats is being made. Going forward, this study will

3Ibid., 9.
4Ibid., 11-12.
utilize a fusion of Krasner’s international and domestic sovereignty with the idea of legitimacy, which will be termed the relative integrity of national borders (RINB).

In sum, RINB is the degree to which a state is perceived as the competent and rightful authority over a territory, due to its ability to earn support for state governance and curtail border violations. The “relative” aspect to RINB is significant because it implies that the perceived integrity of a state’s borders is subject to change and fluctuation across time and space. To be clear, no state is able to achieve high RINB across its borders and civilian communities at all times. Thus, the true utility of RINB is that it addresses the often overlooked relationship between a civilian community’s perception of governance and its likelihood to galvanize and rebuff or enable extraterritorial threats. On a separate note, going forward, the terms irregular, illicit, and illegal migration will be used interchangeably to denote unsanctioned border crossings.

Social inclusion, as defined by the World Bank, is the degree to which individuals (particularly poor or marginalized minority groups) are provided access to government services and opportunities. Significantly, social inclusion demonstrates a government’s willingness to accommodate the needs and interests of its citizens regardless of heritage or creed. It is reasonable to conclude that states with sweeping provisions, and accommodations for all subsets of society, are likely to be viewed as more legitimate to civilians than states that disproportionately accommodate access to select privileged groups. Scholars, such as Karleen Jones West, similarly contend that improving government access for neglected groups can improve perceptions of state authority and thus improve domestic security.

Lastly, affirmative action—policy that favors discriminated groups—is an alternative measure of social inclusion. Affirmative action demonstrates how much a state is willing to acknowledge overarching injustice and take action to involve discriminated victims in the enjoyment of benefits they were once socially excluded from (often pertaining to education). Although affirmative action is sometimes controversial, it is reasonable to argue that (in this modern era) states actively working to remedy structural injustices are more likely to be respected by civilians than regimes that overtly repress and discriminate against various groups. To be clear, social inclusion is not the sole determinant of public support for state governance, but it is a crucial factor. Furthermore, for the purpose of this study, what matters is not how much a state is willing to dispense as welfare or aid, but how well a state that provides any services equitably distributes benefits across its population.

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5In other words, RINB refers to a citizen’s perception of state competence (which is defined by both perceived governance support and empirical evidence of border violations) and how this perception of competence can incline or disincline a civilian community to engage in border management.


Methodology and Hypotheses

Three indicators will be used to evaluate the perceived integrity of national borders. The first indicator is the level of social inclusion within the state (ideally within border communities). This indicator will be measured using interviews, polls, media reports, and assessments of resource accessibility that shed light on the treatment, social mobility, and opportunities open to citizens across society. Before moving forward, the use of the equitable availability of potable water as a metric must be explained. International indices, such as the World Bank’s Human Opportunities Index, use water accessibility as a measure of social inclusion because childhood development and ongoing achievement is tied to one’s access to water and basic nutrients. Therefore, governments that disproportionately provide clean water to privileged communities are socially excluding underserved groups from the means of self-advancement (individual nutrition is tied to human survival, immunological vulnerability, and academic performance). As discussed previously with affirmative action, governments that provide more equitable access to key resources and services are more likely to be supported by civilian populations in this day and age.

The second indicator that will be used to evaluate RINB is the public’s attitude toward the decisions being made by the state (i.e. attitudes on state governance). This indicator will be measured by examining riot frequency, public opinion polls, and news coverage. However, it must be noted that indicators such as news coverage and public polls are not a perfect means of capturing public attitudes across an entire country. In general, based upon practical and logistical constraints, polling sources do not gather data on every member of society, and thus the insights gleaned from any poll should be examined with a degree of scrutiny. Furthermore, one cannot definitively verify if the opinions expressed in polls and interviews reflect a respondents’ true feelings. Nevertheless, considering the limited availability of data, measures such as interviews, polls, and protests are the most applicable and credible means of operationalizing this indicator of RINB.

The third indicator that will be used to evaluate RINB is the efficacy of border enforcement policy. This third indicator will be measured by examining official government statements, press releases, interviews, news coverage, and legal cases stemming from border crossing violations (through indictments, judicial rulings, and other legal documents). The underlying rationale for the use of such metrics is that a government is widely viewed by citizens as a major guarantor of border security. Consequentially, a high level of border violations demonstrates a failure on the part of a government to realize its role as a security provider. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that when citizens recognize a high level of border violations, they will likely surmise that proactively reporting violations of national borders to an incompetent state is not worthwhile.

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9It is difficult to disaggregate public attitudes and link said attitudes to particular border communities, because many comprehensive data sources conduct their studies on the national or provincial level (as opposed to the neighborhood or community level).

In terms of causality, I foresee that an increase or decrease in the level of social inclusion will produce an identical increase or decrease in RINB. I base this prediction on the idea that socially inclusive states, in most cases, are more likely to be seen by citizens as authorities worthy of respect. Thus, because national borders are an extension of the state, an improved respect for an inclusive state will likely motivate citizens to report on violations of respected national borders. An examination of media reports and polls will address how community members have vocalized their dissatisfaction or approval of societal treatment. Since states are deeply intertwined with societies, community members that approve of their societal treatment are more likely to value and view national borders as legitimate.

When addressing popular attitudes towards state decisions and RINB, I anticipate that as popular attitudes improve or worsen, RINB will increase or decrease in tandem. I base this prediction on the idea that, as civilian communities increasingly view state actions as rightful and effective, they are more likely to accept other elements of the state such as national borders. However, there is a negative relationship between riot frequency and perceived border legitimacy. The frequency of riots underscores public dissatisfaction. The more riots and poll results that demonstrate public dissatisfaction with state governance, the less likely civilian communities will perceive national borders as legitimate.

In reference to border policy enforcement and RINB, I foresee that an increase or decrease in border policy enforcement will produce an identical increase or decrease in RINB. I base this prediction on the idea that the better a state is able to demonstrate that its borders are rarely violated, the more likely civilian communities will view the national borders as real and legitimate. Conversely, there is a negative relationship between the frequency of border crossing violations (as demonstrated by government statements, legal documents, and interviews) and perceived border legitimacy. Logically, a large number of border crossing violations demonstrates to citizens that the national borders are not functionally existent or perceived as legitimate. With causality and the indicators addressed, an overview of the case studies is in order.

The states that will be subsequently explored—Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, and Argentina—were selected via a random sample from a population of ten states: Ukraine, Mexico, Paraguay, Lebanon, Greece, Angola, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Thailand, and Pakistan. The random sample was applied to mitigate regional selection bias (for the wealth of state data and border information on European countries made them particularly appealing). These ten states were selected because they each exhibited attributes associated with low RINB, including low state capacity, internal strife, low economic development, and poor infrastructure. Although, ideally, this study would include countries from both prospective low and high RINB states, the time constraints of this project inhibit such a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, this study is limited by the availability of relevant border management data, namely firsthand accounts from civilian communities detailing their role in preventing or enabling (licit and illicit) cross border movements.

Case Study—Lebanon

It is impractical to assess Lebanon’s RINB without contextualizing the security environment. Lebanon is an upper-middle income state, home to a confluence of cultures, religions, and enduring civil strife. Historically, the Ottomans and French have exploited

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ethno-religious cleavages by spurring sectarian strife in the interest of consolidating their rule as external overseers.\textsuperscript{12} Today, even as an independent state molded in the image of the French Third Republic, sectarian divisions have been entrenched in the Lebanese political system through the National Pact—a domestic agreement which requires Lebanon’s chief representatives to be apportioned based upon confessional designation. In essence, the President must be Maronite Christian, the Prime Minster must be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament must be Shiite.\textsuperscript{13} This system has undermined the competitiveness of elections and promotes pandering to narrow community interests. Furthermore, Lebanon’s weak government institutions struggle to effectively provide services and robust democratic representation to its population of 6.2 million.\textsuperscript{14} In recent history, the ongoing influx of Palestinian refugees, Israel’s 1982 invasion and occupation, and the Syrian Civil War have placed considerable burdens on a state with a GNI per capita of $7,930.\textsuperscript{15} In sum, the security environment of Lebanon is caustic and undermined by meager state capacity, the spillover of destabilizing conflict, and deep internal divisions.

In terms of social inclusion, Lebanese citizens have made a concerted effort to foster increased tolerance in spite of decades of deep ethno-religious cleavages and rivalries. In 2014, this was demonstrated by a rise in interfaith community gatherings designed to promote religious dialogue and cooperation.\textsuperscript{16} Unfortunately, comprehensive studies of Lebanese society have found that improvements to inclusion are eclipsed by enduring inequalities and mistreatments. The 2016 report on Poverty, Inequality, and Social Protection in Lebanon, conducted by the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, concludes that of the 117,062 Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon in 2015, 70 percent lived below the poverty line ($3.84 person/day).\textsuperscript{17} The conditions are even worse for the 503, 070 Palestinian refugees and an estimated 30,000 unregistered refugees in Lebanon, who are often barred from applying for citizenship by fees and work permit prices.\textsuperscript{18} Legal status as a citizen is essential for refugees in Lebanon because it grants them access to relief programs such as the Emergency National Poverty Targeting Programme (ENPTP)—which provides partial payment of medical bills, school fee waivers, free books, and food assistance to the poorest.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, the report found that Palestinian refugees have been forced to live in ethnically homogenous refugee camps with extreme levels of poverty and few job opportunities. Consequently, some Syrian women have turned to prostitution to provide for their families. Unfortunately, these acts of desperation have fueled Lebanese allegations of Palestinian immorality, thus contributing to the high level of reported refugee harassment, workplace abuse, arbitrary dismissal, refusal of service, and humiliation in schools.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 18
\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 17.
Furthermore, according to the UNESCO Report on Social Inclusion in Lebanon, the Lebanese constitution provides vague but overarching protections and support for social inclusiveness. However, this formal endorsement of inclusiveness has not translated into governmental regulations and social practices. For instance, the report notes that there is no mention of protections for “disadvantaged groups” in Lebanese laws, there is only a partial provision for a “framework law…promoting cultural pluralism and access to cultural life,” and there are no policies in place that “promote cultural development and creativity…among cultural minorities and disadvantaged groups.” In recognition of these shortcomings, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report designates Lebanon as a major under-performer of “Tolerance and Inclusion” in regard to immigrants and religious toleration. It is important to note that Lebanon’s lack of robust and equitable social provisions is not necessarily the result of outright malice or intentional discrimination by the government. Instead, the likely motive is economic turmoil and concomitant public spending constraints. Nevertheless, based upon the index and report examined above, it appears that Lebanon maintains a significantly low level of social inclusion, at least among Palestinian and Syrian refugees (which adversely affects the RINB of Lebanon regardless of government intentionality).

In regard to public attitudes towards governance, Pew Research Center reports initially demonstrated a decline in public dissatisfaction with the Lebanese government. However, this positive trend has been reversed in recent years. For example, in 2002, polls found that only 25 percent of Lebanese citizens believed that their national government had a good influence on their life. In 2007, this positive outlook towards government increased to 61 percent. Similarly, in 2007, only 28 percent of Lebanese citizens were satisfied with their own life, yet 61 percent were satisfied with the national government. In contrast, a 2016 Gallup poll based on face-to-face interviews of 1,000 adults 15 years or older, found that approval of Lebanon’s leadership had dropped from 33 percent in 2014 to 25 percent. Furthermore, polls show that only 22 percent of the Lebanese citizens interviewed found that elections were honest. Most notably, 90 percent of those interviewed believe that corruption was widespread throughout the Lebanese government. Although the Gallup poll relies on a relatively small sample size, when viewed in conjunction with the other aforementioned poll data, it still provides key insights into current Lebanese attitudes towards governance.

Beyond polls, prevailing public sentiments towards the Lebanese government have been demonstrated through political behavior and violence. Notably, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005, allegedly by members of Hezbollah—a militant Shia Islam political
organization that exerts considerable sway in Lebanon. Beyond this case, Hezbollah has operated in Lebanon as an electorally entrenched paramilitary-political party, which refuses to forego its weapon stockpiles in spite of government demands for disarmament (thus undermining government authority). On another note, in August of 2015, thousands of “You Stink!” protesters gathered in the streets of Beirut to denounce government gridlock. Similarly, in September of 2015, Lebanese security forces forcibly removed 30 protesters of the “You Stink!” anti-government movement that had stormed the Ministry of Environment in Beirut and began a sit-in. To be clear, the You Stink! Movement is a reaction to the Lebanese government’s failure to agree on waste-removal contracts due to political brinkmanship. In turn, garbage had accumulated throughout Beirut, thus sparking widespread denunciations of government incompetence, ineffectiveness, and corruption. In addition, that same year at a different event, a “You Stink!” protester was killed while throwing stones and bottles at police alongside 200 other protesters. Based upon mixed poll results and various traumatic protests, it appears that Lebanon has a moderate to low level of governance approval.

In terms of border enforcement, in 2000, 53 illegal immigrants were arrested while crossing Northern Lebanon in an attempt to reach a Spanish port. In 2015, Lebanese Army Intelligence successfully identified a five-member smuggling network that was using boats to smuggle migrants into Lebanon. In 2016, the Lebanese Army has continued its border enforcement efforts through the arrest of 49 Syrian refugees who attempted to illegally enter Lebanon. In contrast to these cases of successful border enforcement, the Middle East Institute found that in 2010 the number of irregular migrants (at least 400,000) outweighed the level of regular/legal migrants (302,315). This finding undermines the aforementioned evidence regarding effective border enforcement portrayed by the arrest reports and accounts alone. Therefore, in light of proactive efforts and enduring shortcomings, Lebanese border enforcement is moderately ineffective.

29Hezbollah is a truly profound expression of, and contributor to, sectarian strife in Lebanon. For more information please see Berti, Benedetta. 2011. "Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in Electoral Politics: The Case of Hizballah." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34. No. 12: 942-962.
Overall, as demonstrated above, Lebanon has a significantly low level of social inclusion, a moderate to low level of governance approval, and moderately ineffective border enforcement. These characteristics collectively embody low RINB and, consequently, increased border porosity. However, to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, a case must be identified that ties these indicators to an actual instance of a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings to occur. In Lebanon, the impact of low RINB is highlighted in the town of Arsal—a major hub for human trafficking between Syria and Lebanon. In a *Vice* interview, a smuggler named Abu Hussein admitted to illegally funneling fighters from Lebanon into Syria. Hussein claims to use discrete off road routes to reach the Syrian-Lebanese border that has been left virtually unguarded since Syrian troops were recalled to fight rebels in 2011. This case seems to affirm my hypothesis, for Hussein’s decision to engage in smuggling is likely motivated by his perception that the Lebanese borders are undeserving of veneration and civilian policing (which represents low RINB), particularly since the Lebanese government cannot field ample border guards.

**Case Study -- Mexico**

Mexico is home to 123 million individuals and stands as a median between the economically developed North American countries and the developing countries of Central and South America. As such, Mexico is a major hub for both licit and illicit economic migration, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. Mexico has a GNI per capita of $9,710 and enjoys close economic ties with North America via NAFTA. Internally, modern Mexico suffers from the legacy of (and in some cases ongoing) government corruption, thus undermining the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state’s political institutions. The international War on Drugs has strongly impacted the internal affairs of Mexico. In some regions, this is evident through outright conflict between government forces and criminal organizations. In other cases, cartels and local criminals have bribed, coopted, or pacified law enforcement officials. The continued occurrence of civilian homicides, kidnappings, and deaths coupled with the election of Enrique Pena Nieto in 2012 has further flamed internal contentions. Yet, in spite of such tumultuous occurrences, the Mexican government has made considerable strides in curtailing migrant smuggling, in some cases through joint operations with United States’ DEA and border enforcement personnel.

37In this case, “community” entails a single community member who facilitates illegal border crossings, but represents a broader collective. In other words, the actions of this community member underscores the potential for other community members to engage in the same behavior. Vice may have made contact with other smugglers, but were unable to receive permission to disclose their identities and practices.


In terms of social inclusion, media reports have shown an uptick in homophobia related violence in Mexico, despite government efforts such as tolerance campaigns. In addition, the 2016 World Bank Human Opportunities Index Report for Latin America and the Caribbean has found that, in 2012, 61.68 percent of the population had access to well or rain water—a common metric for moderate social inclusion (the unequal distribution of social benefits or services). Similarly, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report ranks Mexico in the “Very High Social Progress” level and designates Mexico as an average performer in terms of “Tolerance and Inclusion” regarding immigrants and religious tolerance.

In contrast, the 2015 America Quarterly Social Inclusion Index poorly ranked Mexico 16th out of the 17 American countries measured in terms of affirmative action and inclusion. Therefore, due to contrasting reports across indices and news sources, Mexico appears to exhibit a moderate level of social inclusion.

Polls from 2007 and 2014 suggest that Mexicans are overall satisfied with state governance. In 2007, only 30 percent of Mexicans were satisfied with the state of the nation, but 70 percent were satisfied with their national government. This disparity suggests that dissatisfaction was rooted in non-state factors, most likely criminal activities and violence related to the embedded drug trade. A 2014 poll found that, in 2013, 68 percent viewed President Pena Nieto’s national government as good, but this decreased to 57 percent in 2014. The same poll found that in 2013, 30 percent viewed President Pena Nieto’s national government as bad, which increased to 41 percent in 2014. Although the recent decline in government support appears minimal, an examination of recent political behavior will provide greater insight.

In 2012, as President Pena Nieto was sworn in, massive protests were staged in front of the National Palace whereby protestors hurled Molotov cocktails and firecrackers at the defending security forces. In addition, a 2014 riot broke out in Mexico City after 43 college students were attacked by policemen and delivered to a local gang, which later dumped and burned the student’s bodies. The protest was carried out, once again, in front of the National Palace, by the relatives of the victims who were denouncing the atrocities committed by state police. In 2016, 55 officers and 53 civilians were wounded in a clash between teachers, police, and locals in the Mexican state of Oaxaca. The clash took place after seven days of street blockages by teachers protesting for national education reform. In short, considering both the polls’ depiction of government approval and enduring instances of public unrest, it appears that Mexico has a moderate level of governance approval.

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50 Ibid.

In terms of border enforcement, a 2004 media report explains that the National Migration Institute (Mexico’s Immigration Agency) initiated an internal effort to improve its bureaucratic integrity after years of accepting bribes in exchange for the release of illegal migrants.\footnote{“Mexico’s Immigration Service Fires Agents for Corruption,” \textit{Kolot8 abc}, October 4, 2016, \url{http://www.kolotv.com/content/news/Mexicos-immigration-service-fires-agents-for-corruption-395796901.html}.} Amnesty International found, in 2013, that irregular migration into and across Mexico had increased since 2012.\footnote{Amnesty International, “Irregular Migrants in Mexico: ten Urgent Measures to Save Lives,” March 12, 2013, \url{http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/irregular-migrants-in-mexico-ten-urgent-measures-to-save-lives}.} Furthermore, in 2015, the news media had reported that President Pena Nieto’s “Plan Frontera Sur” had successfully decreased irregular migration along Mexico’s southern border at the cost of human rights observance. In other words, there were ongoing allegations of governmental mistreatment and outright abuse of illegal migrants.\footnote{Sylvia Longmire, “Mexico Abuses Their Own Illegal Immigrants,” Breitbart, October 21, 2015, \url{http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/10/21/mexico-abuses-illegal-immigrants/}.} This is a unique case, for although the overall decrease in irregular migration is a testament to effective border enforcement, the inhumane means of achieving such security may lead Mexican civilians to find the enterprise of border enforcement to be distasteful and unworthy of their participation or support. Lastly, the US State Department has labeled Mexico as a Tier 2 Trafficking in Persons Country under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000—national legislation designed to allow the US to diplomatically assess and engage foreign governments in an effort to eliminate human trafficking.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Laws on Trafficking in Persons,” accessed October 17, 2016, \url{http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/}.} Tier 2 entails that although Mexico failed to meet minimum anti-trafficking standards in 2015, it has made minor improvements such as the conviction of 86 traffickers.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, “Mexico: Tier 2,” accessed October 10, 2016, \url{http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258821.htm}.} In sum, considering the largely negative reports mentioned above, Mexican border enforcement is ineffective.

Overall, in the case of Mexico, the state demonstrates a low level of social inclusion, a moderate level of governance approval, and ineffective border enforcement. These characteristics collectively constitute moderate to low RINB. However, to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, explicit evidence must be provided that ties these indicators to a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings to occur. In this case, the connection to a single civilian community is not as overt, but still evident. To elaborate, Mexico’s low RINB is reflected by the ongoing success and ambition of \textit{polleros}, Mexican human-smugglers. A pollero interviewed by \textit{Frontline} explained that human smuggling from Mexico into the United States has become increasingly fruitful as average citizens are no longer able to illegally cross the more rigidly policed US-Mexico border without professional aid.\footnote{Frontline World, “Mexico: Crimes at the Border,” May 27, 2008, video, \url{http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/watch/player.html?pkg=704 Crimes&seg=1&mod=0}.} In search of adrenaline and wealth, an increasing number of young and middle-age Mexicans are entering this illicit profession and innovating smuggling practices (developing more discrete human smuggling compartments in cars and discovering new and remote border weak points).\footnote{Ibid.} The case of Mexico partially supports my hypothesis, for it is clear that economic interests play a major role in why individuals are facilitating the violation of borders, and because polleros operate across Mexico (but often in civilian communities). Still, one can infer from this activity that the polleros do not view Mexican national borders as deserving of veneration and
protection, and this is likely tied to prevailing perceptions of government corruption and internal instability (which represents low RINB).

**Case Study -- Ukraine**

Ukraine is a country that has survived socialist rule and integration under the USSR, shares a historic cultural and ethnic bond with Russia, and is struggling to democratize to gain entry into the EU. Domestic and international forces, ranging from the desire to economically develop, to enduring military and political ties to Russian institutions, have given rise to an era of internal dissonance and turmoil. The unconventional proxy war waged against Ukraine by Russia, the 2015 Crimean Crisis, has shaped the security environment of modern Ukraine. In addition, political corruption and democratic aspirations (such as accountability and transparency) have resulted in destabilizing protests and uprisings, an overthrow of the established pro-Russian regime, and the countervailing response of Russian aggression and insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. For a country of 44.2 million and a GNI per capita of $2,620, the tumult of constant political uprisings has severely eroded infrastructure and housing, exacerbating the challenges facing a resource stricken government that is struggling to provide relief to its citizens.

In regard to social inclusion, recent Gallup polls attest that, between 2008 and 2013, the percentage of Ukrainians that believe tolerance for people of different nationalities is worse than in the Soviet Days has increased from 16 percent to 30 percent. Similarly, when this same question was posed with the term “nationalities” replaced with “religions,” the percentage between 2008 and 2013 increased from 12 percent to 19 percent. In other words, the polls suggest that Ukrainians believe they are becoming increasingly intolerant towards those of different nationalities and religions. In contrast, the World Banks’ 2016 Human Opportunities Index states that Ukraine provides 65.17 percent of its population with equitable accessibility to piped water. This fairly moderate percentage suggests that there is a small but important uneven distribution of services across Ukrainian society. In line with this assessment, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report also ranked Ukraine as middling in terms of “Tolerance and Inclusion” regarding immigrants and religious tolerance.

Additionally, a 2009 European Commission Report found that the Ukrainian state has tried to strengthen social protections to excluded groups, but these efforts have been stifled by economic turmoil. The report adds that social exclusion is greatest in Ukraine among

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homosexuals, the homeless, drug-consumers, HIV/AIDS victims, and ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{66} Uniquely, unlike in Lebanon and Mexico where social exclusion was made manifest through violence and degradation, Ukrainians socially exclude minority groups by advocating for their social isolation.\textsuperscript{67} Social isolation differs from social exclusion in that it entails the pressuring of deviants to live in geographically compact enclaves, as opposed to simply excluding deviants from social and economic programs without promoting de facto segregation. The UNDP 2012 report found that 37.75 percent of Ukrainian households experience acute social exclusion, which is particularly problematic because social exclusion of minorities limits their economic life, restricts opportunities, and often translates to low standards of living (which collectively foster societal grievances and deviance).\textsuperscript{68} In the end, although polls demonstrate that Ukraine expresses an interest in promoting inclusiveness, the reports examined largely suggest that Ukraine exhibits a moderate to low level of social inclusion.

In terms of attitudes towards governance, polls have portrayed public dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s government, particularly concentrated in the eastern regions. For instance, a 2007 Pew poll found that only 32 percent of Ukrainians were satisfied with their own lives, and 31 percent were satisfied with their national government.\textsuperscript{69} A 2014 poll found that 77 percent of Ukrainians wanted to remain unified and 14 percent wanted to secede, but the desire to secede was greatest in the Eastern regions. To be precise, only 4 percent of Ukrainians in Western regions of Ukraine wanted to secede, while 18 percent of the Eastern Regions wanted to secede.\textsuperscript{70} In addition, the same poll found that while 41 percent of Ukrainians feel that their current government has a good influence on events in Ukraine, 49 percent felt that the government actually has a bad influence. Though polls are instructive, a richer understanding of governance support requires one to delve deeper.

In 2013, 30,000 Ukrainians took to the streets, calling for the resignation of President Victor Yanukovych in response to his last minute pivot from EU integration to closer ties with Russia.\textsuperscript{71} Roughly 70,000 Ukrainians gathered in Kiev in 2014, and once again advocated for the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych.\textsuperscript{72} In 2015, 260 secessionist protesters clashed with riot police, and one protester even tossed a grenade at the security forces.\textsuperscript{73} Furthermore, militias

\textsuperscript{67}Ibid., 140.
have clashed with police in 2016, namely veterans of the Orange Revolution who were calling for a “Third Maidan Revolution.” In sum, in light of both the poll results and frequent protests, it appears that Ukraine has a low level of governance approval, particularly in the eastern region.

In terms of border efficacy, a 2006 report by the International Centre for Policy Studies (Kyiv, Ukraine) Institute for Public Affairs found that illegal migration detentions in Ukraine grew from 25,539 in 2004, to 32,726 in 2006. In addition, the report concluded that only 5-10 percent of all illegal migrants transiting into and across Ukraine were actually detained. The report notes that the ethnicity of irregular migrants was shifting from South East Asian and African descent to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nationals including Georgians, Russians, Chechens, Uzbeks, Alzeris, Moldovans, and Armenians. In 2016, the BBC found that the Ukrainian security service disbanded a migrant smuggling ring. Meanwhile, the Border Monitoring Project Ukraine, an online media platform that compiles reports of unauthorized border crossings, has cited numerous border violations across 2015 and 2016. For instance, in 2015, 22 irregular migrants were arrested en route to Hungary through Ukraine (four women, three children, and a baby), and that same year a helicopter containing illegal migrants took off in Ukraine and crashed in Slovakia (killing seven). In 2016, the site highlighted reports of 207 illegal migrants caught at the Ukrainian-Slovakian border and 40 captured at the Hungarian Ukrainian border. Based upon these findings, it appears that Ukrainian border enforcement, despite notable successes, is largely ineffective.

Overall, Ukraine exhibits a moderate to low level of social inclusion, a low level of governance approval, and ineffective border enforcement. In sum, these traits constitute low RINB. Still, in order to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, a link between the indicators and a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings must be identified. For Ukraine, the firsthand accounts of illegally smuggled cigarettes known as “cheap whites” demonstrate how elements of low RINB, like ineffective border enforcement, can drive civilian communities to promote or permit illegal transboundary movements. A Vice interview with a low tier smuggler and the regional head of a Ukrainian drug-trafficking cell revealed that a black market for cheap cigarettes has emerged across the EU.

The low tier smuggler described how the illicit goods are hidden in horse-drawn wagons and moved across the countryside of Ukraine and into Poland. Alternatively, the high tier operative described how makeshift aircraft are sometimes launched from Ukraine and illegally

78It is important to note that, because most of the sources on the site are in Cyrillic and are from local Ukrainian news centers, I was unable to find any additional English language accounts of these violations to validate each of the illegal crossings cited. However, it is reassuring that each of the cases were reported on by multiple Russian language news agencies.
drop cigarettes into Poland. The operatives specified that the smuggling was predominantly conducted within rural towns along the Ukrainian-Polish border—sometimes under the gaze of civilian townspeople. Although it is unclear if the townspeople are directly involved in the smuggling, it is clear that they have made no concerted effort to report the unauthorized border crossings to government authorities. Like in the case of Mexico, it seems that economic gain was a major driver behind the smuggling in Ukraine. However, it should not be understated that the interviewed smugglers did not venerate or view Ukrainian national borders as being worthy of protection, and this is likely tied to the internal corruption and ineffectiveness of the state (which represents low RINB).

Case Study -- Argentina

Argentina boasts a particularly unique security environment, one underpinned by pervasive poverty and domestic instability—oddly accompanied by an enduring openness towards incoming goods, peoples, and ideas. The state has experienced a tumultuous history of autocratic socialist and/or military regimes coupled with its status as a rentier state whose stability and economic foundation relies upon the extraction and exploitation of a high demand commodity—in this case being crude oil. Today, with a population of 43 million and a GNI per capita of $12,460, Argentina’s government struggles to reign in exceptionally high crime rates and drug trafficking in spite of deep deficits and the overarching pressure of challenging economic conditions.

In terms of social inclusion, media sources report that Buenos Aires, became a bastion for the Hebrew language and culture in 2001. In 2014, media reports have also called attention to an anti-immigrant xenophobic campaign directed towards Bolivians that has swept the country. The 2010 World Bank Opportunities Index Report for Latin America and the Caribbean states that Argentina, in 2004, provided 98 percent of its children age 16 or younger with access to piped or rain water, without disparities in access. This is a considerable feat considering the country’s ongoing economic turmoil. In addition, the 2016 Social Progress Index Report ranked Argentina as middling in terms of “Tolerance and Inclusion” regarding immigration and religious tolerance. In contrast, the 2015 America Quarterly Social Inclusion Index ranked Argentina as the 9th state out of 17 American countries in terms of Ethno racial inclusion (which is based on

surveys concerning affirmative action and inclusion legislation).\textsuperscript{87} Essentially, in light of mixed reviews on Argentine inclusiveness, Argentina boasts a moderate level of social inclusion.

In regard to attitudes towards governance, polls have shown a mixture of Argentinean support and distaste for their government. To be precise, a 2007 Pew poll found that although only 39 percent of Argentinians were satisfied with the state of their nation, 61 percent were satisfied with their national government.\textsuperscript{88} It is unclear what drove this disparity, but one theory is that there are societal ethnic cleavages that have undermined confidence in Argentina as a unified nation, while vindicating the government as a separate administrative entity not necessarily accountable for such issues. Moreover, between 2002 and 2007, the percentage of Argentineans that believed the national government was good increased drastically from 7 percent to 61 percent. Yet, the same poll found that 75 percent of Argentineans viewed corrupt political leadership as a major issue—this paints a rather unclear picture of public sentiment towards governance.\textsuperscript{89}

Going beyond the polls, in 2012, 500,000 anti-government protestors stormed the streets of Buenos Aires in opposition to the government administration. The protest was due to the Argentine government’s failure to alleviate high levels of inflation, corruption, media controls, and allegations of a planned tenure extension for President Fernandez.\textsuperscript{90} In 2015, thousands of citizens ardently protested in opposition to enduring cases of sexual abuse and violence against women, many protestors denouncing the Argentine government for not keeping comprehensive records on femicide.\textsuperscript{91} In 2016, thousands of protestors took to the streets to voice their dissatisfaction with President Mauricio Macri’s economic austerity measures, which have led to the dismissal of nearly 20,000 unionized public sector workers.\textsuperscript{92} In the end, the mixed results of government approval polls and the cases of political demonstration suggest that Argentina has a low to moderate level of governance approval.

In terms of border enforcement, it is difficult to uncover any precise information regarding contemporary Argentine illegal migration statistics, due to the acceptance of immigration as a human right in 2004.\textsuperscript{93} The most recent available data states that, in 1996, at least 200,000 illegal migrants resided in Argentina. In the end, based upon the fragile economic conditions, limited government capacity, and a lack of explicit data on border violations, one cannot conclude that Argentina is overall ineffective at border enforcement even though prevailing knowledge suggests that it is so. However, the caveat is that Argentina as a state and a society does not prioritize rigid border enforcement (the state recognizes migration as an inherent


\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.


human right). In turn, it is to be expected that Argentina is less effective at managing its borders than countries such as the United States or even Mexico.

Overall, in the case of Argentina, the state boasts a moderate level of social inclusion, a low to moderate level of governance approval, and is seemingly ineffective at border enforcement. Collectively, these characteristics make up low RINB. Yet, in order to enhance the assessment of my hypotheses, evidence must be identified that ties the indicators mentioned above to an instance of a civilian community facilitating or willfully allowing illegal border crossings. Out of the four states studied, Argentina is the only case where evidence linking RINB to actual border violation is not readily available. It is unclear if this shortfall is due to a dearth of English language investigative reporting on Argentine border security issues, or if the societal acceptance of migration in the state has made illegal crossings the status quo (and thus unworthy of being reported to the media or local authorities). In any case, due to the lack of available information on Argentine border management, this case does not lend weight to or necessarily detract from my hypotheses.

Conclusion

With the exception of Argentina, the case studies of Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine appear to affirm my hypotheses. To elaborate, the findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between social inclusion and RINB, a positive relationship between governance approval and RINB, and a positive relationship between border enforcement effectiveness and RINB. Polls, national surveys, think-tank assessments, and scholarship suggest that, in Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine, social inclusion is widely dismal or middling in performance. The exclusion and abuse of minorities, like the Palestinians in Lebanon, has contributed to low RINB and could expand border porousness beyond communities such as Arsal to Palestinian refugee camps. Reports of frequent protests and polls on corruption and governmental support in these three states have demonstrated that government support is overall poor, with some fluctuation. In essence, widespread dissatisfaction with government administration, an aspect of low RINB, undermines the public’s willingness to obey or uphold state border policies. Consequently, low RINB increases the likelihood that illicit trans-border activities—such as the movement of “cheap whites” across Ukrainian borders—will take place.

Furthermore, media reports, nongovernmental watchdogs, and state press releases on Lebanon, Mexico, and Ukraine suggest that border enforcement is largely ineffective. Ongoing and frequent failures by state authorities to restrict border crossings, an element of low RINB, incentivizes smugglers from within and without border towns, like polleros, to challenge border authorities in the interest of economic gain. As the polleros have highlighted, low RINB (a negative perception of a state’s governance and capacity to dissuade border violations) is not the only driver of illegal transboundary movements. Endemic poverty and low standards of living are more widely examined push factors that inspire individuals to engage in illicit transboundary migration and drug trafficking (to improve the livelihood of self and kin). This example underscores, that the concept of RINB should not be viewed as a replacement for explanatory variables concerned with economic aspirations (such as economic development, poverty, and unemployment).

Instead, RINB is a means of explaining how perceptions of state competence are integrally tied to the management of national borders. By utilizing RINB assessments, while considering other factors like economic development, policy-makers will be able to better
identify and understand why border porousness is variable across time, and how changes to domestic policy and public perceptions can greatly improve border management. In sum, this study provides insight into the conceptual utility and significance of RINB, while highlighting enduring challenges to research such as the lack of available first-hand accounts on civilian community sentiments and trafficking experiences. By extension, additional research could build upon RINB and provide an even more robust explanation of border porousness. Still, there are several virtues unique to RINB.

Although RINB is a fledgling concept, its political implications can positively impact all states within the international system—for the concept underscores how non-security polices conventionally unassociated with border management can profoundly impact border porousness. To elaborate, domestic policies that provide and enhance important basic services such as reliable infrastructure, affordable housing, and clean water, are deeply tied to public satisfaction. In other words, these public service polices often foster a great deal of governance support when they succeed, and elicit ardent condemnations when they fail. Thus, when this relationship is considered in conjunction with RINB, policy-makers will be more apt to recognize the significance of allocating resources to developing prudent basic service policies (since RINB suggests that doing so can incline civilian communities to better report on or inhibit unauthorized border crossings).

On a similar note, national governments can use the notion of RINB to help justify investment in basic services, reframing the service programs as security issues during times of economic strife when moral appeals for increased investment in infrastructure and social development programs prove insufficient. Lastly, RINB underscores how the power of popular perception can bolster border security by galvanizing unpaid civilians to more ardently dissuade or report on border violations (thus reducing border defense expenditures). Ultimately, RINB offers a more holistic approach to enhancing border security—one that promotes decreased border porousness without investing large sums of government resources in guard posts and physical barriers, at the expense of public services.
Bibliography


Correctly Handled Contradictions: A Regional Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment and Democratization in China

Sarah Chin

Abstract: As an increasingly large link between China and the rest of the world, as well as a key component of economic policy, foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment made by a party in one country in business interests in another country. It represents the influx of both capitalism and globalism in China. This paper investigates the link between FDI and regime stability by examining how FDI has affected formal and informal institutional change, especially at the local level. I come to the conclusion that FDI has indeed created institutional change in multiple arenas but that this change has reinforced the CCP’s stability.

Introduction

What is the relationship between democracy and foreign direct investment (FDI)? Given that scholars often link economic liberalization, globalization, and democracy, it may seem that FDI and democracy should go hand in hand. However, it is clear that this is not the case in modern China. Though China receives the most FDI in the world, it remains a one-party authoritarian state.1

In December 1978, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee under Deng Xiaoping instituted gaige kaifang, or “reform and opening up”, marking a turning point in Chinese economic development. The 1978 reforms had two key components: decentralizing the economy and opening China up to foreign direct investment (FDI).2 With newfound agency and growing resources, local governments in areas with foreign investment were able to promote local economic growth with greater intensity than ever before.

Economic decentralization gave more decision-making power to local governments, reemphasizing the importance of local actors in both political and economic matters.3 In 1980, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took the first steps towards integrating China into the global economy with the establishment of four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in southern China: Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Xiamen. These SEZs were designed to attract FDI and were under a legal system that allowed for more capitalistic labor practices. In the same way that Yan’an and the Jiangxi Soviet experimented with collectivized agriculture before Land Reform officially began, the SEZs acted as “experiments” for the

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3 Ibid., 257.
CCP. The goal was to determine whether FDI was sustainable and under what conditions it would flourish. The observations gathered from the SEZs helped the CCP develop and implement the “Coastal Development Strategy,” opening fourteen coastal cities to foreign investment only a few years later. Over six thousand foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) were established, marking the beginning of China’s export-oriented growth strategy, which continues today. Nationally, China’s massive economic growth has often been attributed to this influx of FDI.

It is also important to note that regional development in China has been incredibly varied. Outside of SEZs and coastal cities, FDI was limited. This resulted in large disparities in regional wealth and economic development that persist today. On a macro level, this is reflected in regional differences in the number and geographic concentration of businesses; in 2003, nearly 70 percent of registered private enterprises were located on China’s eastern seaboard. In the same year, Guangdong province and Jiangsu province, the two biggest destinations for FDI, had over 70,000 FIEs. China’s three western-most provinces, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai, combined had less than 600 FIEs. In 2014, the number of FIEs in Guangdong and Jiangsu’s grew to over 150,000. On the other hand, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai still had less than 2,000 FIE’s, showing that region does matter when it comes to FDI.

Since the 1980s, FDI has only grown in importance to the Chinese economy. In 1982 (the first year this type of data was collected), China’s net inflow of FDI was 430 million USD. By 2015, this number grew to 250 billion USD. China also topped the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s 2015-2017 list of most attractive investment destinations for multinational companies. Clearly, FDI is a major link between China and the rest of the world. It is a particularly interesting area of study because of the transformative role FDI has had in China. Not only does FDI represent economic liberalization, but it also represents increasing globalization. An investigation into how FDI affects regime stability is necessary to understand the CCP’s current stability, as well as its future trajectory.

It must be noted that the Chinese model of export-oriented growth is different from that of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea). The East Asian NICs relied on export-driven growth with little foreign participation in their economies while FDI was much more prevalent in China.

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5Zweig, "China's Political Economy," 258.
China is also not comparable to former Soviet states because the former Soviet states had more internal economic reform before opening up to the global economy.\textsuperscript{12} China presents a unique case and cannot be understood through the developmental models of other seemingly similar countries.

To further understand the relationship between FDI and regime stability, I will investigate two questions: first, how does FDI change formal and informal institutions in China, especially entrepreneur and government behavior? Second, how does this institutional change or lack thereof affect regime stability?

This paper is separated into three parts: first, an explanation of the hypothesis and description of the methodology; second, a review of the relevant literature; third, an explanation and test of the hypothesis; and fourth, a critical analysis of what the findings mean for the CCP’s future stability. I argue that that FDI causes domestic entrepreneurs to modify their own business practices. In order to help domestic firms better compete with FIEs, governments (both local and national) responded by changing formal institutions to reflect entrepreneurs’ actual practices. It is this institutional change that reinforced the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) stability. If the first component of this hypothesis is true, then we should also observe that entrepreneurs in regions with large amounts of FDI generally did not and do not act assertively towards the government, thus enhancing the region’s political stability.

\textbf{Methodology and Key Concepts}

To evaluate my hypothesis, I will use mostly qualitative data, much of it from Kellee Tsai’s study of entrepreneurial behavior in \textit{Capitalism Without Democracy}, to evaluate a set of hypothesis-confirming criteria. In this paper, institutions are understood as the formal and informal norms regulating society and human behavior. I will focus specifically on the role of formal institutions because changes in formal institutions can indicate societal shifts, especially in the goals and priorities of a regime.\textsuperscript{13} Scrutinizing the processes of transition and change is helpful in understanding how society-at-large currently functions as well as what it may look like in the future. This paper centers its analysis on entrepreneurs, the key actors whose arrival on the post-reform scene marked massive societal changes in China. Here, an entrepreneur is defined as an owner of a private business, both those involved in FIEs and those who are not.

This paper will also make use of several different models of Chinese political economy commonly used in the relevant literature. These models are demarcated by different developmental legacies, which in turn, are influenced by differences in natural resources, geography, and how local governments have implemented (or not implemented) national policies in the face of economic decentralization.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 23.
The two most common models of Chinese political economy referenced in the literature are the Wenzhou and Sunan models. In the Wenzhou model (named after the municipality in Zhejiang province), economic development was led by private sector entrepreneurs beginning in the late 1970s and was supported by the state. Private businesses, most often producing low-end consumer goods, were prevalent and state ownership was not common. Reliance on informal sources of finance is also a key factor in the Wenzhou model. Following the implementation of the Wenzhou model, extremely poor areas experienced rapid economic growth in the 1980s. In contrast, the Sunan model is marked by government-led economic growth. Under the Sunan model, public ownership dominated the early years of reform while private ownership was stifled by government restrictions. It was not until the 1990s that areas began to experience a gradual transition to private ownership.

In Capitalism Without Democracy, Kellee Tsai introduces two other models, the state-dominated model and the limited-development model. The state-dominated model, exemplified by the major industrial cities of the Mao era (Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, etc.), is characterized by the legacy of collective ownership. Up until the 1990s, restrictions on private businesses remained heavily enforced and as a result, business made up a very small portion of the local economy. Areas following the limited-development model are marked by their extreme underdevelopment during both the Mao and reform eras. This includes most of western China, including Xinjiang, Tibet, and Sichuan. The government does not restrict private enterprises in these areas but they still remain scarce. This paper will make some mention of the Wenzhou and Sunan models but will not focus on them. These descriptions are provided here to demonstrate the complex diversity of Chinese political economy.

This paper will focus on the South China model, also known as the Zhujiang or Pearl River Delta model. It combines elements of the Wenzhou and Sunan models but with earlier and greater importance of foreign capital and trade. In the Sunan model, rural industries grew out of collectively-owned (but usually local government-controlled) Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in the late 1970s, before the central government officially sanctioned TVE’s as part of their development strategy. As in the Wenzhou model, small private entrepreneurs were able to pool their capital to establish light industrial factories; however, the powerful presence of FDI differentiates the South China model from any other model. A common saying in Xiamen, a SEZ in Fujian, sums up FDI’s role in the local economy: “3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8”. This refers to the fact that FDI comprised 30 percent of Xiamen’s fixed investment, 40 percent of its tax revenues, 50 percent of its labor force, 60-70 percent of its exports, and 80 percent of its industrial output.

The South China model is considered a regional model because its dynamics were initially concentrated in south China. According to the China Urban Statistical Yearbook, in 1993, 86.8 percent of urban FDI was located on the eastern seaboard. Guangdong province

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16 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 154.
17 J. Zhang, "Marketization, Class Structure, and Democracy in China", 426.
18 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 158.
19 Ibid., 161-163.
20 Ibid., 165-166.
21 Ibid., 159.
22 Ibid., 182.
alone accounted for 32 percent of FDI in the country. Much of South China’s attractiveness came from its physical proximity as well as linguistic and cultural similarities to lenders. That same year, half of China’s FDI came from Hong Kong and Macau, and another eight percent came from Taiwan. FDI-rich regions experienced rapid development. Other cited benefits of FDI include the diffusion of new technology and managerial practices and the creation of foreign-exchange reserves through urbanization and export-led growth.

**Literature Review**

Soon after Deng’s economic reforms, most of the international business community as well as many academics began to predict that FDI (and private sector development more generally) would democratize China. Many argued that the influx of foreign capital and business through FDI would destabilize the authoritarian regime and accelerate the democratization process by both creating western links and a politically active middle class. In 2002, the American Society for Competitiveness stated that “global entrepreneurs must continue to invest in corporate infrastructure to help insure stability, success and the inevitable attainment of full democracy there.” The logic behind this can be described by a combination of modernization theory and Levitsky and Way’s theory of western linkage.

Much of the literature on Chinese FDI employs modernization theory or at least relies on its main premise that democracy is the natural result of capitalism. There is little evidence outside Western Europe that supports modernization theory; in fact, Przeworski and Limongi find that the probability of democratization decreases as new states develop under authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, the basic logic of modernization theory underlies many of the beliefs about China’s democratization prospects post-FDI. According to this logic, capitalism creates a new private sector middle class who will advocate for an increased role in politics. In the case of FDI, multinational corporations (MNCs) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) promote democratization by creating jobs that give rise to a middle class. The middle class would see a democracy with a strong rule of law and limits on the government’s power as beneficial to their business interests and would thus advocate for democratization. Applying this logic specifically to China, Shaohua Hu wrote in 2000 that “[China’s] growing economy will bring higher living standards, a higher level of education, and a more complicated socioeconomic structure in its wake. Under these circumstances, more people will demand more freedom and democracy.”

Levitsky and Way’s theory of linkage and leverage can also explain how FDI might be a democratizing force. They primarily apply this theory to “competitive authoritarian” regimes, or regimes in which formal, nominally democratic institutions exist but are widely

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23Ibid., 161.
25Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, 2.
27Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, 2.
viewed as favorable to the incumbents and hostile to the opposition. China is not one of these regimes and is indeed classified as a “closed regime where no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power.” However, Levitsky and Way’s basic logic can yield some insights into why some believe China might democratize.

Broadly defined, linkage is a regime’s connections to “the West,” defined here as Western states and Western-dominated multilateral institutions, like the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU). Linkage is most effective when working in tandem with leverage, which is defined as an authoritarian regime’s “vulnerability to external democratizing pressure.” Leverage can take the force of diplomatic pressure, military threats, and economic sanctions. Levitsky and Way note that China has low leverage because of its considerable size, military strength, and economic power. While leverage comes specifically from other states, linkage can come from either states or private actors.

Levitsky and Way argue that the more links a country has to the West, the more likely it is to democratize. They posit five distinct categories of linkage: economic, geopolitical, social, communication, and transnational civil society. In the case of FDI and China, economic, social, and communication linkages are the most salient. FDI establishes direct monetary connections between the West and China, and drives interstate travel and communication. Linkage raises the cost of authoritarianism in several ways. First, by heightening Western awareness of government abuse; second, by increasing the probability of international response to this abuse; third, by creating domestic constituencies with a stake in democratization and democratic norms; and fourth, by strengthening democratic forces, especially opposition parties.

In states with high linkage and low leverage, Levitsky and Way predict that external democratizing pressure will be “diffuse and indirect but nevertheless considerable.” Even though there is an absence of direct external pressure, intense scrutiny of government actions from transnational civil society organizations, diasporic groups, international media, etc. will raise the cost of authoritarianism significantly. Thus, “linkage blurs international and domestic politics, transforming international norms into domestic demands.” Levitsky and Way cite Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party and Taiwan under the Kuomintang as prime examples of this blurring. In both of these cases, high linkage raised the cost of authoritarianism by increasing the flow of information across borders and strengthening the indigenous pro-democratization oppositions. China’s similarly low leverage and high linkage, created by FDI, would seemingly put China on a similar trajectory to democratization.

The aggregate of modernization theory and Levitsky and Way’s linkage and leverage theory sums up the dominant beliefs concerning China’s prospects for democratization immediately following economic reforms. That is, the introduction of capitalism and global

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34 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 22-23.
37 Ibid., 23.
38 Ibid., 24.
39 Ibid., 23.
40 Ibid., 53.
business would strengthen democratizing forces within China. The diffuse flow of information from the west would heighten “citizen awareness of their country’s international standing – and its consequences.” This new awareness, along with the wealth brought by FDI, would fuel the rise of an indigenous middle class with a stake in creating Western-style democratic institutions.

However, there are many faults with this type of thinking. First, it is overly linear and deterministic in its assumption that economic development and/or Western linkages always lead to democracy. Second, it assumes that an entrepreneurial middle class will want democracy, although there is no proof that this has been the case in China. Third, it underemphasizes the role of the state and does not address why a state would allow economic liberalization if it would undermine their rule. These weaknesses will become apparent as we explore the case of China and FDI.

The fact remains that China has not democratized, despite economic growth and Western linkages. Most of these writers’ false predictions about FDI’s democratizing effect were published immediately after China’s FDI boom in the 1990s, before the real effects of FDI were detectable. The vast majority of domestic entrepreneurs has neither created a cohesive class identity nor has made any significant attempts to create democratic institutions. Entrepreneurs come from a wide array of regional and socioeconomic backgrounds, which influence their equally diverse array of opinions about the government. As a result, the diversity among Chinese entrepreneurs prevents the formation of a cohesive class identity. As a whole, entrepreneurs are generally not assertive in the political sphere, rarely advocating for democratization. Despite increasing levels of Western linkage, entrepreneurs show no sign of wanting Western-style democracy, as they are satisfied with the current regime. This is not to say that class is not important; indeed, we will return to it at the end of the paper. However, class has not functioned as the catalyst for democratization that many predicted it would.

Mary Gallagher’s 2005 book *Contagious Capitalism* is one of the only major works on FDI and democratization since the 1990s. She argues that FDI does not provide any real democratizing force; rather, it enhances authoritarianism. Gallagher argues that this can be attributed to the sequencing of economic reforms, with FDI liberalization coming first, private sector development coming second, and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform coming third. Because FDI liberalization came first, foreign capital made up a large proportion of the overall domestic economy in the past and thus became a political priority for the CCP. These provinces became very wealthy, which helped the CCP gain local support for more controversial economic reforms.

According to Gallagher, it is especially important that FDI liberalization preceded private sector development. If private sector development occurred first, it would create a domestic middle class who could pressure for political change. In this way, Gallagher does not challenge modernization theory’s “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” argument head on;

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41Ibid., 49.
42 Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, 3.
44 Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, 95.
45 Ibid., 45.
47 Ibid., 32.
48Ibid., 10.
rather, she argues “no bourgeoisie at the right time, no democracy.” She argues that if the middle class developed while the CCP was still in the early stages of economic reform and the regime was less stable, they would have been a democratizing force. Unlike the rest of her argument, this logic seems simplistic and overly linear.

Another problem with Gallagher’s argument is that it portrays the central government as a homogenous entity, rather than seeing it as multifaceted and diffuse. She does touch on the “piecemeal fashion” of economic reform, noting that the first regions that opened up to FDI enjoyed all the benefits and opportunities of the global economy, while regions who took longer to open up lagged behind in development. However, her argument does not explain how local governments can implement formal institutional changes. This is one of the main sites of analysis in this paper.

Analysis

If the hypothesis is correct, we should find that: FDI caused entrepreneurs to modify their own business practices; local and national governments wanted to help domestic firms better compete with FIEs; local and national governments were responsive to entrepreneurs’ modifications by creating institutional change; and institutional change enhanced regime stability. I will evaluate each of these criteria in turn.

Modifications in Business Practices

Did FDI cause entrepreneurs to modify their own business practices? Yes, FIEs utilized more Western managerial and labor practices, in line with their investors’ wants. FIEs were largely concentrated in Special Economic Zones (SEZ), which were governed under an entirely different legal system than the rest of China that allowed (and encouraged) capitalist business practices. For example, FIEs used strongly enforced labor contracts, which outside of SEZs, were mere formalities. Enforcement of labor contracts outside of SEZs was almost non-existent. Most firms relied on at-will employment, resulting in high employment insecurity. An example of this employment insecurity is the right to lay off unnecessary staff. In addition to this, SEZs also gave special tax breaks to FIEs.

Non-FIE firms also changed their practices in response to FDI. Tsai notes that the dominance of FDI had “mixed implications” for entrepreneurs in areas following the South China model; the clearly preferential treatment accorded to FIEs placed domestic entrepreneurs at a disadvantage. While local governments were eager to help certain entrepreneurs attract FDI and engage in export industries, private businesses that lacked overseas connections and FDI were at a disadvantage. Because of this, private businesses wanted to adopt the Western managerial and labor practices of FIEs in order to better compete.

49Ibid., 9.
50Ibid., 12.
51Ibid., 78.
52 Zweig, "China’s Political Economy", 257.
53 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 159.
54 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 182.
55 Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism, 6.
As a result, domestic entrepreneurs in SEZs began to disguise their businesses as FIEs. The most common method was “round tripping,” the process of sending money from China abroad in order to disguise it as FDI and later import it. Often, money was sent to an offshore entity in a tax haven, like Hong Kong. In 2004, the Asian Development Bank estimated that round tripping accounted for 40 percent of total FDI. 56 Falsely registering businesses as FIEs was also very common. 57 By round tripping and registering as FIEs, domestic entrepreneurs were able to access all of the benefits accorded to FIEs, enabling them to better compete with FIEs and giving them an advantage over domestic firms without foreign investment.

**Governmental Support Towards Domestic Firms**

Did local and national governments want to help domestic firms compete with FIEs? Yes. After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, it was clear that the CCP’s political survival was tied to its economic performance. 58 Helping domestic firms grow and compete with FIEs would increase economic prosperity. This was especially salient on the local level where cadres were often rewarded by the central government for positive economic performance. 59 Coupled with the central government’s cuts in financial support to local governments, local economic growth was needed. 60

Helping domestic firms compete with FIEs would also defuse rising tensions and increase social stability. As mentioned previously, Gallagher points out that the CCP had a stake in reframing the economic conflict as one of “Chinese firms versus foreign firms”, rather than “public versus private firms.” 61 The transition to a “socialist market economy” was ideologically controversial; only ten years after the class-focused Cultural Revolution, FIEs were thriving under the CCP’s preferential policies while SOEs and private businesses were floundering. In order to defuse rising societal tensions, the CCP took deliberate steps to emphasize nationalism and unity. Placing ownership in a competitive, international context helped the CCP reduce the importance of public ownership and increase the importance of nationalistic consumerism. In this way, economics became less about morality and more about pragmatism. 62

This was a central point of Deng’s 1992 “Southern Journey” to the south China coast and is evident in the CCP’s ninth Five-Year Plan, authored in 1996. In the plan, the CCP framed the disparate development of different regions as inherent to the process of modernization; “fundamentally speaking, to allow regions capable of development to progress faster is favorable for enhancing the economic strength of the country and for helping underdeveloped regions in developing their economies.” 63 In 1997, “Deng Xiaoping Theory” was incorporated into the official 15th Party Congress platform. It stated that privatization was

57 Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, 185.
58 Zweig, “China’s Political Economy,” 258.
59 Gallagher, *Contagious Capitalism*, 32.
60 Ibid., 12.
61 Ibid., 6.
62 Ibid., 19.
necessary so that domestic industries could be strong enough to compete in the international economic arena.\textsuperscript{64} In 2004, the CCP changed its constitution to guarantee property rights and emphasize the importance of the private sector in Chinese society. Tsai notes that “private entrepreneurs themselves were remarkably absent from the actual process, but the cumulative effect of... the changes that they engendered in formal institutions governing the private sector enabled reformers to justify further protection on their behalf. The causal mechanisms were indirect, informal, incremental, and fundamentally political.”\textsuperscript{65}

**Institutional Changes in Government**

Did local and national governments respond to entrepreneurs’ modifications by creating institutional change? Yes. Both FIE entrepreneurs and local and national governments had an incentive to appease domestic entrepreneurs, namely because they wanted to maintain stability. Stability is important for obvious reasons to local and national government but FIE entrepreneurs also depended upon political and social stability. Without it, FIE entrepreneurs would not be able to conduct business, much less international business. For example, most business owners did not support the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests because they “disrupted the business environment.”\textsuperscript{66} On the other hand, local and national governments were eager to help FIEs, as they boosted the economy and increased wealth in the region and the country as a whole.\textsuperscript{67} Local governments had an additional incentive to partner with entrepreneurs, as the central government and the general public looked favorably upon economically prosperous regions and their cadres. In order to achieve their overlapping goals, both groups must work together to maintain the status quo. An important part of this is appeasing domestic entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{68}

Economic decentralization, which was a key element of Deng’s reforms, granted greater decision-making power to local governments.\textsuperscript{69} In overseeing day-to-day business, local government acted as “part administrator and part chamber of commerce” with little supervision from the central government.\textsuperscript{70} Local governments granted FIEs (and the entrepreneurs and foreign investors associated with them) more managerial control and autonomy over labor practices before the central government did.\textsuperscript{71} Officials in local foreign investment bureaus were “well aware” of which FIEs were fake but tolerated all FIE’s nonetheless, likely because of the wealth and prestige that increased economic growth brought.\textsuperscript{72} David Zweig notes that entrepreneurs and local governments “did not collectively press Beijing to liberalize its foreign trade and foreign investment rules. Instead, as each county or township pursued its own global linkages, this unorganized collective action undermined the central state’s regulatory regime”.\textsuperscript{73} Local government’s tolerance of fake FIEs undermined the central government’s capacity to collect taxes and create credit policy.

\textsuperscript{64} Gallagher, *Contagious Capitalism*, 18-19.
\textsuperscript{65} Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, 70.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{68} J. Zhang, “Marketization, Class Structure, and Democracy in China”, 436.
\textsuperscript{69} Gallagher, *Contagious Capitalism*, 12.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{71} Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, 196.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 184-185.
It is difficult to determine to what extent the central government was aware of fake FIEs but they were surely aware that it was a problem.74

In response, the national government began to extend the special privileges previously reserved for FIEs to domestic businesses, both in and outside of SEZs. National labor laws slowly adopted more characteristics of FIE labor laws: required social welfare contributions decreased, labor contracts were enforced, and formal labor dispute mechanisms were implemented.75 By the mid-1990s, FIE labor law effectively became part of national labor law.76 The CCP passed the Enterprise Income Tax Law in 2007, which made the income tax rate for domestic enterprises the same as FIEs. Finance Minister Jin Renqing specifically referred to fake FIEs and round-tripping as reasons why taxes between domestic firms and FIEs needed to be equal.77

Relationship between Domestic Institutions and Regime Stability

Did institutional change enhance regime stability? Yes. According to Samuel Huntington, rapid social and/or economic change “undermines traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions” and creates political instability.78 Certainly, China underwent swift social and economic change as a result of Deng’s economic reforms. Huntington argues that the more adaptable an institution is, the more institutionalized it is.79 Applying Huntington’s logic specifically to China, Heberer and Schubert argue that the CCP has been especially stable because it made a deliberate effort to reform and adapt institutions.80 As previously described, the adaptations of the legal system and labor practices indicate that they are highly institutionalized.

Another key institutional change is the dramatic transformation in party ideology post-1978. The CCP was able to successfully transform party ideology in a way that maintained stability. As Gallagher notes, the incorporation of “Deng Xiaoping Theory” restructured the conflict as “China versus foreign firms”, rather than “public versus private firms.”81 Addressing the tension between public and private firms was important in preserving social stability and increasing patriotic feelings toward Chinese private firms. In addition, “Deng Xiaoping Theory” undermined socialist labor institutions by framing them as “obsolete but also inimical to the continued [capitalist] development of the economy”.82 In this way, the malleability of party ideology encouraged stability, as well as cleared the way for reforms. As Huntington notes, “success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges”.83

One can also make the argument that changing domestic institutions to resemble Western institutions could promote democratization. In the case of China, however, this has not happened. Rather, this incorporation has strengthened China’s legal institutions, which, as

74 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 186.
76 Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism, 17.
77 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 186.
79 Ibid., 13.
81 Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism, 18.
82 Ibid., 13.
83 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 13.
Huntington points out, strengthens the CCP’s legitimacy as a whole. First, it creates more political and social stability domestically, as laws are applied more evenly across society. In post-Cultural Revolution China, this stability grants legitimacy to the government in the public’s eyes. A strong legal system also grants legitimacy to the CCP in the international community.

Second, it fosters sustained economic growth. In its ninth Five-Year Plan, the CCP emphasized the importance of legal reform, as it would help strengthen “economic order.” FDI, and participation in the general world economy through membership in the World Trade Organization, requires a transparent legal system. Indeed, implementing business-friendly legal reforms made China more attractive to FDI. From 1980 (when the first SEZs were established) to 1999 (a point by which most FIE labor law had become part of national law), China’s GDP rose from 191 billion USD to 1 trillion USD. China’s GDP growth shows little sign of slowing, reaching 11 trillion USD in 2015. This sort of rapid and sustained economic growth proved to both Chinese citizens and other states that the CCP was fast becoming a key player in the global economy. In turn, it helped grant legitimacy to CCP rule.

One point of criticism is the problem of implementation; just because the law has been changed does not necessarily mean that it is implemented. No systematic or statistically meaningful research has been done on the actual implementation of written law and evidence of implementation remains anecdotal. However, the law is important as a signal of party values and societal values, both to entrepreneurs and the international community.

The self-reinforcing nature of China’s institutional adaptability indicates that the CCP will likely stay stable and in power for years to come. In its ninth Five-Year plan, the CCP itself said that the “maintenance of political and social stability is the basic prerequisite for the promotion of reform and development... stability in turn is realized through the deepening of reform and sustained development.”

Because all the criteria are confirmed, this hypothesis is confirmed. FDI has indeed caused domestic entrepreneurs to modify their own business practices and the government has made an effort to help domestic firms adopt business practices more like that of FIEs in order to be more competitive. Formal institutional changes reinforce the CCP’s overall stability, as described by Huntington.

Implications for Regime Stability – Areas Lacking Collusion between Political Elites and Entrepreneurs

In areas with large amounts of FDI, democratization seems unlikely. The adaptability of formal institutions, both on the local and national levels, indicates a high degree of institutionalization and thus, a high degree of stability.

84 Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism, 102.
85 Zweig, “China’s Political Economy,” 255.
88 Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism, 102.
Using a class-based explanation, Jianjun Zhang argues that some models of political economy encourage democratization while others are inherently antagonistic to democratization. In his analysis of the Sunan and Wenzhou models, J. Zhang finds that if market reform only enriches a few (as in the Sunan model), then the economic and political elite have common interests and will work together to maintain the status quo. This is because in the Sunan model, the government has a history of a “hands-on” approach to economics.92

Though the Sunan and South China models are different, they are similar in this regard. As discussed previously, both local and central governments were closely involved with fostering FDI growth. In addition, there is certainly a wide gap between the rich and the poor areas following the South China model, mostly because of the massive population of migrant workers from Chinese provinces and other countries.93 The rewards of FDI are usually concentrated in a small, overlapping group of economic and political elite. Thus, FIE entrepreneurs and local governments also have an incentive to work together to maintain the status quo. A large part of this is appeasing non-FIE entrepreneurs through reforming institutions.

This is echoed in the results of Tsai’s 2002 survey of entrepreneurs across China. Tsai typified 86 percent of South Chinese entrepreneurs’ as “loyally acceptant,” meaning that they have the ability to confront the state but no desire to.94 Loyally acceptant entrepreneurs are generally satisfied with the government, though they still may be dissatisfied with certain aspects. In addressing these problems, loyalty acceptant entrepreneurs do not act assertively; in fact, these entrepreneurs try to actively cultivate positive relationships with state agents in order to solve problems.95 Entrepreneurs rarely expressed their opinions through participatory organizations such as entrepreneurs’ associations (7.8 percent), mass organizations (6.4 percent), and National People’s Congress delegates (2.9 percent). Entrepreneurs who did engage in assertive behavior made up less than five percent of all entrepreneurs in the South China model.96

J. Zhang also finds that if a majority of the population benefits from market reform and development (as in the Wenzhou model), citizens will be more politically assertive. His reasoning for this is because “self-reliant” development creates a class of citizens who are accustomed to being actively involved in politics, fundamentally changing the power dynamic between citizens and the government.97 There is also less overlap between economic and political elites. Thus, they are more likely to compete with each other for power which promotes democratization.98

This is also echoed in Tsai’s survey. Entrepreneurs in the Wenzhou model are also more politically active, with close to 30 percent saying that their primary means of solving disputes is through entrepreneurs’ associations.99 J. Zhang concludes that in areas where

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92 J. Zhang, "Marketization, Class Structure, and Democracy in China", 426.
94 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 108.
95 Ibid., 115.
96 Ibid., 171.
97 J. Zhang, "Marketization, Class Structure, and Democracy in China", 435.
98 Ibid., 440.
99 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 171.
economic reform benefits the majority of people, conditions conducive to democratization are more likely to arise.100

Implications for Regime Stability – Areas with More Equal Wealth Distribution

Will there be a democratic transition in places where wealth is distributed more evenly? The short answer is no. China is massive and diverse, “more like a continent than a unified country both historically and contemporarily.”101 Should a local democracy arise, it would likely exert some pressure on local governments to become more democratic. However, the fragmented nature of national-level politics would make it extremely difficult for a pro-democracy movement to move beyond the local level. Most scholars agree that if democratization were to occur, it would be a top-down process. Zhang notes, “an alternative scenario-- a tumultuous process pushed from below, with the state unable to cope with demands of change-- is almost unthinkable.”102

The rapid growth of the private sector also reduces resistance from those in the public sector because to “stand by and hold fast to ‘socialist enterprise’” would mean losing out on the opportunities and benefits provided by foreign capital, as well as “prestige from association with the international economy.”103 This competitive dynamic further pushes forward the process of economic reform.

Implications for Regime Stability – Disadvantaged Workers

What about workers, both from the public sector and the private sector, who are disadvantaged by new labor laws and practices? Could they potentially act as a democratizing force? This is highly unlikely. Migrant workers make up about one-third of the working population; most come from extremely poor, rural areas.104 Paired with this, their social, economic, and political statuses are extremely low in the cities to which they migrate. Thus, migrant workers are not in a position to present any real threat to the existing regime. In addition, the bloody end to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests (which advocated for increased employment among youth and democracy) serves as a constant reminder of the danger involved in political action. On top of this, the large numbers of people previously employed by the public sector are likely to be loyal to the CCP; former state employees were less likely to endorse democracy than those who had not worked for the state.105

Gallagher notes that FDI could potentially “improve the environment for future democratization, through the promotion of the rule of law, transparency, and the freer flow of information.” In the short term, however, FDI “has afforded the regime more time and more political space to pursue economic reform without political liberalization.”106

100 J. Zhang, "Marketization, Class Structure, and Democracy in China", 440.
101 Ibid., 441.
102 Ibid., 441.
103 Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism, 14.
105 Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, 94.
106 Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism, 25.
Conclusion

In the ninth Five-Year plan, the CCP committed to “correctly [handling] contradictions among the people so as to eliminate factors that cause social instability.” This interesting and vague statement seems to sum up the dynamics of formal institutional change prompted by FDI. “Contradictions” in regional development have given way to societal tensions, specifically between domestic entrepreneurs and FIE entrepreneurs. Formal institutional change, designed to adapt to domestic entrepreneurs’ actual practices, as well as to appease them, have “eliminated” tensions. Thus, formal institutional change “correctly handled” these problems and decreased overall social instability. Though we cannot determine whether the CCP reformed its formal institutions with this specific goal in mind, this has been the effect of institutional change.

This is not to say that FDI is the only source of political stability or instability in China. Indeed, factors such as economics, culture, ethnicity, international standing, and demographic changes all play a role in determining stability. However, FDI is a key piece of China’s political economy as well as a potential catalyst for conflict. Not only has the CCP successfully navigated this rocky area, but it has also manipulated it to preserve its own stability.

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Bibliography


Constructing the Other: Forming Identities Through Ascribed Preferences

James C. Roberts, Ph.D*

Abstract: The construction of identity is a central concept in the constructivist approach to international relations. Much of the scholarship on identity formation has focused on how an agent acquires its own identities and how those identities affect the actions that the agent takes. International relations, however, requires not only understanding how your identity affects your own actions, but also requires understanding how the identities of the other agents with which you interact affect their actions. This paper proposes that the identities of “the other” are constructed by one agent ascribing preferences to the other agent based on cues embedded in the social, cultural, and political setting within which the interaction takes place. Preferences are decision rules that operationalize the interests of agents. An agent perceives the identity of another agent by attempting to understand the other agent’s interests and goals. In other words, one agent knows the other agent by knowing what it wants. Understanding how agents know the other is critical in the contemporary world where new agents rapidly emerge from old social, cultural, and political formations.

Constructing the Other: Forming Identities Through Ascribed Preferences

The protests that began in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 were no accident. As Ashraf Khalil, a reporter for The Times of London stated, “The events of January 25, 2011, may have come as a shock, even to those who participated. But it was no overnight phenomenon – more like the suddenly flowering seeds patiently planted over the preceding decade-plus.”1 Bolstered by the recent successful revolution in Tunisia and motivated by a popular Facebook page, approximately 15,000 protestors responded to Twitter calls to congregate in Tahrir Square. Unlike many past revolutions and civil wars fought by organized resistance groups, the Arab Spring uprisings against authoritarian rule were marked by limited centralized leadership and loose associations of protagonists. Social media made this possible by connecting like-minded people without regard for group membership, class, or even location. Griff Witte, reporting in The Washington Post, captured the decentralized, leaderless quality of the Egyptian protests:

The movement that rose up seemingly out of nowhere last week to pose the greatest challenge yet to the 82-year-old president has no name, no symbols and no formal infrastructure. Although some students and others are involved in

* Dr. Roberts is a Professor at Towson University. He presented this piece at the 56th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, February 18 - 21, 2015. Furthermore, this piece continues Dr. Robert’s work presented at the 2005 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association and the 2012 meeting of the International Studies Association.

organizing its direction, they deny being its leaders.²

Foreign policy, however, demands an “other.” As Nizar Messari notes, “Foreign policy is... an identity-making tool that erects boundaries between the self and the other, defining in the process what are the national interests.”³ It was very unsettling for nation-states to have an unidentified national resistance movement arise in Egypt, which has great strategic importance due to its central location in the volatile Middle East, its proximity to oil fields, and its key role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The lack of a central figure and a defined vision for what happens should Mubarak step aside may be one reason the United States and other Western governments have shied away from embracing the nascent democracy movement, and have instead spoken only in general terms of advocating an orderly transition of power. Above all else, the United States fears instability in this nation of 80 million that has long played a central role in determining the character of the broader Arab world.⁴

Who were these protestors? What did they want? Much of the scholarship on identity in international relations theory focuses on how agents construct their own identities and how those identities affect interests and actions. I address a different question in this paper. How do agents construct the identity of the “other?” I propose that an agent constructs the identity of the other by interpreting the actions of the other, when those actions can be observed, and by ascribing preferences to the other that are derived from the agent’s own identity and the structure of the situation. Even in situations where empirical observations of the other’s actions may abound, the agent tries to determine what the other “wants” in the context of the situation and that determination, is derived, in part, from its own identity.

By using terms like “construct the identity” and “ascribed preferences” I am dangerously mixing oil and water – for the ontological approach of this research is rooted in rule-based constructivism while the epistemological method is unabashedly based on concepts of rational choice. I have argued elsewhere that interests and preferences are socially constructed out of rules that define historic and cultural practice and that rational choice theory provides a causative theory of action based on those interests and preferences.⁵ This approach to rational-choice theory demands that the analyst devote more time to understanding preferences and less time on the formulaic analysis of the strategic interaction itself. It is what Ferejohn calls “thick rationality.”⁶ While I embrace rational choice concepts like preferences and utilities, which will surely disturb constructivists, I also explicitly reject rational choice ideas that preferences are stable and exogenous. Rational choice theory is justly criticized for not addressing the socially constructed sources of preferences. Too many theorists hide behind the adage “there’s no

⁴ Witte, “Egyptian opposition calls for massive protest,” A01.
accounting for tastes” and stipulate that preferences are idiosyncratic. Those theorists that do
address the issue often take a cursory approach that merely imposes cultural norms on decision
makers or they attempt to derive preferences from observed behavior in “revealed preference
theory.”

The thread that connects this seemingly uncomfortable combination is the role that
identity plays in defining interests and preferences. Identity plays a key role in defining
preferences by categorizing behaviors into practices that portray the identity. Identities are
packages of rules. To be known as a jazz musician, one must follow the rules that constitute jazz
as a musical style. Defining jazz is difficult.7 There is a loose, yet identifiable, collection of
styles that constitute jazz. Each of these styles is defined by instruction sense rules (or assertive
rules) that inform the performer which actions are likely to create musical forms identified as
jazz. That style is defined both contextually (New Orleans vs. Chicago jazz) and in practice
(rules regarding syncopation, chord changes, bass line, etc.). A definition of jazz from a popular
web site captures the dual nature of the contextual and practical definition of the genre:

Most attempts to define Jazz music have been from points of view outside that of
Jazz. An academic definition of Jazz would be: A genre of American music that
originated in New Orleans circa 1900 . . . characterized by strong, prominent
meter, improvisation, distinctive tone colors & performance techniques, and
dotted or syncopated rhythmic patterns. But Jazz is so much more than that.8

Humans resort to categories of rules embedded in identities to make decision-making easier.

Kowert explicitly cites this in the context of forming identities:

Individuals are continually confronted with the problem of locating themselves,
and others, in a web of social categories that periodically confront them as salient.
They have limited cognitive resources to devote to this task and, as a result, must
make use of certain simplifying and memory-enhancing strategies. In
constructivist terms, ‘rules’ present agents with simpler ways to interpret the
world and to make choices.9

The Concept of Identity – A Review

After Erik Erikson introduced the concept in developmental psychology in the 1950s and
1960s, identity emerged as a key concept in the social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s with the
development of identity theory in sociology and social identity theory in psychology.10

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7 As Louis Armstrong was reported to say, "Man, if you gotta ask you'll never know,” yet jazz can be defined
because it can be performed and one knows it when one hears it.
9 Paul A. Kowert, “Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity,” Chapter in International
Relations in a Constructed World, edited by Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas G. Onuf, and Paul A. Kowert, Armonk,
10 Erik H. Erikson, “Childhood and Society,” (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1950);
While these two theories approach identity in very different ways, they share some important qualities. First, both theories reject the essentialist approaches to the definition of the actor in terms of essential \textit{a priori} characteristics. Instead, the two theories constitute the actor in terms of its social and cultural histories. Second, both theories recognize that the actor expresses multiple identities embedded in different social practices.\footnote{Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, "A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory," (Social Psychology Quarterly, 58:4, December 1995), 255.}

The primary construct of sociology’s identity theory is the role identity.\footnote{Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Importance of Symbolic Interaction Theory for Family Research,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 30, (1968), 558-64; Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Theory: Developments and Extensions,” Chapter in Self and Identity, edited by K. Yardley and T. Honess, (New York: Wiley, 1987), 89-104; Ralph H. Turner, "The Role and the Person," American Journal of Sociology, (1978) 84, 1-23.} Role identities are definitions that the actor applies to itself derived from the social structure and interactions in which it is engaged. An actor can take on multiple roles in different social settings. A university professor, in the span of a day, may play roles of teacher, administrator, academic advisor, parent, and spouse, to name only a few. Role identities prescribe socially appropriate behavior and imply action.\footnote{Robin W. Simon, “Parental Role Strains, Salience of Parental Identity, and Gender Differences in Psychological Distress,” (Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 1992), 33, 25-35.} As such, from a rational choice perspective, role identities socially constitute preferences upon which an actor acts. The effect of role identities on behavior is affected by the salience and commitment of the role. Salience refers to the importance of the role in determining behavior and is operationalized as “the likelihood that the identity will be invoked in diverse situations.”\footnote{Peter, Callero, "Role-Identity Salience," Social Psychology Quarterly, (1985), 48, 203-15; Hogg et al, "A Tale of Two Theories,” 257.} Commitment is defined as the “degree to which the individual's relationships to particular others are dependent on being a given kind of person.”\footnote{Hogg et al, "A Tale of Two Theories,” 257.} Commitment “reflects the extent to which important significant others are judged to want the person to occupy a particular role position.”\footnote{Stryker, “Symbolic Interaction and Role Theory,” 345.} Thus, commitment addresses not only how the actor defines itself, but also how the actor is defined by others.

Psychology’s social identity theory was developed in the late 1970s to define the actor in terms of its perceived membership in social groups.\footnote{Henri Tajfel, “Some Developments In European Social Psychology,” European Journal of Social Psychology, 2, (1972), 307-22.} Social identity theory is based on the idea that individual actors self-identify with particular social groups (political party, church membership, labor union, ethnic association, etc.). Each of these memberships is represented in the individual member’s mind as a social identity that both describes and prescribes one's attributes as a member of that group—that is, what one should think and feel, and how one should behave. Thus, when a specific social identity becomes the salient basis for self-regulation
in a particular context, self-perception and conduct become in-group stereotypical and normative, perceptions of relevant out-group members become out-group stereotypical, and intergroup behavior acquires competitive and discriminatory properties to varying degrees depending on the nature of relations between the groups.  

A key difference between psychology’s social identity theory and sociology’s identity theory is that social identity theory defines the self (the actor) in terms of group membership. This establishes a sense of in-group versus out-group identification. Again, from a rational choice perspective, the norms and rules of in-group membership constrain and construct behavior by defining the actor’s preferences upon which action is based. Psychology’s social identity theory places more emphasis on group membership and thus places more emphasis on the need to identify out-group members in a similar way by determining the norms and rule that construct the out-group members’ preferences that lead to out-group behavior.

There is a wealth of definitions and categorizations in the literature when scholars speak of identity. Brubaker and Cooper examine five uses of the term in their critique of the overuse of identity in the social sciences. It is used in place of interest as a basis for social or political action. It is used to indicate a “fundamental and consequential sameness among members of a group or category.” It is “understood as a core aspect of (individual or collective) "selfhood" or as a fundamental condition of social being.” It is used to emphasize the “development of the kind of collective self-understanding, solidarity, or ‘groupness’ that can make collective action possible.” Finally, it is invoked to “highlight the unstable, multiple, fluctuating, and fragmented nature of the contemporary self.” Abdelal et. al. define the meanings of collective identity along two dimensions of content and contestation. They propose the following four content types for collective identity: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons with other social categories, and cognitive models. Contestation refers to the degree to which members of the collective agree with the content type of the collective. Fearon analyzes identity in academic writing and ordinary speech and claims that in most cases the term means, “either (a) a social category, defined by membership rules and allegedly characteristic attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) a socially distinguishing feature that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (or, of course, both (a) and (b) at once).” 

The lack of definitional clarity in the use of identity in political science prompted Brubaker and Cooper to recommend that the discipline “…go beyond ‘identity’ - not in the name of an imagined universalism, but in the name of the conceptual clarity required for social analysis and political understanding alike.” Their chief complaints are that identity in the social sciences "... tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity) and that “stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple - leaves us without a rationale for

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talking about ‘identities’ at all and ill-equipped to examine the ‘hard’ dynamics and essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics.”

Nevertheless, the concept of identity has been used widely in international relations since the 1990’s – especially in the constructivist program. Identity has had less traction as a defining concept in neoliberal theory and it has generally been rejected in the neorealist program, which should not be surprising since the neorealist program conceptualizes the state as a received, undifferentiated whole. Like psychology’s social identity, identity in international relations is often associated with defining the agent (self) in terms of the relationships with some sense of the “other.”

Whether we are talking of ‘the body’ or ‘the state’ or of particular bodies and states, the identity of each is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside,' a 'self' from an 'other,' a 'domestic' from a 'foreign.'

David Campbell’s quotation emphasizes two characteristics of identity that are common to much of the international relations literature. First, identity is performatively constituted. That is, an actor’s identity exists in relationship to the identity of the other. Like psychology and sociology, Campbell’s approach to identity in international relations explicitly rejects essentialism and constitutes identity in interaction born of social, cultural, and political histories.

The consequence of this argument is a fundamental reorientation of our understanding of foreign policy. Foreign policy shifts from a concern of relations between states that take place across ahistorical, frozen, and pregiven boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the 'state' and 'the international system.'

Wendt echoes this constructivist view of identity noting that actors often have multiple identities that vary in importance depending on the situation. These identities “are a key link in the mutual constitution of agent and structure”, embodying the “terms of individuality through which agents relate to each other. These terms lead actors to see situations as calling for taking certain actions and thus for defining their interests in certain ways.” Second, Campbell defines identity in terms of self and other.

Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. Nobody could be without it. Inescapable as it is, identity -- whether personal or collective -- is not fixed by nature, given by god, or planned by intentional behavior. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature,

24 Ibid., 2.
26 Ibid., 61.
given by god, or planned by intentional behavior. Difference is constituted in relation to identity.\(^29\)

This need for differentiation is embedded in language and practice.\(^30\) As noted by Campbell above, it is often associated with establishing boundaries of practice that begin with the contrast between domestic politics and international politics. R.B.J. Walker expresses this well by noting the co-dependence of domestic politics on the existence of an antagonistic external other.\(^31\) Thus, the domestic self is justified by providing a safe haven vis a vis the danger from outside. In this way the domestic self and international other are co-constituted. Lebow, however, rejects the need for the agent to define its identity in terms of an opposing other.\(^32\) He critiques claims of the need for a stereotypical, antagonistic other in the Western philosophy of Kant and Hegel and draws on Greco-Roman literature of Homer to show that the individual identity can be created with positive reference to others. He concludes that;

\[\ldots\text{there is ample historical evidence that identity construction has often been accompanied by the creation of stereotyped ‘others’. However, there is little empirical or laboratory evidence to support the claim that identity or national solidarity requires ‘others’, let alone their violent exclusion from domestic, regional or international communities.}\(^33\)]

While Lebow believes that a stereotyped other is not necessary for the creation of an agent’s identity, “…national identity and solidarity are fully consistent with, and even sustained by, policies of inclusion and non-stereotyped understanding of “others.”\(^34\) So, it is clear that, necessary or not, the construction of the self identity is made in reference to an external other in international relations.

In international relations, agents use identity to simplify their choices both by portraying their own identity and by ascribing identities to others. David Campbell discussed, at length, the writing and rewriting of the American identity in foreign policy texts to define the interests and preferences of a nation-state as it grew from colonies of conquest through the superpower of the Cold War.\(^35\) Kowert documented how the British government perceived the changing identity of the Egyptian government in the year that led up to the Suez Crisis of 1956.\(^36\) Messari traced the development of the Islamic “other” in the American foreign policy response to the Bosnia crisis of the early 1990s.\(^37\) In each of these cases, the creation of identity narrowed the action choices available to the agents and prescribed those that would most enhance utility given the perceived or projected identity of the other.

\(^{29}\text{Campbell, “Writing Security,” 9.}\)
\(^{31}\text{Walker, “Inside/Outside.”}\)
\(^{33}\text{Ibid., 479.}\)
\(^{34}\text{Ibid., 488.}\)
\(^{35}\text{Campbell, “Writing Security.”}\)
\(^{36}\text{Kowert, “Agent versus Structure.”}\)
\(^{37}\text{Messari, “Identity and Foreign Policy.”}\)
Constructing the Other

When an individual enters the presence of others, they commonly seek to acquire information about him or to bring into play information about him already possessed. They will be interested in his general socio-economic status, his conception of self, his attitude toward them, his competence, his trustworthiness, etc. Although some of this information seems to be sought almost as an end in itself, there are usually quite practical reasons for acquiring it. Information about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what they may expect of him. Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to act in order to call forth a desired response from him.38

Constructivist understanding of identity has been largely influenced by the work of Alexander Wendt.39 Wendt defines the identities formed in a first encounter between two fictitious actors, Alter and Ego. The two actors exist in an ideal world with no shared ideas (i.e., no culture) but they bring both material and representational expectations to the encounter in the form of physical needs and a priori ideas about who they are. Wendt characterizes the first encounter as a social act that takes place in four scenes.40

In Scene One, Ego engages in some action based on some prior definition of the situation. This creates a signal to Alter about the role that Ego intends to take. It also creates a signal to Alter about what role Ego wants Alter to take. In Scene Two, Alter tries to interpret the meaning of Ego’s action in the absence of shared ideas (cultural foundations). Alter uses its own initial definition of the situation as well as any cues contained in Ego’s action to update its definition of the situation. Scene Three begins with Alter taking an action in response to Ego’s action based on Alter’s updated definition of the situation. As in Scene One, Alter’s action signals to Ego the role that Alter intends to take and the role that Alter wants Ego to take. Finally, in Scene Four, Ego considers Alter’s response and updates its own definition of the situation and prepares a response to Ego’s action. This social act is repeated until either actor decides to end it. Each actor develops both a sense of the other actor’s identity and a refined sense of the definition of the situation within which the encounter took place.

Wendt’s characterization of the first-encounter social act relies heavily on a number of concepts drawn from theories of symbolic interaction of George Mead and Erving Goffman.41, 42 The definition of the situation was first introduced by William Thomas in 1923 and has become a central concept in symbolic interaction.

39 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation,” 1; Wendt, “Social Theory of International Relations.”
42 Goffman, “The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.”
Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the definition of the situation. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follow from a series of such definitions.43

The definition of the situation does much more than simply establish the setting within which a social act takes place. Thomas saw it as a reference to the social structure that defines and constrains the construction of the agent through social rules.

There is therefore always a rivalry between the spontaneous definitions of the situation made by the member of an organized society and the definitions which his society has provided for him. The individual tends to a hedonistic selection of activity, pleasure first; and society to a utilitarian selection, safety first. Society wishes its member to be laborious, dependable, regular, sober, orderly, self-sacrificing; while the individual wishes less of this and more of new experience. And organized society seeks also to regulate the conflict and competition inevitable between its members in the pursuit of their wishes.

It is in this connection that a moral code arises, which is a set of rules or behavior norms, regulating the expression of the wishes, and which is built up by successive definitions of the situation... Morality is thus the generally accepted definition of the situation, whether expressed in public opinion and the unwritten law, in a formal legal code, or in religious commandments and prohibitions.44

Stebbins reinforced this connection between the rules of the social structure and the agent's identity and action by noting that the definition of the situation is a combination of objective and subjective elements.45

Thus, we shall define the objective situation as the immediate social and physical surroundings and the current physiological and psychological state of the actor. It is as MacIver put it, "the situation as it might appear to some omniscient and disinterested eye, viewing all its complex interdependencies and all its endless contingencies." The subjective situation shall be defined as those components of the objective situation which are seen by the actor to affect any one of his action orientations and therefore must be given meaning before he can act.46

Wendt’s first-encounter social act also relies on role-taking and altercasting. Both Ego and Alter define their identities through the roles they take on and the roles that are “cast” upon them by the other. Wendt notes that when an agent takes on a role, it chooses “from among the

44Ibid.
46Ibid., 150.
available representations of the Self how it will be, and thus what interests one intends to pursue, in an interaction." Thus, by defining identity in terms of roles, identities determine the interests of the agent. Similarly, when an agent “casts” a role the other, it is ascribing the interests that it expects the other to pursue. Although Wendt acknowledges the importance of power relationships in the social act, his discussion of altercasting is relatively benign in his exposition of the first encounter. Weinstein and Deutschberger’s original discussion of altercasting placed it in a somewhat more sinister light when they defined altercasting as “a basic technique of interpersonal control.” Altercasting is explicitly used by the agent to control the interaction with the other to pursue the agent’s goals. Weinstein and Deutschberger’s interpretation of altercasting emphasizes the goal-seeking intentionality of the agent and the other in social interaction - a characteristic of strategic interaction that is certainly familiar to rational choice theorists.

My own approach to constructing the other begins with this intentionality. Agents act for a reason. Donald Davidson states that an agent acts based on “desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economics, prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values insofar as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed towards actions.” In a thin version of rationality, all these public and private goals and values are wrapped up in the amorphous concept of utility, which is taken as a given. In a thick approach to rationality, these motivations must be explored, and in a constructivist approach to rationality, they must be explained as social constructions. I start with a simple socially constructed intentionality argument that becomes more complex as definitions are added.

The Intentionality Argument
1. Structures (the definition of the situation) determine roles that define identities
2. Identities define the interests of the agent
3. Interests define the agent’s preferences
4. Preferences determine the agent’s actions
5. Actions identify agents to the social structure (the definition of the situation).

The heart of this argument is that interests define preferences and preferences determine actions. Preferences are, of course, at the center of a rationalist argument about intentionality as well. In rational choice theory, preferences are statements about the expected utility of the outcomes of a choice. Those outcomes with greater expected utility are desired over those with lesser expected utility and are therefore preferred. Formally, an agent is said to be “rational” if the agent’s preferences align with the two conditions of completeness and transitivity. Completeness merely means that the expected utility calculus can be performed using any two outcomes of a choice and the transitivity condition means that three or more outcomes can be rank ordered according to their expected utilities. Formality aside, the intent of the two conditions is to make clear which single outcome the agent should pursue when making a choice. That is, preferences divide up the outcomes of a choice between the single outcome that should be pursued (i.e., choice that is to be made) and those that are not to be pursued.

Nicholas Onuf, in his exposition of rule-based constructivism defines a rule as “a

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statement that tells people *what we should do.*

Rules offer agents the simplest kind of choices. Agents may choose to follow a given rule, or to break it. Compared to most situations in which agents make choices, the choice of following a rule or not following it involves consequences that are easy to calculate. While unintended consequences are always possible, rules give agents the opportunity to make rational choices – choices dictated by reference to goals – with some assurance that they are making the best choices available to them.

Thus, Onuf’s constructivist rule is similar to the rationalist’s conception of a preference. Both divide choices into those that should be performed and those that should not, and imply that performing the choice will benefit the interests of the agent. A preference, therefore, is a type of decision rule about which action to perform in a given situation.

In rational choice theory, preferences are derived from the abstraction of utility but in constructivism, rules are grounded in social relationships. Preferences are the decision rules that operationalize socially constructed interests. Wendt discusses three elements of the process that turns interests into preferences. The primary element is desire but desire is tempered by beliefs about the nature of the world and by deliberation regarding which actions may be appropriate in the given definition of the situation. Norm-based constructivists see this deliberation as an interchange between a logic of consequences (desires) and a logic of appropriateness that establishes which actions are socially acceptable in the given social structure. A restatement of the definition of a preference would then be a decision rule about which action to perform in a given situation derived from the agent's interests through desires, beliefs, and deliberation.

An identity is formed by its relationship with others. This process is deeper than merely identifying the agent as an actor within the international system. Campbell proposes that identity vis a vis another external actor serves to solidify the identity of a state among its own inhabitants by establishing a "them" which requires an "us" to address. This process is accelerated when the "them" is portrayed as a threat or danger to "us". Identities do more than merely distinguish and differentiate different agents. An identity attaches interest and preferences.

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51 Ibid., 65.

52 Wendt, “Social Theory of International Relations,” 118-130.


54 Campbell, “Writing Security.”
to the agent. In her overview and critique of constructivist approaches to identity, Vendulka Kubálková notes that, "In simple terms, states create each other as enemies, rivals, or partners and proceed to share their interpretations of their respective identities. They also act in accordance with each other's expectations of them."

Finally, an agent is identified by its actions. "To explain a piece of behavior is to show that it derives from an intention of the individual exhibiting it. A successful intentional explanation establishes the behavior as an action and the performer as an agent." As I have stated elsewhere, “the constitution of the agent . . . is deeper than a mere empirical observation. The agent is constituted as a set of processes embedded in preferences and cognitions.” The agent is its preferences.

The constitution of the other, then, is a process in which the agent comes to identify the other through its actions and preferences. Central to this process in a first encounter (and in many later encounters as well), is the fact that the agent may have limited information about the actual preferences and actions of the other but still must be able to create and respond to an identity of the other. Unlike Wendt’s image of the first encounter, which is largely based on interpretation of empirical observations of actions, my image of the first encounter is characterized by uncertain perceptions of the interests of the other drawn from the agent’s own interests and interpretations of the social structure. Rather than altercasting desired identities and interests upon the other, the agent ascribes identities, interests, and preferences to the other that represent its understanding of the definition of the situation and social structure. Thus, the identity that the agent sees in the other is a combination of whatever actions it observes in the other and whatever actions it may expect from the other, given the preferences that it has ascribed to the other. In the absence of observed actions (or perhaps in addition to observed actions) the agent identifies the other by identifying what the other wants. The agent must ascribe preferences (decision rules that it expects the other to follow) based on its own interpretation of the definition of the situation derived from its sense of its own identity and its own interests.

Conclusion

As Cairo’s Tahrir Square began filling daily with tens of thousands of protestors in early 2011, U.S. foreign policy analysts were faced with a dilemma. Who was in charge of the movement to bring down their long-term ally, Hosni Mubarak? What was the identity of the group that would likely step up to take the reins of power in a post Mubarak Egypt? What actions would this new entity likely take? Ultimately, what did they want in their relationships with the United States and with the region? How can international actors acquire enough information about the protesters to ascribe preferences to create an identity when the protesters have no clear leadership and no official spokesperson?

The lack of an official spokesperson did not prevent information about the protests from getting out. The Project on Information Technology and Political Islam of the University of Washington analyzed 2,363,139 tweets with the #egypt hashtag between January 14 and March 24, 2011. In the week before Mubarak's resignation, the daily rate of tweets from Egypt grew from 2,300 per day to 230,000 per day. Yet this flurry of information did little to provide the US decision-makers with a way to identify the interests and preferences of a potentially new regime. When Mubarak resigned and the group known as the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the new power in Egyptian politics, the US tried to identify its interests and preferences. As one *New York Times* report noted,

> Its size and diversity, and the legal ban that has kept it from genuine political power for decades, make it hard to characterize simply. As the Roman Catholic Church includes both those who practice leftist liberation theology and conservative anti-abortion advocates, so the Brotherhood includes both practical reformers and firebrand ideologues. Which of those tendencies might rise to dominance in a new Egypt is under intense discussion inside the Obama administration.  

In absence of other information and actions, the US had to identify the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood based on its own identities as a power broker in the Middle East; an ally of the Mubarak regime that for years oppressed the political ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood; an ally of Israel, which the US believed the Brotherhood opposed; and a victim of the Islamic terrorism of 9/11, which was not attributed to the Brotherhood, but which defined the situation for any contact between an Islamist organization and the United States.

Identity matters. It creates an image of the agent that is used by the agent as a shortcut for deciding what to do. The image is also used by others to decide how to respond to the actions of the agent. In doing so, the image becomes the agent - it constitutes the agent. Whether through first encounters or long-lasting relationships, agents are constantly creating images of the other. In a socially constructed world, those images – identities – are the synthesis of the agent’s own identities and interests and the agent’s understanding of the definition of the social structure that constructs and constrains the interaction. In a rule-based world, the image of the other is created by the decision rules that the agent expects the other to follow. These ascribed preferences construct the identity of the other in the interests of the agent. They form the basis for strategic and symbolic interactions between the agent and the other that constitute what we know as international relations.

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